Category: Current Affairs
Johan Fourie interviews me at University of Stellenbosch
Physician Incomes and the Extreme Shortage of High IQ Workers
Physician incomes are extraordinarily high in the United States. A new NBER paper finds that U.S. physicians earn roughly two to four times as much as their counterparts in Canada, the Netherlands, and Sweden.
Why? Is it some feature particular to the US health care sector? Probably not. The same paper finds that physicians in the US have about the same relative income ranking as in Canada, the Netherlands, and Sweden. In other words, lots of high-skill workers in the US earn high incomes and physicians don’t look unusual relative to these other high-skill groups.
That is exactly what one would expect in an economy with an extreme shortage of high-IQ, high-skill workers. The US is a uniquely productive economy for high-skill workers which is why the US demand for foreign workers and the foreign demand to immigrate are so strong, especially at the high end.. By one estimate, “immigrants account for 32 percent of aggregate U.S. innovation.”
Immigration of high-skill workers such as with the H-1B and EB-1,2,3 programs, together with stronger U.S. education, is one way to reduce the shortage of high-skill workers. The alternative is simpler: make the economy less dynamic and less rewarding for talent. Then wages would fall and fewer ambitious people would bother coming. A solution but only if your preferred cure for scarcity is decline.
On the Giving Pledge
From my latest piece from The Free Press:
A lot of America’s most effective giving was done by the early “robber barons,” such as Carnegie, Mellon, and Rockefeller. Andrew Carnegie, for instance, helped to create what is now Carnegie-Mellon University, and Carnegie libraries to this day dot the country and encourage literacy and reading. The Mellon and Rockefeller art collections seeded some of America’s highest quality museums.
None of this was done with any kind of pledge. Those great 19th-century industrialists pursued high-quality philanthropic opportunities when they saw them, unencumbered by today’s massive foundation staffs. If a town wanted to set up a Carnegie library, they had to meet some standard criteria, and they started by sending a letter to Carnegie’s private secretary, James Bertram. The Carnegie Corporation, which in later years led much of the philanthropy, had mainly clerical staff and did not have a full-time salaried president until after Carnegie’s death. It remains to be seen whether today’s philanthropists, including the ones who signed the Giving Pledge, will do as well.
There is much more at the link.
Oil versus Ice Cream
When Tyler and I were writing Modern Principles of Economics, we wanted examples that were modern, specific, and grounded in the real world. That has been a bit of a headache, because we have to update them with every new edition. Our biggest competitor uses the ice cream market as its central example and never has to revise. Smart! But for us, the extra work has been worth it.
We chose the oil market as our central example. Oil is always in the news, and it works really well across a wide range of textbook topics: the elasticity of demand and supply; oligopoly and cartels; the shutdown condition; shocks; expectations, speculation and futures markets; and oil prices have macroeconomic implications that connect micro to macro.
Yes, keeping the examples current takes more work. But when a student sees that the price of crude has surged past $100 a barrel because Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz—choking off 20% of the world’s oil supply—they have the framework to understand what is happening. Supply shock, inelastic demand, expectations and speculation, the macroeconomic transmission to GDP—it’s all right there in the headlines. Try doing that with the ice cream market.
See the Invisible Hand. Understand Your World. It is not just our slogan. It’s our method.
Paraguay trend of the day
Lured by low taxes, entrepreneurs from across Latin America are plowing in money and taking up residence, with applications surging more than 60% in 2025. Sleek towers and luxury car dealerships now dot Asunción, a city where infrastructure is still struggling to catch up. And Wall Street investors are snapping up Paraguay’s bonds as its conservative president, Santiago Peña, aligns his government with the Trump administration.
Though roughly the size of California, Paraguay’s $47 billion economy is about 1% of the Golden State’s. But rapid growth and economic reforms in recent years helped the country win investment-grade credit status from Moody’s Ratings in 2024 and from S&P Global last year.
…Paraguay’s embrace of sound fiscal and monetary policies after its 2003 financial crisis is now paying off, with single-digit inflation and annual growth averaging around 4% over the past two decades.
Here is more from Bloomberg, growth last year was six percent. Southern Cone remains underrated.
How much more will oil prices have to go up?
[Robin] Brooks: So let me give you two ways of thinking about what’s going on, both of them are really about trying to think about what kind of risk premia need to be priced in oil, given all the massive uncertainty that we have. The first way that I’ve been thinking about this is—I spent a lot of time working on Ukraine and Russia and sanctions after the invasion four years ago. Russia produces about 10 million barrels of oil per day. It exports, of that, about 7 million barrels of oil per day. The Strait of Hormuz has transit of about 20 million barrels of oil per day. So the Strait of Hormuz is roughly 3 times what Russia could have been. And remember, in the days right after the invasion, markets were really worried about Russian oil being embargoed. There was a whole discussion about that. So the rise in Brent, which is the global benchmark oil price, is about 70% from two weeks before the outbreak of war in the Gulf to now. On a similar time horizon back in ‘22, it was 20%. So we have roughly a 3X in terms of the rise in oil prices. So when people come to me and say “$150 or $200 for oil prices” and we’re currently at $115, roughly, then I think, “why, what’s the rationale?”
The second perspective is on the supply shortfall that we have and using price elasticity of demand to think about: “how much does the price need to rise if demand has to do all the adjusting in the short term,” which it does. And “what kind of numbers do we come up with if we make reasonable assumptions?” So I put out a Substack note today—thank you so much for reading my Substack, I’m incredibly flattered and stressed as a result— if you assume that the Strait of Hormuz goes from 20 million barrels of oil per day to 10, it’s basically oil from the Gulf is running at half of its normal capacity, and you assume a price elasticity sort of in the middle of the range that the academic literature has, which is about 0.15, then you get that this would generate a rise in oil prices of between 60 and 70%. So again, if I think about what we’re pricing in markets now versus what basic back-of-the-envelope-calculations tell you, then I think we’re roughly in the right ballpark.
That is from his interview with Paul Krugman. Via Luis Garicano.
My excellent Conversation with Harvey Mansfield
Here is the audio, video, and transcript. Here is part of the episode summary:
Tyler and Harvey discuss how Machiavelli’s concept of fact was brand new, why his longest chapter is a how-to guide for conspiracy, whether America’s 20th-century wars refute the conspiratorial worldview, Trump as a Shakespearean vulgarian who is in some ways more democratic than the rest of us, why Bronze Age Pervert should not be taken as a model for Straussianism, the time he tried to introduce Nietzsche to Quine, why Rawls needed more Locke, what it was like to hear Churchill speak at Margate in 1953, whether great books are still being written, how his students have and haven’t changed over 61 years of teaching, the eclipse rather than decline of manliness, and what Aristotle got right about old age and much more.
Excerpt:
COWEN: From a Straussian perspective, where’s the role for the skills of a good analytic philosopher? How does that fit into Straussianism? I’ve never quite understood that. They seem to be very separate approaches, at least sociologically.
MANSFIELD: Analytic philosophers look for arguments and isolate them. Strauss looks for arguments and puts them in the context of a dialogue or the implicit dialogue. Instead of counting up one, two, three, four meanings of a word, as analytic philosophers do, he says, why is this argument appropriate for this audience and in this text? Why is it put where it was and not earlier or later?
Strauss treats an argument as if it were in a play, which has a plot and a background and a context, whereas analytic philosophy tries to withdraw the argument from where it was in Plato to see what would we think of it today and what other arguments can be said against it without really wanting to choose which is the truth.
COWEN: Are they complements or substitutes, the analytic approach and the Straussian approach?
MANSFIELD: I wouldn’t say complements, no. Strauss’s approach is to look at the context of an argument rather than to take it out of its context. To take it out of its context means to deprive it of the story that it represents. Analytic philosophy takes arguments out of their context and arranges them in an array. It then tries to compare those abstracted arguments.
Strauss doesn’t try to abstract, but he looks to the context. The context is always something doubtful. Every Platonic dialogue leaves something out. The Republic, for example, doesn’t tell you about what people love instead of how people defend things. Since that’s the case, every argument in such a dialogue is intentionally a bad argument. It’s meant for a particular person, and it’s set to him.
The analytic philosopher doesn’t understand that arguments, especially in a Platonic dialogue, can deliberately be inferior. It easily or too easily refutes the argument which you are supposed to take out of a Platonic dialogue and understand for yourself. Socrates always speaks down to people. He is better than his interlocutors. What you, as an observer or reader, are supposed to do is to take the argument that’s going down, that’s intended for somebody who doesn’t understand very well, and raise it to the level of the argument that Socrates would want to accept.
So to the extent that all great books have the character of this downward shift, all great books have the character of speaking down to someone and presenting truth in an inferior but still attractive way. The reader has to take that shift in view and raise it to the level that the author had. What I’m describing is irony. What distinguishes analytic philosophy from Strauss is the lack of irony in analytic philosophy. Philosophy must always take account of nonphilosophy or budding philosophers and not simply speak straight out and give a flat statement of what you think is true.
To go back to Rawls, Rawls based his philosophy on what he called public reason, which meant that the reason that convinces Rawls is no different from the reason that he gives out to the public. Whereas Strauss said reason is never public or universal in this way because it has to take account of the character of the audience, which is usually less reasonable than the author.
And yes he does tell us what Straussianism means and how to learn to be a Straussian. From his discussion you will see rather obviously that I am not one. Overall, I found this dialogue to be the most useful source I have found for figuring out how Straussianism fits into other things, such as analytics philosophy, historical reading of texts, and empirical social science.
Perhaps the exchange is a little slow to start, but otherwise fascinating throughout. I am also happy to recommend Harvey’s recent book The Rise and Fall of Rational Control: The History of Modern Political Philosophy.
The 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act
The 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act appears likely to pass the Senate. The bill contains some genuinely good ideas alongside some very popular—but bonkers ideas.
Let’s start with the good ideas.
The bill would streamline NEPA review for federally supported housing, primarily by expanding categorical exclusions. Federal environmental review does impose real costs and delays on housing construction, so reducing unnecessary review is a step in the right direction. The gains will probably be modest—most housing regulation occurs at the state and local level—but removing friction is good.
The bill would also deregulate manufactured housing by eliminating the permanent chassis requirement and creating a uniform national construction and safety standard. The United States once built far more factory-produced housing; in the early 1970s, by some accounts a majority of new homes were factory-built (mobile or modular). Long-run productivity growth in housing almost certainly requires greater use of factory construction. Land-use regulation remains the dominant constraint on supply, but enabling scalable manufacturing is still welcome.
Another interesting provision involves Community Development Block Grants (CDBG). The bill allows CDBG funds to be used for building new housing rather than being largely restricted to rehabilitation of existing housing. More federal spending is not automatically appealing, but the bill adds an unusual incentive mechanism.
The bill creates a tournament for CDBG allocations. Localities that exceed the median housing growth improvement rate among eligible CDBG recipients receive bonus funding. Those below the median face a 10 percent reduction. The key feature is that the penalties fund the bonuses, so the system reallocates money rather than expanding spending.
This is a clever design. It creates competition among localities and benchmarks them against peers rather than against a fixed national target. In effect, the program rewards relative improvement rather than absolute performance—a classic tournament structure. (See Modern Principles for an introduction to tournament theory!).
Ok, now for the popular but bonkers ideas. Section 901 (“Homes are for People, Not Corporations”) restricts the purchase of new single-family homes by large institutional investors. Elizabeth Warren is a sponsor of the bill but this section was driven almost entirely by President Trump. Trump passed an Executive Order, Stopping Wall Street from Competing With Main Street Home Buyers, that cuts off institutional home investors from FHA insurance, VA guarantees, USDA backing, Fannie/Freddie securitization and so forth. The bill goes further by imposing a seven-year mandatory divestiture rule, forcing institutional investors to convert rental homes to owner-occupied units after seven years.
No one objects to institutional investors owning apartment buildings. But when the same investors own single-family homes, it breaks people’s brains. Consider how strange the logic sounds if applied elsewhere:
…a growing share of apartments, often concentrated in certain communities, have been purchased by large Wall Street investors, crowding out families seeking to buy condominiums.
Apartments are fine, hotels are fine, but somehow a corporation owning a single family home is un-American. In fact, the US could do with more rental housing of all kinds! Why take the risk of owning when you can rent? Rental housing improves worker mobility. When foreclosures surged after 2008 and traditional buyers disappeared, institutional investors stepped in and absorbed distressed supply — helping stabilize markets. Who plays that role next time?
Institutional investors own only a tiny number of homes, so even if this were a good idea it wouldn’t be effective. But it’s not a good idea, it’s just rage bait driven by Warren/Trump anti-corporate rhetoric.
What does “Homes are for People, Not Corporations” even mean?–this is a slogan for the Idiocracy era. “Food is for People, Not Corporations,” so we should ban Perdue Farms and McDonald’s?
Latin America and the Great Trade realignment
Citi sees Latin America as one of the main winners of the “great trade realignment”
A new Citi report positions Latin America as one of the main winners of what it calls the “great trade realignment”, as global supply chains shift toward a more multipolar structure driven by tariff volatility, AI adoption and nearshoring trends.
Trade flows from Latin America to ASEAN countries surged 82% between 2019 and 2024, while exports from China to the region grew 59% over the same period.
Latin America’s exports to North America also rose 43% in the same period.
Citi highlights the region’s growing role as a vital supplier of critical minerals to Asia’s electronics industry, an agricultural alternative to the United States for products like soybeans, and an increasingly attractive destination for foreign direct investment, which grew 12% in the first half of 2025 against a negative trend in other developed economies.
Here is the link.
Iran/Venezuela facts of the day
Iran was once one of the key oil suppliers to the world. No longer. Its exports, constrained by sanctions, amount to less than 2 per cent of global supplies, most of which go to China at discounted prices.
A similar change has taken place in Venezuela. Once a star of world oil and one of the founding members of Opec, today it can hardly even be called a petrostate. It produces less oil than the US state of North Dakota and a quarter as much as neighbouring Brazil.
Here is more from Daniel Yergin at the FT.
The Hidden Cost of Hard-to-Fire Labor Laws: Why European Firms Don’t Take Risks
In our textbook, Modern Principles, Tyler and I write:
Imagine how difficult it would be to get a date if every date required marriage? In the same way, it’s more difficult to find a job when every job requires a long-term commitment from the employer.
In two new excellent pieces, Brian Albrecht and Pieter Garicano extend this partial equilibrium aphorism with some general equilibrium reasoning. Here’s Albrecht:
[I]magine there is a surge for Siemens products. Do you hire a ton of workers to fill that demand? No, you’re worried about having to fire them in the future but being stuck until they retire.
But it’s even worse than that…..[suppose Siemens does want to hire] where is Siemens getting those workers from?…Not only is it a problem for Siemens that they won’t be able to fire people down the road, the fact that BMW doesn’t fire anyone means you can’t hire people.
Garicano has an excellent piece, Why Europe doesn’t have a Tesla, with lots of detail on European labor law:
Under the [German] Protection Against Dismissal Act, the Kündigungsschutzgesetz, redundancies over ten employees must pass a social selection test (Sozialauswahl). Employers cannot choose who leaves: they must rank employees by age, years of service, family maintenance obligations, and degree of disability, and then prioritize dismissing those with the weakest social claim to the job. If someone is dismissed for operational reasons but the company posts a similar job elsewhere, the dismissal is usually invalid.
Disabled employees can be dismissed only with the approval of the Integration Office (Integrationsamt), a public body. The office will weigh the employer’s reasons, whether they have taken sufficient steps to integrate the employee, and whether they could be redeployed elsewhere in the organization. Workers who also become caregivers cannot be dismissed at all for up to two full years after they tell their bosses they fulfill that role.
As a company becomes larger and tries to let more workers go at once these difficulties increase. In many European countries, companies with more than a certain number of workers – 50 in the Netherlands, 5 in Germany – are obliged to create a works council, which represents employees and, in some countries, must give its approval to decisions the employer wants to make regarding its employees, including layoffs or pay rises or cuts.
…Companies that are allowed to fire someone and can afford to pay the severance costs have to wait and pay additional fees. Collective dismissal procedures in Germany start after 30 departures within a month; once triggered they require further negotiations with the works council, a waiting period, and the creation of a ‘social plan’ with more compensation for departing workers. When Opel shut down its Bochum factory in Germany, it reached a deal with the works council to spend €552 million on severance for the 3,300 affected employees. This included individual payments of up to €250,000 and a €60 million plan to help workers find new jobs.
Now what is the effect of regulations like this? Well obviously the partial equilibrium effect is to reduce hiring but in addition Garicano notes that it changes what sorts of firms are created in the first place. If you are worried about being burdened by expensive dismissal procedures, build a regulated utility with captive government contracts, not a radical startup with a high probability of failure.
Rather than reduce hiring in response to more expensive firing, companies in Europe have shifted activity away from areas where layoffs are likely. European workers are for sure, solid work only. This works well in periods of little innovation, or when innovation is gradual. The continent, however, is poorly equipped for moments of great experimentation.
…Europe’s companies have immense, specialized knowledge [due to retained workforces, AT]. The problems happen when radical innovation is needed, as in the shift from gasoline to electric vehicles. The great makers of electric cars have either been new entrants, like Tesla and BYD, or old ones who have had their insides stripped, like MG.
..If Europe wants a Tesla, or whatever the Tesla of the next decade will turn out to be, it will need a new approach to hiring and firing.
Democracy continues
Here is a link.
A simple model of AI governance
I trust private companies with strong AI more than I trust the government, regardless of which administration is in power. Yet if the federal government feels it has no say or no control, it will lunge and take over the whole thing. We thus want sustainble methods of perpetual interference that a) are actually somewhat useful from a safety perspective, and b) give governments some control, and the feeling of control, but not too much control.
You should judge AI-related events within this framework.
Banned in California
California cannot permit the construction of a smartphone factory, an electric car plant, or a Navy destroyer shipyard. Not won’t — can’t. The regulatory environment makes it effectively impossible to build new semiconductor fabs, automotive paint shops, battery gigafactories, or steel foundries.
Tesla didn’t put its Gigafactory in Nevada out of affection for Reno. General Dynamics NASSCO in San Diego can build destroyers only because it’s been grandfathered in since 1960. If it closed tomorrow, it could not be rebuilt.
I get tired at all the discussion of tariffs and industrial policy and manufacturing. All of it is BS in comparison to the basics. We have the met the enemy and the enemy is us. Our future is in our hands. Is that optimistic or pessimistic? Either way complaining about China won’t fix our problems.
Brazil is underrated
Numerous nations in the Middle East are being pulled into the current conflict and have received missile attacks from Iran. I believe the proper Bayesian update is that Brazil is underrated.
The country has plenty of water, and lots of capacity to grow its own food. It is an agricultural powerhouse. It is developing more and more fossil fuels. No neighbor or near neighbor dares threaten it. You cannot imagine conquering it, because even the government of Brazil has not conquered its own country.
It is big enough that even the United States can push it around to only a limited degree.
Crime rates are high, but on the up side that gives the place a certain resiliency. People are used to bad events, and society is structured accordingly. You cannot write of “Brazil falling into dystopia” without generating a laugh.
If immigration bothers you (not my view), Brazil and Brazilian culture is not going to be swamped by people coming from somewhere else. For better or worse.
Brazil has “stayed Brazil” through both democracy and autocracy.
Worth a ponder. Here is an FT piece on “Brazil’s Dubai.”