Category: Economics
USPS as a failed sovereign wealth fund
The U.S. government has a direct stake in natural resource wealth, collecting royalties from the extraction of minerals on federal land. In a good year, these royalties (which are dispersed to states) total around $20 billion, although the historic annual average is closer to $10 billion.
These figures pale in comparison to what is arguably America’s largest commercial endeavor: the U.S. Postal Service (USPS). The USPS relies on its vast network of land, buildings, trucks, and processing machines to generate about $80 billion in revenue per year. The obvious problem is that, unlike with Norway and Saudi Arabia’s black gold, the USPS can’t turn a profit on its large asset holdings. The agency lost $9.5 billion on net in FY 2024, and has burned through $100 billion over the past fifteen years…
To sum up: the U.S. isn’t Norway nor Saudi Arabia. Our largest asset-rich enterprise is really bad at making money and channeling investments to productive uses. And, it is for lack of trying; the USPS can do a far better job generating a return on assets such as property.
Here is the full Substack by Ross Marchand.
The Licensing Racket
I review a very good new book on occupational licensing, The Licensing Racket by Rebecca Haw Allensworth in the WSJ.
Most people will concede that licensing for hair braiders and interior decorators is excessive while licensing for doctors, nurses and lawyers is essential. Hair braiders pose little to no threat to public safety, but subpar doctors, nurses and lawyers can ruin lives. To Ms. Allensworth’s credit, she asks for evidence. Does occupational licensing protect consumers? The author focuses on the professional board, the forgotten institution of occupational licensing.
Governments enact occupational-licensing laws but rarely handle regulation directly—there’s no Bureau of Hair Braiding. Instead, interpretation and enforcement are delegated to licensing boards, typically dominated by members of the profession. Occupational licensing is self-regulation. The outcome is predictable: Driven by self-interest, professional identity and culture, these boards consistently favor their own members over consumers.
Ms. Allensworth conducted exhaustive research for “The Licensing Racket,” spending hundreds of hours attending board meetings—often as the only nonboard member present. At the Tennessee board of alarm-system contractors, most of the complaints come from consumers who report the sort of issues that licensing is meant to prevent: poor installation, code violations, high-pressure sales tactics and exploitation of the elderly. But the board dismisses most of these complaints against its own members, and is far more aggressive in disciplining unlicensed handymen who occasionally install alarm systems. As Ms. Allensworth notes, “the board was ten times more likely to take action in a case alleging unlicensed practice than one complaining about service quality or safety.”
She finds similar patterns among boards that regulate auctioneers, cosmetologists and barbers. Enforcement efforts tend to protect turf more than consumers. Consumers care about bad service, not about who is licensed, so take a guess who complains about unlicensed practitioners? Licensed practitioners. According to Ms. Allensworth, it was these competitor-initiated cases, “not consumer complaints alleging fraud, predatory sales tactics, and graft,” where boards gave the stiffest penalties.
You might hope that boards that oversee nurses and doctors would prioritize patient safety, but Ms. Allensworth’s findings show otherwise. She documents a disturbing pattern of boards that have ignored or forgiven egregious misconduct, including nurses and physicians extorting sex for prescriptions, running pill mills, assaulting patients under anesthesia and operating while intoxicated.
Read the whole thing.
How effective was pandemic aid?
We use an instrumental-variables estimator reliant on variation in congressional representation to analyze the macroeconomic effects of federal aid to state and local governments across all four major pieces of COVID-19 response legislation. Through December 2022, we estimate that the federal government allocated $603,000 for each state or local government job-year preserved. Our baseline confidence interval allows us to rule out estimates smaller than $220,400. Our estimates of effects on aggregate income and output are centered on zero and imply modest if any spillover effects onto the broader economy.
That is from a new paper by Jeffrey Clemens, Philip Hoxie, and Stan Veuger. Via the excellent Kevin Lewis.
Michael Pettis responds in the FT
Robert Armstrong at the FT gives him a chance to respond to Noah and Krugman and me, here are links to the originals:
[Armstrong] Cowen argues that intervention in the short term, as you have proposed, is counterproductive because demand shortfalls will resolve themselves as price adjustments. What is your response?
Pettis: While I understand Cowen’s reliance on the “Econ 101” model, which assumes that prices always adjust to balance supply and demand, this framework isn’t relevant in the context of current global economic conditions. Prices have not adjusted in the US or many other countries over several decades. Take China as an example, where price deflation has persisted and consumption has remained exceedingly low for years. To manage the gap between production and consumption, China has had to resort to extraordinarily high levels of investment and, as the cost of this wasteful investment has recently shown up in the form of the fastest- growing debt burden in history, to the highest trade surpluses in history.
So why hasn’t the demand shortfall “gone away”, as Cowen’s model would predict? The answer lies in China’s trade and industrial policies, which enhance global manufacturing competitiveness at the expense of domestic consumption. These policies include an undervalued currency, repressed interest rates, highly directed credit, and, yes, tariffs. These policies, together with strict controls on trade and even stricter controls on the capital account, have prevented any natural adjustment from taking place. This matters, because a country’s internal imbalances created by domestic policies lead automatically to its external imbalances which, in turn, must be reflected in the external imbalances of the trade and investment partners of that country. That is how internal policies in one country will lead automatically to changes in the internal conditions in other countries. Cowen’s models may well be internally consistent, but they are based on simplified assumptions that clearly fail to describe the real-world factors that shape trade imbalances.
I’ll say a few points in response:
1. Pettis says “While I understand Cowen’s reliance on the “Econ 101” model, which assumes that prices always adjust to balance supply and demand, this framework isn’t relevant in the context of current global economic conditions. Prices have not adjusted in the US or many other countries over several decades.” The first sentence there is just the usual anti-economics slur. In fact the (numerous) models I have in mind are workhorses from PhD level international macroeconomics, not from “Econ 101.” And can he really mean “Prices have not adjusted in the US or many other countries over several decades”? Run that one through o1 pro if you have any doubts, it is about as flat out wrong as a proposition about economics can get.
2. The rest of the answer just repeats his usual about China. It does not even attempt to answer why, in the medium-term or long-term, as prices adjust, demand imbalances in the United States do not go away.
3. In another part of the interview, which I will not reproduce for reasons of copyright, Pettis responds to my criticism of his claim that America had weak [sic] demand during 2022-2023. His answer is to focus on this: “Contrary to Cowen’s claim, US business investment is not constrained by a lack of American savings.” That is not something I ever said or wrote, it is something I do not believe, and it completely fails to answer my rather obviously correct criticism of Pettis on U.S. demand.
4. I will let Noah handle the rebuttals to him, if he so chooses. I will however mark his response to Krugman and Smith, on the counterproductive nature of tariffs on intermediate goods, as just abysmally bad and off point. This is one of the most obtuse rebuttals I have read, ever.
5. If you are curious, here is Maurice Obstfeld, a Nobel-quality international economist, on Pettis and related issues.
Alex and I consider how to reform the NSF in economics
Here is a redux of our 2016 Journal of Economic Perspectives piece. Here is the abstract:
We can imagine a plausible case for government support of science based on traditional economic reasons of externalities and public goods. Yet when it comes to government support of grants from the National Science Foundation (NSF) for economic research, our sense is that many economists avoid critical questions, skimp on analysis, and move straight to advocacy. In this essay, we take a more skeptical attitude toward the efforts of the NSF to subsidize economic research. We offer two main sets of arguments. First, a key question is not whether NSF funding is justified relative to laissez-faire, but rather, what is the marginal value of NSF funding given already existing government and nongovernment support for economic research? Second, we consider whether NSF funding might more productively be shifted in various directions that remain within the legal and traditional purview of the NSF. Such alternative focuses might include data availability, prizes rather than grants, broader dissemination of economic insights, and more. Given these critiques, we suggest some possible ways in which the pattern of NSF funding, and the arguments for such funding, might be improved.
Relevant for today’s debates of course.
Three Simple Principles of Trade Policy
Are we in a trade war today? Who knows? Doesn’t really matter. It’s always a good time to review important principles. A good source is Doug Irwin’s Three Simple Principles of Trade Policy published in 1996. Below I have updated occasionally with more recent data.
Principle 1: A Tax on Imports is a Tax on Exports
Exports are necessary to generate the earnings to pay for imports, or exports are the goods a country must give up in order to acquire imports….if foreign countries are blocked in their ability to sell their goods in the United States, for example, they will be unable to earn the dollars they need to purchase U.S. goods.
…The equivalence of export and import taxes is not an obvious proposition, and it is often counterintuitive to most people. Imagine taking a poll of average Americans and asking the following question: “Should the United States impose import tariffs on foreign textiles to prevent low-wage countries
from harming thousands of American textile workers?” Some fraction, perhaps even a sizeable one, of the respondents would surely answer affirmatively. If asked to explain their position, they would probably reply that import tariffs would create jobs for Americans at the expense of foreign workers and thereby reduce domestic unemployment.Suppose you then asked those same people the following question: “Should the United States tax the exportation of Boeing aircraft, wheat and corn, computers and computer software, and other domestically produced goods?” I suspect the answer would be a resounding and unanimous “No!” After all, it would be explained, export taxes would destroy jobs and harm important industries. And yet the Lerner symmetry theorem says that the two policies are equivalent in their economic effects.
Exports and imports rise and fall together. It is surely obvious that if you want more imports you must export more (barring a bit of borrowing see below). The same thing is true in other countries. As a result, it is also true that when you import more you export more.
Principle 2: Businesses are Consumers Too
Business firms are, in fact, bigger consumers of imported products than are U.S. households.
As of 2024, more than 64% of imports are intermediate products. See here for the data.
By viewing imports not as final consumer goods but as inputs to U.S. production, policy makers can more clearly recognize that the issue is not so much one of “saving” jobs but of “trading off’ jobs between sectors. This brings home forcefully the most important lesson in all of economics-there is no such thing as a free lunch. Every action involves a trade-off of some sort. Higher domestic steel prices help employment in the steel industry but harm employment in steel-using industries. Higher domestic semiconductor prices help employment in the semiconductor industry but harm employment in semiconductor using industries. As john Stuart Mill wrote in 1848 in the context of import protection, “The alternative is not between employing our own country-people and foreigners, but between employing one class or another of our own country-people.”
Principle 3: Trade Imbalances Reflect Capital Flows
There is a fundamental equation of international finance that relates this net borrowing and lending activity to the current account. The equation is:
Exports – Imports = Savings – Investment
The powerful implication of this equation is that if a country wishes to reduce its trade deficit, the gap between its domestic investment and its domestic savings must be reduced.
…A country’s trade balance is related to international capital flows–not with open or closed markets, unfair trade practices, or national competitiveness. If a country wants to solve the “problem” of its trade deficit, it must reverse the international flow of capital into its country. In many cases net foreign borrowing can be reversed by reducing the government fiscal deficit. [emphasis added, AT]
Doug concludes:
These three simple principles of trade policy…[have] stood the test of time, they come as close to truths as anything economists have to offer in any area of policy controversy. Yet they are routinely denied, explicitly or implicitly, in trade policy debates in the United States and elsewhere. I do not imagine that a greater appreciation of these principles would invariably bring about more liberal trade policies; I offer them, rather, in the more modest hope that they might lead to sounder debates in which the real consequences of government policies are confronted more seriously than at present.
Hat tip: Erica York.
What should I ask Sheilagh Ogilvie?
She is a Canadian economic historian at Oxford, here is from her home page:
I am an economic historian. I explore the lives of ordinary people in the past and try to explain how poor economies get richer and improve human well-being. I’m interested in how social institutions – the formal and informal constraints on economic activity – shaped economic development between the Middle Ages and the present day.
And:
My current research focusses on serfdom, human capital, state capacity, and epidemic disease. Past projects analysed guilds, merchants, communities, the family, gender, consumption, finance, proto-industry, historical demography, childhood, and social capital. I have a particular interest in the economic and social history of Central and Eastern Europe.
Here is her Wikipedia page. Her book on guilds is well known, and her latest is Controlling Contagion: Epidemics and Institutions from the Black Death to Covid. Here are her main research papers.
So what should I ask her?
Deep Research considers the costs and benefits of US AID
You can read it here, summary sentence:
Based on the analysis above, the net assessment leans toward the conclusion that USAID’s benefits outweigh its costs on the whole, though with important qualifiers by sector and context.
Here is a useful Michael Kremer (with co-authors) paper. Here are some CRS links. Here is a Samo analysis. AID is a major contributor to the Gavi vaccine program, which is of high value. The gains from AID-supported PEPFAR are very high also.
To be clear, I consider this kind of thing to be scandalous. And I strongly suspect that some of the other outrage anecdotes are true, though they are hard to confirm, or not. How about funds to the BBC? While the “Elonsphere” on Twitter is very much exaggerating the horror anecdotes and the bad news, I do see classic signs of “intermediaries capture” for the agency, a common problem amongst not-for-profit institutions.
The Samo piece is excellent. For one thing he notes: “The agency primarily uses a funding model which pays by hours worked, thus incentivizing long-duration projects.” And the very smart Samantha Power, appointed by Biden to run AID, “…is in favor of disrupting the contractor ecosystem.” Samo also discusses all the restrictions that require American contractors to be involved.
Here is a study on how to reform AID, I have not yet read it.
Ken Opalo, in a very useful and excellent post, writes:
For example, in 2017 about 60% of USAID’s funds went to just 25 American organizations. Only 11% of U.S. aid goes directly to foreign organizations. The rest gets management via U.S. entities or multilateral organizations. This doesn’t mean that the 89% of aid gets skimmed off, just that an inefficiently significant share of the 89% gets gobbled up by overhead costs. In addition, this arrangement denies beneficiaries a chance at policy autonomy.
According to the very smart, non-lunatic Charlie Robertson:
My data suggests US AID flows in 2024 were equivalent to: 93% of Somalia’s government revenues, 61% in Sudan, just over 50% in South Sudan and Yemen
While I do not take cutting off those flows lightly, that seems unsustainable and also wrong to me as a matter of USG policy. Those do not seem like viable enterprises to me.
There are various reports of AID spending billions to help overthrow Assad. I cannot easily assess this matter, either whether the outcomes was good or whether AID mattered, but perhaps (assuming it was effective) such actions should be taken by a different agency or institution?
While US AID appears to pass a cost-benefit test, it does seem ripe for reform. Based on what I have read and heard, I would focus all the more on public health programs, and forget about “trade promotion,” “democracy promotion,” and more. I would get rid of virtually all of the consultants, and make direct transfers to worthy African and Ukraine programs, thus lowering overhead. If such worthy programs exist, why not give them money directly? Are they so hard to find? And if so, how trustworthy are these intermediaries really? What are they intermediating to?
So a housecleaning is needed here, but the important sources of value still should be supported.
US AID bleg
What are the best sources to read on US AID, and its costs and benefits? I am not interested in your anecdotes and adjectives, please offer serious research sources only. Thank you.
The New Consensus on the Minimum Wage
My take is that there is an evolving new consensus on the minimum wage. Namely, the effects of the minimum wage are heterogeneous and take place on more margins than employment. Read Jeffrey Clemens’s brilliant and accessible paper in the JEP for the theory. A good example of the heterogeneous impact is this new paper by Clemens, Gentry and Meer on how the minimum wage makes it more difficult for the disabled to get jobs:
…We find that large minimum wage increases significantly reduce employment and labor force participation for individuals of all working ages with severe disabilities. These declines are accompanied by a downward shift in the wage distribution and an increase in public assistance receipt. By contrast, we find no employment effects for all but young individuals with either non-severe disabilities or no disabilities. Our findings highlight important heterogeneities in minimum wage impacts, raising concerns about labor market policies’ unintended consequences for populations on the margins of the labor force.
Or Neumark and Kayla on the minimum wage and blacks:
We provide a comprehensive analysis of the effects of minimum wages on blacks, and on the relative impacts on blacks vs. whites. We study not only teenagers – the focus of much of the minimum wage-employment literature – but also other low-skill groups. We focus primarily on employment, which has been the prime concern with the minimum wage research literature. We find evidence that job loss effects from higher minimum wages are much more evident for blacks, and in contrast not very detectable for whites, and are often large enough to generate adverse effects on earnings.
Remember also that a “job” is not a simple contract of hours of work for dollars but contains many explicit and implicit margins on work conditions, fringe benefits, possibilities for promotion, training and so forth. For example, in Unintended workplace safety consequences of minimum wages, Liu, Lu, Sun and Zhang finds that the minimum wage increases accidents, probably because at a higher minimum wage the pace of work increases:
we find that large increases in minimum wages have significant adverse effects on workplace safety. Our findings indicate that, on average, a large minimum wage increase results in a 4.6 percent increase in the total case rate.
Note that these effects don’t always happen, in large part because, depending on the scope of the minimum wage increase and the industry, large effects of the minimum wage may be passed on to prices. For example here is Renkin and Siegenthaler finding that higher minimum wage increase grocery prices:
We use high-frequency scanner data and leverage a large number of state-level increases in minimum wages between 2001 and 2012. We find that a 10% minimum wage hike translates into a 0.36% increase in the prices of grocery products. This magnitude is consistent with a full pass-through of cost increases into consumer prices.
Similarly, Ashenfelter and Jurajda find there is no free lunch from minimum wage increases, indeed there is approximately full pass through at McDonalds:
Higher labor costs induced by minimum wage hikes are likely to increase product prices.4 If both labor and product markets are competitive, firms can pass through up to the full increase in costs (Fullerton and Metcalf 2002). With constant returns to scale, firms adjust prices in response to minimum wage hikes in proportion to the cost share of minimum wage labor. Under full price pass-through, the real income increases of low-wage workers brought about by minimum wage hikes may be lower than expected (MaCurdy 2015). There is growing evidence of near full price pass-through of minimum wages in the United States….Based on data spanning 2016–20, we find a 0.2 price elasticity with respect to wage increases driven (instrumented) by minimum wage hikes. Together with the 0.7 (first-stage) elasticity of wage rates with respect to minimum wages, this implies a (reduced-form) price elasticity with respect to minimum wages of about 0.14. This corresponds to near-full price pass-through of minimum-wage-induced higher costs of labor.
You can draw your own conclusions about the desirability of the minimum wage, but the fleeting hope that it raises wages without trade-offs is gone. The effects of the minimum wage are nuanced, heterogeneous, and by no means entirely positive.
Gradual Empowerment?
The subtitle is “Systemic Existential Risks from Incremental AI Development,” and the authors are Jan Kulveit, et.al. Several of you have asked me for comments on this paper. Here is the abstract:
This paper examines the systemic risks posed by incremental advancements in artificial intelligence, developing the concept of `gradual disempowerment’, in contrast to the abrupt takeover scenarios commonly discussed in AI safety. We analyze how even incremental improvements in AI capabilities can undermine human influence over large-scale systems that society depends on, including the economy, culture, and nation-states. As AI increasingly replaces human labor and cognition in these domains, it can weaken both explicit human control mechanisms (like voting and consumer choice) and the implicit alignments with human interests that often arise from societal systems’ reliance on human participation to function. Furthermore, to the extent that these systems incentivise outcomes that do not line up with human preferences, AIs may optimize for those outcomes more aggressively. These effects may be mutually reinforcing across different domains: economic power shapes cultural narratives and political decisions, while cultural shifts alter economic and political behavior. We argue that this dynamic could lead to an effectively irreversible loss of human influence over crucial societal systems, precipitating an existential catastrophe through the permanent disempowerment of humanity. This suggests the need for both technical research and governance approaches that specifically address the risk of incremental erosion of human influence across interconnected societal systems.
This is one of the smarter arguments I have seen, but I am very far from convinced. When were humans ever in control to begin with? (Robin Hanson realized this a few years ago and is still worried about it, as I suppose he should be. There is not exactly a reliable competitive process for cultural evolution — boo hoo!)
Note the argument here is not that a few rich people will own all the AI. Rather, humans seem to lose power altogether. But aren’t people cloning DeepSeek for ridiculously small sums of money? Why won’t our AI future be fairly decentralized, with lots of checks and balances, and plenty of human ownership to boot?
Rather than focusing on “humans in general,” I say look at the marginal individual human being. That individual — forever as far as I can tell — has near-zero bargaining power against a coordinating, cartelized society aligned against him. With or without AI. Yet that hardly ever happens, extreme criminals being one exception. There simply isn’t enough collusion to extract much from the (non-criminal) potentially vulnerable lone individuals.
I do not in this paper see a real argument that a critical mass of the AIs are going to collude against humans. It seems already that “AIs in China” and “AIs in America” are unlikely to collude much with each other. Similarly, “the evil rich people” do not collude with each other all that much either, much less across borders.
I feel if the paper made a serious attempt to model the likelihood of worldwide AI collusion, the results would come out in the opposite direction. So, to my eye, “checks and balances forever” is by far the more likely equilibrium.
Does the Gender Wage Gap Actually Reflect Taste Discrimination Against Women?
One explanation of the gender wage gap is taste discrimination, as in Becker (1957). We test for taste discrimination by constructing a novel measure of misogyny using Google Trends data on searches that include derogatory terms for women. We find—surprisingly, in our view—that misogyny is an economically meaningful and statistically significant predictor of the wage gap. We also test more explicit implications of taste discrimination. The data are inconsistent with the Becker taste discrimination model, based on the tests used in Charles and Guryan (2008). But the data are consistent with the effects of taste discrimination against women in search models (Black, 1995), in which discrimination on the part of even a small group of misogynists can result in a wage gap.
That is a new NBER working paper by Molly Maloney and David Neumark.
Genetic Prediction and Adverse Selection
In 1994 I published Genetic Testing: An Economic and Contractarian Analysis which discussed how genetic testing could undermine insurance markets. I also proposed a solution, genetic insurance, which would in essence insure people for changes in their health and life insurance premiums due to the revelation of genetic data. Later John Cochrane would independently create Time Consistent Health Insurance a generalized form of the same idea that would allow people to have long term health insurance without being tied to a single firm.
The Human Genome Project completed in 2003 but, somewhat surprisingly, insurance markets didn’t break down, even though genetic information became more common. We know from twin studies that genetic heritability is very large but it turned out that the effect from each gene variant is very small. Thus, only a few diseases can be predicted well using single-gene mutations. Since each SNP has only a small effect on disease, to predict how genes influence disease we would need data on hundreds of thousands, even millions of people, and millions of their SNPs across the genome and their diseases. Until recently, that has been cost-prohibitive and as a result the available genetic information lacked much predictive power.
In an impressive new paper, however, Azevedo, Beauchamp and Linnér (ABL) show that data from Genome-Wide Association Studies can be used to create polygenic risk indexes (PGIs) which can predict individual disease risk from the aggregate effects of many genetic variants. The data is prodigious:
We analyze data from the UK Biobank (UKB) (Bycroft et al., 2018; Sudlow et al., 2015). The UKB contains genotypic and rich health-related data for over 500,000 individuals from across the United Kingdom who were between 40 and 69 years old at recruitment (between 2006 and 2010). UKB data is linked to the UK’s National Health Service (NHS), which maintains detailed records of health events across the lifespan and with which 98% of the UK population is registered (Sudlow et al., 2015). In addition, all UKB participants took part in a baseline assessment, in which they provided rich environmental, family history, health, lifestyle, physical, and sociodemographic data, as well as blood, saliva, and urine samples.
The UKB contains genome-wide array data for ∼800,000 genetic variants for ∼488,000 participants.
So for each of these individuals ABL construct risk indexes and they ask how significant is this new information for buying insurance in the Critical Illness Insurance market:
Critical illness insurance (CII) pays out a lump sum in the event that the insured person gets diagnosed with any of the medical conditions listed on the policy (Brackenridge et al., 2006). The lump sum can be used as the policyholder wishes. The policy pays out once and is thereafter terminated.
… Major CII markets include Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, India, China, and Germany. It is estimated that 20% of British workers were covered by a CII policy in 2009 (Gatzert and Maegebier, 2015). The global CII market has been valued at over $100 billion in 2021 and was projected to grow to over $350 billion by 2031 (Allied Market Research, 2022).
The answer, as you might have guessed by now, is very significant. Even though current PGIs explain only a fraction of total genetic risk, they are already predictive enough so that it would make sense for individuals with high measured risk to purchase insurance, while those with low-risk would opt out—leading to adverse selection that threatens the financial sustainability of the insurance market.
Today, the 500,000 people in the UK’s Biobank don’t know their PGIs but in principle they could and in the future they will. Indeed, as GWAS sample sizes increase, PGI betas will become more accurate and they will be applied to a greater fraction of an individual’s genome so individual PGIs will become increasingly predictive, exacerbating selection problems in insurance markets.
If my paper was a distant early warning, Azevedo, Beauchamp, and Linnér provide an early—and urgent—warning. Without reform, insurance markets risk unraveling. The authors explore potential solutions, including genetic insurance, community rating, subsidies, and risk adjustment. However, the effectiveness of these measures remains uncertain, and knee-jerk policies, such as banning insurers from using genetic information, could lead to the collapse of insurance altogether.
Sundry observations on the Trump tariffs
Brad Setser estimates the costs at 0.8 percent of U.S: gdp. I am not sure if he is considering exchange rate adjustments in that figure.
Kevin Bryan writes:
The problem with escalating, again, is that Canada is more reliant on US energy than vice versa, US ports than vice versa, US intermediate goods than vice versa, and DT is basically a narcissist. Again: no normal negotiation here, as the tariffs itself have no logical basis! 4/x
The fentanyl excuse seems like a flimsy (and should be illegal) one to let the exec branch set a tariff rate that constitutionally is Congress’ job. But maybe there is some “give Trump a fake win and de-escalate”. I worry about what that does in the future, though. 5/x
Ben Golub notes:
Modern supply chains don’t look like trade theory 101! They involve constant border crossings, each now hit by tariffs. Tariffs raise prices, but the more important thing they do is disrupt supply relationships.
So when a shock hits, you don’t just have a bit less activity by a few of the least profitable firms. You suddenly knock out some of the relationships (contracts) and some of the nodes (companies) in a large and very complex network. This can be pretty disruptive!
Here is Noah’s post. Here is the Yale Budget Lab on likely price effects in America.
Here is an Alan Beattie FT piece on how tariffs often matter less than you think. The size of the costs here can be disputed, but the most relevant fact is that there simply isn’t any upside to the Trump tariff policy. If you think it is about fentanyl, I have a prediction: the price of fentynal will not be rising anytime soon across the window of a one-year moving average. Here are some additional relevant points about fentanyl, which from Canada is not a major problem.
Letting China into the WTO was not the key decision
We study China’s export growth to the United States from 1950–2008, using a structural model to disentangle the effects of past tariff changes from the effects of changes in expectations of future tariffs. We find that the effects of China’s 1980 Normal Trade Relations (NTR) grant lasted past its 2001 accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the likelihood of losing NTR status decreased significantly during 1986–92 but changed little thereafter. US manufacturing employment trends support our findings: industries more exposed to the 1980 reform have shed workers steadily since then without acceleration around China’s WTO accession.
That is from a new and forthcoming JPE article by George Alessandria, Shafaat Yar KhanArmen KhederlarianKim J. RuhlJoseph B. Steinberg.