White Flight from Asian Immigration: Evidence from California Public Schools

Asian Americans are the fastest-growing racial group in the US but we know little about how Asian immigration has affected cities, neighborhoods and schools. This paper studies white flight from Asian arrivals in high-socioeconomic-status Californian school districts from 2000-2016 using initial settlement patterns and national immigrant flows to instrument for entry. We find that, as Asian students arrive, white student enrollment declines in higher-income suburbs. These patterns cannot be fully explained by racial animus, housing prices, or correlations with Black/Hispanic arrivals. Parental fears of academic competition may play a role.

That is from a new NBER working paper by Leah Platt Boustan, Christine Cai, and Tammy Tseng.  Nut unrelated to recent issues surrounding Harvard admissions policies, of course, and also not unrelated to the somewhat uncomfortable role that successful Asian students play in the political discourse of the Left.

The Birth-Weight Pollution Paradox

Maxim Massenkoff asks a very good question. If pollution reduces birth weight as much as the micro studies on pollution suggest, why aren’t birth weights very low in very polluted cities and countries? Figure 1, for example, shows birth weights in a variety of highly polluted world cities. The yellow dashed and blue lines show “predicted” birth weights extrapolated from the well-known Alexander and Schwandt “Volkswagen study” which looked at the effects of increased pollution in the United States. Despite the fact that every one of the highly-polluted cities is much more polluted than the most polluted US city, birth weight is not tremendously lower in these cities. Indeed, there is no obvious correlation between birth weight and pollution at all.

Similarly, US cities were more polluted in the past but were birth weights lower in the past? Figure 2 shows a number of US cities which were two to three times more polluted in 1972 (right side of diagram) than 2002 (left side of diagram). Yet, birth weights do not appear lower in the more polluted past and certainly do not follow the extrapolated birth weight-pollution predictions from the micro literature.

Massenkoff looks at a variety of possible explanations. One possibility, for example, is culling. Perhaps in highly polluted areas there are more miscarriages, still births or difficulty conceiving with the result that the observed sample of births is highly selected. There is some evidence that pollution increases miscarriages and stillbirths but these tend to be correlated with lower birth weight–a scarring effect rather than a culling effect. In addition, the effect of pollution on miscarriages and stillbirths also appears to be bigger on a micro level than on a macro level. That is, these rates aren’t massively higher in high pollution countries.

Another possibility is that pollution isn’t that bad and, in particular, not as bad as I have suggested. As a good Bayesian, I update, but for reasons I have given here, it’s not justifiable to update very much.

I assume, as I always do, that there are some overestimates in the micro literature for the usual reasons. But, more fundamentally, my best guess for the birth-weight pollution paradox is that weight is one of the easiest margins on which the body can adapt and compensate. Even in poor countries there are plenty of calories to go around and so it’s relatively easy for the body to adjust to higher pollution, on this margin. Indeed, weight is known as a variable that creates paradoxes!

Micro studies on weight and exercise, for example, show that exercise reduces weight. But looking across countries, societies, and time we don’t see big effects–indeed, calorie expenditure doesn’t vary much with exercise! Importantly, notice that the micro-estimates are correct. If you increase physical activity for the next 3 months, holding all else equal (which is possible for 3 months), you will lose weight. However, the micro estimates are difficult to extrapolate to permanent, long-run changes because there are complex, adaptive mechanisms governing weight, calorie consumption and energy expenditure.

The exercise paradox doesn’t mean that exercise isn’t good for you–the evidence on the benefits of exercise is extensive and credible. In the same way the birth-weight pollution paradox doesn’t mean that pollution isn’t harmful–the evidence on the costs of pollution is extensive and credible. In particular, it’s going to be much harder to adapt to pollution for heart disease, cancer, life expectancy and IQ than for weight. 

I am always impressed with papers that present big, obviously-true facts that most people have simply missed. Massenkoff is becoming a leader in this field.

Why the NYC congestion pricing plan is bad

I am seeing some critical comments on my latest column, mostly from people who are not reading it through, or in some cases they are making basic mistakes in economics.  Let me start with part of my conclusion:

I suspect that I could endorse a properly targeted version of congestion pricing for Manhattan, for instance, one that encouraged mass transit without discouraging density.

Many people are responding by making a version of that point and thinking it contradicts me.  Here are a few basic facts about the current proposal:

1. The off-peak price is too high at $17, relative to $23 for peak.

2. There is an odd and unjustified discrete notch at 60th St, which will cause further distortions of its own.

3. There is no difference for cars passing through and cars with passengers spending money or doing something productive in lower Manhattan.

This is not the traffic congestion charge you should be looking to implement.

A second line of responses (Erik B. and Alex) suggests that the congestion charge will not lower the flow of humans into Manhattan.  I am sorry, but demand curves slope downward!  The resulting auto commute does become more predictable and regular, but that holds only because there are fewer trips and to some extent because trips are time-shifted.  (Note that the small gap between the $17 and $23 prices suggests a small benefit from time shifting.)  Fewer outsiders will benefit from Manhattan, and those outsiders will skew richer and older.  The methods for improving the quality of the trip really do lower the number of trip-makers, probably both peak and off-peak.  It is not going to mean higher or even constant throughput for vehicles or humans.  (If you think it does, does that imply a big subsidy to car trips would get us to a carless city?  There are some non-linear scenarios where a congestion charge boosts throughput, such as when otherwise no cars move at all in extreme gridlock.  In reality, it seems cars are moving at about 12 mph in Manhattan.)

The actual possible gain — oddly not cited by the critics — is that a congestion charge might get a given visitor more effective time spent learning from Manhattan.  Though do note an offsetting effect — the higher the traffic problem, the more you will make each trip to Manhattan a grand and elaborate one, and it is your externality-less domestic time in Long Island that will suffer all the more.  So per person learning externalities from effective time spent in Manhattan could go either way, noting the number of visitors still goes down.

You might think such a congestion charge improves welfare (a sounder point than suggesting it will not have a standard price effect), but the whole point is that Manhattan density involves massive positive externalities, including for visitors and note that visitors also finance the  externality-rich activities of the natives:

In some urban settings, the clustering of human talent is of utmost importance. Manhattan is the densest urban area in the US, and it succeeds in large part because it is so crowded. You want to be there because other people want to be there. Even though I don’t live there, I nonetheless benefit from Manhattan, both when I visit and when I consume the television shows, movies, music, and art works that come, either directly or indirectly, out of this urban environment. Manhattan also supports America’s financial center, many tech start-ups, and much more.

I don’t want Manhattan to be less crowded, even though it probably would make many Manhattanites happier and less stressed. I want Manhattan to be efficient for me and others, not just for the residents. If there is any part of America where ideas rubbing together lead to great things, it is Manhattan (and the Bay Area). Arguably, Manhattan should be more crowded, at least if we consider everyone’s interest. That militates against congestion tolls, even though such charges are usually a good idea.

The actually useful solution is to make mass transit, most of all the subway, a reliable and predictable method of getting around.  Right now it is not.  (I doubt if lowering the already low subway prices gets you much.)

If you look at visits into Manhattan, whether by car or not, they already face lots of implicit taxes.  Those include poor roads, mediocre subway performance, high variance public infrastructure including on issues such as trash, pollution issues, some degree of crime, awful connecting infrastructure (NJ Transit anyone?) and much more.  And yet Manhattan is one of the world’s very top TFP factories and we are already taxing entry in so many different ways.

It does not make good economic sense to impose higher yet entry fees into that TFP factory.  Given that multiple externalities are present, the correct mix is to lower many different costs of entry and mobility (including within Manhattan), while shifting the relative use benefits toward mass transit and the subway.  Density really does have positive externalities here, and we all know how much idea makers and distributors are undercompensated.

There are a few more threads of responses on Twitter.  One is to note the noise and pollution costs of vehicles.  That is relevant, but fairly soon we will have lots more electric vehicles, which should be encouraged.  The tolls will become a revenue source that lasts forever and they will not be taken away, but the noise and pollution costs of the vehicles soon will be much lower.

Another thread is to argue that most of the people who drive will switch to mass transit if there is a congestion cost.  Some will, but we are asked to believe that a) current traffic congestion is so awful, b) people put up with it anyway, and c) they nonetheless can be easily nudged into taking mass transit.  That is an uncomfortable blend of views that fails to understand the initial motivations behind the car trips.  There are plenty of people with young kids, or elderly relatives, or multiple packages, or multiple stops, or unreliable mass transportation for getting back home at the end of the evening.  Many of those people cannot feasibly switch to mass transit and that is precisely why they put up with the bad traffic.  Say you finish your Manhattan doings at 10:45 p.m., and have to get back to your New Jersey home in a timely and safe manner.  The PATH train will work for some, but a lot of these people really do need cars to consummate the trip.

(It is a theoretically defensible argument to claim that this congestion tax is the only way of financing mass transit improvements. That may or may not be true, but if it is one should still “regret” the plan, which is not the attitude people are taking.  And are there guarantees this will lead to a refurbishment of the subway?  It has proven remarkably difficult to improve the system, and that is with rising NYC budgets.  Another argument that might work is if non-car visitors so hate seeing cars in Manhattan that the net human inflow, due to auto trips, goes down rather than up.  Do note however that the car trips are still helping to finance retail and cultural infrastructure that attracts the non-car visitors, so don’t just take complaints about cars at face value.  Furthermore this car hatred factor also should become less serious as we transition to electric vehicles.)

On net, do you think our most important cities should be more or less dense?  If you support YIMBYism, which surely does make traffic worse, have you not already answered that question?  So either become a NIMBY or — better yet — be a little more consistent applying your intuitions about the net positive externality from Manhattan density.  A simple way to put the point is that an export tax on your TFP factory is unlikely to be the best way to reduce congestion.

Markets in everything those new (Japanese) service sector jobs

Certain tech bosses are notoriously temperamental – so much so that conflict-averse folks have been known to put in their notice while the execs are on leave. But some Japanese employees have taken this a step further – actually employing an agent to quit their job for them.

The idea is to extricate themselves from delicate scenarios where they feel bullied to stay on board or are otherwise unwilling to leave for fear of being accused of “betraying” the corporation.

In a country renowned for its ultra conservative culture and hierarchical structure, those in the workforce who jump between jobs can be perceived as quitters, with all the shameful connotations attached to that branding.

Step forward the taishoku daiko – or “job-leaving agents” – that emerged in recent times to aid those who simply cannot tell their boss they’re off to pastures new.

Here is the full article, via the excellent Samir Varma.

The Running Seminar

Olivier Blanchard on Stan Fisher:

For a number of years, the informal thesis seminar was replaced by a running seminar, in which thesis students would run with Rudi and Stan around the Charles River. One of us would be asked to present his or her work while running. When the argument became too involved, Rudi or Stan would accelerate the pace to force the speaker to slow down their presentation. It made for simpler and clearer presentations.

Also explains why a 280 character limit has some advantages.

 Hat tip: David Beckworth

Might AI boost gender diversity?

In this paper, we use two field experiments to study how AI recruitment tools can impact gender diversity in the male-dominated technology sector, both overall and separately for labor supply and demand. We find that the use of AI in recruitment changes the gender distribution of potential hires, in some cases more than doubling the fraction of top applicants that are women. This change is generated by better outcomes for women in both supply and demand. On the supply side, we observe that the use of AI reduces the gender gap in application completion rates. Complementary survey evidence suggests that this is driven by female jobseekers believing that there is less bias in recruitment when assessed by AI instead of human evaluators. On the demand side, we find that providing evaluators with applicants’ AI scores closes the gender gap in assessments that otherwise disadvantage female applicants. Finally, we show that the AI tool would have to be substantially biased against women to result in a lower level of gender diversity than found without AI.

Here is the full paper by Mallory Avery, Andreas Leibbrandt, and Joseph Vecci.  Via Alice Evans.

How is Portuguese drug decriminalization going?

Is there fatigue with the experiment?:

Portugal decriminalized all drug use, including marijuana, cocaine and heroin, in an experiment that inspired similar efforts elsewhere, but now police are blaming a spike in the number of people who use drugs for a rise in crime. In one neighborhood, state-issued paraphernalia — powder-blue syringe caps, packets of citric acid for diluting heroin — litters sidewalks outside an elementary school.

Porto’s police have increased patrols to drug-plagued neighborhoods. But given existing laws, there’s only so much they can do. On a recent afternoon, an emaciated man in striped pants sleeping in front of a state-funded drug-use center awoke to a patrol of four officers. He sat up, then defiantly began assembling his crack pipe. Officers walked on, shaking their heads.

Portugal became a model for progressive jurisdictions around the world embracing drug decriminalization, such as the state of Oregon, but now there is talk of fatigue. Police are less motivated to register people who misuse drugs and there are year-long waits for state-funded rehabilitation treatment even as the number of people seeking help has fallen dramatically. The return in force of visible urban drug use, meanwhile, is leading the mayor and others here to ask an explosive question: Is it time to reconsider this country’s globally hailed drug model?

For a while the experiment seemed to be working (see the story), but matters have worsened:

Overdose rates have hit 12-year highs and almost doubled in Lisbon from 2019 to 2023. Sewage samples in Lisbon show cocaine and ketamine detection is now among the highest in Europe, with elevated weekend rates suggesting party-heavy usage. In Porto, the collection of drug-related debris from city streets surged 24 percent between 2021 and 2022, with this year on track to far outpace the last. Crime — including robbery in public spaces — spiked 14 percent from 2021 to 2022, a rise police blame partly on increased drug use.

Here is the full WaPo story.

Central Notions of Smithian Liberalism

Just out, by my colleague Daniel B. Klein, I have not yet read it.  It is described as follows:

Central Notions of Smithian Liberalism explores notions jural, political, and economic. The author does intellectual history as a way of theorizing—that is, to advance political theory, jural theory, moral theory, social theory, economic theory. The author treats Adam Smith and the liberalism he shared with David Hume and Edmund Burke. They represent classical liberalism at its best. Their classical liberalism is today aptly called conservative liberalism. The chapters derive mostly from substantial articles previously published in scholarly journals. Chapters expound Smith’s tri-layered justice, liberty, jural dualism, Humean conventionalist political theory, and Smithian liberalism. A chapter written with Erik Matson, “Convention without Convening,” explains natural convention, transcending “nature” and “convention” and attesting the place of Hume and Smith in natural law traditions and enlarging our understanding of those traditions. A chapter asks and answers, “Is It Just to Pursue Honest Income?”.  Another chapter identifies four sets of nonconflicting rules, namely (1) government law, (2) commutative justice, (3) ethics writ large, and (4) just government law. Other chapters relate Smithian liberalism to various topics, including Iain McGilchrist’s divided brain, being grateful for without being grateful to, and the Export-Import Bank. The final chapter considers the fortunes of liberalism in relation to prevailing attitudes toward allegory and God.

Free download at the link, I am pleased to see more books presented in this fashion.  Much better than the $100 price tags (and up) you get from some publishers…

Wemby

He clearly is a special and multi-faceted talent, but I am worried.  Most of all, I am worried by his body shape, which reminds me of both Pervis Ellison and Shawn Bradley, with a height somewhere in between those two.  Players with that kind of physique typically have problems a) avoiding injuries, and b) avoiding foul trouble (they are not always strong enough to hold their ground, they tend to reach a lot, and they tend to be fooled by fakes).

So can he stay on the court?  I am not picking him to win Rookie of the Year, as some big men take much longer to develop (I am looking more at the five blocks than the 2-13 shooting in his Summer League debut).  Let’s hope he gets the chance.

Regulating Transformative Technologies

That is a very new paper by Daron Acemoglu and MIT grad student Todd Lensman, here is the abstract:

Transformative technologies like generative artificial intelligence promise to accelerate productivity growth across many sectors, but they also present new risks from potential misuse. We develop a multi-sector technology adoption model to study the optimal regulation of transformative technologies when society can learn about these risks over time. Socially optimal adoption is gradual and convex. If social damages are proportional to the productivity gains from the new technology, a higher growth rate leads to slower optimal adoption. Equilibrium adoption is inefficient when firms do not internalize all social damages, and sector-independent regulation is helpful but generally not sufficient to restore optimality.

Maybe that’s not a great abstract for non-economists, but the paper itself is pretty clear if you read through it.  It is very good to see someone finally start working this out.  Basically they lay out which assumptions might be needed to make a case for slowing down the progress of AI.

The case for accelerationism becomes stronger if you consider:

1. Early adoption of a technology, especially if done selectively, may facilitate learning.

2. The existence of a rival nation(s) with “less aligned” values and also with less reliable safety procedures.

3. The risk that a centralized regulator might make the technology more rather than less risky.  For instance, you might push the development of the technology into harder to monitor open source forms, and inefficiently so.

Of course a key goal is to endogenize the risk of serious social damages from AI in a decentralized system, rather than taking that risk as given.  I don’t expect the authors to have done that in this paper, in any case this literature is now up and running.