Category: Law
India’s AI wedding buffet
Shruti Rajagopalan surveys much of the AI policy debate in India. Excerpt:
If there is a single domain where India’s AI ambitions will succeed or fail, it is energy. And energy in India is not a technology problem. It is a political economy problem, arguably the most intractable one the country faces.
India’s peak electricity demand hit 250 GW in May 2024, up from 143 GW a decade earlier. The IEA forecasts 6.3 percent annual growth through 2027, faster than any major economy. Cooling demand alone could reach 140 GW of peak load by 2030. One number captures the trajectory. For each incremental degree in daily average temperature, peak demand now rises by more than 7 GW. In 2019 the figure was half that. India is getting hotter, richer, and more electricity-hungry simultaneously.
State-controlled distribution companies have accumulated $83.7 billion in debt because energy prices have been politically distorted for decades. Over 50 GW of renewable capacity sits underutilized. About 60 GW is stranded behind inadequate transmission. The shortage is financial and infrastructural, not resource-based. Without reforming distribution pricing, governance, and grid investment ($50 billion estimated by 2035), new renewable capacity will not become reliable electricity. It will become another line item on a DISCOM balance sheet no one wants to read.
India’s electricity reaches consumers through 72 distribution companies, 44 of them state-owned, collectively the most financially distressed utilities in the world. Accumulated losses stood at ₹6.92 trillion ($76.89 billion) as of March 2024, rising every year despite five government bailouts since 2002.
Substantive throughout.
Taxing Beta, Exempting Alpha: A Benchmark-Based Inheritance Regime
This paper proposes a generational benchmark inheritance regime as a structural replacement for the federal estate tax. By distinguishing between systemic market returns (Beta) and active value creation (Alpha), the regime captures the passive growth of capital at generational boundaries while fully exempting idiosyncratic surplus. Using a Pareto tail interpolation (α ≈ 1.163) calibrated to Federal Reserve wealth data, we estimate baseline annual revenue of approximately $295 billion under conservative assumptions. This revenue is sufficient to finance a 2.1 percentage point reduction in the OASDI payroll tax, shifting the fiscal burden from labor to underperforming dynastic capital. Unlike continuous wealth taxes, the regime requires no new valuation machinery, relying exclusively on existing estate and gift tax procedures. We situate the proposal within the Jeffersonian principle of usufruct and the modern literature on optimal inheritance taxation.
The cocaine problem seems to be getting worse again
Colombian coca cultivation fell dramatically between 2000 and 2015, a period that saw intense U.S.-backed eradication and interdiction efforts. That progress reversed in 2015, when peace talks and legal rulings in Colombia opened enforcement gaps. Coca plantation has since increased to record levels, which coincided with a sharp rise in cocaine-related overdose deaths in the U.S. We estimate how much of that rise can be causally attributed to Colombia’s new coca boom. Leveraging the unforeseen coca supply shock and cross-county differences in pre-shock cocaine exposure, we find that the surge in supply caused an immediate rise in overdose mortality in the U.S. Our analysis estimates on the order of 1,000–1,500 additional U.S. deaths per year in the late 2010s can be attributed to Colombia’s cocaine boom. Implicit annual loss in American statistical life values about $48,000 per hectare of cultivation in Colombia. If left untamed, the current level of coca cultivation (over 230,000 ha in 2022) may impose on the order of $10 billion per year in costs via overdose fatalities.
That is from a new NBER working paper by Xinming Du, Benjamin Hansen, Shan Zhang, and Eric Zou.
I Regret to Inform You that the FDA is FDAing Again
I had high hopes and low expectations that the FDA under the new administration would be less paternalistic and more open to medical freedom. Instead, what we are getting is paternalism with different preferences. In particular, the FDA now appears to have a bizarre anti-vaccine fixation, particularly of the mRNA variety (disappointing but not surprising given the leadership of RFK Jr.).
The latest is that the FDA has issued a Refusal-to-File (RTF) letter to Moderna for their mRNA influenza vaccine, mRNA-1010. An RTF means the FDA has determined that the application is so deficient it doesn’t even warrant a review. RTF letters are not unheard of, but they’re rare—especially given that Moderna spent hundreds of millions of dollars running Phase 3 trials enrolling over 43,000 participants based on FDA guidance, and is now being told the (apparently) agreed-upon design was inadequate.
Moderna compared the efficacy of their vaccine to a standard flu vaccine widely used in the United States. The FDA’s stated rationale is that the control arm did not reflect the “best-available standard of care.” In plain English, that appears to mean the comparator should have been one of the ACIP-preferred “enhanced” flu vaccines for adults 65+ (e.g., high-dose/adjuvanted) rather than a standard-dose product.
Out of context, that’s not crazy but it’s also not necessarily wise. There is nothing wrong with having multiple drugs and vaccines, some of which are less effective on average than others. We want a medical armamentarium: different platforms, different supply chains, different side-effect profiles, and more options when one product isn’t available or isn’t a good fit. The mRNA vaccines, for example, can be updated faster than standard vaccines, so having an mRNA option available may produce superior real-world effectiveness even if it were less efficacious in a head-to-head trial.
In context, this looks like the regulatory rules of the game are being changed retroactively—a textbook example of regulatory uncertainty destroying option value. STAT News reports that Vinay Prasad personally handled the letter and overrode staff who were prepared to proceed with review. Moderna took the unusual step of publicly releasing Prasad’s letter—companies almost never do this, suggesting they’ve calculated the reputational risk of publicly fighting the FDA is lower than the cost of acquiescing.
Moreover, the comparator issue was discussed—and seemingly settled—beforehand. Moderna says the FDA agreed with the trial design in April 2024, and as recently as August 2025 suggested it would file the application and address comparator issues during the review process.
Finally, Moderna also provided immunogenicity and safety data from a separate Phase 3 study in adults 65+ comparing mRNA-1010 against a licensed high-dose flu vaccine, just as FDA had requested—yet the application was still refused.
What is most disturbing is not the specifics of this case but the arbitrariness and capriciousness of the process. The EU, Canada, and Australia have all accepted Moderna’s application for review. We may soon see an mRNA flu vaccine available across the developed world but not in the United States—not because it failed on safety or efficacy, but because FDA political leadership decided, after the fact, that the comparator choice they inherited was now unacceptable.
The irony is staggering. Moderna is an American company. Its mRNA platform was developed at record speed with billions in U.S. taxpayer support through Operation Warp Speed — the signature public health achievement of the first Trump administration. The same government that funded the creation of this technology is now dismantling it. In August, HHS canceled $500 million in BARDA contracts for mRNA vaccine development and terminated a separate $590 million contract with Moderna for an avian flu vaccine. Several states have introduced legislation to ban mRNA vaccines. Insanity.
The consequences are already visible. In January, Moderna’s CEO announced the company will no longer invest in new Phase 3 vaccine trials for infectious diseases: “You cannot make a return on investment if you don’t have access to the U.S. market.” Vaccines for Epstein-Barr virus, herpes, and shingles have been shelved. That’s what regulatory roulette buys you: a shrinking pipeline of medical innovation.
An administration that promised medical freedom is delivering medical nationalism: fewer options, less innovation, and a clear signal to every company considering pharmaceutical investment that the rules can change after the game is played. And this isn’t a one-product story. mRNA is a general-purpose platform with spillovers across infectious disease and vaccines for cancer; if the U.S. turns mRNA into a political third rail, the investment, talent, and manufacturing will migrate elsewhere. America built this capability, and we’re now choosing to export it—along with the health benefits.
Immigration and health for elderly Americans
We measure the impact of increased immigration on mortality among elderly Americans, who rely on the immigrant-intensive health and long-term care sectors. Using a shift-share approach we find a strong impact of immigration on the size of the immigrant care workforce: admitting 1,000 new immigrants would lead to 142 new foreign healthcare workers, without evidence of crowd out of native health care workers. We also find striking effects on mortality: a 25% increase in the steady state flow of immigrants to the US would result in 5,000 fewer deaths nationwide. We identify reduced use of nursing homes as a key mechanism driving this result.
That is from a new NBER working paper by
Why is Singapore no longer “cool”?
To be clear, I am not blaming Singapore on this one. But it is striking to me how much Americans do not talk about Singapore any more. They are much, much more likely to talk about Europe or England, for instance. I see several reasons for this:
1. Much of the Singapore fascination came from the right-wing, as the country offered (according to some) a right-wing version of what a technocracy could look like. Yet today’s American political right is not very interested in technocracy.
2. Singapore willingly takes in large numbers of immigrants (in percentage terms), and tries to make that recipe work through a careful balancing act. That approach still is popular with segments of the right-wing intelligentsia, but it is hardly on the agenda today. For the time being, it is viewed as something “better not to talk about.” Especially in light of some of the burgeoning anti-Asian sentiment, for instance from Helen Andrews and some others. It is much more common that Americans talk about foreign countries mismanaging their immigration policies, for instance the UK and Sweden.
3. Singaporean government looks and feels a bit like a “deep state.” I consider that terminology misleading as applied to Singapore, but still it makes it harder for many people to praise the place.
4. Singapore is a much more democratic country than most outsiders realize, though they do have an extreme form of gerrymandering. Whatever you think of their system, these days it no longer feels transgressive, compared to alternatives being put into practice or at least being discussed. Those alternatives range from more gerrymandering (USA) to various abrogations of democracy (potentially all over). In this regard Singapore, without budging much on its own terms, seems like much more of a mainstream country than before. That means there is less to talk about.
4b. Singapore’s free speech restrictions, whatever you think of them, no longer seem so far outside the box. Trump is suing plenty of people. The UK is sending police to knock on people’s doors for social media posts, and so on. That too makes Singapore more of a “normal country,” for better or worse (I would say worse).
5. The notion of an FDI-driven, MNE-driven growth strategy seems less exciting in an era of major tech advances, most of all AI. Singapore seems further from the frontier than a few years ago. People are wishing to talk about pending changes, not predictability, with predictability being a central feature of many Singaporean service exports.
6. If you want to talk about unusual, well-run small countries, UAE is these days a more novel case to consider, with more new news coming out of it.
Sorry Singapore, we are just not talking about you so much right now! But perhaps, in some significant ways, that is a blessing in disguise. At least temporarily. I wrote this post in part because I realize I have not much blogged about Singapore for some years, and I was trying to figure out why.
Addendum, from Ricardo in the comments:
Bryan Caplan on immigration backlash
Tyler tries to cure my immigration backlash confusion, but not to my satisfaction. The overarching flaw: He equivocates between two different versions of “backlash to immigration.”
Version 1: Letting in more immigrants leads to more resistance to immigration.
Version 2: Letting in more immigrants leads to so much resistance to immigration that the total stock of immigration ultimately ends ups lower than it would have been.
Backlash in the first sense is common, but no reason for immigration advocates to moderate. Backlash in the second sense is a solid reason for immigration advocates to moderate, but Tyler provides little evidence that backlash in this sense is a real phenomenon.
Do read the whole thing, but I feel I am obviously right here. Bryan should read newspapers more! If I did not provide much evidence that backlash is a significant phenomenon, it is because I thought it was pretty obvious. A few points:
1. I (and Bryan all the more so) want more immigration than most voters want. But I recognize that if you strongly deny voters their preferences, they will turn to bad politicians to limit migration. So politics should respect voter preferences to a reasonable degree, even though at the margin people such as myself will prefer more immigration, and also better immigration rules and systems.
2. The anti-immigrant politicians who get elected are very often toxic. And across a wide variety of issues. The backlash costs range far wider than just immigration policies. (I do recognize this does not apply in every case, for instance Meloni in Italy seems OK enough and is not a destructive force. She also has not succeeded in limiting migration, and probably cannot do so without becoming toxic. So maybe that story is not over yet. In any case, consider how many of the other populist right groups have a significant pro-Russia element, Russia being right now probably the most evil country in the world.)
3. If immigration runs “out of control” (as voters perceive it) in your country, there will be anti-immigrant backlash in other countries too. For instance in Japan and Poland. Bryan considers only backlash in the single country of origin. In Japan, for instance, voters just handed their PM a new and powerful mandate, in large part because of the immigration issue. The message was “what is happening in other countries, we do not want that happening here.” The globalization of communications and debate increases the scope and power of the backlash effect considerably.
Most of all, it is simply a mistake to let populist right parties become the dominant force in Europe, and sometimes elsewhere as well. You might think it is not a mistake because we need them to limit migration. Well, that is not my view, but I am arguing it is a mistake to get to that margin to begin with.
In short, we need to limit migration to prevent various democracies from going askew. Nothing in that argument contradicts the usual economic (and other) arguments for a lot of immigration being a good thing. And still it is a good thing to try to sell one’s fellow citizens on the case for more immigration. Nonetheless we are optimizing subject to a constraint, namely voter opinion. Why start off an intertemporal bargaining game by trying to seize as much surplus (immigration) as possible? That to me is obvious, more obvious every day I might add.
Can government coerce women into having more babies?
To illustrate this challenge of measurement and inference, Figure 7 presents Romanian birth rates before, during, and after the imposition of an infamously coercive policy aimed at raising births. In 1966, a dictatorial government imposed Decree 770, which banned abortion and made modern contraception effectively inaccessible. The figure extends an idea from Sobotka, Matysiak, and Brzozowska (2019), which compares cohort and period fertility rates in Romania over a similar evaluation window. We add data from Bulgaria, Romania’s neighbor that was also communist during the time of the policy and that might plausibly serve as a control, shedding light on what course Romanian fertility might have followed after 1967 if not for the policy. Panel A plots period birth rates in the two countries and shows that Romania and Bulgaria had substantially similar trends and levels in period total fertility rates before and after the Romanian policy window. Focusing on panel A of Figure 7, it is clear that birth rates in Romania changed dramatically following the start of the policy, as families were taken by surprise. TFR nearly doubled in the year that followed. The sharp timing of this apparent impact following the policy change, together with the availability of data from neighboring Bulgaria to serve as a control, suggests the possibility of a difference-in-differences analysis comparing birth rates pre– and post–Decree 770 in Romania and Bulgaria.
But while such an analysis could answer the narrow question of the causal effect of Decree 770 on the total fertility rate in 1967, it may nonetheless reveal little in terms of the impact of the policy on the number of children Romanian women had over their lifetimes. After the initial rise in TFR, birth rates soon began falling quickly in Romania, as behavior adapted to the new policy regime. If, for example, an unexpected pregnancy results in a birth at a young age in 1968, a woman may choose and succeed at reducing the probability of a pregnancy in subsequent years, and still achieve the same lifetime count of children.
For a discussion of the theoretically ambiguous impact of abortion restrictions on birth rates, see Lawson and Spears (2025). Of course, the extent of persistence from period fertility to completed fertility depends on the details: A shock that encourages earlier-than-desired births, as Romania’s might have, allows for adjustment later in life. But it may be harder, later in life, to adjust for a policy or event shock that leads to fewer births early in life.Panel B of Figure 7 plots completed cohort fertility. As in earlier figures, cohorts are plotted along the horizontal axis according to the year in which they turned 30. Although Romanian completed cohort fertility began at a higher level than in Bulgaria over the available data series, completed cohort fertility in Romania did not maintain a sizable upward trend relative Bulgaria during the period that Decree 770 was in force.
That is from the recent Geruso and Spears JEP survey piece on whether we can expect fertility rates to rebound in the future. By the way, after Hungary’s subsidy-driven baby boom, the country is now having a baby bust, it is possible that similar mechanisms are operating.
Trump’s Pharmaceutical Plan
Pharmaceuticals have high fixed costs of R&D and low marginal costs. The first pill costs a billion dollars; the second costs 50 cents. That cost structure makes price discrimination—charging different customers different prices based on willingness to pay—common.
Price discrimination is why poorer countries get lower prices. Not because firms are charitable, but because a high price means poorer countries buy nothing, while any price above marginal cost is still profit. This type of price discrimination is good for poorer countries, good for pharma, and (indirectly) good for the United States: more profits mean more R&D and, over time, more drugs.
The political problem, however, is that Americans look abroad, see lower prices for branded drugs, and conclude that they’re being ripped off. Riding that grievance, Trump has demanded that U.S. prices be no higher than the lowest level paid in other developed countries.
One immediate effect is to help pharma in negotiations abroad: they can now credibly say, “We can’t sell to you at that discount, because you’ll export your price back into the U.S.” But two big issues follow.
First, this won’t lower U.S. prices on current drugs. Firms are already profit-maximizing in the U.S. If they manage to raise prices in France, they don’t then announce, “Great news—now we’ll charge less in America.” The potential upside of the Trump plan isn’t lower prices but higher pharma profits, which strengthens incentives to invest in R&D. If profits rise, we may get more drugs in the long run. But try telling the American voter that higher pharma profits are good.
The second issue is that the plan can backfire.
In our textbook, Modern Principles, Tyler and I discuss almost exactly this scenario: suppose policy effectively forces a single price across countries. Which price do firms choose—the low one abroad or the high one in the U.S.? Since a large share of profits comes from the U.S., they’re likely to choose the high price:
Pfizer CEO Albert Bourla was even more direct, saying it is time for countries such as France to pay more or go without new drugs. If forced to choose between reducing U.S. prices to France’s level or stopping supply to France, Pfizer would choose the latter, Bourla told reporters at a pharma-industry conference.
So the real question is: will other countries pay?
If France tried to force Americans to pay more to subsidize French price controls, U.S. voters would explode. Yet that’s essentially what other countries are being told but in reverse: “You must pay more so Americans can pay less.” Other countries are already stingier than the U.S., and they already bear costs for it—new drugs arrive more slowly abroad than here. Some governments may decide—foolishly, but understandably—that paying U.S.-level prices is politically impossible. If so, they won’t “harmonize upward.” They’ll follow the European way: ration, delay and go without.
In that case, nobody wins. Pharma profits fall, R&D declines, U.S. prices don’t magically drop, and patients abroad get fewer new drugs and worse care. Lose-lose-lose.
We don’t know the equilibrium, but lose-lose-lose is entirely plausible. Switzerland, for example, does not seem willing to pay more:
Yet Switzerland has shown little political willingness to pay more—threatening both the availability of medications in the country and its role as a global leader in developing therapies. Drug prices are the primary driver of the increasing cost of mandatory health coverage, and the topic generates heated debate during the annual reappraisal of insurance rates. “The Swiss cannot and must not pay for price reductions in the USA with their health insurance premiums,” says Elisabeth Baume-Schneider, Switzerland’s home affairs minister.
If many countries respond like Switzerland—and Trump’s unpopularity abroad doesn’t help—the sector ends up less profitable and innovation slows. Voters may feel less “ripped off,” but they’ll be buying that feeling with fewer drugs and sicker bodies.
Regulating a Monopolist without Subsidy
We study monopoly regulation under asymmetric information about costs when subsidies are infeasible. A monopolist with privately known marginal cost serves a single product market and sets a price. The regulator maximizes a weighted welfare function using unit taxes as sole policy instrument. We identify a sufficient and necessary condition for when laissez-faire is optimal. When intervention is desired, we provide simple sufficient conditions under which the optimal policy is a progressive price cap: prices below a benchmark face no tax, while higher prices are taxed at increasing and potentially prohibitive rates. This policy combines delegation at low prices with taxation at high prices, balancing access, affordability, and profitability. Our results clarify when taxes act as complements to subsidies and when they serve only as imperfect substitutes, illuminating how feasible policy instruments shape optimal regulatory design.
That is from a new paper by Jiaming Wei and Dihan Zou. Via the excellent Samir Varma.
Effective tax rates for billionaires
Here is the tweet, here is the source data.
The Australian government is overreaching already
The social media ban for the young applies to Substack:
The process was more painful for users of newer platforms that collect far less behavioural data—like Substack. Again, this is something I didn’t predict. In the circles I move in, Substack’s sudden requirement that users upload ID has caused significant ire. But this reaction misunderstands how the eSafety Commissioner’s powers work in relation to the under‑16 ban—or perhaps reflects a hope that Substack would have shown more backbone than it did…
Many people assume that if a platform isn’t on the “banned” list, it doesn’t need to comply with the regulations. This is not true. Only platforms expressly excluded are exempt. Everything else is treated as prohibited for under‑16s unless specifically allowed—a distinct departure from the traditional English liberties approach that everything is legal unless expressly made illegal. This approach is to prevent young users from migrating from a banned platform to an unlisted alternative.
That is by Dara Macdonald on Quillette, via Arnold Kling. I am hoping that consistent advocates of free speech will speak up and repudiate this ban…
The Effects of Ransomware Attacks on Hospitals and Patients
As cybercriminals increasingly target health care, hospitals face the growing threat of ransomware attacks. Ransomware is a type of malicious software that prevents users from accessing electronic systems and demands a ransom to restore access. We create and link a database of hospital ransomware attacks to Medicare claims data. We quantify the effects of ransomware attacks on hospital operations and patient outcomes. Ransomware attacks decrease hospital volume by 17–24 percent during the initial attack week, with recovery occurring within 3 weeks. Among patients already admitted to the hospital when a ransomware attack begins, in-hospital mortality increases by 34–38 percent.
That is by Hannah Neprash, Claire McGlave, and Sayeh Nikpay, recently published in American Economic Journal: Economic Policy.
The United States as an Active Industrial Policy Nation
We document and characterize a new history of U.S. federal-level industrial policies by scanning all 12,167 Congressional Acts and 6,030 Presidential Orders from 1973 through 2022. We find several interesting patterns. First, contrary to a common perception, the United States has always been an active industrial policy nation throughout the period, regardless of which party is in power, with 5.4 laws and 3.4 Presidential Orders per year on average containing new industrial policies. Second, we identify roughly 300% more instances of industrial policies than those in the Global Trade Alert (GTA) database during 2008-2022, despite using essentially the same definition. Third, industrial policies in practice are as likely to be justified by national security as by economic competitiveness. Fourth, many U.S. industrial policies incorporate design features that help mitigate potential drawbacks, such as explicit expiration dates and pilot programs for emerging technologies. Finally, based on stock market reactions and firm performance, the identified policies are recognized as economically significant in shifting resource allocations.
That is from a new NBER working paper by
So if I were designing an “industrial policy” for America, my first priority would be to improve and “unstick” its procurement cycles. There may well be bureaucratic reasons that this is difficult to do. But if it can’t be done, then perhaps the U.S. shouldn’t be setting its sights on a more ambitious industrial policy.
A second form of American industrial policy is the biomedical grants and subsidies associated with the National Institutes of Health.
Published in 2019, but still relevant today.
Should You Resign?
At least six prosecutors resigned in early January over DOJ pressure to investigate the widow of Renee Good (killed by ICE agent Jonathan Ross) instead of the agent himself. They cited political interference, exclusion of state police, and diversion of resources from priority fraud cases. Similarly, an FBI agent was ordered to stand down from investigating the killing of Good. She resigned. The killing of Alex Pretti and what looks to be an attempted federal coverup will likely lead to more resignations. Is resignation the right choice? I tweeted:
I appreciate the integrity, but every principled resignation is an adverse selection.
In other words, when the good leave and the bad don’t, the institution rots.
Resignation can be useful as a signal–this person is giving up a lot so the issue must be important. Resignations can also create common knowledge–now everyone knows that everyone knows. The canonical example is Attorney General Elliot Richardson resigning rather than carrying out Nixon’s order to fire Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox. At that time, a resignation was like lighting the beacon. But today, who is there to be called?
The best case for not resigning is that you retain voice—the ability to slow, document, escalate, and resist within lawful channels. In the U.S. system that can mean forcing written directives, triggering inspector-general review, escalating through professional responsibility channels, and building coalitions that outlast transient political appointees. Staying can matter.
But staying is corrupting. People are prepared to say no to one big betrayal, but a steady drip of small compromises depreciates the will: you attend the meetings, sign the forms, stay silent when you should speak. Over time the line moves, and what once felt intolerable starts to feel normal, categories blur. People who on day one would never have agreed to X end up doing X after a chain of small concessions. You may think you’re using the institution, but institutions are very good at using you. Banality deadens evil.
Resignation keeps your hands and conscience clean. That’s good for you but what about society? Utilitarians sometimes call the demand for clean hands a form of moral self-indulgence. A privileging of your own purity over outcomes. Bernard Williams’s reply is that good people are not just sterile utility-accountants, they have deep moral commitments and sometimes resignation is what fidelity to those commitments requires.
So what’s the right move? I see four considerations:
- Complicity: Are you being ordered to do wrong, or, usually the lesser crime, of not doing right?
- Voice: If you stay can you exercise voice? What’s your concrete theory of change—what can you actually block, document, or escalate?
- Timing: Is reversal possible soon or is this structural capture? Are you the remnant?
- Self-discipline: Will you name the bright lines now and keep them, or will “just this once” become the job?
I have not been put in a position to make such a choice but from a social point of view, my judgment is that at the current time, voice is needed and more effective than exit.
Hat tip: Jim Ward.