Category: Law

My very interesting Conversation with Jared Diamond

Here is the audio, video, and transcript.  Here is part of the episode summary:

So which leaders do make a difference?  

Tyler and Jared debate that question, including conditions what a religious founder needs to succeed, whether destructive leaders matter more than constructive ones, why individual leaders have mattered so little in Papua New Guinea, whether we undervalue preventers, how much Rachel Carson and the Resnicks really mattered, whether Botswana’s success will endure, Jared’s own place in intellectual history, and what he’d tell an ambitious 25-year-old about how to become consequential. They go on to cover whether New Guineans are smarter, his reasons for why the Industrial Revolution started in England, what he learned from Jim Robinson about natural experiments, why he’s more optimistic about the environment than when he wrote Collapse, what he’d do about nuclear risk, the 189 bird species on his street in Los Angeles, why the MacArthur “genius grant” left him depressed for a week, why he’s listening to one Bach cantata a week, what he hopes to work on as he enters his nineties, and more. 

Excerpt, we start with this:

COWEN: Who do you think is the least replaceable leader in human history?

DIAMOND: Wow. Wow. The least replaceable leader in human history. Frankly, my answer is none. There has been no unreplaceable leader in human history because over a long time, things wash out. A candidate, of course, would be Jesus Christ, but there were half a dozen other prophets in the Roman Empire at that time discussed in the New Testament. If Christ had died in childbirth, one of those other prophets might have taken over. I would say that in the long run, there is no leader that has made a difference.

COWEN: Well, you say “might have taken over,” but that’s probabilistic, right? Say with a 40 percent chance, someone else would have taken over. It still seems in expected value terms, Christ made an enormous difference.

DIAMOND: Certainly, his religion made an enormous difference. Christ himself was the charismatic founder, but a religion needs three things: It needs a charismatic founder, it needs an organizer, and often it needs a general because new religions often face opposition. The organizer for Christianity was St. Paul. In the case of the Mahdi’s religion of the Sudan in the late 1800s, the Mahdi was the charismatic founder, and he was the organizer, and he was the general. In the case of Islam, Muhammad was the founder and the organizer and the general. Religions may have three roles, some of which are sometimes played by the same person.

COWEN: Without the figure of Muhammad at exactly the time he came along, is it not quite easy to imagine a Middle East not unified under Islam, not unified with the common language of Arabic? In some ways, maybe a bit more like the Caucasus, which remains a crazy quilt of different patterns. Thus, Muhammad is one of the three or four most consequential leaders ever.

DIAMOND: That’s possible. That’s a big question. It’s harder to become clear about Muhammad than it is about Christ, because we don’t know what the weather was like in Arabia at that time. Weather makes a big difference. If it was rainy, that would mean lots of plant growth for lots of babies and for feeding an army. We just don’t have information on the weather in Arabia at that time.

A counter-example is Genghis Khan, who developed the largest land empire in world history, all the way from China to Poland. Recently, why did Genghis Khan do it when there were other steppe leaders like Adolf Hühnlein and Timur the Turk? We’ve learned recently that the wettest time on the steppes in the last 2,000 years was around the time of Genghis’s birth. He was born at exactly the right time at the right place. If he had been born 200 miles further away and 20 years earlier, we wouldn’t know anything about him. In the case of Muhammad, we just don’t know whether the time of his birth was a particularly propitious time to found a religion in that area or not.

COWEN: The very notion that the two first names we’re talking about, they’re both religious leaders, right? They’re not kings. They’re not inventors. Do you think that suggests a vision of the world where it’s ideas that really matter and somewhat at variance with your own geography-based theories?

Interesting throughout, and we debated pomegranate juice as well.  I enjoyed reading Jared’s new book Profits, Prophets, Coaches, and Kings: (When) Do Leaders Matter?

No Doing, No Learning

A regulation that raises gasoline prices makes people angry but when regulation prevents an industry from ever existing, most people never learn what they lost.

Consider nuclear power. Overnight construction costs for early U.S. demonstration reactors fell 81 percent between 1954 and 1968. For reactors begun between 1967 and 1972, costs rose 187 percent. The 1971 Calvert Cliffs decision and then the reaction to Three Mile Island in 1979 accelerated the cost increases and slowed construction even more.

What might have happened had the earlier learning and deployment trends continued? Peter Lang’s 2017 paper in Energies estimates that nuclear power would have cost about one-tenth as much by 2015. The additional generation could have avoided as many as 9.5 million premature deaths.

The number is staggering even if quartered. Millions of deaths. Yet, the graveyard was both invisible and silent.

(Furthermore, climate change would not be a problem today had nuclear power not been handicapped.)

The nuclear story you probably know but Niko McCarty has an excellent new Works in Progress piece on an invisible graveyard of technology that I knew almost nothing about.

In the 1980s, officials decided to regulate engineered microbes under the Toxic Substances Control Act, a law written for industrial chemicals. Microbes swap genes all the time, but EPA treats them as “new” whenever DNA is introduced from another genus. As a result, even a marker gene used simply to identify successfully edited cells can trigger review if it remains in the organism. McCarty reports that researchers filed more than 240 applications between 1987 and 2018: “Only a few were ever approved for widespread use.”

What have we lost? We can’t know for sure but among the plausible losses McCarty discusses are engineered bacteria that detect buried explosives, microbes that extract rare-earth metals and improved plastic-digesting enzymes. Similarly, Chernia et al. write:

Promising many societal benefits, emergent products of biotechnology involve releasing genetically modified microbes (GMMs) into the environment. However, regulatory challenges limit their use. So far, GMMs have mainly been tested in agriculture and environmental cleanup, with few approved for commercial purposes. Current government regulations inadequately address modern genetic engineering and limit the potential of gut therapeutics, skin products, self-repairing materials, ocean pollution treatment, anti-corrosion coatings, etc.

And those are just some of the plausible first-stage losses. Perhaps even more importantly, we learn by doing. Thus, no doing, no learning. The first approved product is rarely the safest or the best but when we fail to approve the first we don’t get the much better 5th. Forty years of that process could have taken us well beyond the applications McCarty describes. We must build to build better.

Nuclear power at least left us enough reactors to get some idea of what we lost. With microbes, I needed McCarty to tell me there was something missing even though I study these issues for a living. And note one reason new microbe loss was invisible. No vote was ever taken. No debate was ever had. Officials in the 1980s reasoned that genomes are made of chemicals and chemicals are covered, and that doctrine has governed the field ever since despite being overly broad and excessively costly.

How many other gaps in our technology have explanations buried in the Federal Register?
—

Here is a video version of this post. Which do  you like better?

And it begins…(a good start…)

Wall Street banks are pushing large law firms to cut fees, arguing that the business model that has enriched top lawyers for decades is not sustainable in an era of AI.

Morgan Stanley and Citigroup have told major law firms they want to set up new payment arrangements that would save them money, the banks’ in-house lawyers told the FT…

“If the number of hours they’re working on a matter has come down because of AI . . . our expectation is for costs to come down significantly per transaction,” Adam Meshel, global head of legal at Citigroup, told the FT.

He said the bank had started asking law firms to bid for work, explaining during the bidding process how much they were saving using AI…

The ability to complete tasks more quickly could mark “a fundamental altering of the revenue foundation for these mega firms”, he said.

Here is the full FT piece by Kaye Wiggins and Joshua Franklin.  I have been predicting exactly this in many of my talks…

Who values democracy?

This paper examines the conventional view that redistribution is central to the democratization process using data from stock markets. Consistent with this view, democratizations have a large, negative impact on asset valuations driven by a rise in redistribution risk. Across 90 countries over 200 years, risk premia are substantially elevated— similar in magnitude to financial crises—prior to and during democratizations. A shift in Catholic church doctrine in support of democracy provides causal evidence that democratizations increase risk premia. Successful democratizations lead to substantial redistribution: the size of the public sector grows, income inequality falls, and the labor share of income rises. An extended version of the canonical redistribution-based model of democratization that includes asset prices can quantitatively explain these effects. Reductions in inequality and increased taxes explain approximately half of the results. The rest comes from greater economic competition and equality in government spending. The model also explains the negligible asset pricing response to autocratizations. Neither an increase in macroeconomic risk nor generic political risk can explain the results.

That is by Max Miller, now published in the JPE, ungated copy here.

Russia markets in everything

While Western export bans have severed Russia from much of the auto market, they have not tempered the demand for brand-name SUVs and trucks. That has given rise to a sophisticated network of criminals that steals cars, hides them in shipping containers and sends them to Russia, often by way of the Middle East…

Interpol, the international police organization, received 4,798 reports that stolen Canadian vehicles had been found in Russia from February 2024 to July 2026, according to data obtained by The New York Times and confirmed by two law enforcement officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity because it is considered sensitive.

Pickup trucks like Dodge Rams, Toyota Tundras and Ford F-150s are in particularly high demand.

The Interpol figures significantly undercount the problem, but Russia is by far the top international destination for Canadian cars reported to Interpol, according to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

Here is more from Jane Bradley and Michael Swirtz at the NYT.

Scholar Data

In our paper, A Skeptical View of the National Science Foundation’s Role in Economic Research, Tyler and I point out that if the NSF is doing what it should, it ought to be doing very different things than other funders:

Public goods theory tells us that the National Science Foundation should support activities that are especially hard to support through traditional university, philanthropic, and private-sector sources. This insight suggests a simple test: to the extent that the NSF allocates funds to genuine public goods as opposed to subsidies on the margin, we ought to see a large difference in the kinds of projects the NSF supports compared to what the “market” sector supports. But what stands out from lists of prominent NSF grants (like the one provided by Moffitt in this symposium) is how similar they look to lists of “good” research produced by today’s status quo. If we take public goods theory seriously, what areas of economics should be supported?

We suggest replication studies and support for producing public datasets. Which brings me to Scholar Data, a neat new project that won NIH’s competition to create a data-sharing index. Scholar data creates an S-Index, like an H-Index for papers, but instead the S-Index measures a dataset’s ease of access, citations and other mentions. The point is to create a metric to reward the creation of a public good:

Researchers invest years collecting and sharing datasets that underpin reproducibility, transparency, and discovery across every field. Without shared data, findings can’t be verified, built upon, or trusted. And yet, the metrics that define academic careers, such as citations, h-index, and impact factor, only count publications. Data sharing goes unrecognized and unrewarded.

This creates a broken incentive: researchers are expected to share data, but get no credit for doing so. The result is that data sharing is treated as a chore rather than a contribution.

Scholar Data and the S-index are aimed at fixing this. By measuring how impactful your datasets are, the S-index gives data sharing the same visibility and recognition as publishing, turning it from an obligation into a career asset.

Bravo! Your dataset may already be catalogued. You can get credit at ScholarData.

A Big Bet on Explosive AI-Driven Growth

Wow! The excellent Ben Moll has put together a high-stakes bet on US economic growth.

A bet on near-term explosive AI-driven growth: whether U.S. real GDP per capita will grow by at least 15% within a single year (measured relative to prior peak) by the end of 2033. Agreed on X, 15–16 August 2026. This document summarizes the agreed terms.
1. Parties and stakes
Fast-growth side (wins if the growth condition in Section 2 is met):
● William MacAskill https://www.williammacaskill.com/ — $10,000
● Samuel Albanie https://samuelalbanie.com/ — $25,000
● Tom Cohen https://x.com/tomcohen — $25,000
● Total: $60,000
No-fast-growth side (wins otherwise):
● Benjamin Moll http://benjaminmoll.com/ — $40,000
● Andrew Ho https://andrewho.xyz/ — $200,000
● Total: $240,000

Odds: 4:1 — every $1 staked by the fast-growth side is matched by $4 from the no-fast-growth
side. Implied probability of the fast-growth scenario: 20%.

I’m known for quipping that a bet is a tax on bullshit but I don’t think either side is BSing. We have a genuine and important disagreement. I’d side with Moll, for what it is worth.

What should I ask Yiyang Zhuge (诸葛一杨), also known as Zhong Shu (仲树)?

Yes I will be doing a Conversation with her.  She is best known to Western audiences for her interview with Christopher Nolan, but she has numerous other achievements:

Yiyang Zhuge is a political theorist, political columnist, and a translator of German and Greek philosophical texts. She is an instructor at Brandeis University, and a PhD Candidate at Boston College. 

Yiyang is a major translator of Hannah Arendt into Chinese. She has translated The Human Condition, Life of the Mind, Men in Dark Times, collected poetry, Die verborgene Tradition, and Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess. She has given numerous lectures and published numerous public-facing articles on Arendt. 

Yiyang published the first Greek-to-Chinese translation of Plutarch’s Moralia, a best-selling philosophy book in 2025. 

She runs Princeton University Press’s Political Philosophy Book Club, where she interviews important Western academics for the Chinese audience. 

Yiyang is a public intellectual in China. She reports on American higher ed monthly at print magazine Caixin Weekly. She is a political commenter on Hong Kong’s Phoenix TV (here and here). She hosts great books programs on vistopia and has contributed essays on Machiavelli, Rousseau, Tocqueville, Arendt at vistopia. She hosts the most popular Mandarin political philosophy podcast “Monologues of a Committed Observer” with 1m+ subscribers.

So what should I ask her?

The least bad way to regulate AI?

That is the topic of my latest Free Press column.  Excerpt:

The key is to create some basic safeguards, but without stifling broader AI progress. To do so, we must defy the conventional wisdom about public oversight and instead trust the AI labs to be their own primary regulators.

My version of the proposal starts with defining a private not-for-profit body for AI regulation. An ideal body would draw some features from FINRA (the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority): a consortium of financial firms that examines the trade practices of each and makes recommendations, helping the federal Securities and Exchange Commission with oversight and regulation. The AI version would include the major labs and would be authorized and overseen by Washington, perhaps through the now-fledgling Center for AI Standards and Innovation.

This body would periodically audit major AI companies and their models, judging their conduct and safety. In the short run at least, much of this would be focused on issues of cybersecurity, and whether the new models created more cyber risk than they help to solve. If a company passed the audit, it would be exempted from standard liability law, at least provided that it had shown basic, reasonable care, as opposed to extreme or deliberate negligence. That would free the AI labs from the fear that courts might derail their business by granting huge awards to plaintiffs for ill-defined harms that could not reasonably have been prevented. And it would give the labs a strong incentive to meet the safety standards of this body.

It is reasonable to wonder whether such a body, composed of industry players, would issue fair and equitable judgments of safety. Maybe not. Yet there are many upsides and no better alternative.

For one thing, each company knows that a dangerous model from another company could cause a harmful incident and damage the prospects for the entire industry. Consider the Three Mile Island meltdown in 1979, which contributed significantly to the mothballing of the entire U.S. nuclear industry. Few people can name the company (Metropolitan Edison) behind the malfunctioning plant; the reputational penalty attached to the industry as a whole.

Another incentive for safety is that the top companies do not want too much competition from lower-price, lower-quality upstarts. That too will induce those companies to support fairly tough standards, perhaps excessively tough in some cases. Still, we are choosing from imperfect alternatives. The concrete truth, whether we like it or not, is that there is far more expertise within the companies for judging AI safety than we can expect to find in the federal government anytime soon.

I am indebted to some ideas from Dean Ball, noting that his proposal is somewhat different.  And here are some comments from Brendan McCord.

Data Centers and the Open Access Order

The US discussion over datacenters is depressing. Datacenters do not use a lot of water, they produce very useful outputs, they are not a blight on the landscape. All of this is obvious. But I don’t want to restate the obvious. What bothers me most about the discussion is that people seem to think this is or should be a collective decision. No.

We have a simple set of rules that everyone must follow. You buy land from someone willing to sell it. You contract for electricity. You hire workers who want the job. Your obligations to your local neighbors come from the same laws that govern everyone else. We do not ask what the land, electricity and labor is for. If you follow the rules, that is nobody’s business.

This is the distinction North, Wallis and Weingast make in Violence and Social Orders (paper here) between limited access orders or the natural state and open-access orders. For most of recorded history large-scale economic activity depended on access to political power. In the natural state, “people outside the coalition have only limited access to organizations, privileges, and valuable resources and activities.”  The dominant coalition controlled entry into valuable activities and created rents by granting privileges.

An open access order works through general criteria. Organizational formation is “open to everyone who meets a set of minimal and impersonal criteria.” In economic life, the transition entails “the ability to create economic organizations at will, open entry and competition in many markets.”

The key word is impersonal. The same conditions apply regardless of who wants to build or whether public officials admire the proposed use. The state is not necessarily laissez-faire but its role ends once you have complied with the impersonal rules.

Now look at how a data center actually gets built. Rezoning, special use permits, comprehensive plan amendments, a negotiated “community benefits agreement” of school donations, fiber, soccer fields, and payments in lieu of taxes, public comment and then more public comment. These are not general rules. They are terms of admission negotiated with whoever holds the veto. Calling them community benefits doesn’t change the structure. Access to economic activity has become something that must be bargained for, argued for in the collective sphere, and paid for–with success determined by rents and political access. The natural state returns.

(The subsidies, by the way. are the same error wearing the other hat. A sales tax exemption written for datacenters and a county moratorium aimed at datacenters both replace a general rule with a judgment about whether this industry deserves to exist. An open access order offers neither special favors nor special burdens. It offers a rule.)

Opponents often complain that communities deserve more of a say. No, they do not. You did not vote on the bakery and the baker did not vote on you. That is the deal.

Datacenters happen to be where this is most visible today. Their size and novelty make them easy targets for vilification and rent extraction. But the big issue is not datacenters. It is whether building depends on following impersonal rules or on securing permission case by case from those who control access. The natural state was the human default for ten thousand years. The open access order that displaced it is the foundation of our prosperity and our political strength, and it is younger and more fragile than we like to think.

AI and constitutions (from my email)

“Dear Tyler,

I enjoyed reading your notes on visiting Anthropic to advise on Claude’s constitution. Framing AI governance around the common law, case law (“Talmud”), and independent adjudication is a much more adaptive approach than relying on a static, top-down text.

That said, moving from a fixed text to a case-law system introduces its own set of structural risks. If Anthropic adopts this direction, a few institutional design hazards seem worth anticipating:

  • The throughput bottleneck (Speed vs. Due Process): AI models generate billions of dynamic, edge-case interactions daily, while human judicial processes operate at human speed. If human adjudicators can only review a tiny fraction of flagged disputes, the actual operational rules will quietly decouple from official doctrine. Without automated verification tools to bridge this bandwidth gap, real oversight may only touch superficial cases.
  • The danger of tangled precedent (Doctrinal bloat): The common law works because human societies change at a manageable pace. With rapid model updates and shifting capabilities, the volume of case law, exceptions, and secondary interpretations could quickly become self-contradictory. Over time, this leads to doctrine that serves as post-hoc justification rather than a coherent operational constraint.
  • Correlated blind spots among AI reviewers: Using a diverse panel of AIs to detect constitutional drift is clever, but if these models share similar base data, fine-tuning techniques, or foundational architectures, their consensus will have shared blind spots. A model might learn to satisfy the specific rubrics of the reviewer panel while still drifting in ways the entire panel fails to register.
  • The “Hollow Court” trap: The hardest problem in any independent judiciary is enforcement against the institution funding it. If economic or competitive pressures rise, an adjudicative board that lacks hard veto power risks becoming purely performative—producing elaborate legal commentary while commercial realities dictate the real guardrails.

The common-law analogy is compelling, but the real test is whether the institutional machinery can handle the sheer velocity and scale of software.”

That is from Scott Jenkins.

Towards a New House of Lords

In Britain, the House of Lords was traditionally dominated by hereditary peers–a right bequeathed by the monarch, sometimes in ancient times, to sit in the House of Lords that was transmitted generationally. That system has been withering away for decades, however, and was finally ended this year by the 2026 Hereditary Peers Act. So how should members of the House of Lords be chosen?

One idea which comes to mind quickly is selection by merit. Perhaps the House of Lords should be filled with Nobel Prize winners, wise professors, former politicians, distinguished public servants and so forth. All very well and good but the nub here is that these people have to be chosen by someone, and whoever controls the selection process inevitably influences the kind of people selected. That makes an appointed chamber less independent of, and potentially more similar to, ordinary politics, even with lifetime appointments. Moreover, what is their interest? Madison argued that for a good system “the interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place.” A politicized selection of representatives, even meritorious representatives with lifetime appointments, may not differ enough from ordinary elected politicians to make much difference.

In 10% Less Democracy, my colleague Garett Jones, suggests that bondholders have a formal role in government. So let us consider, a House of Lords based on bond holdings. The advantage of this system is that bond holders are self-selected and their interests are in long-term stability–exactly what we want in a check on the popular house.

Votes in the House of Lords could be allocated proportionally to holdings; thus in practice we would get institutional representatives most notably including pension funds. If you want stability and growth, giving pension funds a bit more sway in national politics does not seem like a terrible idea. Bondholders would, for example, likely be more concerned with long-run financial stability, for example than current politicians seem to be. Should foreign holders of bonds be given a vote? Why not? Perhaps this would improve the prospects for peace. Although the popular house will always have the final say.

If anything, bondholders might prove too fiscally conservative as they are concerned primarily with default risk. The traditional House of Lords based on hereditary peers really amounted to a House of Lords based on landed property which isn’t a bad proxy for long-term stability and growth. After all, land owners do tend to do well when the country does well and you can’t take your land to another country. The ancient system had its wisdom; but landholding is not perfectly aligned with national prosperity. The House of Lords defended tariffs on imported foods (the corn laws) to promote land rents at the expense of food prices for everyone else. For similar reasons, we might, therefore, want to leaven the House of Lords with some equity, say ownership of Trills–the Robert Shiller idea for shares backed by real GDP. We would thus have a popular house and a corporate house divided into equity and bonds, all well aligned.

Democracy and Caeserism

In my 2015 post discussing Joseph Heath’s excellent book Enlightenment 2.0, I had this to say:

One of the reasons that I oppose the extension of democratic politics into every aspect of modern life is precisely that in trying to do too much, democracy delivers incoherence, gridlock and frustration, forces that eventually undermine its own legitimacy. I worry about democratic legitimacy because I see democracy as a check and balance on Leviathan (while Heath sees it as a check on government by experts).

The legislature has become a sideshow. But I worry, because the more Congress is held in contempt the greater the support for a bold executive that takes charge, makes decisions and gets things done. Under these pressures, executive power has grown not just in the United States but also in Canada and Great Britain (on this theme see F.H. Buckley’s The Once and Future King.) But for all its faults, the legislature and the rule of law are more conducive to liberty than the executive and the administrative state. Legislators are satisfied with reelection and a bit of pork but executives hunger for greatness and in so doing they promote the real dangers, idolatry, the centralization of power and war.

In short, I worry that the pathologies of democracy drive the demand not for rational, technocratic government but for Caesarism.

I should note that this was before Donald Trump was a Republican presidential contender, let alone a candidate for office.

Addendum: See also  my review of Enlightenment 2.0. It has some good lines!

The propagandizing messages of markets and politics are also very different. Market messages are largely inclusive and cosmopolitan. Coca-Cola advertises “I’d Like to Buy the World a Coke” because they’d like the world to buy a Coke. Firms do try to build brand affiliation but they rarely do so by promoting hatred of their competitors. Pepsi doesn’t tell the Pepsi Generation that Coke drinkers are stealing their jobs and spitting on their gods.

Hat tip: @kingofthecoastt who recently tweeted about the original post.