What I’ve been reading

Fiona Maddocks, Goodbye Russia: Rachmaninoff in Exile.  Captures the spirit of the man and his music, and a good addition to the growing literature on European cultural exiles in America.  Readable and to the point.

Kurt Weyland, Democracy’s Resilience to Populism’s Threat.  This book has useful data, and perhaps it is a useful corrective to the most extreme fears out there.  But overall it does more to persuade me of the opposite conclusion, namely that populism is a real threat.  the author himself writes: “In fact, wide-ranging statistical studies find that only in about one-third of cases have populist chief executives done substantial damage to democracy. and they have truly suffocated liberal pluralism only in approximately one-quarter of all instances…”

Richard J. Evans, Hitler’s People: The Faces of the Third Reich.  This very well-reviewed book does not seem to have either new data or new theory, as yes it does show a lot of the Nazis were “pretty ordinary people.”  Yet it is so well-written and well-presented that it deserves a high recommendation nonetheless.

Tim Lankester, Inside Thatcher’s Monetarism Experiment: The Promise, The Failure, The Legacy, the author was on the scene in the Thatcher government.

Michael Huemer, Progressive Myths.  Michael is a very smart philosopher, but this book seemed like a waste of time to me.  Will it persuade anyone?  Do we need Michael writing seven-page essays rebutting various claims of the BLM movement and the like?

Josephine Quinn, How the World Made the West: A 4,000 Year History is too chatty/friendly a book for me, but for many readers it is probably worthwhile.

Ben Yagoda, Gobsmacked! The British Invasion of American English is great fun, either to read or to browse.  I do for instance use some of these words: one-offgo missingcurateearly dayskerfuffleeasy peasy, and cheeky.

Dana Gioia: Poet & Critic, edited by John Zheng and Jon Parrish, is a series of essays in honor of Dana and a very good introduction to his life and work.  Here is my earlier CWT with Dana, information billionaire and aspiring information trillionaire.

Weep, Shudder, and Die: On Opera and Poetry, is Dana’s forthcoming book on opera.  He claims that Sweeney Todd is one of the two greatest American operas.

The value of books on tractors

In addition, there were no textbooks to be found, except in libraries, where the numbers who tried to get in were so immense that readers could only access the building for one hour, according to surname. An enterprising Shanghai publisher began reprinting textbooks from the early 1960s, which soon were worth their weight in gold. Young people in faraway places were pleading to relatives to send the books to them. Soon there was a black market. Printers sold imperfect copies outside the printworks. Textbooks were resold at phenomenal prices. In one part of the country, manuals on tractor repairs, normally in high demand, were exchanged twenty to one for physics textbooks. When the doors to the examination halls were finally opened, few prospective students were surprised that one topic set for Chinese composition was “An unforgettable day.” In the end, 278,000 students were admitted for college starting in the fall of 1978. One student, enrolled at Yan’an University in Shaanxi, wrote home to his family about how surprised he was that people in the city were nearly as poor as those in his village. But his admission to college opened a new world for him, with new kinds of people.

That is from the new and interesting Odd Arne Westad and Chen Jian, The Great Transformation: China’s Road to Reform.

A country run by schoolteachers?

One disgruntled veteran at a FF annual meeting in 2016 was heard to complain, ‘They’re all fucking schoolteachers now.’ He was partly right. In the thirtieth Dáil in 2007 there were 3 university lecturers, 14 primary school teachers and 14 secondary school teachers; there were also 16 lawyers, 5 doctors, 3 nurses and 14 farmers; 22 TDs described themselves as business people and 26 ‘now qualify for the bus pass’; 31 were the children of former TDs. By 2011, the number of TDs from a business background had only increased from 22 to 25, while the number of primary and secondary teachers was 30, making teaching still the largest profession represented in the Dáil, although the number of TDs who were offspring of former TDs was reduced to 15.

That is from the new and highly useful Diarmaid Ferriter book The Revelation of Ireland 1995-2020.

The polity that is Russia

Russia’s parliament, the State Duma, is working on a law that aims to ban so-called child-free ideology which it sees as harmful to traditional values.

Vyacheslav Volodin, the chairman of the State Duma, the lower house of parliament, announced recently that fines for “propaganda of childlessness” will amount to up to 400,000 rubles ($4,300; €3,879) for individuals and up to 5 million rubles for companies.

This legislation is based on a 2022 law banning “LGBTQ+ propaganda.”

…The first draft of this new law to ban “child-fee ideology” was discussed in the State Duma in September 2022. The following year, special “family lessons” were introduced in schools. According to officials, their aim is to “form a healthy society” and increse the “popularization of large families.” Several parliamentarians have even raised the idea of imposing taxes on childless families.

At the same time, access to emergency contraception and abortion has been limited in Russia. New Health Ministry guidelines instruct medics on how best to dissuade woman from having an abortion, while many private clinics have lost their license to carry out abortions. Ten regions in Russia have imposed fines for “inducing” women to have abortions.

Here is the full story.  Via Rasheed Griffith.

Scott Alexander on Milei

Monthly inflation went from 25% to about 4%. This is obviously great, but there are two small notes of concern.

First, the 25% number was just one really bad month. Inflation had been at a baseline of about 4% for most of the last five years. The immediately-pre-Milei government really cranked up the money printer in its last few months, increasing the numbers to 10% for a few months, and finally 25% for one really bad final month. Milei was able to get it down to its usual baseline of 4%, but I think he was hoping to get it lower. So far it’s been stubborn and stayed at the 4% level through the spring and summer.

Second, even 4% monthly inflation is awful. 4% monthly = 60% yearly. Remember, the United States briefly had 9% yearly inflation after COVID and people were livid. Argentina’s “good” “improved” inflation is still 7x that.

Here is much more detail on many related issues.

Saturday assorted links

1. Another meta-study on smart phone use and mental illness.

2. Ross Douthat has a serialized fantasy novel.

3. Movie Gen, on Meta.

4. “Home to only around four percent of the world’s automobiles, Africa accounted for 19 percent of road deaths last year.

5. Why is “the Silent Generation” so well-cited in philosophy?

6. Henry Oliver on the new Sally Rooney and neurodiversity.

7. Rebecca Lowe Substack: “philosophical takes on what’s happening, particularly in politics, from a (classical) liberal point of view. bonus pieces on cool stuff like space, fiscal decentralisation, and whether we’re obligated to bring back the dinosaurs.”

8. Very good print collection going up for sale.

How much does hard work matter?

That is the topic of my latest Bloomberg column, here is one excerpt:

Economists from Princeton, Vanderbilt and the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis have estimated just how much hard work contributes to inequality in lifetime earnings. While the answer depends on context, they arrived at an average for the US workforce: About 20% of the variance in lifetime earnings can be explained by differences in hours worked…

The decision to work harder operates on at least two levels. First, you put in more total time, which leads to higher lifetime earnings. Second, you invest more in your human capital, which makes you more productive. Between one-third and one-half of the higher income for the harder workers stems from this human capital channel. One lesson is that if you are going to work hard, you should do so relatively early in your life, so as to reap the human capital benefits for future years.

Another crucial point is that those who work harder do so because they want to. There can be different kinds of heterogeneity in ability, including in learning capability or initial human capital. But in the researchers’ model, 90% of the variation in earnings due to hard work comes from a simple desire to work harder.

And this:

The study focuses on the US, but it has implications for Europe as well. In France, for instance, work is limited to 48 hours per week, with a standard week of 35 hours. That reduces average earnings and inequality in earnings, since it is harder for the top achievers to keep making more money. This research finds that the losers from this regulation are found at all parts of the wage distribution, not only at the top.

How different are Trump judges?

Donald J. Trump’s presidency broke the mold in many ways, including how to think about judicial appointments. Unlike other recent presidents, Trump was open about how “his” judges could be depended on to rule in particular ways on key issues important to voters he was courting (e.g., on issues such as guns, religion, and abortion). Other factors such as age and personal loyalty to Trump seemed important criteria. With selection criteria such as these, one might expect that Trump would select from a smaller pool of candidates than other presidents. Given the smaller pool and deviation from traditional norms of picking “good” judges, we were curious about how the Trump judges performed on a basic set of measures of judging. One prediction is that Trumpian constraints on judicial selection produced a different set of judges.  Specifically, one that would underperform compared to sets of judges appointed by other presidents. Using data on active federal appeals court judges from January 1, 2020 to June 30, 2023, we examine data on judges across three different measures: opinion production, influence (measured by citations), and independence or what we refer to as “maverick” behavior. Contrary to the prediction of underperformance, Trump judges outperform other judges, with the very top rankings of judges predominantly filled by Trump judges.

That new paper is by Stephen J. Choi and Mitu Gulati, who seem to be academic “normies” (NYU and UVA, respectively), not MAGAland crazies.

Via the excellent Kevin Lewis.

The case why culture is not stuck

From the excellent Katherine Dee, here is just one excerpt:

TikTok sketch comedy is in the same lineage of theater. It invites a suspension of disbelief from the audience, creators often play multiple characters, rapidly switching between roles with nothing more than a change in voice, facial expression, or camera angle. And importantly, it’s funny. When the whole feed is taken together, it’s almost digital vaudeville: a song, a short sketch, a physical feat, slapstick, animal acts and satire, one after another, in a personalized variety show on your phone.

And:

It’s a spectrum. At one end, we have Internet Personalities, with their cults of devotion. In the middle, we find fan culture, where some fans become prominent figures within their fandoms, stars in their own right. These Big Name Fans occasionally break out to create their own media kingdoms, as was the case with E.L. James, who authored Fifty Shades of Grey, itself originally Twilight fanfiction, and Cassandra Clare, who began in the Harry Potter fan community, before going on to write several popular fantasy series. At the other end of the spectrum are anonymous creators, whose approach to authorship is almost medieval: their projects are not about them as individuals, but the meme, the project, the aesthetic, the vision. They are less like the expressive individualists of Modern art, than the cathedral builders of the Middle Ages.

Much has been said about memes as art and the collective labor and imagination that goes into their creation, but it extends further than that. It’s not just memes. Creating mood boards on Pinterest or curating aesthetics on TikTok are evolving art forms, too. Constructing an atmosphere, or “vibe,” through images and sounds, is itself a form of storytelling, one that’s been woefully misunderstood and even undermined as shallow. Many of these aesthetics have staying power, like “coquette” and “cottagecore.” They’re not passing fads or stand-ins for personalities or subcultures. They are more than ever-evolving vectors for consumerism. They’re a type of immersive art that we don’t yet have the language to fully describe.

But that is the case with so much of what’s new. We won’t understand it until it’s in the rearview mirror.

Interesting throughout.  Of course AI-aided creations will be the next step in this process.  Maybe you don’t like a lot of these new forms, perhaps because they do not have the nobility and grandeur of say Bach.  One simple point is that it is not optimal for every period in culture to focus on exactly what you want from it.  This point is rarely recognized.  Diversity across time is valuable as well!

Friday assorted links

1. Bitcoin documentary on HBO.  Claims they will unmask Satoshi.

2. GPT Canvas, for writing and research writing, interactive.  And more here.

3. Inaugural World Bank Business Ready report (successor to the Doing Business which ended in 2021 over political rigging) is now out.  Hungary, Estonia, and Singapore take the top spots.

4. More Scott Sumner on movies.

5. Toyota to invest $500mn in flying taxi start-up Joby (FT).

6. Writing Examples, from David Perell, to learn from the best writing in history.

7. The shift toward protectionism, starting in 2017, has failed.

8. U.S. obesity rate fell in 2023.

9. Miles Brundage speaks: “With very rare exceptions, the economics profession is completely discrediting itself by either ignoring or badly misunderstanding AI”

What should I ask Stephen Kotkin?

Kotkin’s most prominent book project is his three-volume biography of Joseph Stalin: The first two volumes have been published as Stalin: Paradoxes of Power, 1878–1928 (2014) and Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929–1941 (2017), and the third volume remains to be published.

Here is more from Wikipedia, of course he is an expert on the Soviet Union and also Russia more generally:

Among scholars of Russia, he is best known for Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization which exposes the realities of everyday life in the Soviet city of Magnitogorsk during the 1930s. In 2001, he published Armageddon Averted, a short history of the fall of the Soviet Union…

He is currently writing a multi-century history of Siberia, focusing on the Ob River Valley.

He is currently at the Hoover Institution.  So what should I ask him?

Ask ChatGPT o1-preview, fiscal theory of the price level edition

Question: An economist once said that the fiscal theory of the price level was true, or became more true, as governments approached insolvency. But otherwise it is not true. Can you reconstruct analytically why the economist might have held this view?

The economist’s view hinges on the relationship between a government’s fiscal position and the determination of the price level, as articulated by the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL). The FTPL posits that the price level is determined by the government’s fiscal policy—specifically, the present value of its future primary surpluses relative to its outstanding debt—rather than solely by monetary factors such as the money supply.

Here’s an analytical reconstruction of why the economist might have held the view that the FTPL becomes more true as governments approach insolvency:

  1. Government’s Intertemporal Budget Constraint (GIBC):The GIBC states that the current real value of government debt (BB) must equal the present value of future primary surpluses (PV(S)PV(S)):B=PV(S)B = PV(S)This equation implies that the government must eventually generate enough primary surpluses (budget surpluses excluding interest payments) to repay its debt.
  2. Normal Circumstances—Solvent Government:
    • When a government is solvent, it has the capacity to adjust its fiscal policy—by increasing taxes or reducing spending—to ensure that PV(S)PV(S) matches BB.
    • In this scenario, the central bank’s monetary policy is the primary determinant of the price level. The government doesn’t need the price level to adjust to satisfy its budget constraint because it can adjust fiscal variables.
    • The Quantity Theory of Money (QTM) or other monetary theories are more relevant here, linking the money supply and velocity of money to the price level.
  3. Approaching Insolvency—Fiscal Limitations:
    • As a government approaches insolvency, its ability to generate sufficient future primary surpluses diminishes. It may face political, economic, or structural barriers to raising taxes or cutting spending.
    • In this case, the GIBC cannot be satisfied through adjustments in fiscal policy alone.
  4. Price Level Adjustment Necessity:
    • To satisfy the GIBC when PV(S)PV(S) is insufficient, the only remaining variable that can adjust is the price level (PP).
    • An increase in the price level reduces the real value of nominal government debt (BB), effectively lowering the debt burden.
    • This inflationary adjustment allows the GIBC to hold despite the government’s inability to generate adequate primary surpluses.
  5. Dominance of Fiscal Policy in Price Determination:
    • When the government is near insolvency, fiscal considerations become paramount in determining the price level.
    • Monetary policy may become subordinate or even impotent because the central bank might be compelled to accommodate the government’s fiscal needs (e.g., by monetizing debt).
    • The FTPL becomes the relevant theory, as it explains how fiscal imbalances necessitate price level adjustments to satisfy the GIBC.
  6. Conclusion—Conditional Validity of the FTPL:
    • Under normal, solvent conditions, the FTPL does not primarily determine the price level because the government can adjust fiscal policy, and monetary policy remains effective.
    • As insolvency looms, fiscal constraints force reliance on price level adjustments, making the FTPL increasingly accurate in explaining inflation dynamics.
    • Therefore, the economist argues that the FTPL becomes “more true” as a government approaches insolvency because fiscal limitations leave the price level as the main adjustment mechanism to restore fiscal balance.

Summary:

The economist believed that the FTPL’s applicability depends on the government’s fiscal health. In solvency, fiscal adjustments can maintain balance without affecting the price level, keeping monetary policy as the main determinant of inflation. Near insolvency, fiscal adjustments are constrained, necessitating price level changes to satisfy the government’s budget constraint—thus, the FTPL becomes more accurate in explaining the price level under these conditions.

Answer:

Because when a government is solvent, it can adjust taxes and spending to ensure its debts are covered, so fiscal policy doesn’t determine the price level—the central bank’s monetary policy does. But as a government nears insolvency and can’t generate enough future surpluses to repay debt, the only way to satisfy its budget constraint is through a higher price level (inflation reducing the real value of debt). So the fiscal theory of the price level becomes more applicable—the price level adjusts to ensure the real value of government debt equals the present value of future surpluses. Thus, the economist believed the fiscal theory is “more true” as governments approach insolvency because fiscal limitations force the price level to adjust to restore fiscal balance.

TC again: Here is the link to the chat.  What percent of professional economists would have come up with a better answer?  Here is an article on the o1 model beating the experts.

Tariffs Hurt Manufacturing

In Disentangling the Effects of the 2018-2019 Tariffs on a Globally Connected U.S. Manufacturing Sector (forthcoming) Aaron Flaaen and Justin Pierce of the Federal Reserve Board write:

The unprecedented increase in tariffs imposed by the United States against its major trading partners in 2018-2019 has brought renewed attention to the economic effects of tariffs. While vast theoretical and empirical literatures document the effects of changes in trade policy, it is not clear how prior estimates apply when there are virtually no modern episodes of a large, advanced economy raising tariffs in a way comparable to the U.S. during this period. Further complicating estimation of the effects of tariffs is the rapid expansion of globally interconnected supply chains, in which tariffs can have impacts through channels beyond their traditional effect of limiting import competition.

Another important feature of these tariffs is that they were imposed, in part, to boost the U.S. manufacturing sector by protecting against what were deemed to be the unfair trade practices of trading partners, principally China. Thus, understanding the impact of tariffs on manufacturing is vitally important, as some may view the negative consequences of tariff increases documented in existing research—including higher prices, lower consumption, and reduced business investment—as an acceptable cost for boosting manufacturing activity in the United States.

…On the one hand, U.S. import tariffs may protect some U.S.-based manufacturers from import competition in the domestic market, allowing them to gain market share at the expense of foreign competitors. On the other hand, U.S. tariffs have also been imposed on intermediate inputs, and the associated increase in costs may hurt U.S. firms’ competitiveness in producing for both the export and domestic markets. Moreover, U.S. trade partners have imposed retaliatory tariffs on U.S. exports of certain goods, which could again put U.S. firms at a disadvantage in those markets, relative to their foreign competitors. Disentangling the effects of these three channels and determining which effect dominates is an empirical question of critical importance.

…Our results suggest that the traditional use of trade policy as a tool for the protection and promotion of domestic manufacturing is complicated by the presence of globally interconnnected supply chains and the retaliatory actions of trade partners. Indeed, we find the impact from the traditional import protection channel is completely offset in the short-run by reduced competitiveness from retaliation and especially by higher costs in downstream industries…[the] net effect is a relative reduction in manufacturing employment.

Most famously, Whirlpool predicted that tariffs on washing machines would be great for Whirlpool profits, but their pleasure turned to dismay when they  realized that steel and aluminum tariffs would raise their input prices.

Hat tip: The excellent Kevin Lewis.