The case why culture is not stuck

From the excellent Katherine Dee, here is just one excerpt:

TikTok sketch comedy is in the same lineage of theater. It invites a suspension of disbelief from the audience, creators often play multiple characters, rapidly switching between roles with nothing more than a change in voice, facial expression, or camera angle. And importantly, it’s funny. When the whole feed is taken together, it’s almost digital vaudeville: a song, a short sketch, a physical feat, slapstick, animal acts and satire, one after another, in a personalized variety show on your phone.

And:

It’s a spectrum. At one end, we have Internet Personalities, with their cults of devotion. In the middle, we find fan culture, where some fans become prominent figures within their fandoms, stars in their own right. These Big Name Fans occasionally break out to create their own media kingdoms, as was the case with E.L. James, who authored Fifty Shades of Grey, itself originally Twilight fanfiction, and Cassandra Clare, who began in the Harry Potter fan community, before going on to write several popular fantasy series. At the other end of the spectrum are anonymous creators, whose approach to authorship is almost medieval: their projects are not about them as individuals, but the meme, the project, the aesthetic, the vision. They are less like the expressive individualists of Modern art, than the cathedral builders of the Middle Ages.

Much has been said about memes as art and the collective labor and imagination that goes into their creation, but it extends further than that. It’s not just memes. Creating mood boards on Pinterest or curating aesthetics on TikTok are evolving art forms, too. Constructing an atmosphere, or “vibe,” through images and sounds, is itself a form of storytelling, one that’s been woefully misunderstood and even undermined as shallow. Many of these aesthetics have staying power, like “coquette” and “cottagecore.” They’re not passing fads or stand-ins for personalities or subcultures. They are more than ever-evolving vectors for consumerism. They’re a type of immersive art that we don’t yet have the language to fully describe.

But that is the case with so much of what’s new. We won’t understand it until it’s in the rearview mirror.

Interesting throughout.  Of course AI-aided creations will be the next step in this process.  Maybe you don’t like a lot of these new forms, perhaps because they do not have the nobility and grandeur of say Bach.  One simple point is that it is not optimal for every period in culture to focus on exactly what you want from it.  This point is rarely recognized.  Diversity across time is valuable as well!

Friday assorted links

1. Bitcoin documentary on HBO.  Claims they will unmask Satoshi.

2. GPT Canvas, for writing and research writing, interactive.  And more here.

3. Inaugural World Bank Business Ready report (successor to the Doing Business which ended in 2021 over political rigging) is now out.  Hungary, Estonia, and Singapore take the top spots.

4. More Scott Sumner on movies.

5. Toyota to invest $500mn in flying taxi start-up Joby (FT).

6. Writing Examples, from David Perell, to learn from the best writing in history.

7. The shift toward protectionism, starting in 2017, has failed.

8. U.S. obesity rate fell in 2023.

9. Miles Brundage speaks: “With very rare exceptions, the economics profession is completely discrediting itself by either ignoring or badly misunderstanding AI”

What should I ask Stephen Kotkin?

Kotkin’s most prominent book project is his three-volume biography of Joseph Stalin: The first two volumes have been published as Stalin: Paradoxes of Power, 1878–1928 (2014) and Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929–1941 (2017), and the third volume remains to be published.

Here is more from Wikipedia, of course he is an expert on the Soviet Union and also Russia more generally:

Among scholars of Russia, he is best known for Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization which exposes the realities of everyday life in the Soviet city of Magnitogorsk during the 1930s. In 2001, he published Armageddon Averted, a short history of the fall of the Soviet Union…

He is currently writing a multi-century history of Siberia, focusing on the Ob River Valley.

He is currently at the Hoover Institution.  So what should I ask him?

Ask ChatGPT o1-preview, fiscal theory of the price level edition

Question: An economist once said that the fiscal theory of the price level was true, or became more true, as governments approached insolvency. But otherwise it is not true. Can you reconstruct analytically why the economist might have held this view?

The economist’s view hinges on the relationship between a government’s fiscal position and the determination of the price level, as articulated by the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL). The FTPL posits that the price level is determined by the government’s fiscal policy—specifically, the present value of its future primary surpluses relative to its outstanding debt—rather than solely by monetary factors such as the money supply.

Here’s an analytical reconstruction of why the economist might have held the view that the FTPL becomes more true as governments approach insolvency:

  1. Government’s Intertemporal Budget Constraint (GIBC):The GIBC states that the current real value of government debt (BB) must equal the present value of future primary surpluses (PV(S)PV(S)):B=PV(S)B = PV(S)This equation implies that the government must eventually generate enough primary surpluses (budget surpluses excluding interest payments) to repay its debt.
  2. Normal Circumstances—Solvent Government:
    • When a government is solvent, it has the capacity to adjust its fiscal policy—by increasing taxes or reducing spending—to ensure that PV(S)PV(S) matches BB.
    • In this scenario, the central bank’s monetary policy is the primary determinant of the price level. The government doesn’t need the price level to adjust to satisfy its budget constraint because it can adjust fiscal variables.
    • The Quantity Theory of Money (QTM) or other monetary theories are more relevant here, linking the money supply and velocity of money to the price level.
  3. Approaching Insolvency—Fiscal Limitations:
    • As a government approaches insolvency, its ability to generate sufficient future primary surpluses diminishes. It may face political, economic, or structural barriers to raising taxes or cutting spending.
    • In this case, the GIBC cannot be satisfied through adjustments in fiscal policy alone.
  4. Price Level Adjustment Necessity:
    • To satisfy the GIBC when PV(S)PV(S) is insufficient, the only remaining variable that can adjust is the price level (PP).
    • An increase in the price level reduces the real value of nominal government debt (BB), effectively lowering the debt burden.
    • This inflationary adjustment allows the GIBC to hold despite the government’s inability to generate adequate primary surpluses.
  5. Dominance of Fiscal Policy in Price Determination:
    • When the government is near insolvency, fiscal considerations become paramount in determining the price level.
    • Monetary policy may become subordinate or even impotent because the central bank might be compelled to accommodate the government’s fiscal needs (e.g., by monetizing debt).
    • The FTPL becomes the relevant theory, as it explains how fiscal imbalances necessitate price level adjustments to satisfy the GIBC.
  6. Conclusion—Conditional Validity of the FTPL:
    • Under normal, solvent conditions, the FTPL does not primarily determine the price level because the government can adjust fiscal policy, and monetary policy remains effective.
    • As insolvency looms, fiscal constraints force reliance on price level adjustments, making the FTPL increasingly accurate in explaining inflation dynamics.
    • Therefore, the economist argues that the FTPL becomes “more true” as a government approaches insolvency because fiscal limitations leave the price level as the main adjustment mechanism to restore fiscal balance.

Summary:

The economist believed that the FTPL’s applicability depends on the government’s fiscal health. In solvency, fiscal adjustments can maintain balance without affecting the price level, keeping monetary policy as the main determinant of inflation. Near insolvency, fiscal adjustments are constrained, necessitating price level changes to satisfy the government’s budget constraint—thus, the FTPL becomes more accurate in explaining the price level under these conditions.

Answer:

Because when a government is solvent, it can adjust taxes and spending to ensure its debts are covered, so fiscal policy doesn’t determine the price level—the central bank’s monetary policy does. But as a government nears insolvency and can’t generate enough future surpluses to repay debt, the only way to satisfy its budget constraint is through a higher price level (inflation reducing the real value of debt). So the fiscal theory of the price level becomes more applicable—the price level adjusts to ensure the real value of government debt equals the present value of future surpluses. Thus, the economist believed the fiscal theory is “more true” as governments approach insolvency because fiscal limitations force the price level to adjust to restore fiscal balance.

TC again: Here is the link to the chat.  What percent of professional economists would have come up with a better answer?  Here is an article on the o1 model beating the experts.

Tariffs Hurt Manufacturing

In Disentangling the Effects of the 2018-2019 Tariffs on a Globally Connected U.S. Manufacturing Sector (forthcoming) Aaron Flaaen and Justin Pierce of the Federal Reserve Board write:

The unprecedented increase in tariffs imposed by the United States against its major trading partners in 2018-2019 has brought renewed attention to the economic effects of tariffs. While vast theoretical and empirical literatures document the effects of changes in trade policy, it is not clear how prior estimates apply when there are virtually no modern episodes of a large, advanced economy raising tariffs in a way comparable to the U.S. during this period. Further complicating estimation of the effects of tariffs is the rapid expansion of globally interconnected supply chains, in which tariffs can have impacts through channels beyond their traditional effect of limiting import competition.

Another important feature of these tariffs is that they were imposed, in part, to boost the U.S. manufacturing sector by protecting against what were deemed to be the unfair trade practices of trading partners, principally China. Thus, understanding the impact of tariffs on manufacturing is vitally important, as some may view the negative consequences of tariff increases documented in existing research—including higher prices, lower consumption, and reduced business investment—as an acceptable cost for boosting manufacturing activity in the United States.

…On the one hand, U.S. import tariffs may protect some U.S.-based manufacturers from import competition in the domestic market, allowing them to gain market share at the expense of foreign competitors. On the other hand, U.S. tariffs have also been imposed on intermediate inputs, and the associated increase in costs may hurt U.S. firms’ competitiveness in producing for both the export and domestic markets. Moreover, U.S. trade partners have imposed retaliatory tariffs on U.S. exports of certain goods, which could again put U.S. firms at a disadvantage in those markets, relative to their foreign competitors. Disentangling the effects of these three channels and determining which effect dominates is an empirical question of critical importance.

…Our results suggest that the traditional use of trade policy as a tool for the protection and promotion of domestic manufacturing is complicated by the presence of globally interconnnected supply chains and the retaliatory actions of trade partners. Indeed, we find the impact from the traditional import protection channel is completely offset in the short-run by reduced competitiveness from retaliation and especially by higher costs in downstream industries…[the] net effect is a relative reduction in manufacturing employment.

Most famously, Whirlpool predicted that tariffs on washing machines would be great for Whirlpool profits, but their pleasure turned to dismay when they  realized that steel and aluminum tariffs would raise their input prices.

Hat tip: The excellent Kevin Lewis.

My Conversation with the excellent Kyla Scanlon

Here is the audio, video, and transcript.  Here is the episode summary:

Kyla Scanlon has made it her personal mission to bring economics education to a larger audience through social media. She publishes daily content across TikTok, YouTube, Substack, LinkedIn and more, explaining what is happening in the economy and why it is happening. Tyler calls her first book In This Economy? How Money & Markets Really Work a “good and bracing shock to those who have trained their memories on some weighted average of the more distant past.”

Tyler and Kyla dive into the modern state of economics education and a whole range of topics like if fantasy world building can help you understand economics, what she learned trading options at 16, why she opted for a state school over the Ivy League, lessons from selling 38 cars over summer break, introversion as an ingredient for social media success, if she believes in any conspiracy theories, Instagram scrolling vs TikTok scrolling, the decline of print culture, why people are seeking out cults, modern nihilism, how perspective can help with optimism, the death of celebrity and the rise of influencers, why econ education has gone backward, improving mainstream media, YIMBYism and real estate, nuclear pragmatism versus utopian geothermalists, investing advice for young people, why she thinks about the Great Depression more than Rome, creating the next Free to Choose, and more.

Excerpt:

COWEN: Putting aside your own work, what kind of economics do you think young people are learning from TikTok?

SCANLON: [laughs] Concerning.

COWEN: Is it conspiratorial? Is it leaning in some particular direction?

SCANLON: I would say it’s definitely conspiratorial. There’s a lot of desire to pin inflation onto companies, which I don’t know if that’s the best thing to do. There’s a lot of desire to have a scapegoat. I think a lot of people are frustrated with their economic situation, and so they look at TikTok videos, and somebody is telling them that, yes, Blackrock is conspiring against them, and that’s very soothing. I think that’s where we have ended up with TikTok and econ.

And this:

COWEN: Yes, in a way, they’re making a deal with you. They promise to listen and give you numbers, and you promise to let them abuse you. That’s the exchange. That’s what they want.

SCANLON: Yes, exactly.

COWEN: It’s the right to selectively abuse.

Definitely recommended.  And here is the earlier David Beckworth podcast with Kyla.

Incentives matter, the demand curve slopes downward, mental health edition

Since 2000, pharmaceuticals for common psychiatric conditions aged out of patent protection. After generic entry, supply increases as more sellers enter the market, leading to lower prices – about 80-85% less! Cheaper prescriptions and more treatment are the stated goal of policies to improve affordability.

…Drug prices definitely fell during this period. For the SSRI sertraline, consumer cost per month dropped from ~35 dollars in the mid-2000s to ~6 dollars by the mid 2010s. Total Medicaid spending on antidepressants peaked in 2004 ($2 billion) then declined through 2018 ($750 million). Authors of that paper note that “generic drug prices steadily decreased over time” while utilization increased. From 2013 to 2018, both out-of-pocket costs and total expenditures per prescription fill went down for antidepressants and antipsychotics. For antipsychotics, generic drug claims grew 35% from 2016 to 2021.

According to the DEA, total dispensing of stimulants jumped 58% from 2012 to 2022; note how this follows the generic entry of long-acting Ritalin (methylphenidate) and Adderall (amphetamine) products. More recently, stimulant prices shot up amid shortages.

And:

By the mid 2010s, people with psychiatric conditions were better able to afford mental health care. Young adults, now on their parents insurance, saw declining out of pocket costs for behavioral health in particular. For people aged 18-25, “mental health treatment increased by 5.3 percentage points relative to a comparison group of similar people ages 26–35.” Even for employer plans, in-network prices and cost-sharing decreased from 2007 to 2017…

Here is the full essay by AffectiveMedicine.  It has numerous other points of interest.

Model this

Doctors were given cases to diagnose, with half getting GPT-4 access to help. The control group got 73% right & the GPT-4 group 77%. No big difference.

But GPT-4 alone got 92%. The doctors didn’t want to listen to the AI.

Here is more from Ethan Mollick.  And now the tweet is reposted with (minor) clarifications:

A preview of the coming problem of working with AI when it starts to match or exceed human capability: Doctors were given cases to diagnose, with half getting GPT-4 access to help. The control group got 73% score in diagnostic accuracy (a measure of diagnostic reasoning) & the GPT-4 group 77%. No big difference. But GPT-4 alone got 88%. The doctors didn’t change their opinions when working with AI.

New MRU Video! Negative Externalities

Here’s the latest video from Marginal Revolution University. It covers negative externalities–drawing, of course, from the most innovative and interesting principles of economics textbook, Modern Principles of Economics.

MRU videos are free for anyone’s use anytime, anywhere and don’t forget there are also two new econ-practice games on negative externalities and positive externalities and a fun choose your own adventure story on Unintended Consequences (most textbooks just teach when regulation works. We are more balanced.)

Podcast on science policy

It is titled ARPAS, FROs, and Fast Grants, Oh My!  The host is the excellent Tammy Winter, and the other guests are Patrick Hsu and Adam Marblestone, plus yours truly.

Here is the link, with transcript.  Excerpt:

Tyler Cowen: In virtually all institutions, we should be taking more chances on quite young people, giving them more authority, in general. My background is quite different from the rest of you at this meeting. I spent a big chunk of my career studying the financing of the creative arts, economics of the arts. That’s always my mental touchstone. When I hear about Focused Research Organizations that expire when the project is over, I think of Hollywood movies. We’ve been doing that for a long time.

You can almost always find parallels in the arts, which makes you much more optimistic about what you can do. Rapid patronage was a big thing during the Renaissance, and it worked really well. I knew when we started Fast Grants, “Oh, we can do this” because of historical examples.

And when you think of young people running things — well, who ran the Beatles? There was George Martin and Brian Epstein, but the Beatles ran the Beatles. Paul McCartney had to figure out the recording studio. We don’t call that science, but that was an extremely difficult scientific project that had never been done before. And this guy, who hadn’t gone to college, at age 23 starts figuring it out and becomes a master. When you see those things happen in the arts — frequently, they happen — you become way more optimistic. “How many people can do this? How can we scale it? Can super young people contribute? Can this all work?”

You are not saying it’s easy — most projects in the arts fail, too — but you think, “Yes, yes, yes, we can do this.” And you do it, or you try to do it.

Recommended, interesting throughout.  We had great fun taping this at Stripe headquarters.

Econ Journal Watch, new issue

Volume 21, Number 2, September 2024

In this issue:

Academic Productivity after the CEA: Gordon Tullock wrote that government economists found capable of “firefighting” are assigned to do more of it, “with the result that the higher ranks of government economists aren’t able to read.” Here, Richard Burkhauser, Kevin Corinth, and Casey Mulligan offer themselves as confounding data points.

Intelligent? DEI in the U.S. intelligence communityJohn Gentry examines and criticizes claims by Carmen Medina and others that DEI improves operational performance in the CIA and the U.S. intelligence community more broadly. (Medina is hereby invited to reply in a future issue of this journal.)

Temperature~economic growthDavid Barker analyzes the Economic Inquiry article by Michael Kiley, who declined to respond to Barker’s critique of the Fed working paper version. Barker addresses what’s new and what he thinks is wrong. (Kiley is hereby invited to reply in a future issue of this journal.)

The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment, which was sanctioned by the federal government, plausibly created mistrust of the medical profession among Blacks. In a Quarterly Journal of Economics article Marcella Alsan and Marianne Wanamaker purport to show a causal link between the despicable experiment and Black male mortality. Here, Robert Kaestner reassesses and concludes that their analysis was based on unsupported theoretical assumptions and faulty empirical methods. He concludes that the article does not provide proper evidence for the claim that the experiment caused an increase in Black male mortality. (Alsan and Wanamaker are hereby invited to reply in a future issue of this journal.)

Can we detect the effects of racial violence on Black patenting? Lisa Cook published a Journal of Economic Growth article on the effect of racial violence on innovation by Black Americans over the period 1870–1940. Here, Michael Wiebe contends that Cook’s results are not reliable and her conclusions are uninformative. (Cook is hereby invited to reply in a future issue of this journal.)

If in 1917 the Bolsheviks had failed, would Marx not have become such a big deal? In a Journal of Political Economy article, Phillip Magness and Michael Makovi argue that Karl Marx was not destined to become such a big deal, but rather that his enormous place as symbol and influence depended adventitiously on 1917 and its aftermath in the Soviet Union. Here, Joseph Francis challenges their hypothesis, and, in a reply, Magness and Makovi stick to their original claim.

Classical Liberalism in Argentina, from 1816 to 1884: Alejandro Gómez and Nicolás Cachanosky treat the classical liberal influence in Argentine history from independence in 1816 to the 1853 constitution and its aftermath. The foremost protagonist is Juan Bautista Alberdi (1810–1884). The piece extends the Classical Liberalism in Econ, by Country series.

Mission: Preposterous! The ‘mission economy,’ associated with economist Mariana Mazzucato, repackages the aim to governmentalize economic affairs. The ‘mission economy’ mission is assessed by the 2024 book Moonshots and the New Industrial Policy: Questioning the Mission Economy edited by Magnus Henrekson, Christian Sandström, and Mikael Stenkula. A review essay is here provided by Michael Munger.

Are Economic Freedom and Political Unfreedom Compatible? Mark Koyama reviews Evan Osborne’s 2024 book on economic liberalism in modern China.

Cure for Russia Hate: The Anglo tradition of hating Russia started in earnest in the 1830s. In 1836, Richard Cobden wrote a pamphlet challenging the development. A portion is presented here.

EJW Audio:

Glenn Diesen on Russophobia from Cobden’s Time to Today

Michael O’Connor on Sharpe Ratios and Investing

Tuesday assorted links

1. “Montana Man Sentenced for Federal Wildlife Trafficking Charges as Part of Yearslong Effort to Create Giant Hybrid Sheep for Captive Hunting.

2. Dikembe Mutombo, RIP (NYT).

3. Rick Rubin asked me to make for him a Spotify playlist of some of my favorite classical performances.  Quite subjective and arbitrary.

4. How are “Top Five” publications distributed across economics departments? And the spreadsheet.

5. “The IRS says American hostages who had been held in Russia for years still have to pay the full penalties under the law for failure to file their taxes while they were trapped abroad.

6. The artificial sublime.

7. Apologies, there was an error in the “France fact of the day” post, explained here.

8. Claims: “basically one thing that’s happening globally right now is that american ideological strains escaped from america. they’re incredibly potent and while americans have been selected for resistance the rest of the world is naive. basically brain smallpox but for the old world”

9. Switzerland and Italy redraw border due to melting glaciers.

10. NotebookLM.  Beats the Turing test, to say the least.

There are not 13,099 Illegal Immigrant Murderers Roaming Free on American Streets

Migrants incarcerated for homicide are considered “non-detained” by ICE when they are in state or federal prisons. When ICE uses the term “non-detained,” they mean not currently detained by ICE. In other words, the migrant murderers included in the letter are overwhelmingly in prison serving their sentences. After they serve their sentences, the government transfers them onto ICE’s docket for removal from the United States.

And that is only part of the mistake in the numbers you may have heard.  Here is more from Alex Nowrasteh:

The third untrue claim is that these 13,099 migrants convicted of homicide committed their crimes recently. Those migrant criminal convictions go back over 40 years or more. Confusion over the period covered by a dataset afflicts the interpretation of other criminal datasets too. If there really were 13,099 migrants convicted for domestic homicides in 2023, then they would have accounted for about 99 percent of all homicide convictions in the U.S. last year despite being about 4 percent of the population. That is obviously not the case because no group of people is criminally overrepresented by a factor of 25 above their share of the population. Even when the 13,099 homicide convictions of migrants are spread out over the entire Biden administration, migrants would have accounted for about one-third of all homicide convictions from 2021 through 2023. That’s obviously not true. The problem comes from erroneously increasing the numerator (the number of homicide convictions) for a single year and decreasing the denominator (the total number of homicide convictions in just one year) rather than spreading out the convictions and the total number of all murders over a 40-plus year period.

As a side observation:

 Illegal immigrants in Texas are about 7.1 percent of the population, but they accounted for just 5 percent of all homicide convictions in 2022.

Here is the whole essay.  Tweetstorm here.  Via Naveen.