Category: Philosophy
*Being and Time: An Annotated Translation*
Translated from the German by Cyril Welch.
Periodically I am asked if I have read Being and Time, and I always give the same response: “I have looked at every page.”
I also have spent time with it in German, though not for every page. But have I read it? Read it properly? Can anyone?
Is the book worth some study? Yes. But.
People, this volume is the best chance you are going to get.
Gaurav Ahuja interviews me
I very much enjoyed this exchange, print only, here is the link. Excerpt:
Gaurav: Going back to Iceland for a moment. I’ve never truly appreciated how old that parliament is. A thousand years is extraordinary. What is it about Iceland that has allowed that kind of continuity?
Tyler: Iceland was taken over by Denmark for quite a while. But the Icelanders persisted as an autonomous culture with their own language, not simply becoming Danish. They had this tradition of individualism, which you can read in the Icelandic sagas. Their own kind of common law, a good system of incentives built into the legal code, traditions of autonomy based on food supply and how you deal with the cold and the weather. For a long time, they just played defense. Then after World War II, they had a chance to transform it into what I think is one of the world’s most successful countries.
Their total population is around four hundred thousand. To do that with such numbers in a place that is not always hospitable is remarkable. They have almost entirely green energy. They’re super resourceful, very highly educated. Book sales per capita are through the ceiling. There’s something about their interest in poetry, legal codes, reading, what they do with those long winter nights, that has been quite persistent. That’s an informal institution, and it’s been very durable.
Is there anything in US policy that you see drawing us toward a short-term siren call that makes it harder to create a lasting democracy?
Our government fiscal policy is irresponsible. I hope we can survive it. I’m not a doom-and-gloomer, but thirty-eight trillion dollars in debt is not ideal. I don’t think we should try to run a balanced budget. T-bills play a key role in the world economy, and some amount of debt and deficit is good for us, good for the world. But we’re pushing it too far. We underinvest in our young people, underinvest in parts of our education. But look, we’re a pretty successful country.
There’s this interesting tension between wanting a stable environment to build something that lasts and needing to ride a new wave for something to emerge in the first place.
I was recently thinking about how much the bad weather in the United States is functional for some larger purpose. You learn early that you have to deal with things. You need a certain kind of independence, planning, and preparation.
British weather is quite benevolent. Maybe it’s too gray, but it’s not going to kill you. American weather, hurricanes, blizzards, flooding, is very volatile. We don’t always feel it because we’ve become wealthy, but maybe in part we had to become wealthy to deal with that volatility. That might be a blessing in disguise. It’s related to the earlier point about Iceland. It’s tough there. You’d better be pretty adaptive. A perfectly stable environment is not ideal either.
Interesting throughout, and plenty of fresh material. The weather point I owe to conversations with Henry Oliver and Rebecca Lowe.
Colin McGinn’s “My Honest Views”
I think David Lewis was off his rocker, I think Donald Davidson was far too impressed by elementary logic and decision theory, I think Willard Quine was a mediocre logician with some philosophical side-interests, I think Daniel Dennett never understood philosophy, I think Michael Dummett was a dimwit outside of his narrow specializations, I think P.F. Strawson struggled to understand much of philosophy, I think Gilbert Ryle was a classicist who wanted philosophy gone by any means necessary, I think Gareth Evans had no philosophical depth, I think John Searle was a philosophical lightweight, I think Jerry Fodor had no idea about philosophy and didn’t care, I think Saul Kripke was a mathematician with a passing interest in certain limited areas of philosophy, I think Hilary Putnam was a scientist-linguist who found philosophy incomprehensible, I think Ludwig Wittgenstein was a philosophical ignoramus too arrogant to learn some history, I think Bertrand Russell was only interested in skepticism, I think Gottlob Frege was a middling mathematician with no other philosophical interests, I think the positivists were well-meaning idiots, I think Edmund Husserl had no interest in anything outside his own consciousness, I think Martin Heidegger and John-Paul Sartre were mainly psychological politicians, I think John Austin was a scientifically illiterate language student, I think Noam Chomsky was neither a professional linguist nor a philosopher nor a psychologist but some sort of uneasy combination, I think the vast majority of current philosophers have no idea what philosophy is about and struggle to come to terms with it, I think philosophy has been a shambles since Descartes, I think Plato and Aristotle were philosophical preschoolers, I think no one has ever really grasped the nature of philosophical problems, I think the human brain is a hotbed of bad philosophy (and that is its great glory).
Here is the link, via The Browser. My honest view is that he is worrying too much about other people, and not enough about issues.
Liberal AI
Can AI be liberal? In what sense? One answer points to the liberal insistence on freedom of choice, understood as a product of the commitment to personal autonomy and individual dignity. Mill and Hayek are of course defining figures here, emphasizing the epistemic foundations for freedom of choice. “Choice Engines,” powered by AI and authorized or required by law, might promote liberal goals (and in the process, produce significant increases in human welfare). A key reason is that they can simultaneously (1) preserve autonomy, (2) respect dignity, and (3) help people to overcome inadequate information and behavioral biases, which can produce internalities, understood as costs that people impose on their future selves, and also externalities, understood as costs that people impose on others. Different consumers care about different things, of course, which is a reason to insist on a high degree of freedom of choice, even in the presence of internalities and externalities. AI-powered Choice Engines can respect that freedom, not least through personalization. Nonetheless, AI-powered Choice Engines might be enlisted by insufficiently informed or self-interested actors, who might exploit inadequate information or behavioral biases, and thus co5mpromise liberal goals. AI-powered Choice Engines might also be deceptive or manipulative, again compromising liberal goals, and legal safeguards are necessary to reduce the relevant risks. Illiberal or antiliberal AI is not merely imaginable; it is in place. Still, liberal AI is not an oxymoron. It could make life less nasty, less brutish, less short, and less hard – and more free.
Optimal timing for superintelligence
There is a new paper by Nick Bostrom with that title:
Developing superintelligence is not like playing Russian roulette; it is more like undergoing risky surgery for a condition that will otherwise prove fatal. We examine optimal timing from a person-affecting stance (and set aside simulation hypotheses and other arcane considerations). Models incorporating safety progress, temporal discounting, quality-of-life differentials, and concave QALY utilities suggest that even high catastrophe probabilities are often worth accepting. Prioritarian weighting further shortens timelines. For many parameter settings, the optimal strategy would involve moving quickly to AGI capability, then pausing briefly before full deployment: swift to harbor, slow to berth. But poorly implemented pauses could do more harm than good.
Via Nabeel.
David Hume update — “model this”
The tomb of the philosopher David Hume and two other memorials at a historic cemetery in Edinburgh have been vandalised with “disturbing occult-style paraphernalia”.
A tour guide made the discovery at the Old Calton burial ground. It included a drawing of a naked woman pointing a bloodied knife at a baby with a noose around its neck, and coded writing on red electrical tape attached to the David Hume mausoleum and two nearby memorial stones.
The guide emailed photographs of the vandalism to Edinburgh council and described the symbols as “satanic”.
A group on Telegram purporting to be responsible for the vandalism of graves at unnamed cemeteries posted photographs of the same damage in a now-deleted channel. They shared examples of other disturbing drawings, including a naked woman grabbing the bloodied head of a baby, to which one member responded: “For EH1?” EH1 is the postcode in Edinburgh covering the historic Old Town.
The group also posted photographs of strange paraphernalia found at the Old Calton burial ground, including nails hammered through red candles, chalked symbols and red tape in which the words “anti meta physical front” were printed.
Here is the story, via Hollis Robbins.
Are the French lazy?
Olivier Blanchard writes:
The French are not lazy. They just enjoy leisure more than most (no irony here)
And this is perfectly fine: As productivity increases, it is perfectly reasonable to take it partly as more leisure (fewer hours per week, earlier retirement age), and only partly in income.
He has follow-up points and clarifications in later posts. For instance:
If somebody, in France, wants to work hard, retire late or not all, and work 50-60 hours a week, it is perfectly possible. (this conclusion is based on introspection). Some of us are blessed with exciting jobs. Most of us unfortunately are not.
Here is JFV on that question. And a response from Olivier. Here is John Cochrane.
Perhaps “lazy” is not the right word for this discussion. I view West Europeans in general as providing good quality work per hour, but wanting to work fewer hours, compared to Americans and also compared to many East Asians. Much of that is due to taxes, noting that tax regimes are endogenous to the mores of a population. (Before the 1970s, West Europeans often worked longer hours, by the way.) So it is not only taxes by any means. Furthermore, many (not all) parts of Europe have superior leisure opportunities, compared to what is available in many (not all) parts of the United States. That seems to me the correct description of the reality, not “lazy,” or “not lazy.”
I would add some additional points. First, the world is sometimes in a (short?) period of local increasing returns. I believe we are in such a period now, as evidenced by China and the United States outperforming much of the rest of the world. Maybe the French cannot do anything to leap to such “large economy margins,” but I am not opposed to saying “there is something wrong” with not much trying. Perhaps lack of ambition at the social level is the concept, rather than laziness. I see only some French people, not too many to be clear, throwing themselves onto the bonfire trying to nudge their societal norms toward more ambition.
Second, although the world is not usually in an increasing returns regime, over the long long run it probably is. We humans can stack General Purpose Technologies, over the centuries and millennia, and get somewhere really splendid in a (long-run) explosive fashion. That is another form of increasing returns, even if you do not see it in the data in most individual decades in most countries.
That also makes me think “there is something wrong” with not much trying. And on that score, France can clearly contribute and to some extent already is contributing through its presence in science, math, bio, etc. The French even came up with an early version of the internet. Nonetheless France could contribute more, and I think it would be preferable if social norms could nudge them more in that direction. I do not see comparable potent externalities from French leisure consumption. Maybe the French could teach America how wonderful trips to France are, and thus induce Americans to work more to afford them, and if that is the dominant effect I am happy once again.
So on the proactive side, it still seems to be France could do better than it does, and social welfare likely would rise as a result. That said, they hardly seem like the worst offender in this regard, though you still might egg them on because they have so much additional high-powered potential.
*You Have No Right to Your Culture: Essays on the Human Condition*
By Bryan Caplan, now on sale. From Bryan’s Substack:
My latest book of essays, You Have No Right to Your Culture: Essays on the Human Condition, flips this narrative. All of these demands for “reshaping culture” are thinly-veiled calls for coercing humans. As the title essay explains:
[C]ulture is… other people! Culture is who other people want to date and marry. Culture is how other people raise their kids. Culture is the movies other people want to see. Culture is the hobbies other people value. Culture is the sports other people play. Culture is the food other people cook and eat. Culture is the religion other people choose to practice. To have a “right to your culture” is to have a right to rule all of these choices — and more.
What’s the alternative? Instead of treating capitalism as the root of cultural decay, the world should embrace capitalist cultural competition. Actions speak louder than words; instead of using government to “shape” culture, let’s see what practices, beliefs, styles, and flavors pass the market test. Which in practice, as I explain elsewhere in the book, largely means the global triumph of Western culture, infused with an array of glorious culinary, musical, and literary imports. Nativists who bemoan immigrants’ failure to assimilate are truly blind; the truth is that even non-immigrants are pre-assimilating at a staggering pace.
Recommended. Bryan also offers some essays on what he finds valuable in GMU Econ sub-culture.
Should You Resign?
At least six prosecutors resigned in early January over DOJ pressure to investigate the widow of Renee Good (killed by ICE agent Jonathan Ross) instead of the agent himself. They cited political interference, exclusion of state police, and diversion of resources from priority fraud cases. Similarly, an FBI agent was ordered to stand down from investigating the killing of Good. She resigned. The killing of Alex Pretti and what looks to be an attempted federal coverup will likely lead to more resignations. Is resignation the right choice? I tweeted:
I appreciate the integrity, but every principled resignation is an adverse selection.
In other words, when the good leave and the bad don’t, the institution rots.
Resignation can be useful as a signal–this person is giving up a lot so the issue must be important. Resignations can also create common knowledge–now everyone knows that everyone knows. The canonical example is Attorney General Elliot Richardson resigning rather than carrying out Nixon’s order to fire Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox. At that time, a resignation was like lighting the beacon. But today, who is there to be called?
The best case for not resigning is that you retain voice—the ability to slow, document, escalate, and resist within lawful channels. In the U.S. system that can mean forcing written directives, triggering inspector-general review, escalating through professional responsibility channels, and building coalitions that outlast transient political appointees. Staying can matter.
But staying is corrupting. People are prepared to say no to one big betrayal, but a steady drip of small compromises depreciates the will: you attend the meetings, sign the forms, stay silent when you should speak. Over time the line moves, and what once felt intolerable starts to feel normal, categories blur. People who on day one would never have agreed to X end up doing X after a chain of small concessions. You may think you’re using the institution, but institutions are very good at using you. Banality deadens evil.
Resignation keeps your hands and conscience clean. That’s good for you but what about society? Utilitarians sometimes call the demand for clean hands a form of moral self-indulgence. A privileging of your own purity over outcomes. Bernard Williams’s reply is that good people are not just sterile utility-accountants, they have deep moral commitments and sometimes resignation is what fidelity to those commitments requires.
So what’s the right move? I see four considerations:
- Complicity: Are you being ordered to do wrong, or, usually the lesser crime, of not doing right?
- Voice: If you stay can you exercise voice? What’s your concrete theory of change—what can you actually block, document, or escalate?
- Timing: Is reversal possible soon or is this structural capture? Are you the remnant?
- Self-discipline: Will you name the bright lines now and keep them, or will “just this once” become the job?
I have not been put in a position to make such a choice but from a social point of view, my judgment is that at the current time, voice is needed and more effective than exit.
Hat tip: Jim Ward.
Indicate precisely what you mean to say…
The book I was reading is titled Encounters and Reflections: Conversations with Seth Benardete, here is one excerpt:
Michael: What was [Allan] Bloom like when you first met him?
Seth: He was supersensitive to people’s defects. He had antennae out, he knew exactly…
Robert: People’s weak spots?
Seth: Oh yes, it was extraordinary.
Ronna: You continued talking to Bloom often over the years, didn’t you?
Seth: Pretty often. But he was often was distracted. He got impatient if you could not say what you wanted to say in more than half a sentence.
Robert: The pressure of the sound bite.
Seth: I remember the last time he came. He was about to write the book and he asked me what I thought the Phaedrus was about. I summed it up in a sentence, and it didn’t make any impressions.
Ronna: Do you remember what the sentence was?
Seth: Something about the second speech turning into the third speech, and how this was connected to the double character of the human being. I managed to get it into one sentence, but it wasn’t something he wanted to hear.
A fun book. For all the criticisms you hear of Straussians, the few I have known I find are quite willing to speak their actual views and state of mind very clearly and directly.
Morally judging famous and semi-famous people
This is one of the worst things you can do for your own intellect, whatever you think the social benefits may be. I know some reasonable number of famous people, and I just do not trust the media accounts of their failings and flaws. I trust even less the barbs I read on the internet. I am not claiming to know the truth about them (most of them, at least), but I can tell when the people writing about them know even less.
I am not saying everyone is an angel — sometimes you come to learn negative information that in fact is not part of the standard press reports or internet whines.
If you are going to possibly be working with someone on a concrete and important project, absolutely you should be trying to form an assessment of their moral quality and reliability. (And you are allowed to do it once per electoral race, when deciding for whom to vote.) But if not, spending real time and energy morally judging famous and semi-famous people is one of the best and quickest ways to make yourself stupider. Focus on the substantive arguments for and against various policies and propositions, not the people involved. Furthermore, smart people do not seem to be immune from this form of mental deterioration. Here is my 2008 post on “pressing the button.”
A corollary of this is that if you read an internet comment that, when a substantive issue is raised, switches to judging a famous or semi-famous person, the quality of that comment is almost always low. Once you start seeing this, you cannot stop seeing it.
Addendum: If by any chance you are wondering how to make yourself smarter, learn how to appreciate almost everybody, and keep on cultivating that skill.
Podcast with Salvador Duarte
Salvador is 17, and is an EV winner from Portugal. Here is the transcript. Here is the list of discussed topics:
0:00 – We’re discovering talent quicker than ever 5:14 – Being in San Francisco is more important than ever 8:01 – There is such a thing like a winning organization 11:43 – Talent and conformity on startup and big businesses 19:17 – Giving money to poor people vs talented people 22:18 – EA is fragmenting 25:44 – Longtermism and existential risks 33:24 – Religious conformity is weaker than secular conformity 36:38 – GMU Econ professors religious beliefs 39:34 – The west would be better off with more religion 43:05 – What makes you a philosopher 45:25 – CEOs are becoming more generalists 49:06 – Traveling and eating 53:25 – Technology drives the growth of government? 56:08 – Blogging and writing 58:18 – Takes on @Aella_Girl, @slatestarcodex, @Noahpinion, @mattyglesias, , @tszzl, @razibkhan, @RichardHanania, @SamoBurja, @TheZvi and more 1:02:51 – The future of Portugal 1:06:27 – New aesthetics program with @patrickc.
Self-recommending, here is Salvador’s podcast and Substack more generally.
My excellent Conversation with Brendan Foody
Here is the audio, video, and transcript. Here is the episode summary:
At 22, Brendan Foody is both the youngest Conversations with Tyler guest ever and the youngest unicorn founder on record. His company Mercor hires the experts who train frontier AI models—from poets grading verse to economists building evaluation frameworks—and has become one of the fastest-growing startups in history.
Tyler and Brendan discuss why Mercor pays poets $150 an hour, why AI labs need rubrics more than raw text, whether we should enshrine the aesthetic standards of past eras rather than current ones, how quickly models are improving at economically valuable tasks, how long until AI can stump Cass Sunstein, the coming shift toward knowledge workers building RL environments instead of doing repetitive analysis, how to interview without falling for vibes, why nepotism might make a comeback as AI optimizes everyone’s cover letters, scaling the Thiel Fellowship 100,000X, what his 8th-grade donut empire taught him about driving out competition, the link between dyslexia and entrepreneurship, dining out and dating in San Francisco, Mercor’s next steps, and more.
And an excerpt:
COWEN: Now, I saw an ad online not too long ago from Mercor, and it said $150 an hour for a poet. Why would you pay a poet $150 an hour?
FOODY: That’s a phenomenal place to start. For background on what the company does — we hire all of the experts that teach the leading AI models. When one of the AI labs wants to teach their models how to be better at poetry, we’ll find some of the best poets in the world that can help to measure success via creating evals and examples of how the model should behave.
One of the reasons that we’re able to pay so well to attract the best talent is that when we have these phenomenal poets that teach the models how to do things once, they’re then able to apply those skills and that knowledge across billions of users, hence allowing us to pay $150 an hour for some of the best poets in the world.
COWEN: The poets grade the poetry of the models or they grade the writing? What is it they’re grading?
FOODY: It could be some combination depending on the project. An example might be similar to how a professor in English class would create a rubric to grade an essay or a poem that they might have for the students. We could have a poet that creates a rubric to grade how well is the model creating whatever poetry you would like, and a response that would be desirable to a given user.
COWEN: How do you know when you have a good poet, or a great poet?
FOODY: That’s so much of the challenge of it, especially with these very subjective domains in the liberal arts. So much of it is this question of taste, where you want some degree of consensus of different exceptional people believing that they’re each doing a good job, but you probably don’t want too much consensus because you also want to get all of these edge case scenarios of what are the models doing that might deviate a little bit from what the norm is.
COWEN: So, you want your poet graders to disagree with each other some amount.
FOODY: Some amount, exactly, but still a response that is conducive with what most users would want to see in their model responses.
COWEN: Are you ever tempted to ask the AI models, “How good are the poet graders?”
[laughter]
FOODY: We often are. We do a lot of this. It’s where we’ll have the humans create a rubric or some eval to measure success, and then have the models say their perspective. You actually can get a little bit of signal from that, especially if you have an expert — we have tens of thousands of people that are working on our platform at any given time. Oftentimes, there’ll be someone that is tired or not putting a lot of effort into their work, and the models are able to help us with catching that.
And:
COWEN: Let’s say it’s poetry. Let’s say you can get it for free, grab what you want from the known universe. What’s the data that’s going to make the models, working through your company, better at poetry?
FOODY: I think that it’s people that have phenomenal taste of what would users of the end products, users of these frontier models want to see. Someone that understands that when a prompt is given to the model, what is the type of response that people are going to be amazed with? How we define the characteristics of those responses is imperative.
Probably more than just poets that have spent a lot of time in school, we would want people that know how to write work that gets a lot of traction from readers, that gains broad popularity and interest, drives the impact, so to speak, in whatever dimension that we define it within poetry.
COWEN: But what’s the data you want concretely? Is it a tape of them sitting around a table, students come, bring their poems, the person says, “I like this one, here’s why, here’s why not.” Is it that tape or is it written reports? What’s the thing that would come in the mail when you get your wish?
FOODY: The best analog is a rubric. If you have some —
COWEN: A rubric for how to grade?
FOODY: A rubric for how to grade. If the poem evokes this idea that is inevitably going to come up in this prompt or is a characteristic of a really good response, we’ll reward the model a certain amount. If it says this thing, we’ll penalize the model. If it styles the response in this way, we’ll reward it. Those are the types of things, in many ways, very similar to the way that a professor might create a rubric to grade an essay or a poem.
Poetry is definitely a more difficult one because I feel like it’s very unbounded. With a lot of essays that you might grade from your students, it’s a relatively well-scoped prompt where you can probably create a rubric that’s easy to apply to all of them, versus I can only imagine in poetry classes how difficult it is to both create an accurate rubric as well as apply it. The people that are able to do that the best are certainly extremely valuable and exciting.
COWEN: To get all nerdy here, Immanuel Kant in his third critique, Critique of Judgment, said, in essence, taste is that which cannot be captured in a rubric. If the data you want is a rubric and taste is really important, maybe Kant was wrong, but how do I square that whole picture? Is it, by invoking taste, you’re being circular and wishing for a free lunch that comes from outside the model, in a sense?
FOODY: There are other kinds of data they could do if it can’t be captured in a rubric. Another kind is RLHF, where you could have the model generate two responses similar to what you might see in ChatGPT, and then have these people with a lot of taste choose which response they prefer, and do that many times until the model is able to understand their preferences. That could be one way of going about it as well.
Interesting throughout, and definitely recommended. Note the conversation was recorded in October (we have had a long queue), so a few parts of it sound slightly out of date. And here is Hollis Robbins on LLMs and poetry.
The Molly Cantillon manifesto, A Personal Panopticon
I find this piece significant, and think it is likely to be one of the most important essays of the year:
A few months ago, I started running my life out of Claude Code. Not out of intention to do so, it was just the place where everything met. And it just kept working. Empires are won by conquest. What keeps them standing is something much quieter. Before a king can tax, he must count. Before he can conscript, he must locate. Before he can rule, he must see. Legibility is the precondition for governance…
The first thing Claude solved was product blindness. NOX now runs on a cron job: pulling Amplitude, cross-referencing GitHub, and pointing me to what needs building. It handles A/B testing, generates winning copy, and has turned customer support into a fully autonomous department.
Once I saw this was possible, I chased it everywhere. Email, hitting inbox zero for the first time ever, with auto-drafted replies for everything inbound. Workouts, accommodating horrendously erratic travel schedules. Sleep, built a projector wired to my WHOOP after exactly six hours that wakes me with my favorite phrases. Subscriptions, found and returned $2000 I didn’t know I was paying. The dozen SFMTA citations I’d ignored, the action items I’d procrastinated into oblivion. People are using it to, I discovered, run vending machines, home automation systems, and keep plants alive.
The feeling is hard to name. It is the violent gap between how blind you were and how obvious everything feels now with an observer that reads all the feeds, catches what you’ve unconsciously dropped, notices patterns across domains you’d kept stubbornly separate, and—crucially—tells you what to do about it.
My personal finances are now managed in the terminal. Overnight it picks the locks of brokerages that refuse to talk to each other, pulls congressional and hedge fund disclosures, Polymarket odds, X sentiment, headlines and 10-Ks from my watchlist. Every morning, a brief gets added in ~/𝚝𝚛𝚊𝚍𝚎𝚜. Last month it flagged Rep. Fields buying NFLX shares. Three weeks later, the Warner Bros deal. I don’t always trade, sometimes I argue with the thesis. But I’m never tracking fifteen tabs at 6am anymore.
It feels borderline unfair seeing around corners, being in ten places at once, surveilling yourself with the attention span of a thousand clones.
A panopticon still, but the tower belongs to you.
There is more at the link, or this link, and yes she is related to the 18th century Irish economist Richard Cantillon.
Who gets an “RIP” on Marginal Revolution?
A few of you have been asking me this. The core standards are as follows:
1. Most notable figures in economics. MR has many economist readers, and these deaths are not usually well-publicized by mainstream media.
2. A cultural figure I feel more of you should know about. Various figures from say African music or foreign cinema might be examples here.
3. A person who, if even at a distance, has played some special role in my life.
Someone who would not get a mention would be, for instance, a leading footballer. I figure any of you who care already will be hearing about the death.
I also discriminate against suicides, as I consider suicide both a sin and as having (in most cases) high negative externalities on others. I am not so inclined to honor or glorify those who have killed themselves.