Elon recently re-opened the perennial debate about whether Social Security is a ponzi scheme. Here’s my, lightly edited post from 2011.

Elon is in good company calling social security a ponzi scheme. First up is Nobel prize winner Paul Samuelson who wrote:

The beauty of social insurance is that it is actuarially unsound. Everyone who reaches retirement age is given benefit privileges that far exceed anything he has paid in — exceed his payments by more than ten times (or five times counting employer payments)!

How is it possible? It stems from the fact that the national product is growing at a compound interest rate and can be expected to do so for as far ahead as the eye cannot see. Always there are more youths than old folks in a growing population. More important, with real income going up at 3% per year, the taxable base on which benefits rest is always much greater than the taxes paid historically by the generation now retired.

…A growing nation is the greatest Ponzi game ever contrived.

Samuelson wrote that in 1967 riffing off his classic paper of 1958. By “as far as the eye cannot see” he apparently meant not very far because it soon became clear that the system could not count on waves of youths or rapid productivity growth to generate the actuarially unsound returns that made the program so popular in the early years.

Milton Friedman and Paul Samuelson rarely agreed on much but Friedman also called social security a Ponzi scheme. In fact, he called it The Biggest Ponzi Scheme on Earth but perhaps Friedman is too partisan so let’s go for a third Nobel prize winner who recognizes the Ponzi like nature of social security, none other than…..Paul Krugman (writing in 1996):

Social Security is structured from the point of view of the recipients as if it were an ordinary retirement plan: what you get out depends on what you put in. So it does not look like a redistributionist scheme. In practice it has turned out to be strongly redistributionist, but only because of its Ponzi game aspect, in which each generation takes more out than it put in. Well, the Ponzi game will soon be over, thanks to changing demographics, so that the typical recipient henceforth will get only about as much as he or she put in (and today’s young may well get less than they put in). (ital added, AT)

Of these, I agree the most with Krugman. Social Security is not necessarily a Ponzi scheme but it only generated massive returns in the past because of its Ponzi-like aspects. The Ponzi-like aspects are now over and social security is turning into what is essentially a forced savings/welfare program with, as Krugman recognizes, crummy returns for average workers. Social security is thus a Ponzi scheme which has not gone bust but it has gone flat.

Robert Higgs coined the term regime uncertainty to illustrate the challenge faced by business under Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, when a flurry of unpredictable legislation such as the expansive and often unclear mandates of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), attempts at court packing, abrupt tax increases, and shifting labor policies, meant businesses couldn’t reliably forecast returns or risks. Uncertainty magnified bad policy causing investment to collapse and remain unprecedently low.

For the eleven-year period of 1930 to 1940, net private investment totaled minus $3.1 billion. Only in 1941 did net private investment ($9.7 billion) exceed the 1929 amount.

The data leave little doubt. During the 1930s, private investment remained at depths never plumbed in any other decade for which data exist.

Real options theory explains why uncertainty can reduce investment even more than predictable but unfavorable policies. Suppose you’re deciding whether to build a factory in North Carolina or South Carolina. Both locations are viable, but one of the Carolina’s might offer a tax concession—though the decision won’t be announced for six months. Even if investing immediately would still be profitable without the concession, you might choose to delay building the factory. The potential benefit of waiting (the real option) only needs to offset the costs associated with waiting. Thus, even modest uncertainty can incentivize investors to delay big investments. Recent studies confirm Higgs’ insights: spikes in uncertainty strongly correlate with declines in private investment.

Ok, so where do we stand? We are now at a greater level of uncertainty than anything over the last 40 years, barring the worst weeks of the 2008 financial crisis  (updated graph as of today!). Investment has begun a modest decline. Some, very preliminary data (take with a grain of salt) are already predicting a recession.

Tariff policy is especially bad because it is uncertainty about bad events. Here are comments from the latest ISM survey (h/t Joe Weisenthal).

Much of the Trump administration’s agenda promises long-term benefits, but chaos and uncertainty threaten its success. Tariff policy, in particular, is bad economics and even worse foreign policy. Even if Trump’s tariff strategy stabilizes, global responses—and their ripple effects—remain unpredictable and with potentially severe downsides. This uncertainty could spark an economic downturn, jeopardizing the administration’s otherwise strong policies.

All of this is unnecessary. We need to get back to the best case for a Trump Presidency.

Jon Klick finds that when courts in CA surprisingly invalidated a set of DEI laws, the market value of firms subject to those laws increased:

California mandated that firms headquartered in the state include women (SB 826) and underrepresented minorities (AB 979) on their corporate boards. These laws, passed in 2018 and 2020 respectively, were held to violate the state’s constitution by judges on the Los Angeles County Superior Court in 2022. This paper examines the market reaction to these surprising court decisions, finding that California firms appreciated significantly on the days of the rulings…Because the court decisions arguably had no repercussions for other changes in corporate law and regulation in the state…these results improve confidence in the conclusion that board diversity mandates do not improve firm value and, perhaps, they even lead investors to lower their valuations.

Luis Garicano has an amazing post on “one of the dumbest fiscal policies in recent memory.” Launched in Italy during COVID by Prime Minister Conte, the “Superbonus” scheme subsidized 110% of housing renovation costs. Now if one were to use outdated, simplistic, Econ 101 type reasoning one would predict that such a scheme would be massively costly not only because people would rush to renovate their homes for free but because the more expensive the renovation on paper the bigger the bonus.

The proponents of the Superbonus, most notably Riccardo Fraccaro, were however, advocates of Monetary Monetary Theory so deficits were considered only an illusory barrier to government spending and resource constraints were far distant concerns. Italy still had to meet EU rules, however, so the deficit spending was concealed with creative accounting:

rather than direct cash grants, the government issued tax credits that could be transferred. A homeowner could claim these credits directly against their taxes, have contractors claim them against invoices, or sell them to banks. These credits became a kind of fiscal currency – a parallel financial instrument that functioned as off-the-books debt (Capone and Stagnaro, 2024). The setup purposefully created the illusion of a free lunch: it hid the cost to the government, as for European accounting purposes the credits would show up only as lost tax revenue rather than new spending.

In MMT terms, Fraccaro and his team effectively created money as a tax credit, putting into practice MMT’s notion that a sovereign issuer’s currency is ultimately a tax IOU​.

So what were the results? The “free renovation” scheme quickly spiraled out of control. Initially projected to cost €35 billion, the program ballooned to around €220 billion—about 12% of Italy’s GDP! Did it drive a surge in energy-efficient renovations? Hardly. Massive fraud ensued as builders and homeowners inflated renovation costs to siphon off government funds. Beyond that, surging demand ran headlong into resource constraints. Econ 101 again: in the short run, marginal cost curves slope upward.

Construction costs sharply increased – the Construction Cost Index grew by roughly 20% after the pandemic and surged another 13% after September 2021, with the Superbonus directly responsible for about 7 percentage points of that rise, according to Corsello and Ercolani (2024). The price of setting up scaffolding, an essential first step for renovation, increased by 400% by the end of 2021.

…Even the program’s environmental benefits came at an astronomical cost – any calculation will yield far north of €1,000 per ton of carbon saved (versus an ETS Carbon price of around €80 per ton).

Moreover, as Garicano trenchantly notes once started the program’s structure made it fiendishly difficult to stop:

The benefits were concentrated among vocal constituencies: homeowners getting renovations, the environmental movement, and contractors seeing booming business. The costs, while enormous, were spread across all taxpayers and pushed into the future through the tax credit mechanism. No government—leftist, technocratic, or right-wing—was able to resist its logic. Parliament consistently pushed back against efforts to limit its scope, even after fraud estimates hit €16 billion. As prime minister, Mario Draghi, despite publicly criticizing the program for tripling construction costs, could not halt it — in fact, his initial action was to simplify access to it. When his government attempted to curb abuse, the Five Star Movement reacted with anger, and even modest controls on credit transfers were fought. By 2023, Giorgia Meloni’s right-wing government faced the same constraints—industry groups protested, coalition partners balked.

In normal times, the EU might have intervened to curb the reckless deficit spending—everyone knew what was going on, even if the numbers were temporarily kept off the books. But during COVID, the EU turned a blind eye, and the ECB kept interest rates low.

In fact, Garicano argues that the Superbonus story is merely the most blatant example of deeper systemic issues which now trouble the entire EU:

This erosion of discipline isn’t limited to Italy. France’s deficit has drifted to 6.1% of GDP. Spain reversed its post crisis pension reform right around the time Italy was passing the Superbonus, with much larger negative consequences for fiscal sustainability. In a world where the ECB will always intervene to prevent bond market pressure and Brussels cannot credibly enforce fiscal rules on large states, sustainable fiscal policy becomes politically almost impossible.

The very mechanisms designed to protect the euro may now be undermining it.

Recall Principle 2 of Three Simple Principles of Trade Policy, Businesses are Consumers Too. Case in point, steel. Justin Wolfers summarizes an analysis of Trump’s 2018 steel tariffs:

Going back further we have a good analysis from Lydia Cox of the Bush steel tariffs. Even though the tariffs were temporary, they led to a rearrangement of supply chains which led to long-lasting declines in exports and employment in steel using industries.