Category: Economics
Steel Tariffs in Two Pictures
Recall Principle 2 of Three Simple Principles of Trade Policy, Businesses are Consumers Too. Case in point, steel. Justin Wolfers summarizes an analysis of Trump’s 2018 steel tariffs:
Going back further we have a good analysis from Lydia Cox of the Bush steel tariffs. Even though the tariffs were temporary, they led to a rearrangement of supply chains which led to long-lasting declines in exports and employment in steel using industries.
Will stablecoins herald a broader-based dollarization?
That is the topic of my latest Bloomberg column. Here is one excerpt:
Stablecoins are programmable crypto assets that promise conversion into some currency, typically US dollars. Currently, they are the fastest-growing sector of crypto. Stablecoin usage is up 84% since August 2023 and is now at a peak of $224 billion. The sympathetic stance of President Donald Trump’s administration toward crypto is likely to help growth further.
It is noteworthy that, measured by market capitalization, perhaps as much as 99% of stablecoins are denominated in dollars. That is a much higher share than is found in standard international trade and finance. This shows that, if monetary institutions were started all over again from scratch — which is part of what crypto is doing — the market would opt largely for dollars.
Traders in many less well governed countries want to partake in dollar-based economies, but they do not always have ready access to dollar-based banking in the way that Americans do. Their domestic banking systems may be unreliable or be regulated to discourage dollar dominance. Traders may also be afraid of US regulations, which operate through sanctions and restrictions on dollar-denominated transactions. “Know your customer” regulations, for example, can make interacting with US financial institutions very costly.
So foreigners are increasingly turning to stablecoins, which they can access quickly and directly through apps. Stablecoins are not much regulated now, but eventually regulation will emerge in many countries. That said, there will likely be more and less regulated versions of stablecoins for a long time to come. For that reason, another advantage of stablecoins — at least for individual traders, if not always for broader society — is that traders will be able to choose the level of regulation they desire.
Several countries have dollarized in recent years — including Panama, Ecuador and El Salvador — and none seems to regret it. President Javier Milei in Argentina has pledged dollarization, and that proved to be a popular campaign promise, although it remains to be seen if he can summon the resources to pull it off.
The simplest scenario is that people outside developed nations use stablecoins more and more. Their economies will become partly “dollarized” — or if you wish to use an even less elegant term, “stablecoinized,” with the stablecoins backed by dollars. People in those economies will get more used to thinking and calculating in terms of dollars, even for their domestic transactions. Dual-currency economies may become more common, with both a domestic currency and dollar-backed stablecoins. Over time, fearing the redemption risks associated with stablecoins, many nations will opt for outright dollarization, either full or partial. In some cases, the dollar might end up predominating.
Worth a ponder, and this is yet another scenario where crypto proves useful.
The danger of Trump disobeying court orders
Ilya Somin covers this question over at Volokh Conspiracy. I receive many queries about this, some of them panicky and anguished. I haven’t covered it, mostly because I don’t feel I have enough insights into the relevant matters of constitutional law, or for that matter what is going on inside the administration (for instance, how should one interpret those Vance tweets?)
I can tell you what I would find useful. If you are especially pessimistic on this front, which are the securities prices that would indicate an actual constitutional problem? Particular equities? Interest rates? The value of the dollar? Measures of volatility? Something else? Don’t restrict yourself to the absolute level of share prices, surely there are favored and disfavored companies and sectors, right?
I am allergic to the view that “fascism could come and market prices would not even budge.” In fact, I think it is extremely skeptical and subversive of democracy, or shall I better say a constitutional republic. I think fascism, or a constitutional collapse, would be a terrible outcome in a variety of very practical ways, in addition to its moral failings. At the very least it would matter for many particular enterprises.
In a variety of other contexts, such as tariffs, market prices have been super-sensitive to the actions of the Trump administration. So people, on this question, which exactly are the measurable, market price indicators? After all, you don’t want to be like those doomster AI skeptics who think no one can trade on the (supposed) truth.
In the comments section, I am not interested in your blah blah blah opinion full of adjectives. Just tell me which prices please. I do see this issue as constituting a real risk, if perhaps a sometimes exaggerated one. So I will follow those market prices with great interest. I just need to know what they are.
Addendum: In an excellent Substack today Matt Yglesias notes: “Republicans, meanwhile, are making very little forward progress on their legislative agenda.”
What should I ask Jennifer Pahlka?
Yes, I will be doing a Conversation with her. From Wikipedia:
Jennifer Pahlka (born December 27, 1969) is an American businesswoman and political advisor. She is the founder and former executive director of Code for America. She served as U.S. Deputy Chief Technology Officer from June 2013 to June 2014 and helped found the United States Digital Service. Previously she had worked at CMP Media with various roles in the computer game industry. She was the co-chair and general manager of the Web 2.0 conferences. In June 2023, she released the book Recoding America: Why Government Is Failing in the Digital Age and How We Can Do Better.
Recently she has been working on the Niskanen Institute state capacity project. So what should I ask her?
Lift the Ban on Supersonics: No Boom
Boom, the supersonic startup, has announced that their new jet reaches supersonic speeds but without creating much of an audible boom. How so? According to CEO Blake Scholl:
It’s actually well-known physics called Mach cutoff. When an aircraft breaks the sound barrier at a sufficiently high altitude, the boom refracts in the atmosphere and curls upward without reaching the ground. It makes a U-turn before anyone can hear it. Mach cutoff physics is a theoretical capability on some military supersonic aircraft; now XB-1 has proven it with airliner-ready technology. Just as a light ray bends as it goes through a glass of water, sound rays bend as they go through media with varying speeds of sound. Speed of sound varies with temperature… and temperature varies with altitude. With colder temperatures aloft, sonic booms bend upward. This means that sonic booms can make a U-turn in the atmosphere without ever touching the ground. The height of the U varies—with the aircraft speed, with atmospheric temperature gradient, and with winds.
….Boomless Cruise requires engines powerful enough to break the sound barrier at an altitude high enough that the boom has enough altitude to U- turn. And realtime weather and powerful algorithms to predict the boom propagation precisely.
Here is the crazy part. Civilian supersonic aircraft have been banned in the United States for over 50 years! In case that wasn’t clear, we didn’t ban noisy aircraft we banned supersonic aircraft. Thus, even quiet supersonic aircraft are banned today. This was a serious mistake. Aside from the fact that the noise was exaggerated, technological development is endogenous.
If you ban supersonic aircraft, the money, experience and learning by doing needed to develop quieter supersonic aircraft won’t exist. A ban will make technological developments in the industry much slower and dependent upon exogeneous progress in other industries.
When we ban a new technology we have to think not just about the costs and benefits of a ban today but about the costs and benefits on the entire glide path of the technology.
In short, we must build to build better. We stopped building and so it has taken more than 50 years to get better. Not learning, by not doing.
In 2018 Congress directed the FAA:
..to exercise leadership in the creation of Federal and international policies, regulations, and standards relating to the certification and safe and efficient operation of civil supersonic aircraft.
But, aside from tidying up some regulations related to testing, the FAA hasn’t done much to speed up progress. I’d like to see the new administration move forthwith to lift the ban on supersonic aircraft. We have been moving too slow.
Addendum: Elon says it will happen.
The Effect of European Monarchs on State Performance
We create a novel reign-level data set for European monarchs, covering all major European states between the 10th and 18th centuries. We first document a strong positive relationship between rulers’ cognitive ability and state performance. To address endogeneity issues, we exploit the facts that (i) rulers were appointed according to hereditary succession, independent of their ability, and (ii) the widespread inbreeding among the ruling dynasties of Europe led over centuries to quasirandom variation in ruler ability. We code the degree of blood relationship between the parents of rulers, which also reflects “hidden” layers of inbreeding from previous generations. The coefficient of inbreeding is a strong predictor of ruler ability, and the corresponding instrumental variable results imply that ruler ability had a sizeable effect on the performance of states and their borders. This supports the view that “leaders made history,” shaping the European map until its consolidation into nation states. We also show that rulers mattered only where their power was largely unconstrained. In reigns where parliaments checked the power of monarchs, ruler ability no longer affected their state’s performance.
By Sebastian Ottinger and Nico Voigtländer, from Econometrica. Here are less gated versions. Via the excellent Kevin Lewis.
The exhaustion of rents
A computer expert who has battled for a decade to recover a £600m bitcoin fortune he believes is buried in a council dump in south Wales is considering buying the site so he can hunt for the missing fortune.
James Howells lost a high court case last month to force Newport city council to allow him to search the tip to retrieve a hard drive he says contains the bitcoins.
The council has since announced plans to close and cap the site, which would almost certainly spell the end of any lingering hopes of reaching the bitcoins. The authority has secured planning permission for a solar farm on part of the land.
Here is the full story, via Michael Rosenwald. It is of course amazing that the local authority owning the dump has no interest in recovering the money for itself.
Minimum Wages, Efficiency, and Welfare
Recently Alex raised some doubts, to say the least, about the Card-Krueger view of minimum wage hikes. Well, it turns out there is more, and a new consensus is on the verge of forming. Here are David Berger, Kyle Herkenhoff, and Simon Mongey, from a new Econometrica piece:
Many argue that minimum wages can prevent efficiency losses from monopsony power. We assess this argument in a general equilibrium model of oligopsonistic labor markets with heterogeneous workers and firms. We decompose welfare gains into an efficiency component that captures reductions in monopsony power and a redistributive component that captures the way minimum wages shift resources across people. The minimum wage that maximizes the efficiency component of welfare lies below $8.00 and yields gains worth less than 0.2% of lifetime consumption. When we add back in Utilitarian redistributive motives, the optimal minimum wage is $11 and redistribution accounts for 102.5% of the resulting welfare gains, implying offsetting efficiency losses of −2.5%. The reason a minimum wage struggles to deliver efficiency gains is that with realistic firm productivity dispersion, a minimum wage that eliminates monopsony power at one firm causes severe rationing at another. These results hold under an EITC and progressive labor income taxes calibrated to the U.S. economy.
Here is the link to Econometrica. Here is an earlier NBER working paper version.
USPS as a failed sovereign wealth fund
The U.S. government has a direct stake in natural resource wealth, collecting royalties from the extraction of minerals on federal land. In a good year, these royalties (which are dispersed to states) total around $20 billion, although the historic annual average is closer to $10 billion.
These figures pale in comparison to what is arguably America’s largest commercial endeavor: the U.S. Postal Service (USPS). The USPS relies on its vast network of land, buildings, trucks, and processing machines to generate about $80 billion in revenue per year. The obvious problem is that, unlike with Norway and Saudi Arabia’s black gold, the USPS can’t turn a profit on its large asset holdings. The agency lost $9.5 billion on net in FY 2024, and has burned through $100 billion over the past fifteen years…
To sum up: the U.S. isn’t Norway nor Saudi Arabia. Our largest asset-rich enterprise is really bad at making money and channeling investments to productive uses. And, it is for lack of trying; the USPS can do a far better job generating a return on assets such as property.
Here is the full Substack by Ross Marchand.
The Licensing Racket
I review a very good new book on occupational licensing, The Licensing Racket by Rebecca Haw Allensworth in the WSJ.
Most people will concede that licensing for hair braiders and interior decorators is excessive while licensing for doctors, nurses and lawyers is essential. Hair braiders pose little to no threat to public safety, but subpar doctors, nurses and lawyers can ruin lives. To Ms. Allensworth’s credit, she asks for evidence. Does occupational licensing protect consumers? The author focuses on the professional board, the forgotten institution of occupational licensing.
Governments enact occupational-licensing laws but rarely handle regulation directly—there’s no Bureau of Hair Braiding. Instead, interpretation and enforcement are delegated to licensing boards, typically dominated by members of the profession. Occupational licensing is self-regulation. The outcome is predictable: Driven by self-interest, professional identity and culture, these boards consistently favor their own members over consumers.
Ms. Allensworth conducted exhaustive research for “The Licensing Racket,” spending hundreds of hours attending board meetings—often as the only nonboard member present. At the Tennessee board of alarm-system contractors, most of the complaints come from consumers who report the sort of issues that licensing is meant to prevent: poor installation, code violations, high-pressure sales tactics and exploitation of the elderly. But the board dismisses most of these complaints against its own members, and is far more aggressive in disciplining unlicensed handymen who occasionally install alarm systems. As Ms. Allensworth notes, “the board was ten times more likely to take action in a case alleging unlicensed practice than one complaining about service quality or safety.”
She finds similar patterns among boards that regulate auctioneers, cosmetologists and barbers. Enforcement efforts tend to protect turf more than consumers. Consumers care about bad service, not about who is licensed, so take a guess who complains about unlicensed practitioners? Licensed practitioners. According to Ms. Allensworth, it was these competitor-initiated cases, “not consumer complaints alleging fraud, predatory sales tactics, and graft,” where boards gave the stiffest penalties.
You might hope that boards that oversee nurses and doctors would prioritize patient safety, but Ms. Allensworth’s findings show otherwise. She documents a disturbing pattern of boards that have ignored or forgiven egregious misconduct, including nurses and physicians extorting sex for prescriptions, running pill mills, assaulting patients under anesthesia and operating while intoxicated.
Read the whole thing.
How effective was pandemic aid?
We use an instrumental-variables estimator reliant on variation in congressional representation to analyze the macroeconomic effects of federal aid to state and local governments across all four major pieces of COVID-19 response legislation. Through December 2022, we estimate that the federal government allocated $603,000 for each state or local government job-year preserved. Our baseline confidence interval allows us to rule out estimates smaller than $220,400. Our estimates of effects on aggregate income and output are centered on zero and imply modest if any spillover effects onto the broader economy.
That is from a new paper by Jeffrey Clemens, Philip Hoxie, and Stan Veuger. Via the excellent Kevin Lewis.
Michael Pettis responds in the FT
Robert Armstrong at the FT gives him a chance to respond to Noah and Krugman and me, here are links to the originals:
[Armstrong] Cowen argues that intervention in the short term, as you have proposed, is counterproductive because demand shortfalls will resolve themselves as price adjustments. What is your response?
Pettis: While I understand Cowen’s reliance on the “Econ 101” model, which assumes that prices always adjust to balance supply and demand, this framework isn’t relevant in the context of current global economic conditions. Prices have not adjusted in the US or many other countries over several decades. Take China as an example, where price deflation has persisted and consumption has remained exceedingly low for years. To manage the gap between production and consumption, China has had to resort to extraordinarily high levels of investment and, as the cost of this wasteful investment has recently shown up in the form of the fastest- growing debt burden in history, to the highest trade surpluses in history.
So why hasn’t the demand shortfall “gone away”, as Cowen’s model would predict? The answer lies in China’s trade and industrial policies, which enhance global manufacturing competitiveness at the expense of domestic consumption. These policies include an undervalued currency, repressed interest rates, highly directed credit, and, yes, tariffs. These policies, together with strict controls on trade and even stricter controls on the capital account, have prevented any natural adjustment from taking place. This matters, because a country’s internal imbalances created by domestic policies lead automatically to its external imbalances which, in turn, must be reflected in the external imbalances of the trade and investment partners of that country. That is how internal policies in one country will lead automatically to changes in the internal conditions in other countries. Cowen’s models may well be internally consistent, but they are based on simplified assumptions that clearly fail to describe the real-world factors that shape trade imbalances.
I’ll say a few points in response:
1. Pettis says “While I understand Cowen’s reliance on the “Econ 101” model, which assumes that prices always adjust to balance supply and demand, this framework isn’t relevant in the context of current global economic conditions. Prices have not adjusted in the US or many other countries over several decades.” The first sentence there is just the usual anti-economics slur. In fact the (numerous) models I have in mind are workhorses from PhD level international macroeconomics, not from “Econ 101.” And can he really mean “Prices have not adjusted in the US or many other countries over several decades”? Run that one through o1 pro if you have any doubts, it is about as flat out wrong as a proposition about economics can get.
2. The rest of the answer just repeats his usual about China. It does not even attempt to answer why, in the medium-term or long-term, as prices adjust, demand imbalances in the United States do not go away.
3. In another part of the interview, which I will not reproduce for reasons of copyright, Pettis responds to my criticism of his claim that America had weak [sic] demand during 2022-2023. His answer is to focus on this: “Contrary to Cowen’s claim, US business investment is not constrained by a lack of American savings.” That is not something I ever said or wrote, it is something I do not believe, and it completely fails to answer my rather obviously correct criticism of Pettis on U.S. demand.
4. I will let Noah handle the rebuttals to him, if he so chooses. I will however mark his response to Krugman and Smith, on the counterproductive nature of tariffs on intermediate goods, as just abysmally bad and off point. This is one of the most obtuse rebuttals I have read, ever.
5. If you are curious, here is Maurice Obstfeld, a Nobel-quality international economist, on Pettis and related issues.
Alex and I consider how to reform the NSF in economics
Here is a redux of our 2016 Journal of Economic Perspectives piece. Here is the abstract:
We can imagine a plausible case for government support of science based on traditional economic reasons of externalities and public goods. Yet when it comes to government support of grants from the National Science Foundation (NSF) for economic research, our sense is that many economists avoid critical questions, skimp on analysis, and move straight to advocacy. In this essay, we take a more skeptical attitude toward the efforts of the NSF to subsidize economic research. We offer two main sets of arguments. First, a key question is not whether NSF funding is justified relative to laissez-faire, but rather, what is the marginal value of NSF funding given already existing government and nongovernment support for economic research? Second, we consider whether NSF funding might more productively be shifted in various directions that remain within the legal and traditional purview of the NSF. Such alternative focuses might include data availability, prizes rather than grants, broader dissemination of economic insights, and more. Given these critiques, we suggest some possible ways in which the pattern of NSF funding, and the arguments for such funding, might be improved.
Relevant for today’s debates of course.
Three Simple Principles of Trade Policy
Are we in a trade war today? Who knows? Doesn’t really matter. It’s always a good time to review important principles. A good source is Doug Irwin’s Three Simple Principles of Trade Policy published in 1996. Below I have updated occasionally with more recent data.
Principle 1: A Tax on Imports is a Tax on Exports
Exports are necessary to generate the earnings to pay for imports, or exports are the goods a country must give up in order to acquire imports….if foreign countries are blocked in their ability to sell their goods in the United States, for example, they will be unable to earn the dollars they need to purchase U.S. goods.
…The equivalence of export and import taxes is not an obvious proposition, and it is often counterintuitive to most people. Imagine taking a poll of average Americans and asking the following question: “Should the United States impose import tariffs on foreign textiles to prevent low-wage countries
from harming thousands of American textile workers?” Some fraction, perhaps even a sizeable one, of the respondents would surely answer affirmatively. If asked to explain their position, they would probably reply that import tariffs would create jobs for Americans at the expense of foreign workers and thereby reduce domestic unemployment.Suppose you then asked those same people the following question: “Should the United States tax the exportation of Boeing aircraft, wheat and corn, computers and computer software, and other domestically produced goods?” I suspect the answer would be a resounding and unanimous “No!” After all, it would be explained, export taxes would destroy jobs and harm important industries. And yet the Lerner symmetry theorem says that the two policies are equivalent in their economic effects.
Exports and imports rise and fall together. It is surely obvious that if you want more imports you must export more (barring a bit of borrowing see below). The same thing is true in other countries. As a result, it is also true that when you import more you export more.
Principle 2: Businesses are Consumers Too
Business firms are, in fact, bigger consumers of imported products than are U.S. households.
As of 2024, more than 64% of imports are intermediate products. See here for the data.
By viewing imports not as final consumer goods but as inputs to U.S. production, policy makers can more clearly recognize that the issue is not so much one of “saving” jobs but of “trading off’ jobs between sectors. This brings home forcefully the most important lesson in all of economics-there is no such thing as a free lunch. Every action involves a trade-off of some sort. Higher domestic steel prices help employment in the steel industry but harm employment in steel-using industries. Higher domestic semiconductor prices help employment in the semiconductor industry but harm employment in semiconductor using industries. As john Stuart Mill wrote in 1848 in the context of import protection, “The alternative is not between employing our own country-people and foreigners, but between employing one class or another of our own country-people.”
Principle 3: Trade Imbalances Reflect Capital Flows
There is a fundamental equation of international finance that relates this net borrowing and lending activity to the current account. The equation is:
Exports – Imports = Savings – Investment
The powerful implication of this equation is that if a country wishes to reduce its trade deficit, the gap between its domestic investment and its domestic savings must be reduced.
…A country’s trade balance is related to international capital flows–not with open or closed markets, unfair trade practices, or national competitiveness. If a country wants to solve the “problem” of its trade deficit, it must reverse the international flow of capital into its country. In many cases net foreign borrowing can be reversed by reducing the government fiscal deficit. [emphasis added, AT]
Doug concludes:
These three simple principles of trade policy…[have] stood the test of time, they come as close to truths as anything economists have to offer in any area of policy controversy. Yet they are routinely denied, explicitly or implicitly, in trade policy debates in the United States and elsewhere. I do not imagine that a greater appreciation of these principles would invariably bring about more liberal trade policies; I offer them, rather, in the more modest hope that they might lead to sounder debates in which the real consequences of government policies are confronted more seriously than at present.
Hat tip: Erica York.
What should I ask Sheilagh Ogilvie?
She is a Canadian economic historian at Oxford, here is from her home page:
I am an economic historian. I explore the lives of ordinary people in the past and try to explain how poor economies get richer and improve human well-being. I’m interested in how social institutions – the formal and informal constraints on economic activity – shaped economic development between the Middle Ages and the present day.
And:
My current research focusses on serfdom, human capital, state capacity, and epidemic disease. Past projects analysed guilds, merchants, communities, the family, gender, consumption, finance, proto-industry, historical demography, childhood, and social capital. I have a particular interest in the economic and social history of Central and Eastern Europe.
Here is her Wikipedia page. Her book on guilds is well known, and her latest is Controlling Contagion: Epidemics and Institutions from the Black Death to Covid. Here are her main research papers.
So what should I ask her?