Category: Law
The slide toward growing protectionism?
That is the topic of my latest Bloomberg column, here is one part of the argument:
Start with the distinction between trade in goods and trade in services. When a US manufacturer sells tractors overseas, that’s goods. When a US software firm creates an AI medical diagnostic tool and sells access via the internet to foreigners, that’s services.
It is much easier to keep trade “free” for the first category than for the second. The tractor crosses a border at a specific place and time. It may face additional regulation once inside the foreign country, but the transaction is relatively clean.
An online medical service, by contrast, could “cross the border” — that is, be used by someone outside the US — hundreds or thousands of times per day. It may also face licensing requirements, foreign liability law, extensive testing and, if the country has multiple jurisdictions, layers of regulation. In the European Union, the website itself would be subject to extensive regulation through laws regarding data, privacy and AI. Even within the EU, a supposed free-trade area, there are restrictions on trade in legal, medical and notary services, to name a few examples.
The wisdom or foolishness of these regulations is not the point. They exist, and most are not going away anytime soon. In fact, they will become only more important as the provision of services expands as a share of the global economy.
In the US, much of this growth occurs in education, health care and, especially, technology. Nvidia, for instance, depending on fluctuations in share prices that day, is often worth more than the entire German and Italian stock markets combined. Efforts to “harmonize” (i.e., increase) corporate taxation thus are more harmful to US interests than would have been the case a decade ago.
Any world trading order that broadly stays put is thus weighted against the exporting interests of the US. That is essential background for understanding the debate over trade prompted by President Donald Trump’s various proposals.
Recommended.
Milei Implements Peer Approval for Food
Reason: In a sweeping move to overhaul Argentina’s food trade policies, Javier Milei’s administration officially deregulated food imports and exports on Monday. The reform, outlined in Decree 35/2025, seeks to boost foreign trade, cut bureaucratic red tape, and lower consumer prices.
Federico Sturzenegger, head of the Ministry of Deregulation and State Transformation, explained in a post on X that the measure “seeks cheaper food for Argentines and more Argentine food for the world.”
Under the new policy, food products and packaging certified by countries with “high sanitary surveillance” can now enter Argentina without any additional registration or approval processes. These items will be automatically recognized under the Argentine Food Code, cutting down on administrative delays and costs for importers.
The legislation identifies countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United States, Israel, Japan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, as well as the European Union, as having similar or higher sanitary standards than Argentina.
As Sturzenegger explains in his post, this measure “eliminates requirements to register and authorize: samples, products, establishments, warehouses, utensils, and containers (32 pages of paperwork).”
An excellent “peer approval” policy and one that I have long supported when it comes to the FDA and drug approvals. In fact, since 2010 the US FDA has begun to recognize other countries as having comparable food safety systems. To date, Canada, Australia and New Zealand have been recognized with a Systems Recognition partnership.
Systems Recognition (SR) is a partnership between the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and a foreign regulatory counterpart, in which the agencies have concluded that they operate comparable regulatory programs that yield similar food safety outcomes.
Argentina’s policy is unilateral and assumes equivalence if a country uses recognized standards (e.g., Codex Alimentarius) or has high sanitary vigilance while the FDA’s SR policy is bilateral and involves more regulatory harmonization and investigation. I prefer the Argentinian approach. Nevertheless, both programs have the goals of simplifying trade, avoiding duplicate inspections, and helping to prioritize scarce inspection resources.
I encourage the FDA to build on SR for food and extend it to drugs. This could be done in a minor and major way, both of which would useful. The minor reform would be peer approval for already-approved US drugs. In this way, importation could ease drug shortages. The FDA has done this in the past on an ad-hoc basis but it should be made permanent. The second, more major reform, would to extend peer-approval to any drug or device approved by a stringent authority.
Democracy, Capitalism and Monarchy (Yarvin)
The Yarvin interview in the NYTimes magazine illustrates the change in vibes, but frankly, I was bored. It’s amusing when Yarvin tweaks liberals by pointing out that FDR was an authoritarian, but Liberal Fascism did it better.
More generally, much of Yarvin’s thinking is superficial. He thinks, for example, that capitalism works because firms are monarchies.
Yes. I think that having an effective government and an efficient government is better for people’s lives. When I ask people to answer that question, I ask them to look around the room and point out everything in the room that was made by a monarchy, because these things that we call companies are actually little monarchies. You’re looking around, and you see, for example, a laptop, and that laptop was made by Apple, which is a monarchy.
There are many errors here. First, Apple is one firm among countless others most of which do not produce hugely successful products. The big question is not how Apple produces but how Apple is produced. Firms operate as planned entities but they are embedded in and constrained by a broader sea of market competition. It’s the competitive environment that drives innovation, efficiency, and consumer satisfaction.
Second, Mises was closer to the truth when he wrote in Planned Chaos that it’s the consumers not the producers who are monarchs:
In the market economy the consumers are supreme. Their buying and their abstention from buying ultimately determine what the entrepreneurs produce and in what quantity and quality. It determines directly the prices of consumer goods and indirectly the prices of all producer goods, viz., labor and material factors of production. It determines the emergence of profits and losses and the formation of the rate of interest. It determines every individual’s income…The market adjusts the efforts of all those engaged in supplying the needs of the consumers to the wishes of those for whom they produce, the consumers. It subjects production to consumption.
Capitalist firms are disciplined by the necessity of persuading consumers to purchase their products and by competition. Successful firms must continuously meet our desires and needs to survive. When Apple fails to do so, it will face the same fate as countless firms before it—obsolescence and failure.
Markets do hold lessons about governance, but Yarvin draws the wrong conclusions. Democracy, not monarchy, is the political system most analogous to capitalism. As Mises observed, “The market is a democracy in which every penny gives a right to vote.” The analogy works both ways: voting in a democracy mirrors spending in a market. Both systems empower individuals—consumers or voters—to shape outcomes, whether by determining market success or selecting leaders.
Democracy and capitalism are both examples of open-access orders, systems characterized by dispersed power, low barriers to entry, and transparent, universally applicable rules. Such features foster adaptability, accountability, and broad participation—qualities essential to both economic and political success.
The West does face a modest “crisis” of democracy, but the root of this crisis lies in expecting democracy to do too much. We have collectivized decisions which are best left in the hands of individuals and markets but democracy is not a good way of making collective decisions.
Democracy is best understood as a constraint on government power, akin to a Bill of Rights, federalism, and the separation of powers. Democracy’s virtue is in providing a mechanism to remove bad rulers without resorting to bloodshed and its primary value lies in preventing catastrophic outcomes like mass famines and democide—a significant and undeniable merit. Autocracies and monarchies perform much less well on the big issues and, contrary to what many people think, autocracies do not grow faster, win more wars, or perform better on any meaningful comparison that has been investigated.
It is also essential to recognize that “democracy” encompasses a wide range of structures—parliamentary, presidential, constitutional, and more—and there is plenty of room for improved choice within the broader category. We can improve our democracy.
The real lesson from markets is not to create monarchs but to design systems that create choice and competition and allow citizens to remove leaders when they fail.
Hat tip for discussion: Connor.
The 1920s immigration restrictions
The 1920s immigration restrictions in the US did not affect manufacturing wages.
The US immigration restrictions of the 1920s lowered the occupational standings of whites and incumbent immigrants.
US counties with more immigrants excluded by the quotas of the 1920s saw increased in-migration.
During the Great Black Migration of the US, black southerners moved to northern counties, filling roles left by excluded immigrants.
During the Great Black Migration, blacks who migrated to counties with more excluded immigrants experienced greater economic gains.
That is from a new piece by Bin Xie in the Journal of Comparative Economics. Via the excellent Kevin Lewis.
What should AI policy learn from DeepSeek?
That is a Bloomberg column of mine from about two weeks ago. I thought it would make more sense to people if I did not blog it right away. Here is one bit:
Now the world knows that a very high-quality AI system can be trained for a relatively small sum of money. That could bring comparable AI systems into realistic purview for nations such as Russia, Iran, Pakistan and others. It is possible to imagine a foreign billionaire initiating a similar program, although personnel would be a constraint. Whatever the dangers of the Chinese system and its potential uses, DeepSeek-inspired offshoots in other nations could be more worrying yet.
Finding cheaper ways to build AI systems was almost certainly going to happen anyway. But consider the tradeoff here: US policy succeeded in hampering China’s ability to deploy high-quality chips in AI systems, with the accompanying national-security benefits, but it also accelerated the development of effective AI systems that do not rely on the highest-quality chips.
It remains to be seen whether that tradeoff will prove to be a favorable one. Not just in the narrow sense — although there are many questions about DeepSeek’s motives, pricing strategy, plans for the future and its relation to the Chinese government that remain unanswered or unanswerable. The tradeoff is uncertain in a larger sense, too.
To paraphrase the Austrian economist Ludwig Mises: Government interventions have important unintended secondary consequences. To see if a policy will work, it is necessary to consider not only its immediate impact but also its second- and third-order effects.
Travis Fisher on electricity privatization (from my email)
I’m a long-time reader and first-time emailer. I just read your blog post from earlier this month about privatizing public services like water and electric utilities.
My colleague Glen Lyons and I are developing a way to introduce more competition into the electricity sector, which some believe to be hopelessly uncompetitive. The idea is to allow new, large electricity customers to form new electricity networks. The change to state statute would officially introduce contestability into many markets, and we think actual rival networks would be built to satisfy new load. They would probably have to be large, electrically, meaning they would likely need to serve multiple large customers (today you can go off-grid, but only to supply yourself).
We aren’t necessarily trying to revolutionize the existing grid or change the way a typical residential customer receives electric service, although there may be beneficial spillover effects for all customers. And the idea is not brand new (I find myself agreeing with many of Wayne Crews’ views from the late 1990s), but the concept’s technological feasibility is at an all-time high, and the flood of new demand from data centers and new manufacturers is creating the right political environment to enact new policies.
Here is my description of the policy: https://www.cato.org/blog/what-would-consumer-regulated-electricity-look
Plus an interview we did recently: https://secondpower.substack.com/p/wacc
Here is the Cato bio of Travis Fisher.
A Galt’s Gulch for Talent
A new paper in the QJE, The Global Race for Talent: Brain Drain, Knowledge Transfer, and Growth, by Marta Prato uses extensive data on inventors and their migration to make the following points.
(i) gross migration is asymmetric, with brain drain (net emigration) from the EU to the United States; (ii) migrants increase their patenting by 33% a year after migration; (iii) migrants continue working with inventors at origin after moving, although less frequently; (iv) migrants’ productivity gains spill over to their collaborators at origin, who increase patenting by 16% a year when a co-inventor emigrates.
Notice that migration doesn’t just relocate talent from the EU to the US; it amplifies talent. Preventing “brain drain” would create short-term gains for the EU but retaining talent at lower productivity would stifle long-term innovation and patenting, ultimately slowing growth for both the EU and the world. In short, even the EU gains from sending talent to the US! The effect would be much larger if we can import high-skill immigrants from countries where their skills are even less productive than in the EU. Ideally, other nations could replicate the US institutions that supercharge productivity, creating global economic gains. For now, however, the US seem to be a unique Galt’s Gulch for talent.
Prato concludes with a practical suggestion:
On the migration policy side, doubling the size of the U.S. H1B visa program increases U.S. and EU growth by 4% in the long run, because it sorts inventors to where they produce more innovations and knowledge spillovers.
Of course, when we expand the H1B program, we should allocate the visas by compensation rather than by lottery. (Jeremy Neufeld runs the numbers). In this way, we would get the most valuable workers. And please don’t tell me that we need a lottery so some poor startup can hire workers. No. Unless you have some compelling argument for why there is a massive externality and why lotteries (lotteries!) are the best way to target that externality we should let price allocate.
Ross Marchand on postal service privatization (from my email)
I really enjoyed your piece on USPS privatization. I recently wrote about the subject too. Even in the absence of privatization, relaxing the mail monopoly and allowing competition would make for better, more reliable mail services. This is true even in countries with a “national champion”-style carrier subject to a universal service obligation.
It appears that, over the long-run, nations such as Germany and the U.K. that relax their monopolies eventually come around to (at least considering) ending their universal service obligations. The advantage of the “end the monopoly first” approach is it allows countries to experiment with greater competition in a less risky and threatening manner than whole immediate privatization.
Corin Wagen defends Leviticus (from my email)
In your recent conversation with Misha Saul, you and Misha discussed your joint dislike for Leviticus. I can’t say that I find Leviticus a page-turner, but the book that’s done the most to help me understand why it’s important and what role it plays in the movement of the narrative is L Michael Morales’s book Who Shall Ascend The Mountain Of The Lord? (Amazon). A number of folks I’ve talked to have found this book very helpful. (Disclaimer: Morales is a Protestant, as is D. A. Carson (the editor), so the biases are apparent.)
Briefly, his argument is that Leviticus serves to resolve the narrative tension introduced by the ending of Exodus. Exodus 40:34–35: “Then the cloud covered the tent of meeting, and the glory of the Lord filled the tabernacle. And Moses was not able to enter the tent of meeting because the cloud settled on it, and the glory of the Lord filled the tabernacle.” The tension introduced by Genesis 3 is that God and man can no longer co-exist because of sin. Moses is able to ascend Sinai, speak with God, and bring the people his laws, but even after building the tabernacle and the ark, even Moses is unable to reside in the presence of God—let alone the people who cannot even touch Sinai!
The rules of Leviticus presents the conditions to resolve this tension and allow the people access to God—protected by the rules that God gives them. In particular the book has a chiastic structure centered around Leviticus 16 (Yom Kippur) where the high priest himself is able to enter the Holy of Holies. There’s other points about how the structure of the tabernacle and later the temple mirrors Eden, etc. “Interesting throughout,” as they say.
Gordon Tullock was right
Do minimum wage changes affect workplace health and safety? Using the universe of workers’ compensation claims in California over 2000-2019, we estimate whether minimum wage shocks affect the rate of workplace injuries. Our identification exploits both geographic variation in state-and city-level minimum wages and local occupation-level variation in exposure to minimum wage changes. We find that a 10% increase in the minimum wage increases the injury rate by 11% in an occupation-metro area labor market which is fully exposed to the minimum wage increase. Our results imply an elasticity of the workplace injury rate to minimum-wage-induced wage changes of 1.4. We find particularly large effects on injuries relating to cumulative physical strain, suggesting that employers respond to minimum wage increases by intensifying the pace of work, which in turn increases injury risk.
That is from a new working paper by Michael Davies, R. Jisung Park, and Anna Stansbury, MIT and U. Penn, by the way. Via the excellent Kevin Lewis.
Net neutrality, we hardly knew ye
That is the topic of a recent Bloomberg column. Here is the opening bit:
One of the longest, most technical and, as it turns out, most inconsequential public-policy debates of the 21st century was about net neutrality. Now that a federal appeals court has effectively ended the debate by striking down the FCC’s net neutrality rules, it’s worth asking what we’ve learned.
If you have forgotten the sequence of events, here’s a quick recap: In 2015, during President Barack Obama’s presidency and after years of debate, the Federal Communications Commission issued something called the Open Internet Order, guaranteeing net neutrality, which is broadly defined as the principle that internet service providers treat all communications equally, offering both users and content providers consistent service and pricing. Two years later, under President Donald Trump, the FCC rescinded the net neutrality requirement. It was then reinstated under President Joe Biden in 2024, until being struck down earlier this month.
Hardly anyone cares or even notices, and the rest of the column explains why. Here is one part of that argument:
The actual reality has been somewhat different. Bandwidth has expanded, and Netflix transmissions do not interfere with Facebook, or vice versa. There is plenty of access to go around. That has been the case during periods with net neutrality and without.
So one lesson of the net neutrality debate comes from economics: Supply is elastic, at least when regulation allows it to be.
Internet experts Tim Wu, Cory Doctorow, Farhad Manjoo and many others were just plain, flat out wrong about this, mostly due to their anti-capitalist mentality.
Should the U.S. recognize Somaliland?
I do not myself have a position on this issue, but I found this analysis by Ken Opalo interesting:
The main argument below is that while the people of Somaliland deserve and have a strong case for international recognition, such a development at this time would very likely take away the very incentives that have set them apart from the rest of Somalia over the last 33 years.
To be blunt, achieving full sovereignty with de jure international recognition at this time would do little beyond incentivizing elite-level pursuit of sovereign rents at the expense of continued political and economic development. What has made Somaliland work is that its elites principally derive their legitimacy from their people, and not the international system. Stated differently, full sovereignty runs the risk of separating both the Somaliland state and ruling elites from the productive forces of society; which in turn would free politicians (and policymakers) from having to think of their people as the ultimate drivers of their overall economic wellbeing. Just like in the rest of the Continent, the resulting separation of “suspended elites” from the socio-economic foundations of Somaliland society and inevitable policy extraversion would be catastrophic for Somalilanders.
The last thing the Horn needs is another Djibouti — a country whose low-ambition ruling elites are content with hawking their geostrategic location at throwaway prices while doing precious little to advance their citizens’ material well-being (Djibouti’s poverty rate is a staggering 70%).
There is much more at the link.
Some game theory of Greenland
It is commonly assumed that the U.S. “acquiring” Greenland, whatever that might mean, will result in greater U.S. control of the territory. Along some dimensions that is likely. But it is worth pondering the equilibrium here more seriously.
I observe, in many locations around the world, that indigenous groups end up with far more bargaining power than their initial material resources might suggest. For instance, in the United States Native Americans often (not always) can exercise true sovereignty. The AARP cannot (yet?) say the same. In Mexico, indigenous groups have blocked many an infrastructure project.
One reason for these powers is that, feeling outmatched, the indigenous groups cultivate a temperament of “orneriness” and “being difficult.” Some of that may be a deliberate strategic stance, some of it may be heritage from having been treated badly in the past and still lacking trust, and some of it may, over time, be acquired culture as the strategic stance gets baked into norms and behavior patterns.
Often, in these equilibria, the more nominal power you have over the indigenous group, the more orneriness they will have to cultivate. If you only want a few major concessions, sometimes you can get those better as an outsider. A simple analogy is that sometimes a teenager will do more to obey a grandparent than a parent. Fewer issues of control are at stake, and so more concessions are possible, without fear of losing broader autonomy.
So a greater American stake in Greenland, however that comes about, may in some regards end up being counterproductive. And these factors will become more relevant as more resource and revenue control issues come to the table. For some issues it may be more useful having Denmark available as “the baddie.”
It is worth thinking through these questions in greater detail.
The Greenland debates
I would say we have not yet figured out what is the best U.S. policy toward Greenland, nor have we figured out best stances for either Greenland or Denmark. I am struck however by the low quality of the debate, and I mean on the anti-U.S. side most of all. This is just one clip, but I am hearing very much the same in a number of other interchanges, most of all from Europeans. There is a lot of EU pearl-clutching, and throwing around of adjectives like “colonialist” or “imperialist.” Or trying to buy Greenland is somehow analogized to Putin not trying to buy Ukraine. Or the word “offensive” is deployed as if that were an argument, or the person tries to switch the discussion into an attack on Trump and his rhetoric.
C’mon, people!
De facto, you are all creating the impression that Greenland really would be better off under some other arrangement. Why not put forward a constructive plan for improving Greenland? It would be better yet to cite a current plan under consideration (is there one?). “We at the EU, by following this plan, will give Greenland a better economic and security future than can the United States.” If the plan is decent, Greenland will wish to break off the talks with America it desires. (To be clear, I do not think they desire incorporation. This FT piece strikes me as the best so far on the debates.)
Or if you must stick to the negative, put forward some concrete arguments for how greater U.S. involvement in Greenland would be bad for global security, bad for economic growth, bad for the U.S., or…something. “Your EU allies won’t like it,” or “Trump’s behavior is unacceptable” isn’t enough and furthermore the first of those is question-begging.
It is time to rise to the occasion.
p.s. I still am glad we bought the Danish West Indies in 1917. Nor do I hear many Danes, or island natives, complain about this.
My podcast with Reason
With Liz Wolfe and Zach Weissmueller:
The link here contains the YouTube video, text description, and links to audio versions at reason.com: https://reason.com/podcast/2025/01/10/tyler-cowen-why-do-we-refuse-to-learn-from-history/
Youtube page for embedding is here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p-Kpyg2mFU8
Lots of about libertarianism and state capacity libertarianism, and The Great Forgetting, food at the end…interesting throughout!