Category: Current Affairs
Another rationale for sticky prices?
…what can be predicted, Dabis said, is that a recent policy change by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority requiring drivers to verbally quote the $2.25 fare to passengers may make their job even riskier.
Eight current Metro employees and two former employees who work at the union representing Metro workers told The Washington Post that they are concerned that announcing the fare is ineffective and may increase the risk that bus operators will be harassed or assaulted. As a result, several drivers said they are disregarding the policy to keep themselves safe.
“It’s very disheartening to think that a company would put their operators in harm’s way by allowing this type of change,” said Dabis, who is among those refusing to quote the fare. “I just want to go home the same way that I came to work: healthy, unharmed. I love this company. I love the customers. But quoting the fare is just too much.”
Fare evasion has plagued Metro for years. In 2024, Metro said about 70 percent of bus riders didn’t pay.
Here is the full story. And for the pointer I thank Rich.
A Conservative Case for Liberal Immigration
That is the title of my latest Free Press piece, here is one excerpt:
Or look at the AI revolution, another area where America is leading the world and also using its AI models to exert soft power. Dario Amodei of Anthropic has an Italian father, neural-network pioneer Geoffrey Hinton is originally from the U.K., and Elon Musk and Peter Thiel, who helped initially fund and found OpenAI, are from South Africa and Germany, respectively. OpenAI co-founder Wojciech Zaremba is from Poland. Musk and Thiel, of course, have other achievements to their credit as well. A significant portion of the employees at the major labs are Chinese. In one survey of published AI researchers, 38 percent received their undergraduate education in China, and 72 percent of those are working in the U.S.
Recommended, do read the whole thing.
My very interesting Conversation with Daron Acemoglu
Here is the audio, video, and transcript. Here is the episode summary:
Daron Acemoglu returns for his second appearance with a new book, What Happened to Liberal Democracy?, which Tyler reads as an attempt to redefine and revitalize liberalism for our times. Where Daron’s first visit was about how states and societies contend for the narrow corridor in which liberty survives, this one asks what liberals themselves got wrong, and the answer implicates the educated elite—that is to say, you.
Tyler and Daron discuss what’s wrong with social contract theories and Rousseau’s general will, whether Acemoglu is more objectivist than Rorty, why he blames left liberalism’s own establishment power for its collapse, what standard is left once you refuse to have a book of higher values, nondomination versus noninterference, who counts as working class, why automation alone will not lead to widespread prosperity, how he can call himself a free speech absolutist while wanting to regulate social media, why he worries we’ve given up on educating Americans, whether teachers’ unions need to be reconstituted, what the life expectancy for an educated twenty year old is today, whether open-source models undercut the centralization worry, what pro-worker AI actually means, why the fertility crisis leaves him strangely close to a real business cycle position, whether AI will raise his own already prodigious paper output, why Armenia has disappointed economically, what he wants to learn next, and more.
For an excerpt, let us start from near the beginning:
COWEN: Richard Rorty had a consensus-based defense of liberal democracy. Is your view the same as his, or are there some metrics along which it’s different? Are you more objectivist in some way?
ACEMOGLU: I wouldn’t say it’s more objectivist. I think my commitment in my mind has always been that it’s impossible for us at any point in time not just to know what’s really the absolute truth, but also to have a clear map of what is the right stance. In the same way that I think many people would agree science makes gradual and sometimes uncertain progress toward some better understanding, I think morally, philosophically, we also have to have gradual uncertain evolution toward what we agree on. Objectivism, in some sense, is too strict.
COWEN: Say we’re not evolving toward greater agreement.
ACEMOGLU: No, sometimes we go back.
COWEN: Today, it seems we’re not evolving toward greater agreement, right?
ACEMOGLU: We’re not. Absolutely not. I think you can blame that on reactions to globalization, reactions to technology, better authoritarian challenges. This is the most uncomfortable part because I see myself firmly within the left liberal tradition. I think it’s partly because of the failure of left liberalism. In some sense, if you think of why did Rome fail or collapse, we can tell a story about the barbarians were really too strong. No, really, Rome collapsed because internally it had problems that opened up weaknesses against outside invaders as well as some inside problems.
It’s the same with left liberalism. I think it became quite influential throughout much of the Western world and some of the emerging economies as well over the last 70, 80 years. It did not use that establishment power just in the right way, creating its own weaknesses that made it much more vulnerable to outside attacks. That’s why I think we are now going back because we are at an interregnum period in which ideas are battling again. In some sense, it’s just like the early 19th century where you had all these very different ideas and they were trying to get a toehold in the imagination of people. I think we are going through a period like that, except that there are really many more confusing ideas out there.
COWEN: Say when we’re not evolving toward greater consensus, what’s the external standard you introduce to judge which are the correct ideas and which not? Like Rorty, you need one, though.
ACEMOGLU: I don’t have one.
COWEN: Then why believe in what you believe?
ACEMOGLU: Okay. I think what I believe is, first of all, not as an external standard—I don’t know whether external standard or internal standard is the right word—but that we have to defend some degree of individual freedom because everything starts from that, both in terms of our meaningful lives, but also any kind of improvement in the human condition requires individual initiative, and that individual initiative is impossible without some amount of freedom, a meaningful freedom, not just saying, “Okay, you have the freedom to pray, but you cannot express that idea with others or you cannot turn it into action.” Some meaningful freedom.
That is the only starting point that we need to have. Around that, we need to build things with some sort of consensus within society. That’s what I think liberalism has to recognize, that you have to enshrine those rights, but then give enough elbow room to people to form their own community-level agreements.
COWEN: You present some different values in the book. One is nondomination. Another is noninterference. There’s others. When they clash, what’s the metric you introduce to decide how to resolve that clash?
ACEMOGLU: I wish I had a perfect answer for that. I don’t.
COWEN: You have an imperfect answer.
ACEMOGLU: I have an imperfect answer. I think noninterference by itself isn’t enough because, at least as read or as interpreted by some philosophers and economists, it is just about being left alone from higher authority or typically state-level authority, although it could be some other authorities as well. We do also need opportunities and some way of actualizing our intentions and our freedom. That’s what the idea of nondomination, which goes back to Roman Republican times, recognizes.
It is not, in my mind, an extremely interventionist philosophy. It doesn’t say the state knows it best or that the state should always have an opportunity to override individual or group-level decisions. It does emphasize that providing people some amount of protection against those who have much greater physical or other power relative to them is something that cannot be done at the individual level. It has to have a community-level component.
COWEN: That’s a good answer, but is it an answer to the question? If we’re Sidgwick, we might say, when values clash, we look to utility, or maybe it’d be cost-benefit analysis to decide which gets priority. You’re not willing to say that, so why not? What’s wrong with that answer?
Very much interesting throughout.
Is there a Balkan fertility paradox? (from my email)
The Balkans may be the only region other than central Asia where fertility has increased from 2015 to 2026.*
All of the highest fertility rates in Europe are in the Balkans. As of 2024: Montenegro (1.8), Bulgaria (1.73) Moldova (1.73), and Serbia (1.64) are top four. France was next at 1.61.
Other balkan countries were generally about 1.5 (Slovenia, Croatia, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Slovakia), comparable to the highest non-gallic TFRs in Western Europe: Britain (1.55) and Ireland (1.47).
The lowest Balkan countries (Macedonia, Romania, Albania, and Hungary) sit at ~1.35-1.4, which would be lowish for Western Europe, but extremely high for Southern Europe or the former Warsaw pact/USSR.
During the post-soviet nadir, the Balkans had perhaps the lowest fertility in Europe. The rates rose circa 2010, and have recently continued to slowly rise.
Ostensibly similar cultures/economies have no parallel increase (Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, and the Baltics).
I don’t have any theory that would explain this pattern. Balkan men are famously unhelpful husbands and fathers, and the Balkans aren’t any more religious than Poland, Italy and Belarus.
What could possibly be the deal?
That is from Thomas Hanes.
The Binmen of Birmingham
I was on the British CapX Podcast talking about the Equality Act, riffing off my two posts Equality Act 2010 and The Apples and Oranges Tribunal. One thing I discussed in the podcast which I haven’t blogged on is the amazing Birmingham dustbin dispute.
In 2010 an employment tribunal ruled that Birmingham City Council had discriminated against thousands of female workers — cooks, cleaners, care assistants, caretakers — who were denied bonuses paid to the mostly male binmen, gardeners, and gravediggers. Why were the binmen given bonuses? Well, refuse collection is filthy, heavy, outdoor work and not many people want to be gravediggers. Thus, these jobs command a premium for exactly the reason Adam Smith gave in 1776 — compensating differentials. Or was it sexism? Well, note first that there is nothing stopping women from becoming “binpersons” and indeed there are female binpersons and they earn the same bonuses as their male counterparts (just as with the Next case). Moreover, we can test the sexism versus compensating differentials theory. Let’s see what happened.
Here’s the problem, which contributed to Birmingham going bankrupt in 2023. The council employs roughly 400 binmen and something like 6,000 women in comparable graded roles. Every extra pound paid to a binman therefore implied about fifteen pounds owed to the cooks and cleaners. The council simply didn’t have the money to pay everyone binman wages so they cut the binmen’s wages. But the market wage for collecting rubbish is what it is, so when Birmingham finally deleted the premium in January 2025, the binmen went on strike — and they are still on strike, nearly eighteen months later. The rubbish piled up, 17,000 tonnes of it, and the city declared a major incident.
Here’s the most amazing part. The council hired an outside contractor to take over its rubbish collection and it now pays roughly triple its pre-strike outsourcing bill–more than it was paying its own employees. So much for sexism. Apparently the premium wasn’t a favor to men; it was the price of the job. If you want your rubbish picked up and your graves dug, you must pay the market wage. This was pure regulatory arbitrage, of course. Because the new binmen were contractors they legally had a different employer than the Council’s female caregivers and the Act’s comparator rules stop at the employer’s nexus.
The government mandarins, of course, want to close the “loophole” adding yet another bureaucratic requirement to push the equal pay madness up the supply chain. The rubbish piles up.
Will U.S. cities face a knock-on fiscal crisis from the feds?
Federal money flows to cities in three flavors: direct transfers, indirect transfers, and what we call fiscal dark matter. Direct transfers are exactly what they sound like — money sent directly from the federal government to various localities. These include funds disbursed through programs like the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG), which supports things like public infrastructure and neighborhood services.3 In 2022, direct transfers like the CDBG totaled $146.3 billion.4 That’s significant, but actually the smallest of the three categories.
Less visible are the indirect transfers. These monies are initially awarded to state governments, which then allocate funds to municipal-level programs and services in accordance with state prerogatives. The cleanest example is probably K-12 education, which receives federal Title I dollars to pay for teachers and programs, but federal highway dollars work essentially the same way. All told, in 2022, the federal government handed down $1.1 trillion to state governments. That amounted to 36% of overall state revenue for that year and, depending on the individual state, ranged from roughly 22% to 50% of state revenue. How much of that ultimately flowed down to cities is hard to say, which is itself a problem: it’s difficult to even establish how exposed local governments are to a pullback in federal support of state budgets.
The third category – our fiscal dark matter – is all the federal money spent into local communities that never shows up in a local budget. This includes housing subsidies like the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) and Section 8. It also includes food support programs like SNAP and even some direct funding for local food banks.
Rightfully or not, when the flow of federal money in this category starts to dry up, the resulting problems will fall squarely on the mayor’s desk. After all, the median voter is never going to see increasing numbers of homeless encampments and think to blame the head of HUD.
Here is the full piece by Jeff Fong.
Taiwan fact of the day
Mexico (Taiwan) fact of the day
Mexico has quietly become a cornerstone of the AI boom, providing 40 per cent of US imports this year of the computer servers that are widely used in the data centres powering artificial intelligence.
Taiwanese manufacturers are rapidly expanding factories in Mexico to assemble servers, which are now the country’s top US export, overtaking autos that dominated its trade for decades.
Mexico is the second-largest provider of enterprise servers to the US so far this year, with sales reaching $46.9bn, behind Taiwan, which sold $53.5bn, though Mexico became the largest on a monthly basis in May.
The phenomenon is helping prop up Mexico’s limp economy, pushing the country’s exports to record levels. Servers and related hardware made up almost one-fifth of the $317bn of goods Mexico exported between January and May, more than double the same period a year earlier. Taiwan, in turn, is now Mexico’s third-largest trading partner, up from eighth place in 2022. Taiwanese companies have spent more than $1.6bn since 2020 on Mexican factories that offer geographic proximity and tariff-free access to US tech giants spending hundreds of billions on data centres.
“Mexico is of tremendous importance to the way this new AI-powered economy is working,” said Jesse Rogers, head of Latin America economics at Moody’s Analytics. “It is really a new frontier of collaboration and even dependency on the Mexican economy when it comes to AI servers.”
Here is more from Christine Murray and Alan Smith at the FT.
Reforms to the PhD?
The Trump administration is pairing top universities with corporate giants in an effort to steer traditional PhD programs toward national scientific priorities.
Today, the White House and National Science Foundation are announcing a $47 million pilot program to fund around 250 four-year doctorates in technical fields, starting this fall. Students in the pilot will be placed at an industry partner, where they will spend at least one year doing “practical research” that can go towards their dissertation. NSF’s investment will fund three years of these PhDs, with 31 universities and 20-plus companies funding the rest.
“About the same amount of basic research is done today in academia as in the private sector,” Michael Kratsios, the director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, told Pirate Wires. “Over time, while the ecosystem has changed and different players have emerged where important scientific work is being done, the institutions which train our next generation of scientists have not really been updated.”
…The pilot represents a small fraction of the more than 45,000 science and engineering doctorates awarded annually — but the administration says it’s a “scalable model” that can expand to more universities and companies.
Here is the full story, I will pass along more details as I learn them.
The Confucian fertility paradox
Total fertility rates in East Asia have fallen to levels without historical precedent, even though the region’s Confucian heritage long placed extraordinary emphasis on family continuity and large families. We argue that this “Confucian Fertility Paradox” dissolves once we separate two strands of the tradition and recognize that modernization affected them very differently. The pro-natal strand, built on lineage continuity, ancestor worship, and reliance on sons for old-age support, was gradually switched off as child mortality fell, incomes rose, women entered the labor force, and state pensions replaced the family as the main source of security in old age. What survived was the second strand: the veneration of education and of status won through examination success, rooted in the imperial examination tradition. Under modern conditions this surviving strand reverses sign with respect to its effect on fertility. Where the historical examination system rewarded having many sons so that one might succeed, the modern single-ranking tournament rewards concentrating resources on one or two intensively educated children, and the quantity/quality tradeoff turns a once pro-natal culture into a powerful engine of low fertility. Drawing on recent empirical evidence from China and Korea, we show how education competition becomes the channel through which traditional values now suppress childbearing. We explain why standard pro-natalist policies, such as removing birth restrictions or offering cash subsidies, accomplish little when the underlying problem is a competitive equilibrium in parental investment, and we argue that policies aimed at the source of the distortion, such as structural reform of educational pathways, hold more promise.
Here is the paper by Hanming Fang and Chang Liu. Usually I am suspicious of such explanations, as the low birth rates typically apply also to families who do not face such education/career considerations. Thailand? Indians in Singapore? Ethnic minorities in China? But I pass this along nonetheless, due to the importance of the topic. Via Glenn Mercer.
Could our preoccupation with mental health be part of the problem?
Could our preoccupation with mental health be part of the problem?
In some ways, encouraging people to think and talk more about their mental health is a good thing. There is now less stigma around mental illness, and more people who can benefit from professional help are getting it. But there is also reason to believe that efforts to bring attention to mental health struggles are inadvertently making us more vulnerable to psychological distress.
Start with our expanding conception of mental illness. The more fixated we are on mental health, the more sensitive we become to anything that might qualify as a symptom and the more we use clinical language to describe normal emotional experiences like grief, burnout and loneliness. This broadening of what we think counts as a disorder — known as concept creep — encourages us to pathologize ordinary life and see ourselves as mentally unhealthy.
Here is more from Clay Routledge at the NYT.
Further progress in South America
The share of people who are hungry has been decreasing faster in South America than anywhere else in the world. It is down by one-third since 2020, according to a report published on July 21st by the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). Just 3.5% of people in the region consume insufficient calories, the lowest level recorded. Eliminating hunger by 2030 is one of the UN’s “sustainable development” goals. “If there is a region in the world that can potentially achieve that, it’s South America,” says Máximo Torero, the FAO’s chief economist.
Lula, as the president is commonly known, made food security a priority when he returned to office in 2023. By 2025 Brazil had made it off the UN’s Hunger Map, which tracks countries where more than 2.5% of the population suffers from chronic hunger. Chile and oil-rich Guyana were also removed. Argentina is almost there at under 3%. Colombia and Paraguay are approaching at 4%, while Peru and crisis-battered Venezuela are making inroads near 5%. Even Ecuador and Bolivia have improved a tad, to 11% and 20% respectively. Only Suriname is moving in the wrong direction.
This decline rests on sturdier foundations. The first is macroeconomic stability. South America’s central banks are far more independent and adept at managing inflation than they were two decades ago.
Here is more from The Economist. If you are interested in further economic development, South America (plus Mexico and Panama and the DR) is really the place to look. What is your other choice? (Vietnam?) Most of these countries will continue to grow, albeit at a modest pace. Sooner or later they will get there.
The common sense of Fareed Zakaria
This is one of the best Op-Eds you will read this year, though it deliberately deemphasizes the personal (no one is attacked) in a manner that will result in less attention. Better to write the truth! Excerpt:
Why has this [voter discontent} happened? Some of it is economic. Expensive housing, stagnant incomes and widening inequality have fueled public anger. But economics is only part of the story. America has enjoyed stronger growth than most other advanced economies. France under President Emmanuel Macron has lowered unemployment, and it has attracted more foreign investment projects than any country in Europe for seven straight years, according to an Ernst & Young analysis. South Korea is an economic success story. Japan was experiencing a comeback. Yet democratic governments almost everywhere are unpopular.
The larger explanation is that we are living through one of history’s great technological revolutions. And these transformations always produce deep anxiety and fear.
The last technological transformation on this scale came between roughly 1880 and 1920. Electricity, the telephone, railroads, the automobile and movies overturned entire industries and ways of life. Millions left farms for cities. Global trade disrupted local economies. New fortunes appeared overnight, while old occupations disappeared. In this turmoil, frustration and anger found political pathways. The left turned to communism, the right to fascism. What followed were new mass movements, cultural upheavals and world war.
Do read the whole thing. You can be a victim of these processes, or keep your wits about you. The choice is yours.
The optimal Bayesian update?
I see at least three updates one might make from the recent OAI/Hugging Face hacking incident:
1. “This happened sooner than I expected, and the story is more dramatic than I expected,” therefore I am more worried than before.
2. “This happened, and the inferior Chinese cyber-defense seems to have performed just fine,” therefore I am less worried than before.
3. “This happened, and as far as we can tell, absolutely no one was harmed,” therefore I am less worried than before.
Obviously the net impact, from those bare hypotheses, is indeterminate. And yet few people seem to be paying much heed to #2 or #3. Joshua Saxe from the cyber world has some relevant observations. And perhaps other updates are needed as well.
Solve for the equilibrium
Something that the Ukraine and Iran wars have taught me is that for a lot of countries, including very big countries, there are a small number of buildings and infrastructure components that are required for their economy to function.
And in countries that aren’t protected by oceans, like the US, drones completely change everything.
You can just make a list of oil refineries and production plants and the infrastructure around their main exports, and you can just attack them and destroy them and take them off the list.
4 years ago I would have thought there are too many of these components and they’re too easy to recreate, but both of these collisions have taught me that there are far fewer and that many of them will take years, if not over a decade, to rebuild.
It’s very strange to me that drones can now effectively harm the economy of a country.
That is from Daniel Miessler. While I am glad Russia is on the receiving end of this right now, this is arguably our biggest pending problem, bigger than what people typically refer to as AI risk.