Category: Law

What should AI policy learn from DeepSeek?

That is a Bloomberg column of mine from about two weeks ago.  I thought it would make more sense to people if I did not blog it right away.  Here is one bit:

Now the world knows that a very high-quality AI system can be trained for a relatively small sum of money. That could bring comparable AI systems into realistic purview for nations such as Russia, Iran, Pakistan and others. It is possible to imagine a foreign billionaire initiating a similar program, although personnel would be a constraint. Whatever the dangers of the Chinese system and its potential uses, DeepSeek-inspired offshoots in other nations could be more worrying yet.

Finding cheaper ways to build AI systems was almost certainly going to happen anyway. But consider the tradeoff here: US policy succeeded in hampering China’s ability to deploy high-quality chips in AI systems, with the accompanying national-security benefits, but it also accelerated the development of effective AI systems that do not rely on the highest-quality chips.

It remains to be seen whether that tradeoff will prove to be a favorable one. Not just in the narrow sense — although there are many questions about DeepSeek’s motives, pricing strategy, plans for the future and its relation to the Chinese government that remain unanswered or unanswerable. The tradeoff is uncertain in a larger sense, too.

To paraphrase the Austrian economist Ludwig Mises: Government interventions have important unintended secondary consequences. To see if a policy will work, it is necessary to consider not only its immediate impact but also its second- and third-order effects.

Here is yesterday’s summary of the news from DeepSeek.

Travis Fisher on electricity privatization (from my email)

I’m a long-time reader and first-time emailer. I just read your blog post from earlier this month about privatizing public services like water and electric utilities.

My colleague Glen Lyons and I are developing a way to introduce more competition into the electricity sector, which some believe to be hopelessly uncompetitive. The idea is to allow new, large electricity customers to form new electricity networks. The change to state statute would officially introduce contestability into many markets, and we think actual rival networks would be built to satisfy new load. They would probably have to be large, electrically, meaning they would likely need to serve multiple large customers (today you can go off-grid, but only to supply yourself).

We aren’t necessarily trying to revolutionize the existing grid or change the way a typical residential customer receives electric service, although there may be beneficial spillover effects for all customers. And the idea is not brand new (I find myself agreeing with many of Wayne Crews’ views from the late 1990s), but the concept’s technological feasibility is at an all-time high, and the flood of new demand from data centers and new manufacturers is creating the right political environment to enact new policies.

Here is my description of the policy: https://www.cato.org/blog/what-would-consumer-regulated-electricity-look

And Glen’s: https://www.datacenterknowledge.com/energy-power-supply/consumer-regulated-electricity-the-path-to-faster-reliable-power-solutions-

Plus an interview we did recently: https://secondpower.substack.com/p/wacc

Here is the Cato bio of Travis Fisher.

A Galt’s Gulch for Talent

A new paper in the QJE, The Global Race for Talent: Brain Drain, Knowledge Transfer, and Growth, by Marta Prato uses extensive data on inventors and their migration to make the following points.

(i) gross migration is asymmetric, with brain drain (net emigration) from the EU to the United States; (ii) migrants increase their patenting by 33% a year after migration; (iii) migrants continue working with inventors at origin after moving, although less frequently; (iv) migrants’ productivity gains spill over to their collaborators at origin, who increase patenting by 16% a year when a co-inventor emigrates.

Notice that migration doesn’t just relocate talent from the EU to the US; it amplifies talent. Preventing “brain drain” would create short-term gains for the EU but retaining talent at lower productivity would stifle long-term innovation and patenting, ultimately slowing growth for both the EU and the world. In short, even the EU gains from sending talent to the US! The effect would be much larger if we can import high-skill immigrants from countries where their skills are even less productive than in the EU. Ideally, other nations could replicate the US institutions that supercharge productivity, creating global economic gains. For now, however, the US seem to be a unique Galt’s Gulch for talent.

Prato concludes with a practical suggestion:

On the migration policy side, doubling the size of the U.S. H1B visa program increases U.S. and EU growth by 4% in the long run, because it sorts inventors to where they produce more innovations and knowledge spillovers.

Of course, when we expand the H1B program, we should allocate the visas by compensation rather than by lottery. (Jeremy Neufeld runs the numbers). In this way, we would get the most valuable workers. And please don’t tell me that we need a lottery so some poor startup can hire workers. No. Unless you have some compelling argument for why there is a massive externality and why lotteries (lotteries!) are the best way to target that externality we should let price allocate.

Ross Marchand on postal service privatization (from my email)

I really enjoyed your piece on USPS privatization. I recently wrote about the subject too. Even in the absence of privatization, relaxing the mail monopoly and allowing competition would make for better, more reliable mail services. This is true even in countries with a “national champion”-style carrier subject to a universal service obligation.

It appears that, over the long-run, nations such as Germany and the U.K. that relax their monopolies eventually come around to (at least considering) ending their universal service obligations. The advantage of the “end the monopoly first” approach is it allows countries to experiment with greater competition in a less risky and threatening manner than whole immediate privatization.

Corin Wagen defends Leviticus (from my email)

In your recent conversation with Misha Saul, you and Misha discussed your joint dislike for Leviticus. I can’t say that I find Leviticus a page-turner, but the book that’s done the most to help me understand why it’s important and what role it plays in the movement of the narrative is L Michael Morales’s book Who Shall Ascend The Mountain Of The Lord? (Amazon). A number of folks I’ve talked to have found this book very helpful. (Disclaimer: Morales is a Protestant, as is D. A. Carson (the editor), so the biases are apparent.)

Briefly, his argument is that Leviticus serves to resolve the narrative tension introduced by the ending of Exodus. Exodus 40:34–35: “Then the cloud covered the tent of meeting, and the glory of the Lord filled the tabernacle. And Moses was not able to enter the tent of meeting because the cloud settled on it, and the glory of the Lord filled the tabernacle.” The tension introduced by Genesis 3 is that God and man can no longer co-exist because of sin. Moses is able to ascend Sinai, speak with God, and bring the people his laws, but even after building the tabernacle and the ark, even Moses is unable to reside in the presence of God—let alone the people who cannot even touch Sinai!

The rules of Leviticus presents the conditions to resolve this tension and allow the people access to God—protected by the rules that God gives them. In particular the book has a chiastic structure centered around Leviticus 16 (Yom Kippur) where the high priest himself is able to enter the Holy of Holies. There’s other points about how the structure of the tabernacle and later the temple mirrors Eden, etc. “Interesting throughout,” as they say.

Gordon Tullock was right

Do minimum wage changes affect workplace health and safety? Using the universe of workers’ compensation claims in California over 2000-2019, we estimate whether minimum wage shocks affect the rate of workplace injuries. Our identification exploits both geographic variation in state-and city-level minimum wages and local occupation-level variation in exposure to minimum wage changes. We find that a 10% increase in the minimum wage increases the injury rate by 11% in an occupation-metro area labor market which is fully exposed to the minimum wage increase. Our results imply an elasticity of the workplace injury rate to minimum-wage-induced wage changes of 1.4. We find particularly large effects on injuries relating to cumulative physical strain, suggesting that employers respond to minimum wage increases by intensifying the pace of work, which in turn increases injury risk.

That is from a new working paper by Michael Davies, R. Jisung Park, and Anna Stansbury, MIT and U. Penn, by the way.  Via the excellent Kevin Lewis.

Net neutrality, we hardly knew ye

That is the topic of a recent Bloomberg column.  Here is the opening bit:

One of the longestmost technical and, as it turns out, most inconsequential public-policy debates of the 21st century was about net neutrality. Now that a federal appeals court has effectively ended the debate by striking down the FCC’s net neutrality rules, it’s worth asking what we’ve learned.

If you have forgotten the sequence of events, here’s a quick recap: In 2015, during President Barack Obama’s presidency and after years of debate, the Federal Communications Commission issued something called the Open Internet Order, guaranteeing net neutrality, which is broadly defined as the principle that internet service providers treat all communications equally, offering both users and content providers consistent service and pricing. Two years later, under President Donald Trump, the FCC rescinded the net neutrality requirement. It was then reinstated under President Joe Biden in 2024, until being struck down earlier this month.

Hardly anyone cares or even notices, and the rest of the column explains why.  Here is one part of that argument:

The actual reality has been somewhat different. Bandwidth has expanded, and Netflix transmissions do not interfere with Facebook, or vice versa. There is plenty of access to go around. That has been the case during periods with net neutrality and without.

So one lesson of the net neutrality debate comes from economics: Supply is elastic, at least when regulation allows it to be.

Internet experts Tim Wu, Cory Doctorow, Farhad Manjoo and many others were just plain, flat out wrong about this, mostly due to their anti-capitalist mentality.

Should the U.S. recognize Somaliland?

I do not myself have a position on this issue, but I found this analysis by Ken Opalo interesting:

The main argument below is that while the people of Somaliland deserve and have a strong case for international recognition, such a development at this time would very likely take away the very incentives that have set them apart from the rest of Somalia over the last 33 years.

To be blunt, achieving full sovereignty with de jure international recognition at this time would do little beyond incentivizing elite-level pursuit of sovereign rents at the expense of continued political and economic development. What has made Somaliland work is that its elites principally derive their legitimacy from their people, and not the international system. Stated differently, full sovereignty runs the risk of separating both the Somaliland state and ruling elites from the productive forces of society; which in turn would free politicians (and policymakers) from having to think of their people as the ultimate drivers of their overall economic wellbeing. Just like in the rest of the Continent, the resulting separation of “suspended elites” from the socio-economic foundations of Somaliland society and inevitable policy extraversion would be catastrophic for Somalilanders.

The last thing the Horn needs is another Djibouti — a country whose low-ambition ruling elites are content with hawking their geostrategic location at throwaway prices while doing precious little to advance their citizens’ material well-being (Djibouti’s poverty rate is a staggering 70%).

There is much more at the link.

Some game theory of Greenland

It is commonly assumed that the U.S. “acquiring” Greenland, whatever that might mean, will result in greater U.S. control of the territory.  Along some dimensions that is likely.  But it is worth pondering the equilibrium here more seriously.

I observe, in many locations around the world, that indigenous groups end up with far more bargaining power than their initial material resources might suggest. For instance, in the United States Native Americans often (not always) can exercise true sovereignty.  The AARP cannot (yet?) say the same.  In Mexico, indigenous groups have blocked many an infrastructure project.

One reason for these powers is that, feeling outmatched, the indigenous groups cultivate a temperament of “orneriness” and “being difficult.”  Some of that may be a deliberate strategic stance, some of it may be heritage from having been treated badly in the past and still lacking trust, and some of it may, over time, be acquired culture as the strategic stance gets baked into norms and behavior patterns.

Often, in these equilibria, the more nominal power you have over the indigenous group, the more orneriness they will have to cultivate.  If you only want a few major concessions, sometimes you can get those better as an outsider.  A simple analogy is that sometimes a teenager will do more to obey a grandparent than a parent.  Fewer issues of control are at stake, and so more concessions are possible, without fear of losing broader autonomy.

So a greater American stake in Greenland, however that comes about, may in some regards end up being counterproductive.  And these factors will become more relevant as more resource and revenue control issues come to the table.  For some issues it may be more useful having Denmark available as “the baddie.”

It is worth thinking through these questions in greater detail.

The Greenland debates

I would say we have not yet figured out what is the best U.S. policy toward Greenland, nor have we figured out best stances for either Greenland or Denmark. I am struck however by the low quality of the debate, and I mean on the anti-U.S. side most of all.  This is just one clip, but I am hearing very much the same in a number of other interchanges, most of all from Europeans.  There is a lot of EU pearl-clutching, and throwing around of adjectives like “colonialist” or “imperialist.”  Or trying to buy Greenland is somehow analogized to Putin not trying to buy Ukraine.  Or the word “offensive” is deployed as if that were an argument, or the person tries to switch the discussion into an attack on Trump and his rhetoric.

C’mon, people!

De facto, you are all creating the impression that Greenland really would be better off under some other arrangement.  Why not put forward a constructive plan for improving Greenland?  It would be better yet to cite a current plan under consideration (is there one?).  “We at the EU, by following this plan, will give Greenland a better economic and security future than can the United States.”  If the plan is decent, Greenland will wish to break off the talks with America it desires.  (To be clear, I do not think they desire incorporation.  This FT piece strikes me as the best so far on the debates.)

Or if you must stick to the negative, put forward some concrete arguments for how greater U.S. involvement in Greenland would be bad for global security, bad for economic growth, bad for the U.S., or…something.  “Your EU allies won’t like it,” or “Trump’s behavior is unacceptable” isn’t enough and furthermore the first of those is question-begging.

It is time to rise to the occasion.

p.s. I still am glad we bought the Danish West Indies in 1917.  Nor do I hear many Danes, or island natives, complain about this.

My podcast with Reason

With Liz Wolfe and Zach Weissmueller:

The link here contains the YouTube video, text description, and links to audio versions at reason.comhttps://reason.com/podcast/2025/01/10/tyler-cowen-why-do-we-refuse-to-learn-from-history/

Youtube page for embedding is here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p-Kpyg2mFU8

Lots of about libertarianism and state capacity libertarianism, and The Great Forgetting, food at the end…interesting throughout!

Martha

Martha (Netflix): A compelling bio on Martha Stewart. Her divorce from Andrew Stewart happened more than 30 years ago so the intensity of her anger and bitterness comes as a surprise. With barely concealed rage, she recounts his affairs and how poorly he treated her. “But didn’t you have an affair before he did?” asks the interviewer. “Oh, that was nothing,” she replies waving it off, “nothing.”

Stewart’s willpower and perfectionism are extraordinary. She becomes the U.S.’s first self-made female billionaire after taking her company public in 1999. Then comes the insider trading case. The amount in question was trivial—she avoided a $45,673 loss by selling her ImClone stock early. Stewart was not an ImClone insider and not guilty of insider trading. However, in a convoluted legal twist, she was charged with attempting to manipulate her own company’s stock price by publicly denying wrongdoing in the ImClone matter. Ultimately, she was convicted of lying to the SEC. It’s worth a slap on the wrist but the lead prosecutor is none other than the sanctiminous James Comey (!) and she gets 5 months in prison. 

Despite losing hundreds of millions of dollars and control of her own company, Martha doesn’t give up and in 2015, now in her mid 70s, she creates a new image and a new career starting with, of all things, a shockingly hard-assed roast of Justin Bieber. The Bieber roast leads to a succesful colloboration with Snoop Dogg. Legendary.

Stewart is as compelling a figure as Steve Jobs or Elon Musk. Not entirely likable, perhaps, but undeniably admirable.

Claims about fires?

From Isaiah Taylor:

In 2007 the Sierra Club successfully sued the Forest Service to prevent them from creating a Categorical Exclusion (CE) to NEPA for controlled burns (the technical term is “fuel reduction”). The CE would have allowed the forest service to conduct burns without having to perform a full EIS (the median time for which is 3.5 years). See: caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-9th-c John Muir project helped to claw back the full scope of Categorial Exclusions from the 2018 Omnibus Bill as well (though some easement did make it through). In 2021 the outgoing Trump BLM was served with the following notice of intent to sue by the Center for Biological Diversity for their fuel reduction plan in the Great Basin: biologicaldiversity.org/programs/publi BLM backed away from the plan after the transition. These are specific cases, but the cumulative outcome is that CA state agencies don’t even try it because they know they’ll be sued.

Some of the latter part is exaggerated, here is o1 pro commentary.

In California it is apparently illegal to price fire insurance according to risk?  o1 pro seems a bit off on this question, but I think you can read between the lines.

Which are the best analyses you are seeing?

Nuclear Deregulation

Nuclear deregulation. Yes, I know how that sounds but bear with me. As Koopman and Dourado write in the WSJ:

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 established a precise framework for nuclear regulation, requiring federal licensing only for facilities that either use nuclear material “in such quantity as to be of significance to the common defense and security” or use it “in such manner as to affect the health and safety of the public.” This careful distinction recognized that not every nuclear reactor poses meaningful risks.

Those qualifiers were intentional but for a long time were unimportant because nuclear reactors were big and potentially quite dangerous but that was 70 years ago! Today, there are small, safe nuclear reactor designs which meet the requirements of the 1954 Act.

Small modular reactors are dramatically different from the massive reactors envisioned during the Cold War. The reactors at issue in this case generate a fraction of the power of conventional nuclear plants—around 20 megawatts or less—and are designed with modern safety features that would release close to zero radiation even in a worst-case meltdown scenario. Last Energy’s design operates entirely inside a container with 12-inch steel walls that has no credible mode of radioactive release even in the worst reasonable scenario.

Even in such a scenario, according to the plaintiffs, radiation exposure would be less than a tenth what the NRC has deemed too safe to require regulation in other contexts—and less than 1/800th of a routine abdominal CT scan.

The NRC should not be regulating these reactors. Small scale nuclear should be regulated like x-Ray machines or gas turbines not like billion dollar nuclear power plants, the current rule. Reasonable regulation will allow iterative innovation. As I sais in my post Give Innovation a Chance, innovation is a dynamic process. You must build to build better.

Yet the NRC is stifling this progress. The licensing process alone can take up to nine years. Small modular reactor company NuScale spent more than $500 million just to get its design certification approved by the NRC, a process that took more than two million hours of labor and required millions of pages of information. NuScale still needs to apply for its license, which will multiply these costs.

The NRC rule is currently being challenged in State of Texas v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I think the case has a good chance of winning which would be a wonderful win for energy abundance.

One early report on congestion pricing in NYC

That is my latest Bloomberg column, here is one bit:

The core version of the plan stipulates a $9 toll for drivers entering Manhattan below and including 60th Street. Implementation is by E-Z Pass, and the tolls can vary in complex ways. But if you don’t cross the line, you don’t pay. So residents below 60th Street are exempt, provided they stay within the zone.

And:

The data do indicate some effective immediate adjustments. Most notably, morning commutes through the major bridges and tunnels into Manhattan have eased. Presumably the tolls have discouraged some drivers whose trips were less important to them, leading to quicker travel times for those drivers willing to pay. Economists typically consider such changes to be an improvement.

Such changes, however, aren’t of much help to native New Yorkers, in particular those living inside the zone. The earliest measurements indicate that traffic within the zone has not eased notably. So far, I would say the biggest beneficiaries of the policy are the wealthier residents of New Jersey and the New York state government, which is now set to take in more revenue.

Whatever you think of those consequences — YMMV, as they say — at least there is now actual data to sift through. You can track it here, and again it is important to stress that these preliminary assessments may change with time.

Many Manhattanites supported the charges on the grounds that they wanted a quieter, cleaner, less congested center city that was more friendly to bicycles and pedestrians. Think of Copenhagen or Amsterdam, if you have ever been. What they may end up getting is a central city more friendly to their cars — and less friendly to outsiders. It remains to be seen if central Manhattan has a path to becoming truly pleasant in the Nordic sense.

I will continue to follow this issue, as new results will be coming in.  Of course stiff tolls on those living inside the zone were the correct thing to do.  But that is not how politics works.