Category: Law

Can the SVB crisis be solved in the longer run?

The failure and closure of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) raise immediate issues as to how policymakers should react. I’d like to step back and consider what this implies for banking regulation more generally in the longer run. The main lesson is that successful bank regulation is an ongoing, dynamic problem, unintended secondary consequences are rife, and neither more regulation or less regulation can be guaranteed to succeed.

If you think of the FDIC/Fed/Treasury as a consolidated entity, the broader question is how many financial institution liabilities they should guarantee, whether explicitly or implicitly. Let us consider why in fact the government felt compelled to guarantee all of the deposits.

An unwillingness to guarantee all the deposits would satisfy the desire to penalize businesses and banks for their mistakes, limit moral hazard, and limit the fiscal liabilities of the public sector. Those are common goals in these debates. Nonetheless unintended secondary consequences kick in, and the final results of that policy may not be as intended.

Once depositors are allowed to take losses, both individuals and institutions will adjust their deposit behavior, and they probably would do so relatively quickly. Smaller banks would receive many fewer deposits, and the giant “too big to fail” banks, such as JP Morgan, would receive many more deposits. Many people know that if depositors at an institution such as JP Morgan were allowed to take losses above 250k, the economy would come crashing down. The federal government would in some manner intervene – whether we like it or not – and depositors at the biggest banks would be protected.

In essence, we would end up centralizing much of our American and foreign capital in our “too big to fail” banks. That would make them all the more too big to fail. It also might boost financial sector concentration in undesirable ways.

To see the perversity of the actual result, we started off wanting to punish banks and depositors for their mistakes. We end up in a world where it is much harder to punish banks and depositors for their mistakes.

Another unintended secondary consequence is that lots of funds would flow out of the banking system and into U.S. Treasuries. In other words, our private businesses would find it harder to borrow and our government would find it easier to borrow and thus government would command more resources. That hardly seems like a desirable outcome for a policy decision that had some initially libertarian motives.

Alternatively, you might think it is a simple way out for the government to guarantee all those deposits, as indeed was done last evening.

That decision too will prove to have unintended secondary consequences. Raising the FDIC protection limit from $250,000 to ??? raises political eyebrows in a dramatic manner. For one thing, the FDIC would then be seen as guaranteeing a much larger part of the financial system. Over time, the pressures for the government to protect yet additional parts of the financial system will grow, just as they did after the bailouts from the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Furthermore, if the FDIC keeps on increasing its protections in the quest for financial stability, that means a larger FDIC, a larger regulatory apparatus, perhaps higher capital requirements, and over time higher premia for banks to pay to the FDIC.  (As a side note, worthy of another post, we are also hearing calls that somehow VCs need to be regulated now, if they are going to “receive bailouts”.)

As that scenario unfolds, there will be all the more incentives to supply more lending and also deposit-taking services outside the formal and more heavily regulated banking sector. Rather than pushing more resources into the larger banks, this policy would push additional resources outside the formal banking system altogether. That would mean less power, oversight and scrutiny from the Fed and also from other regulatory bodies. Typically American banks are more tightly regulated and monitored than are non-bank financial entities.

This kind of problem is likely to unfold slowly, but it is no less real. The initial policy was an expansion of FDIC regulatory authority, but the end result could well be less total regulation of lending and depository functions. Once again, the policy decision may fail at achieving its initially intended goals.

The core problem is this: regulators can only protect so much of the financial system. Yet in a wealthy, peaceful economy the financial system often grows more rapidly than does gdp, if only because the financial system is based on the intermediation of wealth, not income. Simple accumulation boosts the ratio of wealth to income over time, thereby creating regulatory dilemmas for finance. Neither “regulating more and more of it” nor “letting more and more of it continue in a less regulated manner” are entirely satisfactory solutions.

But those of course are the only options available to us.

“Authorities Reinstate Alcohol Ban for Aboriginal Australians”

Geoff Shaw cracked open a beer, savoring the simple freedom of having a drink on his porch on a sweltering Saturday morning in mid-February in Australia’s remote Northern Territory.

“For 15 years, I couldn’t buy a beer,” said Mr. Shaw, a 77-year-old Aboriginal elder in Alice Springs, the territory’s third-largest town. “I’m a Vietnam veteran, and I couldn’t even buy a beer.”

Mr. Shaw lives in what the government has deemed a “prescribed area,” an Aboriginal town camp where from 2007 until last year it was illegal to possess alcohol, part of a set of extraordinary race-based interventions into the lives of Indigenous Australians.

Last July, the Northern Territory let the alcohol ban expire for hundreds of Aboriginal communities, calling it racist. But little had been done in the intervening years to address the communities’ severe underlying disadvantage. Once alcohol flowed again, there was an explosion of crime in Alice Springs widely attributed to Aboriginal people.

Here is more from Yan Zhuang at the New York Times.  Via Rich Dewey.

Restrictions on state public health authorities

When the next pandemic sweeps the United States, health officials in Ohio won’t be able to shutter businesses or schools, even if they become epicenters of outbreaks. Nor will they be empowered to force Ohioans who have been exposed to go into quarantine. State officials in North Dakota are barred from directing people to wear masks to slow the spread. Not even the president can force federal agencies to issue vaccine or testing mandates to thwart its march.

Conservative and libertarian forces have defanged much of the nation’s public health system through legislation and litigation as the world staggers into the fourth year of covid.

At least 30 states, nearly all led by Republican legislatures, have passed laws since 2020 that limit public health authority, according to a Washington Post analysis of laws collected by Kaiser Health News and the Associated Press as well as the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials and the Center for Public Health Law Research at Temple University.

Health officials and governors in more than half the country are now restricted from issuing mask mandates, school closures, and other protective measures or must seek permission from their state legislatures before renewing emergency orders, the analysis showed.

Here is more from the Washington Post.

The Collectivization of Innovation

In Collective Action Kills Innovation I wrote:

We have innovations like Uber and Airbnb and many others only because entrepreneurs didn’t have to ask for permission. Had we put these ideas to the vote they would have been defeated. Allow almost anyone with a car to drive customers around town? Stranger danger! Let any house be turned into a hotel? Not in my neighborhood! Once the innovations were brought into existence, the masses saw the benefits but they would not have seen those benefits if the idea had been put to a vote. Demonstration is more powerful than imagination.

More and more, however, the sphere of individual action shrinks and that of collective action grows.

A small but sadly amusing case in point is building in San Francisco. A plan was proposed to build the apartments at right. Love it, hate it. I don’t care. But it shouldn’t be up for collective action. Instead, what we have, however, is a planning process in which the President of the SF Planning Commission, Myrna Melgar, can opposed the plan because:

….I have to just state that I hate the design. Nothing against the architect, I think that the big windows, to me, are a statement of class and privilege. …having that building, with all of those windows it’s such a statement of, to me, class privilege because you know, poor people don’t do that, they don’t you know, like, win- you know, have everything out on the street. It just, so it just, it really rankles me the wrong way. So I just have to say it is a design issue. To me, design guidelines for what’s going to come are going be really important because I do think it does say to the community – is this still our community, what are we building for?

The building was proposed as a replacement for an auto shop (!) in 2014! Building didn’t start until 2022 and as of January 2023 it still wasn’t complete, although it looks like they got most of the windows approved.

An amusing video on some of the hypocrisy involved.

Hat tip: M. Nolan Gray and twitter thread.

My Conversation with Yasheng Huang

Here is the audio, video, and transcript, Yasheng is a China scholar and a professor at MIT.  Here is part of the episode summary:

Yasheng joined Tyler to discuss China’s lackluster technological innovation, why declining foreign investment is more of a concern than a declining population, why Chinese literacy stagnated in the 19th century, how he believes the imperial exam system deprived China of a thriving civil society, why Chinese succession has been so stable, why the Six Dynasties is his favorite period in Chinese history, why there were so few female emperors, why Chinese and Chinese Americans have less well becoming top CEOs of American companies than Indians and Indian Americans, where he’d send someone on a two week trip to China, what he learned from János Kornai, and more.

And an excerpt:

COWEN: Now, in your book, you write of what you call Tullock’s curse— Gordon Tullock having been my former colleague — namely, embedded succession conflict in an autocracy. Why has Chinese succession been so stable up to now? And will we see Tullock’s curse whenever Xi steps down, passes on, whatever happens there?

HUANG: I do want to modify the word that you use, stable. There are two ways to use that term. One is to describe the succession process itself. If that’s the situation we’re trying to describe, it is not stable at all. If you look at the entire history of the PRC, there have been so many succession plans that failed, and at a catastrophic level. One potential successor was persecuted to death. Another fled and died in a plane crash. Others were unceremoniously dismissed, and one was put under house arrest for almost 15 years, and he died —

COWEN: But no civil war, right?

HUANG: Yes, that’s right.

COWEN: No civil war.

HUANG: That’s right. There’s another way to talk about stability, which is stability at the system level, and that, you are absolutely right. Despite all these problems with these successions, the system as a whole has remained stable. The CCP is in power. There’s no coup, and there were not even demonstrations on the street associated with the succession failures. So, we do need to distinguish between these two kinds of stability. By one criterion, it was not stable. By the other criterion, it is quite stable.

The reason for that is, I think — although it’s a little bit difficult to generalize because we don’t really have many data points — one reason is the charisma power of individual leaders, Mao and Xiaoping. These were founding fathers of the PRC, of the CCP, and they had the prestige and — using Max Weber’s term — charisma, that they could do whatever they wanted while being able to contain the spillover effects of their mistakes. The big uncertain issue now is whether Xi Jinping has that kind of charisma to contain future spillover effects of succession failure.

This is a remarkable statistic: Since 1976, there have been six leaders of the CCP. Of these six leaders, five of them were managed either by Mao or by Deng Xiaoping. Essentially, the vast majority of the successions were handled by these two giants who had oversized charisma, oversized prestige, and unshakeable political capital.

Now we have one leader who doesn’t really have that. He relies mostly on formal power, and that’s why he has accumulated so many titles, whereas he’s making similar succession errors as the previous two leaders.

Obviously, we don’t know — because he hasn’t chosen a successor — we don’t really know what will happen if he chooses a successor. But my bet is that the ability to contain the spillover effect is going to be less, rather than more, down the road, because Xi Jinping does not match, even in a remote sense, the charisma and the prestige of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. There’s no match there.

Recommended.  And I am happy to recommend Yasheng Huang’s forthcoming book The Rise and Fall of the East.

Pre-order here: https://www.amazon.com/dp/0300266367?ref_=cm_sw_r_cp_ud_dp_CXCHDSQB8JBKEXM4J5BE

Dollars, dollars, everywhere…

As if the dual currency exchange is not enough to contend with, Argentina has around 15 different exchange rates, including a “soy dollar” for soy exports, a “Qatar dollar” for Argentine tourists travelling to the World Cup last year, and even the “Coldplay dollar”, a special exchange rate for paying foreign entertainers that made a name for itself when the band had a string of sellout concerts last year.

Here is more from the FT, via Tom V.,

Britain’s Long Timeline of Housing Decline

In 1947 the British Town and Country Planning Act made planning permission a requirement for land development; ownership alone no longer conferred the right to develop the land. A decline in construction was predictable but housing is a durable good. Even today more than a third of the British housing stock dates to before 1947. So it has taken time but, according to a new study, the act has had a slow but long-run depressing effect on construction with the result that today the average house in England costs more than ten times the average salary.

Britain has a severe housing crisis, especially in the most prosperous places in the Greater South East. Across England, the average house costs more than ten times the average salary, vacancy rates are below 1 per cent, and space per person for private renters has dropped substantially in recent decades.

This report explores the root cause of the UK’s housing problem, how policy in this area has developed over the last 75 years, and what action policymakers need to take to deliver enough homes in the UK.

…This report uses this new data and other sources to compare British housebuilding and outcomes to that in Ireland, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, (West) Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland from 1955 to 2015. It finds that Britain’s housing shortage began at the beginning of the post-war period…

Housebuilding rates in England and Wales have dropped by more than a third after the introduction of the Town and Country Planning Act 1947, from 2 per cent growth per year between 1856 and 1939 to 1.2 per cent between 1947 and 2019.

This has been a key factor behind the UK’s long-standing housing crisis, which has led to inflated property prices and soaring rents in recent decades.

No Respect for Diversity of Opinion or Choice

David Zweig notes an important correlation:

The colleges with the most stifling atmospheres for speech also have the most aggressive Covid vaccine policies. The colleges that most welcome and protect a free exchange of ideas, in turn, have the least intrusive vaccine requirements.

Number 1 ranked [on Fire’s Free Speech Index, AT] Chicago has no vaccine mandate at all. The university merely “strongly recommends” Covid vaccination. Numbers 2, 3, 4, and 5 on the list – Kansas StatePurdueMississippi State, and Oklahoma State – do not require any Covid vaccination either. They do each highly encourage vaccination, though.

At the bottom, Columbia not only requires the primary series for its students, but also requires the most recent bivalent booster. Ditto for second-to-last place Penn. For the many students who received an initial booster early on, this means a requirement of four doses. Rounding out the worst five colleges for free speech, Rensselaer Polytechnic InstituteGeorgetown, and Skidmore also mandate all students be boosted. Though compared to Columbia and Penn they are relatively lax, only requiring “a booster,” meaning the third shot could have been from a long while ago, and not necessarily the bivalent.

Why are the colleges with the worst limits on free speech also the worst for limiting bodily autonomy?

Columbia and its ilk had a history of liberalism which, as is well-known now, has recently morphed into a more stifling form of modern progressivism that doesn’t tolerate dissent. The political tribalism that demands in-group thinking also demands in-group behavior — during, and now exiting the pandemic, the more extreme that one reacted toward Covid, the more one demonstrated their membership in the left wing. (Being double masked and triple vaxxed was for a long time a progressive identity marker.) Quite simply, an extreme vaccination policy, out of step with much of the world yet perfectly accepted in progressive America, announces one’s institution as an unimpeachable member of the tribe.

That there is an association between respect toward free speech and respect toward bodily autonomy — or a lack thereof for each — at academic institutions shouldn’t surprise anyone. Both reflect attitudes either in agreement with or against a libertarian ideal of individual freedom. But the degree of correlation is still disheartening.

…It is an embarrassment that policies at many of our most elite institutions of higher education are the most divorced from scientific evidence, and are now, finally, even alienating mainstream liberals. FIRE’s free speech rankings, alas, help explain how we got to this place.

We live in a diverse society and that requires respect. Unfortunately, at some of our nation’s top universities there is no respect for diversity of opinion or choice.

Incentives matter, edition #4637

Many developed countries currently both face and resist strong migratory pressure, fueling irregular migration. The Central Mediterranean Sea is among the most dangerous crossings for irregular migrants in the world. In response to mounting deaths, European nations intensified search and rescue operations in 2013. We develop a model of irregular migration to identify the effects of these operations. Leveraging exogenous variation from rapidly varying crossing conditions, we find that smugglers responded by sending boats in adverse weather and shifting from seaworthy boats to flimsy rafts. As a result, these operations induced more crossings in dangerous conditions, ultimately offsetting their intended safety benefits due to moral hazard and increasing the realized ex post crossing risk for migrants. Despite the increased risk, these operations likely increased aggregate migrant welfare; nevertheless, a more successful policy should instead restrict the supply of rafts and expand legal alternatives for migration.

While I agree with that policy recommendation, I say good luck with that one.  “Not enough people are dying” is what one of those harsh, old school economists might have said instead.  Good thing we got rid of them.

In any case, that article is by Claudio Deiana, Vikram Maheshri, and Giovanni Mastrobuoni, forthcoming in the American Economic Journal (Economic Policy), with the title being “Migrants at Sea: Unintended Consequences of Search and Rescue Operations.”

On a land tax, from the comments

A land tax in its purest form will never survive contact with political reality. To implement it you have to tell people that own their own homes that they are in fact renting them from the government, and at rates which depend on how much other people covet their land. This may be economically incorrect but it is how opposition will play out.

Furthermore, determining land values as distinct from property values in highly built-up areas with strong planning constraints (e.g. the UK) is an exercise in guesswork. You cannot realistically disentangle the value of the land from the actual and likely permissions on that land. The valuation process will be intensely political, prone to corruption, and any modelling easily manipulated by how exemplars are chosen. In the UK at least it would be a bloodbath.

That is from Sonofid.  And from dan1111:

So much hand wringing over NYC and San Francisco, and treating this as the standard “urban” case.

Meanwhile, 90% of US cities feature depressed urban cores with very cheap, under-used land. Maybe figuring out how to make more US cities desirable is the low hanging fruit? And there is plenty of comparative study that can be done, since some cities have been better at rebounding than others.

My Conversation with Glenn Loury

Moving throughout, here is the audio, video, and transcript.  Here is part of the summary:

Economist and public intellectual Glenn Loury joined Tyler to discuss the soundtrack of Glenn’s life, Glenn’s early career in theoretical economics, his favorite Thomas Schelling story, the best place to raise a family in the US, the seeming worsening mental health issues among undergraduates, what he learned about himself while writing his memoir, what his right-wing fans most misunderstand about race, the key difference he has with John McWhorter, his evolving relationship with Christianity, the lasting influence of his late wife, his favorite novels and movies, how well he thinks he will face death, and more.

Here is one excerpt:

COWEN: What’s your favorite Thomas Schelling story?

LOURY: [laughs] This is a story about me as much as it is about Tom Schelling. The year is 1984. I’ve been at Harvard for two years. I’m appointed a professor of economics and of Afro-American studies, and I’m having a crisis of confidence, thinking I’m never going to write another paper worth reading again.

Tom is a friend. He helped to recruit me because he was on the committee that Henry Rosovsky, the famous and powerful dean of the college of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard, who hired me — the committee that Rosovsky put together to try to find someone who could fill the position that I was hired into: professor of economics and of Afro-American Studies. They said Afro-American in those years.

Tom was my connection. He’s the guy who called me up when I was sitting at Michigan in Ann Arbor in early ’82, and said, “Do you think you might be interested in a job out here?” He had helped to recruit me.

So, I had this crisis of confidence. “Am I ever going to write another paper? I’m never going to write another paper.” I’m saying this to Tom, and he’s sitting, sober, listening, nodding, and suddenly starts laughing, and he can’t stop, and the laughing becomes uncontrollable. I am completely flummoxed by this. What the hell is he laughing at? What’s so funny? I just told him something I wouldn’t even tell my wife, which is, I was afraid I was a failure, that it was an imposter syndrome situation, that I could never measure up.

Everybody in the faculty meeting at Harvard’s economics department in 1982 was famous. Everybody. I was six years out of graduate school, and I didn’t know if I could fit in. He’s laughing, and I couldn’t get it. After a while, he regains his composure, and he says, “You think you’re the only one? This place is full of neurotics hiding behind their secretaries and their 10-foot oak doors, fearing the dreaded question, ‘What have you done for me lately?’ Why don’t you just put your head down and do your work? Believe me, everything will be okay.” That was Tom Schelling.

COWEN: He was great. I still miss him.

And the final question:

COWEN: Very last question. Do you think you will do a good job facing death?

Interesting and revealing throughout.

This is actually quite a common attitude toward science

On Christmas morning, Scarlett Doumato took a break from playing with her new toys, marched into the kitchen, returned with plastic bags and started collecting evidence — the half-eaten Oreo and a pair of munched-on carrots she’d left for Santa and his reindeer the night before.

Scarlett, a 10-year-old from Cumberland, R.I., could see teeth marks in both. But neither she nor her parents could prove that the person who ate the cookie was Santa or that the reindeer were the ones that chomped on the baby carrots.

Scarlett decided to call for backup.

A few days later, the fourth-grader sent the evidence she’d collected to local police with a letter explaining her investigative methodology and what she was trying to find out: “Dear Cumberland Police department, I took a sample of a cookie and carrots that I left for Santa and the raindeer on christmas eve and was wondering if you could take a sample of DNA and see if Santa is real?”

Here is the full story by Jonathan Edwards, via the excellent Kevin Lewis.