Category: Data Source

The US Leads the World in Robots (Once You Count Correctly)

If you search for data on robots you will quickly find data from the International Federation of Robotics which places South Korea in the lead with ~818 robots per 10,000 manufacturing workers, followed by China, Japan, Germany and finally at 10th place the US at ~304 robots per 10,000. The IFR, however, misses the most sophisticated, impressive and versatile robots, namely Teslas with FSD capability. Teslas see the world, navigate complex environments, move tons of metal at high speeds and must perform at very high levels of tolerance and safety. If you included Teslas as robots, as you should, the US leaps to the top.

Moreover, once you understand Teslas as robots, Optimus, Tesla’s humanoid robot division, stops being a quixotic Elon side-project and becomes the obvious continuation of Tesla’s core work.

Direct and Indirect Effects of Vaccines: Evidence from COVID-19

Sorry people, but the verdict on this one continues to come in:

We estimate direct and indirect vaccine effectiveness and assess how far the infection-reducing externality extends from the vaccinated, a key input to policy decisions. Our empirical strategy uses nearly universal microdata from a single state and relies on the six-month delay between 12- and 11-year-old COVID vaccine eligibility. Vaccination reduces cases by 80 percent, the direct effect. This protection spills over to close contacts, producing a household-level indirect effect about three-fourths as large as the direct effect. However, indirect effects do not extend to schoolmates. Our results highlight vaccine reach as important to consider when designing policy for infectious disease.

That is from American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, by Seth Freedman, Daniel W. Sacks, Kosali Simon, and Coady Wing.  So many different methods and papers are pointing in the same direction…

Economic inequality does not equate to poor well-being or mental health

A meta-analysis of 168 studies covering more than 11 million people found no reliable link between economic inequality and well-being or mental health. In other words, living in a place that has large gaps between the rich and poor does not affect these outcomes, with implications for policy.

Here is the Nature link, this claim has been bad science all along.

A model of girl happiness, a compensatory-use study

A statistical model was used to examine these relationships simultaneously by predicting the likelihood that a girl reports being very happy.

The model includes socioeconomic status, parent–child communication, screen-time limits, and an interaction between limits and communication.

The results reinforce the patterns in the figures. Parent–child communication dominates the model. Girls who report strong communication are about three to four times more likely to report being very happy than those who report none. Socioeconomic status shows a smaller independent association. Screen-time limits contribute little on their own and matter modestly only when strong communication is already present.

If phones were the central problem, limits would emerge as a robust solution across contexts. They do not…

What the compensatory-use model rejects is a stronger claim. It rejects the idea that smartphone exposure itself is the primary driver of youth distress and that prohibition is therefore the central remedy. If that causal story were correct, limits would show large and consistent benefits across households, including among those with the weakest communication and highest distress. They do not.

And to close:

The most reliable way to improve youth well-being is to meet individual needs through connection instead of control.

That work depends on cooperation, not compliance.

Here is the full essay by Owen Kellogg, of course this is only a single study.

Cayman (U.S.) fact of the day

Over the past four years, hedge funds have doubled their footprint in the U.S. debt market, making the Cayman Islands — where many hedge funds are officially based — the place where the most U.S. debt outside the United States is held, according to the Fed. Typically, people flock to Treasuries for safety in times of crisis. Yet, driven in large part by hedge fund activity, the Treasury market went through unusual turbulence during recent shocks, including the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic in March 2020 and President Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariff announcement in April 2025.

And this:

By the early 2010s, these foreign governments made up over 40 percent of Treasury holdings, excluding those the Federal Reserve held. That was up from just over 10 percent in the mid-1990s…Foreign governments now make up less than 15 percent of the overall Treasury market.

Here is more from Geng Ngarmboonanant at the NYT.

Marginal Returns to Public Universities

From Jack Mountjoy, forthcoming in the QJE:

This paper studies the returns to enrolling in American public universities by comparing the long-term outcomes of barely admitted versus barely rejected applicants. I use administrative admission records spanning all 35 public universities in Texas, which collectively enroll 10 percent of all American public university students, to systematically identify and employ decentralized cutoffs in SAT/ACT scores that generate discontinuities in admission and enrollment. The typical marginally admitted student gains an additional year of education in the four-year sector, becomes 12 percentage points more likely to ever earn a bachelor’s degree, and eventually earns 8 percent more than their marginally rejected but otherwise identical counterpart. Marginally admitted students pay no additional tuition costs thanks to offsetting grant aid; cost-benefit calculations show internal rates of return of 26 percent for the marginal students themselves, 16 percent for society (which must pay for the additional education), and 7 percent for the government budget. Earnings gains are similar across admitting institutions of varying selectivity, but smaller for students from low-income families, who spend more time enrolled but complete fewer degrees and major in less lucrative fields. Finally, I develop a method to separately identify effects for students on the extensive margin of attending any university versus those on the margin of attending a more selective one, revealing larger effects on the extensive margin.

That is one simple way of seeing why I do not think of higher education as largely signaling, noting that signaling theories might give you a higher wage up front but not over extended periods of time, as worker quality becomes known.

How to rise to the very top?

From athletes like Simone Biles and Michael Phelps to scientists like Marie Curie and Albert Einstein, identifying exceptional talent is essential in the science of innovation. But how does talent originate? Did the most talented athletes, scientists, and musicians reach peak performance relatively early or late in their career? Did they forgo mastering multiple sports, academic subjects, and musical instruments to reach world-class performance in only one? In an Analytical Review, Güllich et al. looked at published research in science, music, chess, and sports and found two patterns: Exceptional young performers reached their peak quickly but narrowly mastered only one interest (e.g., one sport). By contrast, exceptional adults reached peak performance gradually with broader, multidisciplinary practice. However, elite programs are designed to nurture younger talent.

That is from a new article in Science by Arne GüllichMichael BarthDavid Z. Hambrick, and Brooke N. Macnamara.  Via Atta Tarki.  But are they conditioning on a collider?  Short players seem to do pretty well in today’s NBA…

An RCT on AI and mental health

Young adults today face unprecedented mental health challenges, yet many hesitate to seek support due to barriers such as accessibility, stigma, and time constraints. Bite-sized well-being interventions offer a promising solution to preventing mental distress before it escalates to clinical levels, but have not yet been delivered through personalized, interactive, and scalable technology. We conducted the first multi-institutional, longitudinal, preregistered randomized controlled trial of a generative AI-powered mobile app (“Flourish”) designed to address this gap. Over six weeks in Fall 2024, 486 undergraduate students from three U.S. institutions were randomized to receive app access or waitlist control. Participants in the treatment condition reported significantly greater positive affect, resilience, and social well-being (i.e., increased belonging, closeness to community, and reduced loneliness) and were buffered against declines in mindfulness and flourishing. These findings suggest that, with purposeful and ethical design, generative AI can deliver proactive, population-level well-being interventions that produce measurable benefits.

That is from a new paper by Julie Y.A. Cachia, et.al.  A single paper or study is hardly dispositive, even when it is an RCT.  But you should beware of those, such as Jon Haidt and Jean Twenge, who are conducting an evidence-less jihad against AI for younger people.

Via the excellent Kevin Lewis.

California facts of the day

At Berkeley, as recently as 2015, white male hires were 52.7 percent of new tenure-track faculty; in 2023, they were 21.5 percent. UC Irvine has hired 64 tenure-track assistant professors in the humanities and social sciences since 2020. Just three (4.7 percent) are white men. Of the 59 Assistant Professors in Arts, Humanities and Social Science appointed at UC Santa Cruz between 2020-2024, only two were white men (3 percent).

Here is the essay by Jacob Savage that everyone is talking about.

Growth Matters

Between 2011 and 2023 India’s GDP per capita grew at a rate of about 4.8% per year so in those 12 years GDP per capita, a good measure of the standard of living, nearly doubled (77%). Shamika Ravi and Sindhuja Penumarty look at what this means on the ground.

The percentage of the budget spent on food has declined–dropping below 50% for the first time ever–and that has enabled significant purchases of consumer durables.

It will perhaps not be surprising that mobile phones have become universal among both the poor and the rich but vehicle ownership is also converging with rural ownership of a vehicle (2 or 4 wheeler) nearly tripling from (19% to 59%).

Another standout is refrigerators which reflects growing income and reliable electricity. In the 12 years across the survey, refrigerator ownership in rural areas more than tripled from 9.4% circa 2011 to 33.2% in 2023. In urban areas refrigerator ownership went from less than half (43.8%) to more than two-thirds (68.1%) of urban households. Overall, only two states Bihar (37.1%) and Odisha (46.3%), had less than 50% of urban households owning a refrigerator in 2023-24.

Economists are often accused of “line go up” thinking but the truth is that line go up matters. The 4.8% annual growth matters because it shows up as a broad, visible upgrade in how people live.

Cats, dogs, and babies, in Taiwan

Using newly linked Taiwanese administrative datasets, including an annual census of dog and cat registrations from 1999 to 2020 matched to complete personal tax records from 2009 to 2020, we revisit the claim that “pets crowd out babies.” We exploit two quasi-experimental price shocks: a childbirth subsidy and large receipt lottery windfalls. These allow us to estimate cross elasticities between childbearing and pet ownership. The results reveal a Marshallian cross elasticity of −1.32: as the effective cost of children falls, pet ownership rises. Combined with income elasticity estimates, we recover a child price elasticity of fertility of −0.21, suggesting that pets and children are complements, not substitutes. Event study evidence reveals dynamic asymmetry. Acquiring a dog sharply increases subsequent births among previously childless adults (a “starter family” effect), while a new baby temporarily depresses further pet acquisitions, likely due to time constraints. Overall, our findings challenge popular narratives and suggest that pet ownership may support, rather than displace, fertility.

That is from an AEA session paper by Kuan-Ming Chen, Ming-Jen Lin, Hau-Hung Yang, and Shirley Yen, here is the online abstract.

Is involuntary hospitalization working?

From Natalia Emanuel, Valentin Bolotnyy, and Pim Welle:

The involuntary hospitalization of people experiencing a mental health crisis is a widespread practice, as common in the US as incarceration in state and federal prisons and 2.4 times as common as death from cancer. The intent of involuntary hospitalization is to prevent individuals from harming themselves or others through incapacitation, stabilization and medical treatment over a short period of time. Does involuntary hospitalization achieve its goals? We leverage quasi-random assignment of the evaluating physician and administrative data from Allegheny County, Pennsylvania to estimate the causal effects of involuntary hospitalization on harm to self (proxied by death by suicide or overdose) and harm to others (proxied by violent crime charges). For individuals whom some physicians would hospitalize but others would not, we find that hospitalization nearly doubles the probability of being charged with a violent crime and more than doubles the probability of dying by suicide or overdose in the three months after evaluation. We provide evidence of housing and earnings disruptions as potential mechanisms. Our results suggest that on the margin, the system we study is not achieving the intended effects of the policy.

Here is the abstract online at the AEA site.  I am looking forward to seeing more of this work.

How bad was British “austerity” anyway?

Chris Giles writes in the FT:

The main periods of measurement error came in the austerity years of 2012 to 2014, in 2017 during the early period after the Brexit referendum and in recent post-pandemic years. The truth is that a huge pessimistic bias in our national accounts has led us to be fed with contemporary reports of doom and gloom, which subsequently turn out to be nonsense.

But it is the first version of economic events that enters the national debate — and the national consciousness — for the entirely understandable reason that initial releases of economic data make news. You cannot expect people to care deeply about a revision to data that is three years old. Psychologically, they have made up their mind by then.

We are still told that 2010s austerity destroyed growth, but the data no longer supports that story: growth between David Cameron’s election victories of 2010 and 2015 now registers an annualised average of 2 per cent.

Somehow I am not seeing people jumping all over this story?  Is it even correct?  I have not seen anyone refute or counter it.  Here is the analysis from 5.2 Pro, largely confirming, though it suggests 1.8% to 1.9% is a better estimate than 2%.  I am very open to alternative points of view here, but at the moment it appears the correct stance was a) the British economic problems were largely structural and would not just be fixed by an aggregate demand boost, and b) fiscal consolidation was necessary, and while done imperfectly, not a disaster relative to the alternatives available.

The dust has not yet settled, but perhaps most of you were basically just wrong on this one?

Art as Data in Political History

From Valentine Figuroa of MIT:

Ongoing advances in machine learning are expanding opportunities to analyze large-scale visual data. In historical political economy, paintings from museums and private collections represent an untapped source of information. Before computational methods can be applied, however, it is essential to establish a framework for assessing what information paintings encode and under what assumptions it can be interpreted. This article develops such a framework, drawing on the enduring concerns of the traditional humanities. I describe three applications using a database of 25,000 European paintings from 1000CE to the First World War. Each application targets a distinct type of information conveyed in paintings (depicted content, communicative intent, and incidental information) and a cultural transformation of the early-modern period. The first revisits the notion of a European “civilizing process”—the internalization of stricter norms of behavior that occurred in tandem with the growth of state power—by examining whether paintings of meals show increasingly complex etiquette. The second analyzes portraits to study how political elites shaped their public image, highlighting a long-term shift from chivalric to more rational-bureaucratic representations of men. The third documents a long-term process of secularization, measured by the share of religious paintings, which began prior to the Reformation and accelerated afterward.

Here is the link, via the excellent Kevin Lewis.