Data Source

At the University of Arizona, school officials know when students are going to drop out before they do.

The public college in Tucson has been quietly collecting data on its first-year students’ ID card swipes around campus for the last few years. The ID cards are given to every enrolled student and can be used at nearly 700 campus locations including vending machines, libraries, labs, residence halls, the student union center, and movie theaters.

They also have an embedded sensor that can be used to track geographic history whenever the card is swiped. These data are fed into an analytics system that finds “highly accurate indicators” of potential dropouts, according to a press release last week from the university. “By getting [student’s] digital traces, you can explore their patterns of movement, behavior and interactions, and that tells you a great deal about them,” Sudha Ram, a professor of management systems, and director of the program, said in the release. “It’s really not designed to track their social interactions, but you can, because you have a timestamp and location information,” Ram added.

That is from Amy X. Wang at Quartz.

His [Barry Bogin’s] research, published in Anthropologischer Anzeiger: Journal of Biological and Clinical Anthropology, considered numerous other examples of migration and height change over the past 140 years, including rural Bangladeshis who came to London in the 1970s.

In each instance, migrant youngsters’ growth accelerated until their average height matched that of their new native peers.

“This is usually thought to be due to better food and health care in the new country,” said Prof Bogin.

“But also, because the emotional stress that limited growth in the old country has been lifted — and there is emotional stimulus for bigger body size in the new country.”

Professor Bogin’s study, carried out in collaboration with Dr Christiane Scheffler, at the University of Potsdam, and Professor Michael Hermanussen, from the University of Kiel, also explored a second phenomenon called competitive growth — where the ruling social classes adjust their height to exceed the subordinate population.

Prof Bogin said: “This is when the mean height of colonial or military migrants, who become the socially dominant group in the conquered country, surpasses the average height of the both the conquered people and the origin population.”

In one example, the researchers found that the height of Dutch colonial masters in Indonesia in the 19th and early 20th centuries was greater than the Indonesians they ruled, and also greater than social upper classes back in the Netherlands.

“This was also the case for English colonial masters in North America,” said Prof Bogin.

“We find that it is the superior social status of the conquerors that promotes their greater height.

Fascinating stuff, to what else might this apply?  Here is the full link, via Anecdotal.


by on March 15, 2018 at 7:25 am in Data Source, Economics, Education | Permalink

The Richmond Fed has a good overview of apprenticeships in the United States and some of the academic literature:

According to a 2013 World Bank and International Labour Office study, only about 0.3 percent of the total U.S. workforce is in registered apprenticeships — about a 12th of the share in Germany. But some states, including South Carolina, have expanded “dual system” apprenticeships in recent years by building partnerships between colleges and firms and, in some cases, offering tax credits. Through the state’s “Apprenticeship Carolina” program, about 27,000 workers have been trained since 2007, including many at foreign-owned firms. Nationwide, there were about 505,000 registered apprentices in 2016, according to the U.S. Labor Department.

The review offers some useful ideas on why apprenticeships are less common in the United States. One problem is cultural:

In other countries, it’s more likely that college is seen as one option among many, and apprenticeships are con­sidered a worthwhile route to middle-class employment. In the United States, parents are more likely to see college as a vital investment without considering other alterna­tives…

As I said in Launching the Innovation Renaissance:

The U.S. has paved a single road to knowledge, the road through the classroom. “Sit down, stay quiet, and absorb. Do this for 12 to 16 years,” we tell the students, “and all will be well.” Most of them, however, crash before they reach the end of the road — some drop out of high school and then more drop out of college. Who can blame them? Sit-down learning is not for everyone, perhaps not even for most people. There are many roads to knowledge.

Because of measurement issues and data limitations, Mexican Americans in particular and Hispanic Americans in general probably have experienced significantly more socioeconomic progress beyond the second generation than available data indicate. Even so, it may take longer for their descendants to integrate fully into the American mainstream than it did for the descendants of the European immigrants who arrived near the turn of the twentieth century.

That is from a new NBER working paper by Brian Duncan and Stephen J. Trejo.

Vodka, circuses, and public libraries are in decline.

Russians love Lada (why?), microwaves, and IKEA.  And contrary to what many people believe, the population is now growing.

On top of all that, Vladimir Kramnik is playing brilliantly in the Candidates’ Tournament in Berlin.  I don’t know the time series on poisoning spies and double agents with WMD.

For the pointer I thank Ray Lopez.

In this study, we argue that the perceived polarization of Americans along party lines is partially an artifact of the low response rates that characterize contemporary surveys. People who agree to participate in opinion surveys are more informed, involved, and opinionated about the political process and therefore hold stronger, more meaningful, and partisan political attitudes. This motivational discrepancy generates a bias in survey research that may amplify evidence of party polarization in the mass public. We test the association between response rates and measures of polarization using individual-level data from Pew surveys from 2004 to 2014 and American National Election Studies from 1984 to 2012. Our empirical evidence demonstrates a significant decline in unit response that is associated with an increase in the percentage of politically active, partisan, and polarized individuals in these surveys. This produces evidence of dissensus that, on some issues, may be stronger than exists in reality.

That is from a forthcoming piece by Cavari and Freedman in The Journal of Politics.  For the pointer I thank an anonymous correspondent.

And via Nathan, here is a relevant comment.

Very unattractive respondents always earned significantly more than unattractive respondents, sometimes more than average-looking or attractive respondents. Multiple regression analyses showed that there was very weak evidence for the beauty premium, and it disappeared completely once individual differences, such as health, intelligence, and Big Five personality factors, were statistically controlled.

…Past findings of beauty premium and ugliness penalty may possibly be due to the fact that: 1) “very unattractive” and “unattractive” categories are usually collapsed into “below average” category; and 2) health, intelligence (as opposed to education) and Big Five personality factors are not controlled. It appears that more beautiful workers earn more, not because they are beautiful, but because they are healthier, more intelligent, and have better (more Conscientious and Extraverted, and less Neurotic) personality.

That is from Satoshi Kanazawa and Mary C. Still, probably not the last word on this topic but still an advance in knowledge.  Via Kevin Lewis.

Iceland in particular stands out among the Nordic states, since it has a smaller welfare state than its larger Nordic cousins and also ranks among the highest share of female managers in the world. On the other hand, Denmark has the highest tax rate among all the nations in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and ranks at the bottom in terms of its proportion of female managers.

In the dataset for developed economies, there are three countries with equal or higher rates of female managers than Iceland: New Zealand, the United States, and Latvia. These countries have relatively low tax rates: 26.4 percent in the United States, 29.0 percent in Latvia, and 32.8 percent in New Zealand.

That is from a new Cato study by Nima Sanandaji.

From Michael Mann:

For over 150 years liberal optimism has dominated theories of war and violence. It has been repeatedly argued that war and violence either are declining or will shortly decline. There have been exceptions, especially in Germany and more generally in the first half of the twentieth century, but there has been a recent revival of such optimism, especially in the work of Azar Gat, John Mueller, Joshua Goldstein, and Steven Pinker who all perceive a long-term decline in war and violence through history, speeding up in the post-1945 period. Critiquing Pinker’s statistics on war fatalities, I show that the overall pattern is not a decline in war, but substantial variation between periods and places. War has not declined and current trends are slightly in the opposite direction. The conventional view is that civil wars in the global South have largely replaced inter-state wars in the North, but this is misleading since there is major involvement in most civil wars by outside powers, including those of the North. There is more support for their view that homicide has declined in the long-term, at least in the North of the world (with the United States lagging somewhat). This is reinforced by technological improvements in long-distance weaponry and the two transformations have shifted war, especially in the North, from being “ferocious” to “callous” in character. This renders war less visible and less central to Northern culture, which has the deceptive appearance of being rather pacific. Viewed from the South the view has been bleaker both in the colonial period and today. Globally war and violence are not declining, but they are being transformed.

The pointer is from the excellent Kevin Lewis.

Among the young, expectations for future well-being run far ahead of reported well-being today. The gap diminishes with age, and in the rich countries, the lines cross around age 65 after which the future is expected to be worse than the present. Except for this, people appear to be perpetually optimistic about their futures even though this optimism is perpetually frustrated by actual outcomes.

…This (unjustified) optimism seems to happen everywhere in the world…

That is from a new paper by Angus Deaton.

Based on selective exposure and reinforcing spirals model perspectives, we examined the reciprocal relationship between Facebook news use and polarization using national 3-wave panel data collected during the 2016 US Presidential Election. Over the course of the campaign, we found media use and attitudes remained relatively stable. Our results also showed that Facebook news use was related to a modest over-time spiral of depolarization. Furthermore, we found that people who use Facebook for news were more likely to view both pro- and counter-attitudinal news in each wave. Our results indicated that counter-attitudinal news exposure increased over time, which resulted in depolarization. We found no evidence of a parallel model, where pro-attitudinal exposure stemming from Facebook news use resulted in greater affective polarization.

That is from Beam, Hutchens, and Hmielowski.  I thank an anonymous correspondent for the pointer.

Beware the snake, the spider and the scorpion. But know this: You are much more likely to be killed by a bee or a dog.

Of the 1,610 people killed in encounters with animals between 2008 and 2015, 478 were killed by hornets, wasps and bees, and 272 by dogs, according to a study published in Wilderness & Environmental Medicine. Snakes, spiders and scorpions were responsible for 99 deaths over the eight years.

Using a database published by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, researchers found that 72 people annually were killed by “other mammals,” which includes horses, cattle and pigs.

Only six people a year died from snakebite, and six after being bitten by a venomous spider. Two people were killed by marine animals over the eight-year period, and no one was killed by a rat.

That is from Nicholas Bakalar at the NYT, via Michelle Dawson.

A lot of psychological research has failed to replicate, throwing cold water on the entire field. “Grit” and the “growth mindset”, the two taglines of superstar researchers Angela Duckworth and Carol Dweck, checked all the boxes for predictive failure including the requisite TED talks (Duckworth, Dweck), best-selling popular books (Duckworth, Dweck) and genius awards and, to be sure, there has been lots of puffery about the “incredible potential” and “profound impact” of grit and the growth mindset. But, to their great credit, Duckworth and Dweck have taken the replication crisis to heart and have sought to address it. Working with a large team (PI David S Yeager), the authors have tested a growth mindset intervention in 65 randomly chosen schools with over 12,000 students representative of the United States grade 9 population.

Here is what is notable: The analyses were pre-registered, the data were collected by independent researchers and key parts of the model were analyzed by independent statisticians in a blinded dataset.

To achieve arms-length independence, a research firm not involved in designing the materials or study hypotheses drew the sample, recruited schools, facilitated treatment delivery, obtained administrative data, and cleaned and merged data. Data were processed blind to treatment status.

…A random sample of schools, rather than a convenience sample, meant that it represented the full array of the U.S. public educational contexts.

Data were analyzed following a pre-registered analysis plan (the so-called “preregistration challenge,” that was developed by an interdisciplinary team, including one external evaluator. All analyses were “intent to treat” (ITT); data were analyzed as long as students saw the first page of the randomized materials.

independent statisticians reproduced the key moderation findings by estimating a hierarchical, nonlinear Bayesian model using a blinded dataset that masked the identities of the variables, to further reduce the possibility of chance findings.

Ok, so what were the results?

Based on administrative records, 9th grade adolescents assigned to the growth mindset
intervention, as compared to the control activity, earned slightly higher GPAs in core classes at
the end of 9
th grade. On a 4-point grade metric (“A” = 4.0, “B” = 3.0, etc.), the average treatment
effect was 0.03 grade points,
SE = .01, N = 12,542 students, k = 65 schools, t = 3.09, P = .003.

In other words, a small, positive effect. But this small effect is coming from a small intervention, two online survey/interventions of 25 minutes each that could be easily scaled to the entire country or even worldwide. We have come a long way from the “mindset revolution” but who am I to discount a marginal revolution? Moreover, the average effect hides heterogeneity, the effect was bigger on the students who needed it most.

as expected, average effects were small because many students
are already doing well, do not have motivational issues, or are not in environments that
encourage or support growth-mindset behaviors. When we take account of such factors, more
noteworthy effects emerge. The improvements in the gateway outcome of 9
th grade GPA were
concentrated among adolescents who are at significant risk for compromised well-being and
economic welfare: those with lower levels of prior achievement attending relatively lower achieving schools. The finding that an intervention can redirect this adolescent outcome in this
sub-group, in under an hour, without training of teachers, and at scale (i.e. in a random sample
of nation’s schools), represents a significant advance.

Overall, this is a very impressive study and one that I suspect will be used to mark the beginning of the post-replication-crisis era.

The ending of the post-replication-crisis era also makes another trend clear–the future of social science will be even more hierarchical and unequal–future social science will be done by large, well-funded teams, run by superstar researchers at top universities. This study, for example, had 10 co-authors from multiple universities and probably cost well over a million dollars. The smaller the effect the bigger the team that will be needed to find it.

Addendum: A big meta-analysis out today also finds very small effects for growth mindset (correlation of growth mindset with achievement=.01) but the effects are probably real especially for academically high-risk students and low-SES students and perhaps they could be magnified by better interventions.

Hat tip: Stuart Richie.

That is the new and excellent Sendhil Mullainathan NYT column, here is one excerpt from many good points:

Corporate success has similar consequences: Women who become chief executives divorce at higher rates than others.

Another study found that the same is true in Hollywood: Winning the best actress Oscar portends a divorce, while winning the best actor award does not.

Of course, the divorce itself may be a preferred outcome, one that is better than enduring a poisonous relationship. Even then, I’d argue that the tax was exacted in the emotional toll and the time lost in a failed marriage.

Men react particularly negatively to their spouses’ relative success. Marianne Bertrand and Emir Kamenica, economists at the University of Chicago, and Jessica Pan, an economist at the National University of Singapore, examined the wages of spouses. Because women generally earn less in the work force, they generally earn less than their husbands, too.

What is more surprising in the data is that it is far more common for the husband to earn just a tiny bit more than the wife than the other way around. The fact that women on average earn less does not account for such a sharp asymmetry.

The piece is interesting throughout.

Non-subscribers visiting now get a score, based on dozens of signals, that indicates how likely they’ll be to subscribe. The paywall tightens or loosens accordingly: “The content you see is the output of the paywall, rather than an input.”

Here is the full Nieman Lab article, you all have a good enough score to read it, just like at MR.