Category: Data Source

Disparities in psychological traits and incomes

There are pronounced racial, ethnic, and gender gaps in income in the U.S. We investigate whether these correspond with differences in competitiveness, risk tolerance, and confidence relative to performance in a large, stratified sample of the U.S. prime-age population. We find substantial differences in all three traits across Black, Hispanic, and White males and females. These traits predict individual income. Competitiveness and risk tolerance help explain the White gender income gap. Competitiveness also affects the Black-White income gap between men. Confidence about one’s performance helps explain a substantial and significant portion of all five race-gender income gaps with White men.

That is from a new paper by Aurélie Dariel, John Ham, Nikos Nikiforakis, and Jan Stoop.  The number of data points is 2,463.  Here is one sentence from the paper:

The sizes of the effects are substantial: individuals above the median in terms of competitiveness and risk tolerance,
for instance, have incomes that are 21.2% and 15.7% higher than those below the median, respectively, when jointly estimated. Confidence in relative performance is also associated with income: individuals in the upper and lower third of the distribution (the upper third being overconfident and the lower third being underconfident) have incomes that are 23.5% and 16.7% lower than the middle third, who are better at evaluating their relative performance.

And this:

We find that controlling for confidence substantially and significantly reduces the unexplained income gaps between White men and all of our other five REG groups; the effects range from 7.2% of the differential (White women versus White men) to 18.7% (Hispanic men versus White men). Only controlling for competitiveness significantly reduces the unexplained income gap between White women and White men by 5.9%, but increases the unexplained income gap between Black men and White men by 5.1%. Only controlling for risk tolerance, on the other hand, does not significantly affect any of the income gaps, with the exception of a (marginally) significant reduction of 4.1% in the gap between White women and White men. Jointly controlling for the three traits significantly reduces the unexplained income gap between Black women and White men (by 15.2%), Hispanic women and White men (by 11.5%), and White women and White men (by 15.0%). However, these traits do not explain the gap between Black men and White men, as the overconfidence and competitiveness effects go in opposite directions.

All worthy of a ponder.  I did find this result of particular interest:

On average, Blacks and Hispanics are 9.7% more competitive than Whites.

You will note this is based on self-reports.  While self-reports often are more reliable than outsiders might think, are they so reliable for making comparisons across different groups in this manner?  And the variable “confidence in relative performance” — might that be a proxy for other, unobserved but also quite real factors?

Via a loyal MR reader, and I commend the researchers for their courage, even if I am not convinced by everything they have done.

An RCT for income-sharing agreements

Is this the first one?

We conduct a survey-based experiment with 2,776 students at a non-profit university to analyze income insurance demand in education financing. We offered students a hypothetical choice: either a federal loan with income-driven repayment or an income-share agreement (ISA), with randomized framing of downside protections. Emphasizing income insurance increased ISA uptake by 43%. We observe that students are responsive to changes in contract terms and possible student loan cancellation, which is evidence of preference adjustment or adverse selection. Our results indicate that framing specific terms can increase demand for higher education insurance to potentially address risk for students with varying outcomes.

That is from a new NBER working paper by Sidhya BalakrishnanEric BettingerMichael S. KofoedDubravka RitterDouglas A. WebberEge Aksu Jonathan S. Hartley.

Netherlands fact of the day

The country, which is a bit bigger than Maryland, not only accomplished this feat but also has become the world’s second largest exporter of agricultural products by value behind the United States. Perhaps even more significant in the face of a warming planet: It is among the largest exporters of agricultural and food technology. The Dutch have pioneered cell-cultured meat, vertical farming, seed technology and robotics in milking and harvesting — spearheading innovations that focus on decreased water usage as well as reduced carbon and methane emissions…

The country has nearly 24,000 acres — almost twice the size of Manhattan — of crops growing in greenhouses. These greenhouses, with less fertilizer and water, can grow in a single acre what would take 10 acres of traditional dirt farming to achieve. Dutch farms use only a half-gallon of water to grow about a pound of tomatoes, while the global average is more than 28 gallons.

Here is the full article, via S.  The article is interesting throughout.  However here is a more recent piece on the Dutch nitrogen revolt.

New results on intergenerational progress

The full paper title is “Has Intergenerational Progress Stalled? Income Growth Over Five Generations of Americans,” by Kevin Corrinth and Jeff Larrimore.  Here is the abstract:

We find that each of the past four generations of Americans was better off than the previous one, using a post-tax, post-transfer income measure constructed annually from 1963-2022 based on the Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement. At age 36–40, Millennials had a real median household income that was 18 percent higher than that of the previous generation at the same age. This rate of intergenerational progress was slower than that experienced by the Silent Generation (34 percent) and Baby Boomers (27 percent), but similar to that experienced by Generation X (16 percent). Slower progress for Generation X and Millennials is due to their stalled growth in work hours—holding work hours constant, they experienced a greater intergenerational increase in real market income than Baby Boomers. Intergenerational progress for Millennials under age 30 has remained robust as well, although their income growth largely results from higher reliance on their parents. We also find that the higher educational costs incurred by younger generations is far outweighed by their lifetime income gains.

The emphasis added is from me, not from the authors.  Via the excellent Kevin Lewis.

Non-binary gender economics

Economics research has largely overlooked non-binary individuals. We aim to jump-start the literature by providing data on several economically-important beliefs and preferences. Among many results, non-binary individuals report more gender-based discrimination and express different career and life aspirations, including less desire for children. Anti-non-binary sentiment is stronger than anti-LGBT sentiment, and strongest among men. Non-binary respondents report lower assertiveness than men and women, and their social preferences are similar to men’s and less prosocial than women’s, with age an important moderator. Elicited beliefs reveal inaccurate stereotypes as people often mistake the direction of group differences or exaggerate their size.

Here is the new NBER working paper by Katherine B. Coffman, Lucas C. Coffman, and Keith Marzilli Ericson.  P.s. comments are closed.

Which U.S. firms have grown in profitability?

China’s admission into the WTO in 2001 heralded a new era of globalization, increasing both import competition in domestic markets and foreign opportunities for US firms. In the aggregate, the average annual profitability of US public firms during the post globalization period (2003-2019) increased by 11.5% of the corresponding pre-globalization period (1984-2002) profitability. This increase in overall aggregate profitability was primarily driven by foreign profitability increasing by 47.4% for firms in the S&P 500 index, which are larger and have more intangible assets created by R&D and SG&A expenditures. In contrast, following globalization, the average aggregate domestic profitability of US firms remained flat, and firms employed more capital to generate sales. Firms with higher intangible assets benefited more from globalization.

That is from a new NBER working paper by Bullipe R. Chintha, Ravi Jagannathan, and Sri S. Sridhard.  When Average is Over was published about eleven years ago, in talks and media appearances I used to commonly draw a distinction between people/firms who are exporting their products — yes economists too — and those who are not.  Which category do you belong to?

U.S.A. yikes fact of the day

Between January 2016 and December 2022, the monthly antidepressant dispensing rate increased 66.3%, from 2575.9 to 4284.8. Before March 2020, this rate increased by 17.0 per month (95% confidence interval: 15.2 to 18.8). The COVID-19 outbreak was not associated with a level change but was associated with a slope increase of 10.8 per month (95% confidence interval: 4.9 to 16.7). The monthly antidepressant dispensing rate increased 63.5% faster from March 2020 onwards compared with beforehand. In subgroup analyses, this rate increased 129.6% and 56.5% faster from March 2020 onwards compared with beforehand among females aged 12 to 17 years and 18 to 25 years, respectively. In contrast, the outbreak was associated with a level decrease among males aged 12 to 17 years and was not associated with a level or slope change among males aged 18 to 25 years.

That is by Kao-Ping Chua, et.al., from the high-quality journal Pediatrics.  So that is how we respond to crises?  By doping up the young women?  Yikes!

Via the excellent Kevin Lewis.

Further data on alcohol use amongst American youth

This paper provides the first long-run assessment of adolescent alcohol control policies on later-life health and labor market outcomes. Our analysis exploits cross-state variation in the rollout of “Zero Tolerance” (ZT) Laws, which set strict alcohol limits for drivers under age 21 and led to sharp reductions in youth binge drinking. We adopt a difference-in-differences approach that combines information on state and year of birth to identify individuals exposed to the laws during adolescence and tracks the evolving impacts into middle age. We find that ZT Laws led to significant improvements in later-life health. Individuals exposed to the laws during adolescence were substantially less likely to suffer from cognitive and physical limitations in their 40s. The health effects are mirrored by improved labor market outcomes. These patterns cannot be attributed to changes in educational attainment or marriage. Instead, we find that affected cohorts were significantly less likely to drink heavily by middle age, suggesting an important role for adolescent initiation and habit-formation in affecting long-term substance use.

Here is the article by Tatiana Abboud, Andriana Bellou, and Joshua Lewis, via tekl once again.  People, you can make things easier for the political philosophers — why should they have to weigh liberty against utility?  Just give up drinking voluntarily.

The Gender Gap in Confidence: Expected but Not Accounted For

We investigate how the gender gap in confidence affects the views that evaluators (e.g., employers) hold about men and women. We find the confidence gap is contagious, causing evaluators to form overly pessimistic beliefs about women. This result arises even though the confidence gap is expected and even though the confidence gap shouldn’t be contagious if evaluators are Bayesian. Only an intervention that facilitates Bayesian updating proves (somewhat) effective. Additional results highlight how similar findings follow even when there is no room for discriminatory motives or differences in priors because evaluators are asked about arbitrary, rather than gender-specific, groups.

That is a new piece by Christine L. Exley and Kirby Nielsen in the new March 2024 AER.

I am tired of making this point

Here Robin Hanson notes that social spending as a percent of gdp tends to rise almost universally:

 

Do recessions benefit our health?

That is the topic of my latest Bloomberg column, here is one excerpt:

The human and economic costs of recessions are deep and well-documented. They can also have real health benefits, however, and seldom are they expressed so starkly as in this sentence in a new paper from the National Bureau of Economic Research: “The Great Recession provided one in twenty-five 55-year-olds with an extra year of life.”

…Overall, the paper notes, age-adjusted mortality in the US fell by 2.3% during the Great Recession. The finding, from professors at MIT, the University of Chicago and McMasters University, broadly tracks previous research showing that that mortality rates rise in good times and fall in hard times.

And:

One answer is related to air pollution, which is lower in recessions, typically because of reduced economic activity. The benefits of lower pollution levels persist long after the recession — at least 10 years, according to the researchers’ estimates. Air pollution reduction accounts for more than one-third of the mortality benefits from the Great Recession.

And all of this:

The data do provide some additional clues. Except for cancer, for example, all major causes of mortality fell during the Great Recession. Decreases in cardiovascular-related deaths accounted for about half the mortality gains during that time. Furthermore, the mortality benefits were concentrated among Americans without college degrees. You might think that some of these improved health outcomes were due to people losing their stressful, low-paying jobs, but unemployment can be pretty stressful too.

For a 55-year-old, according to the paper’s estimates, about one-quarter of the economic costs of the Great Recession were countered by these mortality gains. So the Great Recession was still a very bad event — just less bad than we used to think. That is especially true for less educated Americans, who were hit harder by unemployment but also reaped the mortality gains.

At the top end of the age distribution, Americans aged 65 and older didn’t lose much from the Great Recession, in part because so many were already retired or working only part-time (in some cases, they were ensconced in jobs they were not going to lose). The researchers estimate that those over age 60 were also better off, on net, from the Great Recession.

Worth a ponder.  Here is the original paper by Amy FinkelsteinMatthew J. NotowidigdoFrank Schilbach Jonathan Zhang.

Lithium

WEF 2002: The world could face lithium shortages by 2025, the International Energy Agency (IEA) says, while Credit Suisse thinks demand could treble between 2020 and 2025, meaning “supply would be stretched”.

Reuters 2023:  Lithium producers are growing anxious that delays in mine permitting, staffing shortages and inflation may hinder their ability to supply enough of the battery metal to meet the world’s aggressive electrification timelines.

GEP 2023: Lithium faces supply shortages due to past underinvestment amid surging electric vehicle demand.

This list could easily be extended. In contrast here from Nat Bullard’s presentation is data on battery prices per kilowatt-hour. Note that almost all of the above is very short-term extrapolation from the price increase in 2022. As Tyler says, do not underrate the elasticity of supply.

But I haven’t yet given you my favorite headline on this topic, an all-time classic:

Lithium Price Crash Could Trigger Shortages From 2025