Category: Law
What should I ask Dan Wang?
Yes, I will be doing a podcast with him. Dan first became famous on the internet with his excellent Christmas letters. More recently, Dan is the author of the NYT bestselling book Breakneck: China’s Quest to Engineer the Future.
Here is Dan Wang on Wikipedia, here is Dan on Twitter. I have known him for some while. So what should I ask him?
The median voter model, or the Becker pressure group model?
Or perhaps a game-theoretic model between the President and the Supreme Court? From the WSJ:
President Trump in recent weeks has exempted dozens of products from his so-called reciprocal tariffs and offered to carve out hundreds more goods from farm products to airplane parts when countries strike trade deals with the U.S.
The offer to exempt more products from tariffs reflects a growing sentiment among administration officials that the U.S. should lower levies on goods that it doesn’t domestically produce, say people familiar with administration planning. That notion “has been emerging over time” within the administration, said Everett Eissenstat, deputy director of the National Economic Council in Trump’s first term. “There is definitely that recognition.”
The move comes ahead of a Supreme Court hearing in early November on the reciprocal tariffs—a case that could force the administration to pay back many of the levies if it loses in court. The White House, Commerce Department and U.S. Trade Representative’s office didn’t respond to requests for comment.
I suppose that is good news, but of course it can introduce more cross-product and cross-nation distortions as well.
The Economic Geography of American Slavery
What would the antebellum American economy have looked like without slavery? Using new micro-data on the U.S. economy in 1860, we document that where free and enslaved workers live and how much they earn correlates strongly—but differently—with geographic proxies for agricultural productivity, disease, and ease of slave escape. To explain these patterns, we build a quantitative spatial model of slavery, where slaveholders coerce enslaved workers into supplying more labor, capture the proceeds of their labor, and assign them to sectors and occupations that maximize owner profits rather than worker welfare. Combining theory and data, we then quantify how dismantling the institution of slavery affected the spatial economy. We find that the economic impacts of emancipation are substantial, generating welfare gains for the enslaved of roughly 1,200%, while reducing welfare of free workers by 0.7% and eliminating slaveholder profit. Aggregate GDP rises by 9.1%, with a contraction in agricultural productivity counteracted by an expansion in manufacturing and services driven by an exodus of formerly enslaved workers out of agriculture and into the U.S. North.
That is from a new NBER working paper by
AI and the First Amendment
The more that outputs come from generative AI, the more the “free speech” treatment of AIs will matter, as I argue in my latest column for The Free Press. Here is one excerpt, quite separate from some of my other points:
Another problem is that many current bills, including one already passed in California, require online platforms to disclose which of their content is AI-generated, in the interest of transparency. That mandate has some good features, and in the short run it may be necessary to ease people’s fears about AI. But I am nervous about its longer-run implications.
Let’s say that most content evolves to be jointly produced by humans and AI, and not always in a way where all the lines are clear (GPT-5 did proofread this column, to look for stylistic errors, and check for possible improvements). Does all joint work have to be reported as such? If not, does a single human tweak to AI-generated material mean that no reporting is required?
And if joint work does have to be reported as joint, won’t that level of requirement inevitably soon apply to all output? Who will determine if users accurately report their role in the production of output? And do they have to keep records about this for years? The easier it becomes for individual users to use AI to edit output, the less it will suffice to impose a single, supposedly unambiguous reporting mandate on the AI provider.
I am not comfortable with the notion that the government has the legal right to probe the origin of a work that comes out under your name. In addition to their impracticality, such laws could become yet another vehicle for targeting writers, visual artists, and musicians whom the government opposes. For example, if a president doesn’t like a particular singer, he can ask her to prove that she has properly reported all AI contributions to her recordings.
I suspect this topic will not prove popular with many people. If you dislike free speech, you may oppose the new speech opportunities opened up by AIs (just build a bot and put it out there to blog, it does not have to be traceable to you). If you do like free speech, you will be uncomfortable with the much lower marginal cost of producing “license,” resulting from AI systems. Was the First Amendment really built to handle such technologies?
In my view free speech remains the best constitutional policy, but I do not expect AI systems to make it more popular as a concept. It is thus all the more important that we fight for free speech rights heading into the immediate future.
China understands negative emotional contagion
China’s censors are moving to stamp out more than just political dissent online. Now, they are targeting the public mood itself — punishing bloggers and influencers whose weary posts are resonating widely in a country where optimism is fraying.
The authorities have punished two bloggers who advocated for a life of less work and less pressure; an influencer who said that it made financial sense not to marry and have children; and a commentator known for bluntly observing that China still lags behind Western countries in terms of quality of life.
These supposed cynics and skeptics, two of whom had tens of millions of followers, have had their accounts suspended or banned in recent weeks as China’s internet regulator conducts a new cleanup of Chinese social media. The two-month campaign, launched by the Cyberspace Administration of China in late September, is aimed at purging content that incites “excessively pessimistic sentiment” and panic or promotes defeatist ideas such as “hard work is useless,” according to a notice from the agency.
Here is more from Lily Kuo from the NYT. If you are spreading negative emotional contagion, there is a very good chance that, no matter what you are saying, that you are part of the problem. A more fundamental division these days than Left vs. Right.
Claims about polygyny
The title of this piece is “High rates of polygyny do not lock large proportions of men out of the marriage market.” I believe further investigation is warranted before drawing such conclusions, but here is the abstract:
Social scientists often assume that when men can marry multiple wives (polygyny), many other men will be unable to marry. Versions of this assumption feature prominently in theories of civil war, the evolution of monogamy, and the incel movement. Using census data from 30 countries across Africa, Asia, and Oceania, as well as data from the historical United States, we find no clear evidence that polygyny is associated with higher proportions of unmarried men in society. Instead, high-polygyny populations often have marriage markets skewed in favor of men, and actually, men in high-polygyny populations usually marry more than men in low-polygyny ones. These findings challenge entrenched assumptions and inform debates on marriage systems, societal stability, and human rights.
That is from a recent paper by Hampton Gaddy, Rebecca Sear, and Laura Fortunato. At the very least, you hear the contrary story so often, and without firm documentation, that it is worth shaking the debate here a little bit.
Why we should not auction off all H1-B visas
I am fine with auctioning off some of them, but it should not be the dominant allocation mechanism. The visas work best when they support young talents who are unproven and perhaps liquidity constrained. Sundar Pichai was not a big star when he received his H1-B.
How about the business paying? Well, that is hard for a lot of start-ups. McKinsey, the employer who got Sundar his visa, might have coughed up the 100k, but Sundar did not stay there very long, only about two years. Which is what you might expect from the most talented, upwardly mobile candidates. That will discourage even well-capitalized businesses from making these investments, or they might try to lock in their new hires more than is currently the case.
So a pure auction mechanism probably is not optimal here, even though again it is fine to auction off some of the slots.
AI and the FDA
Dean Ball has an excellent survey of the AI landscape and policy that includes this:
The speed of drug development will increase within a few years, and we will see headlines along the lines of “10 New Computationally Validated Drugs Discovered by One Company This Week,” probably toward the last quarter of the decade. But no American will feel those benefits, because the Food and Drug Administration’s approval backlog will be at record highs. A prominent, Silicon Valley-based pharmaceutical startup will threaten to move to a friendlier jurisdiction such as the United Arab Emirates, and they may in fact do it.
Eventually, I expect the FDA and other regulators to do something to break the logjam. It is likely to perceived as reckless by many, including virtually everyone in the opposite party of whomever holds the White House at the time it happens. What medicines you consume could take on a techno-political valence.
Agreed—but the nearer-term upside is repurposing. Once a drug has been FDA approved for one use, physicians can prescribe it for any use. New uses for old drugs are often discovered, so the off-label market is large. The key advantage of off-label prescribing is speed: a new use can be described in the medical literature and physicians can start applying that knowledge immediately, without the cost and delay of new FDA trials. When the RECOVERY trial provided evidence that an already-approved drug, dexamethasone, was effective against some stages of COVID, for example, physicians started prescribing it within hours. If dexamethasone had had to go through new FDA-efficacy trials a million people would likely have died in the interim. With thousands of already approved drugs there is a significant opportunity for AI to discover new uses for old drugs. Remember, every side-effect is potentially a main effect for a different condition.
On Ball’s main point, I agree: there is considerable room for AI-discovered drugs, and this will strain the current FDA system. The challenge is threefold.
First, as Ball notes, more candidate drugs at lower cost means other regulators may become competitive with the FDA. China is the obvious case: it is now large and wealthy enough to be an independent market, and its regulators have streamlined approvals and improved clinical trials. More new drugs now emerge from China than from Europe.
Second, AI pushes us toward rational drug design. RCTs were a major advance, but they are in some sense primitive. Once a mechanic has diagnosed a problem, the mechanic doesn’t run a RCT to determine the solution. The mechanic fixes the problem! As our knowledge of the body grows, medicine should look more like car repair: precise, targeted, and not reliant on averages.
Closely related is the rise of personalized medicine. As I wrote in A New FDA for the Age of Personalized, Molecular Medicine:
Each patient is a unique, dynamic system and at the molecular level diseases are heterogeneous even when symptoms are not. In just the last few years we have expanded breast cancer into first four and now ten different types of cancer and the subdivision is likely to continue as knowledge expands. Match heterogeneous patients against heterogeneous diseases and the result is a high dimension system that cannot be well navigated with expensive, randomized controlled trials. As a result, the FDA ends up throwing out many drugs that could do good.
RCTs tell us about average treatment effects, but the more we treat patients as unique, the less relevant those averages become.
AI holds a lot of promise for more effective, better targeted drugs but the full promise will only be unlocked if the FDA also adapts.
Michael Clemens on H1-B visas
From 1990 to 2010, rising numbers of H-1B holders caused 30–50 percent of all productivity growth in the US economy. This means that the jobs and wages of most Americans depend in some measure on these workers.
The specialized workers who enter on this visa fuel high-tech, high-growth sectors of the 21st century economy with skills like computer programming, engineering, medicine, basic science, and financial analysis. Growth in those sectors sparks demand for construction, food services, child care, and a constellation of other goods and services. That creates employment opportunities for native workers in all sectors and at all levels of education.
This is not from a textbook narrative or a computer model. It is what happened in the real world following past, large changes in H-1B visa restrictions. For example, Congress tripled the annual limit on H-1B visas after 1998, then slashed it by 56 percent after 2004. That produced large, sudden shocks to the number of these workers in some US cities relative to others. Economists traced what happened to various economic indicators in the most-affected cities versus the least-affected but otherwise similar cities. The best research exhaustively ruled out other, confounding forces.
That’s how we know that workers on H-1B visas cause dynamism and opportunity for natives. They cause more patenting of new inventions, ideas that create new products and even new industries. They cause entrepreneurs to found more (and more successful) high-growth startup firms. The resulting productivity growth causes more higher-paying jobs for native workers, both with and without a college education, across all sectors. American firms able to hire more H-1B workers grow more, generating far more jobs inside and outside the firm than the foreign workers take.
An important, rigorous new study found the firms that win a government lottery allowing them to hire H-1B workers produce 27 percent more than otherwise-identical firms that don’t win, employing more immigrants but no fewer US natives—thus expanding the economy outside their own walls. So, when an influx of H-1B workers raised a US city’s share of foreign tech workers by 1 percentage point during 1990–2010, that caused7 percent to 8 percent higher wages for college-educated workers and 3 percent to 4 percent higher wages for workers without any college education.
Here is the full piece.
H1-B visa fees and the academic job market
Assume the courts do not strike this down (perhaps they will?).
Will foreigners still be hired at the entry level with an extra 100k surcharge? I would think not,as university budgets are tight these days. I presume there is some way to turn them down legally, without courting discrimination lawsuits?
What if you ask them to accept a lower starting wage? A different deal in some other manner, such as no summer money or a higher teaching load? Is that legal? Will schools have the stomach to even try? I would guess not. Is there a way to amortize the 100k over five or six years? What if the new hire leaves the institution in year three of the deal?
In economics at least, a pretty high percentage of the graduate students at top institutions do not have green cards or citizenships.
So how exactly is this going to work? There are not so many jobs in Europe, not enough to absorb those students even if they wish to work there. Will many drop out right now? And if the flow of graduate students is not replenished, given that entry into the US job market is now tougher, how many graduate programs will close up?
Will Chinese universities suddenly hire a lot more quality talent?
Here is some related discussion on Twitter.
As they say, solve for the equilibrium…
My excellent Conversation with David Commins
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf are the topics, here is the audio, video, and transcript. Here is the episode summary:
David Commins, author of the new book Saudi Arabia: A Modern History, brings decades of scholarship and firsthand experience to explain the kingdom’s unlikely rise. Tyler and David discuss why Wahhabism was essential for Saudi state-building, the treatment of Shiites in the Eastern Province and whether discrimination has truly ended, why the Saudi state emerged from its poorer and least cosmopolitan regions, the lasting significance of the 1979 Grand Mosque seizure by millenarian extremists, what’s kept Gulf states stable, the differing motivations behind Saudi sports investments, the disappointing performance of King Abdullah University of Science and Technology despite its $10 billion endowment, the main barrier to improving its k-12 education, how Yemen became the region’s outlier of instability and whether Saudi Arabia learned from its mistakes there, the Houthis’ unclear strategic goals, the prospects for the kingdom’s post-oil future, the topic of David’s next book, and more.
And an excerpt:
COWEN: Now, as you know, the senior religious establishment is largely Nejd, right? Why does that matter? What’s the historical significance of that?
COMMINS: Right. Nejd is the region of central Arabia. Riyadh is currently the capital. The first Saudi empire had a capital nearby, called Diriyah. Nejd is really the territory that gave birth to the Wahhabi movement, it’s the homeland of the Saud dynasty, and it is the region of Arabia that was most thoroughly purged of the older Sunni tradition that had persisted in Nejd for centuries.
Consequently, by the time that the Saudi government developed bureaucratic agencies in the 1950s and ’60s, the religious institution was going to recruit from that region of Arabia primarily. Now, it certainly attracted loyalists from other parts of Arabia, but the Wahhabi mission, as I call it — their calling to what they considered true belief — began in Nejd and was very strongly identified with the towns of Nejd ever since the late 1700s.
COWEN: Would I be correct in inferring that some of the least cosmopolitan parts of Saudi Arabia built the Saudi state?
COMMINS: Yes, that is correct. That is correct. If you think of the 1700s and 1800s, the Red Sea and Persian Gulf coast of Arabia were the most cosmopolitan parts of Arabia.
COWEN: They’re richer, too, right? Jeddah is a much more advanced city than Riyadh at the time.
COMMINS: Somewhat more advanced. Yes, it is more advanced, it is more cosmopolitan than Nejd. There is the regional identity in Hejaz, that is the Red Sea coast where the holy cities and Jeddah are located. The townspeople there tended to look upon Nejd as a less advanced part of Arabia. But again, that’s a very recent historical development.
COWEN: How is it that the coastal regions just dropped the ball? You could imagine some alternate history where they become the center of Saudi power and religious thought, but they’re not.
COMMINS: Right. If you take Jeddah, Mecca, and Medina — that region of Arabia, known as Hejaz, had always been under the rule of other Muslim empires. They were under the rule of other Muslim powers because of the religious value of possessing, if you will, the holy cities, Mecca and Medina. From the time of the first Muslim dynasty that was based in Damascus in the seventh and early eighth centuries, all the way until the Ottoman Empire, Muslim dynasties outside Arabia coveted control of that region. They were just more powerful than local resources could generate.
Hejaz was always, if you were, to dependency on outside Muslim powers. If you look at the east coast of Arabia — what’s now the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf — it was richer than central Arabia. It’s the largest oasis in Arabia. It is in proximity to pearling banks, which were an important source for income for residents there. It was part of the Indian Ocean trade between Iraq and India. The population there was always — well, always — for the last thousand years has been dominated by Bedouin tribesmen.
There was a brief Ismaili Shia republic, you might say, in that part of Arabia in medieval times. It just didn’t have, it seems, the cohesion to conquer other parts of Arabia. That’s what makes the Saudi story really remarkable, is that they were able to muster and sustain the cohesion to carry out a conquest like that over the course of 50 years.
COWEN: Physically, how did they manage that? Water is a problem, a lot of transport is by camel, there’s no real rail system, right?
Recommended, full of historical information about a generally neglected region, neglected from the point of view of history at least rather than current affairs.
Summary of a new DeepMind paper
Super intriguing idea in this new @GoogleDeepMind paper – shows how to handle the rise of AI agents acting as independent players in the economy.
It says that if left unchecked, these agents will create their own economy that connects directly to the human one, which could bring both benefits and risks.
The authors suggest building a “sandbox economy,” which is a controlled space where agents can trade and coordinate without causing harm to the broader human economy.
A big focus is on permeability, which means how open or closed this sandbox is to the outside world. A fully open system risks crashes and instability spilling into the human economy, while a fully closed system may be safer but less useful.
They propose using auctions where agents fairly bid for resources like data, compute, or tools. Giving all agents equal starting budgets could help balance power and prevent unfair advantages.
For larger goals, they suggest mission economies, where many agents coordinate toward one shared outcome, such as solving a scientific or social problem.
The risks they flag include very fast agent negotiations that humans cannot keep up with, scams or prompt attacks against agents, and powerful groups dominating resources.
To reduce these risks, they call for identity and reputation systems using tools like digital credentials, proof of personhood, zero-knowledge proofs, and real-time audit trails.
The core message is that we should design the rules for these agent markets now, so they grow in a safe and fair way instead of by accident.
That is from Rohan Paul, though the paper is by Nenad Tomasev, et.al. It would be a shame if economists neglected what is perhaps the most important (and interesting) mechanism design problem facing us.
Should we abolish mandatory quarterly corporate reporting?
President Trump has suggested doing that. I have not found a human source as good as GPT5, so I will cite that:
Theory predicts that more frequent reporting can exacerbate managerial short‑termism; some archival evidence finds lower investment when reporting frequency rises. But when countries reduced frequency (UK/EU), the average firm’s investment didn’t materially change—in part because most issuers kept giving quarterly updates anyway…
Will markets just insist on quarterly anyway? That’s what happened in the UK and Austria: after rules allowed semi‑annual reporting, only a small minority actually stopped quarterly updates; those that did often saw lower liquidity and less analyst coverage. So yes—many issuers kept some form of quarterly communication to satisfy investors.
There is much, much more at the link.
Intertemporal substitution
Across several Central American nations money transfers have jumped 20 percent.
The reason, officials, migrants and analysts say, is that people afraid of being deported are trying to get as much money out of the country as possible, while they still can.
The money transfers, called remittances, are a critical lifeline for many countries and families around the world, especially in Central America and the Caribbean. There, the funds sometimes make up a huge chunk of a nation’s economy — as much as a quarter of a country’s gross domestic product, as in Honduras and Nicaragua.
Here is more from James Wagner at the NYT.
What should I ask Cass Sunstein?
Yes, I will be doing a Conversation with him soon. Most of all (but not exclusively) about his three recent books Liberalism: In Defense of Freedom, Manipulation: What It Is, Why It Is Bad, What To Do About It, and Imperfect Oracle: What AI Can and Cannot Do.
So what should I ask him? Here is my previous CWT with Cass.