Category: Economics
Spreading AI to the rest of the world
Another job we’ll have, I call this imperialism, but I mean that in a value neutral way. But AI comes to different parts of the world at different speeds. I think the countries where AI changes a lot of things first, there’ll be a very high demand for people from those places, which I’ll think to be the US, possibly UK, to go around the rest of the world and teach people in other places how to integrate AI into what we have. And a lot of those demands won’t be fully rational. They won’t be, oh, give us the best possible AI. They’ll be like, oh, we’re Peruvians. We want to keep things a certain way. You may or may not agree, but we want you to give us a version of AI that helps keep it that way. And that will be the job. And I think Americans in particular, probably Brits as well, huge growth sector will be living in other parts of the world spreading AI. And again, the fact that AI can do it better may or may not be true, but I don’t think it’s what will matter. I think the Peruvians or some analogue will want humans to come and listen to their concerns and assure and persuade them as humans, that’s what they’re going to get. I’m not saying it’s always going to go well, but that will always be, I think, a big job for humans to do.
It’s already a growth sector for Americans to want to live abroad. Like we have all this accumulated wealth. Life in America can be a bit dull. Life in Europe in particular is amazing. Personally, I love life in most parts of Latin America. So it’s already a trend for Americans to live overseas. For another reason, it’s nothing to do with AI. So if there are all these future job opportunities, like full of meaning, like come to Kenya, help Kenya, you can save 73 lives or maybe like 73,000 lives, help them build out their AI in a way that’s acceptable to them. That’ll just be this phenomenally rich inner and outer life. And I think it’ll be a great source of job creation.
I have already linked to the transcript of the talk.
My GOAT book now has updated software/AI
Occupational Licensing Around the World
Hartley and Kleiner have a new Fed Minneapolis working paper surveying workers around the world to measure occupational licensing by country. In the United States, occupational licensing has increased substantially over time, so one might expect licensing to rise with income. Their headline result is the opposite: occupational licensing is negatively correlated with GDP per capita. Many developing countries such as India, South Africa, and the Philippines have a lot of occupational licensing while Denmark, Sweden and France have relatively little. Similarly, countries which rate poorly in measures of government quality, such as regulatory quality, political stability, the rule of law, and corruption have more occupational licensing.
I do have some concerns, however. The figure for India of 42% of workers requiring a government license seems too high. Admittedly this is the home of the License Raj but I worry about the survey results. In order to mark a surveyed worker as requiring an occupational license HK require that the worker say that a) they have a license and b) a license is required to work in their profession. But in India there are many workers who do not have a license and a license is required to work in their profession–HK, however, consider these workers confused and drop them from the analysis. That is appropriate for a developed country where there aren’t many illegal unlicensed workers but, as the authors later discuss, informality is very high in India so working illegally is not uncommon.
Including these workers would make the true India figure even higher than HK report but I think with such a high degree of informality we also have to wonder whether survey responders in India really are responding the same way as in Germany. Perhaps they are reporting a license isn’t really required since very few workers have one. In India, for example, some 60% of “licensed” drivers have an fake or invalid license and many have no license at all so maybe workers are just reporting the facts on the ground.
Within the United States, professions are regulated in some states but not others—Louisiana, for instance, requires florists to be licensed. (Do license-holding Louisiana florists produce better, safer arrangements? I don’t think so.) Given this variation even within a single country, we’d expect considerable variation across countries too. Multiple independent surveys—not just HK—confirm that Denmark, Sweden, and even France have less occupational licensing than the United States. Since these countries have high state capacity, we can rule out the hypothesis that licensing exists for safety or quality. The implication is clear: occupational licensing is often about rent-seeking, not quality assurance.
Addendum: See also my review of Allensworth’s The Licensing Racket which finds that licensing board spend most of their time and effort on regulating entry rather than quality and my paper on the surprise delicensing of occupational licensing in the funeral industry in Colorado.
Persistent Inequality in Publishing in Economics
This paper documents new facts about concentration in publishing in economics. First, the profession grows downward . The number of economists grew almost sixfold since 1990, but new entrants publish in lower-tier journals while incumbents hold the top. Second, there is high and persistent concentration at the top. Along with the downward growth, the top-1% authors accounted for 38.4% of top-5 publication credit in 1990 and for 78.3% in 2025. Third, the persistence is widespread within cohorts, within subfields, and within gender. Fourth, new journals only slightly dilute concentration. Fifth, elite authors diversify on topics faster than the rest of the profession. We interpret the findings with a screening model of attention under information overload. The evidence is consistent with the model: as the field grows, citations concentrate on established work and the conditional citation premium of top-author papers narrows.
By Ricardo Dahis, via the excellent Samir Varma.
*Who Thinks Like an Economist?*
That is the title of a recent book by Beatrice Magistro. Some key results are:
Economic knowledge consistently predicts higher support for welfare-enhancing policies (Eurozone membership, free trade, and EU immigration), independent on whether individuals stand to gain or lose initially from globalization. This challenges conventional self-interest accounts and instead highlights the role of economic knowledge — and potentially time preferences — in shaping globalization attitudes.
Economic knowledge also predicts a lower discount rate, even after adjusting for years of education.
I would say that over the years I have altered my perspective a bit on these issues. I used to think these factors were correlated, in large part, through a kind of wisdom. I now think that more of the effect, however much I may sympathize with it, runs through sociological expectation and perceived obligation, combined with conformity and signaling pressures.
That was then, this is now
One of the cool things about European football is that it provides good evidence that high-income, high-ability individuals move in response to tax rates…
That is from Jeremy Horpendahl, citing research by…Emanuel Saez.
Land Reclamation!
“Buy land,” they said, “they aren’t making any more.” But in fact, we used to make a lot of land. Half the land area of Boston, a quarter of Manhattan, and 15% of San Francisco were raised from the sea before 1970. Tyler has already pointed to Zigmund Forrest and Max Tabarrok’s piece on land reclamation in Works in Progress. Check it out, it’s an excellent piece.
But also don’t miss Connor Tabarrok’s historical overview of land reclamation featuring the ancient Iraqi city of Ur, Alexander the Great’s siege of Tyre, and the amazing flood tanks built under the city of Tokyo! Connor, a civil engineer by trade, points out that most land reclamation isn’t done to build cities with land fill but rather to create farmland through drainage:
In the lower 48 states, the US Fish and Wildlife Service estimates that wetlands covered 221 million acres in the 1780s and 104 million by the 1980s. That is roughly 117 million acres drained in two centuries, a loss rate the report puts at 60 acres an hour, sustained for 200 years. For comparison, the total urban footprint of the United States is around 70 million acres. America has drained substantially more wetland than it has built city, and nearly all of that drained land became farmland.
… The Dutch invented the modern polder and have spent eight centuries pushing back the North Sea, and the result is one of the densest, richest countries in Europe. Yet around two-thirds of the country’s dry land is farmland. Flevoland, the newest province, is 1,410 square kilometers reclaimed from the Zuiderzee in the 1950s and 60s, and it was laid out as an agricultural basin, not a city. The country with the most reclaimed land per person uses it to grow potatoes, graze dairy cattle, and ranks as the world’s second-largest agricultural exporter.
The other reason that we drained land historically was to get rid of mosquito-driven malaria and to improve sewage.
In the mid-1800s the land south and west of the Washington Monument was the Potomac Flats, a tidal marsh that collected the city’s sewage and exposed it to the sun twice a day. The stench reached the White House. In 1882 Congress appropriated $400,000 and the Army Corps of Engineers, under Major Peter Hains, began dredging the river’s shipping channels and pumping the mud onto the flats. The work created more than 600 acres of new ground and a Tidal Basin engineered to flush the Washington Channel with each tide. The Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials stand on that fill. So do the cherry trees, planted in 1912 on land that had been open water within living memory.
Much more of interest at the whole thing.
Single-payer health care systems are looking worse all the time
That is the theme of my latest Free Press piece, here is one excerpt from it:
Government-run systems often (not always) do a perfectly fine job setting a broken arm or administering a long-standing, well-known medication. They do much less well when it comes to developing, financing, and delivering a new immunological approach to fighting cancer, personalized to your individual genome at a cost of hundreds of thousands of dollars. In our rapidly arriving biomedical future, innovation capacity will matter above all else. And though they may not see it today, the people with the most life ahead of them will reap nearly all of the benefits of a dynamic system, or suffer the consequences of a paralytic one.
Thirty years ago, it was often debated whether the Canadian or British healthcare systems were better than what we have in the U.S. After all, they offered a kind of guaranteed access to health services. The details could differ, but often the healthcare had no upfront price or only a low user fee. In America, in contrast, healthcare was more expensive, there were many millions of uninsured people, and dealing with sometimes rapacious insurers and hospitals could involve significant emotional trauma.
But over time the British and Canadian systems look worse and worse. The queues and rationing have increased, as giving healthcare away for free makes it hard to satisfy demands in a timely manner. In Canada, for instance, the median wait time has risen from 9.3 weeks in the early 1990s to 28.6 weeks today. In the British National Health Service, only 65.3 percent of patients start treatment within 18 weeks.
Worse yet, both of those systems are undercapitalized. In Britain, healthcare is badly understaffed and underfunded. Yet the country already has high taxes, high debt, and slow economic growth, so it is not clear where the new money will come from to recapitalize the system.
And this sentence:
This entire dynamic will be intensified as the pace of medical innovation picks up.
Your life may depend on it.
Why we stopped making land
From Zigmund Forrest and Maxwell Tabarrok in Works in Progress:
In total, around eight percent of the land in America’s major coastal cities was underwater in the 1890s and has since been reclaimed. This includes the land under several major airports, like Newark, Logan, and SFO, as well as neighborhoods like the Financial District in San Francisco, the Back Bay in Boston, and Camden in Philadelphia. Some cities, like Boston and Charleston, have doubled in size by reclaiming land.
Today, reclamation should be more common than ever. Land values in some cities are thirty times what they were in 1950, and high-tide flooding is four to eight times as frequent. Reclamation could extend and protect our coastal cities as it has for centuries. But rather than reclaim more land, we have virtually ceased to reclaim any at all. Since the completion of Battery Park City in 1976, there has not been a single major urban land reclamation project in the United States and only a handful of port expansions.
…Reclamation stopped abruptly in the 1970s when a wave of environmental regulations made it enormously expensive to reshape the landscape. And it halted at the same time in every other country that passed similar laws.
Recommended.
From Prediction Markets to Decision Markets and Beyond!
Arin Dube points to a great illustration of the power of prediction markets. Yesterday due to a new scandal the probability that Graham Platner would drop out of the Maine Democratic primary exploded from 9% to 96% (+87 percentage points). At the same time, the probability that the Democrats would win the election jumped by about 9 percentage points, from 54% to 63%. What does this tell you?
The market is signaling that Platner reduces the Democrats’ chances of victory. We can be more precise. If an 87-point increase in the probability of dropping out gets you 9 points of winning, then a 100% chance of dropping out implies a gain of 9/0.87 ≈ 10.3 percentage points.
Thus the market’s best estimate is that Platner is reducing the Democrats’ chance of winning by about 10 percentage points (compared to an unknown replacement). That’s a pretty big number! Democrats should surely use this information to make better decisions.
Now, I have been a bit loose. We have implicitly assumed that the news mainly moved the probability of Platner dropping out, rather than independently changing the Democrats’ general-election prospects. The issue is we are trying to reverse engineer two conditional prices, P(win|drop) and P(win|stay), from one unconditional price, P(win), and its comovement with P(drop). It works pretty well here as an illustration but Robin Hanson’s idea is that we can do better yet by trading the conditionals instead of inferring them.
Hanson’s decision markets would run contracts of the form “pays $1 if Democrats win, conditional on Platner dropping out — bet refunded if he stays.” Plus the mirror contract conditioned on staying. The refund provision makes the price a conditional probability: a trader pricing the first contract doesn’t need any view on whether Platner drops out, only on how the race goes if he does. With this structure we would get cleaner estimates of the conditional probabilities–in this case whether the Democrats do better with Platner in or out–which is exactly what a decision maker needs.
We were able to plausibly reverse engineer our estimate because the market happened to move 87 points in a single day. But a decision market would have posted the number continuously, no scandal required. In other words, with decision markets in play, not just prediction markets, we could have seen how much Platner was costing the Democrats before the latest scandal hit—which is precisely when the information would have been most useful.
It’s been fun to see prediction markets catch on with the public but the world is still decades behind Hanson’s decision markets—let alone futarchy!
What should I ask Liaquat Ahamed?
Yes I will be doing a Conversation with him. From Wikipedia:
Ahamed is the author of Lords of Finance: The Bankers Who Broke the World (2009). The book was awarded the 2010 Pulitzer Prize for History, the 2010 Spear’s Book Award (Financial History Book of the Year), the 2010 Arthur Ross Book Award Gold Medal, the 2009 Financial Times and Goldman Sachs Business Book of the Year Award. For 2009 it was recognized as one of Time magazine’s “Best Books of the Year”, New York Times “Best Books of the Year” and Amazon.com’s “Best Books of the Year”. It was shortlisted for the Samuel Johnson Prize…The book narrates the events preceding the Black Tuesday stock market crash of 1929 and the disastrous response of the world’s major central banks.
He has a new and excellent book out, namely 1873: The Rothschilds, the First Great Depression, and the Making of the Modern World.
Liaquat Ahamed also has extensive experience in the private sector, and dealing with the World Bank and IMF. He has produced a movie and done much more as well.
So what should I ask him?
Capital Gains Can Be Labor Income
Zwick and Zidar argue that a substantial share of the decline in labor share can be accounted for by changing forms of pay, including pass-throughs and equtiy compensation. In particular, if an employee is paid in stock and that stock increases in value then the tax rules tend to count some of that as capital income (depending on when the capital gains occur) rather than as labor income. Zwick and Zidar point us to Human Capitalists for the details:
Human capitalists are corporate employees who receive significant equity-based compensation such as equity grants and stock options. These employees are partial owners of US firms, and in return for their human capital input, human capitalists accrue a share of firm profits through firm dividends and capital gains in addition to earning wages. We document the stylized facts describing the evolution of human capitalists’ income over time and across industries within the US manufacturing sector.1 Human capitalists have become an increasingly important class of corporate income earners. Due to measurement challenges, prior work has underestimated the importance of equity pay below the C-suite. Correctly measuring the total income of human capitalists substantially alters conclusions about changes in factor shares and technological complementarity.
Equity-based compensation represents 36% of compensation to human capitalists from 2010 to 2019 and constitutes a 7% share of value added in the manufacturing sector in 2019. Correctly accounting for the total income earned by high-skilled workers has a substantial effect on measured changes in labor shares over the modern era. The addition of equity pay to cash wages reduces the decline implied by the wage-only income share of value added in manufacturing since the 1980s by 32%. Without including equity pay, high-skilled labor’s share decreased from 17% in the 1980s to 11% in the most recent decade. The inclusion of equity-based compensation almost eliminates this decline. The high-skilled share of total labor income increases from one-third at the beginning of the 1960s to two-thirds in the 2010s when equity-based compensation is included.
See also my previous post The Labor Share Fell. So What?
Do falling birth rates boost per capita income?
The secular decline in birth rates across the globe over the past seven decades has slowed population growth, raised average ages, and reshaped labor markets and the macroeconomy. Contrary to the widespread expectation that these trends hamper economic growth, we find lower birth rates are associated with higher growth in GDP per working-age adult across countries and higher wage growth across US commuting zones, with no negative impact on aggregate GDP or earnings. These patterns are not explained by educational upgrading, rising female labor force participation, the declining importance of agriculture, or neoclassical-Solow mechanisms. We argue that they reflect the endogenous, labor-saving response of technology to the scarcity of younger workers. Consistent with this interpretation, countries and regions with lower birth rates exhibit more labor-saving patents and growing high-tech activity. There is also higher TFP growth across countries and industries. Exploiting cross-country variation in WWII military and civilian deaths, we find that declines in younger population, rather than population size per se, drive our results.
Here is the full paper by Acemoglu, Autor, Beirne, and Scott. Via Philip Heimburger.
How Britain Became as Poor as Mississippi
How Britain Became as Poor as Mississippi is a good piece in the Atlantic by Idrees Kahloon filled with colorful anecdotes of a nation in decline:
The health service now has to spend more money settling maternity-malpractice claims than it does on actually providing maternity care. Many Brits can neither obtain an appointment with a publicly funded dentist nor afford a private one; in a 2023 survey, one in 10 reported doing DIY dental work, in extreme cases extracting their own teeth or gluing broken crowns back together.
Incomes can be shockingly low: Junior doctors recently went on strike for the 15th time in three years over their salaries, which start at just £38,800; the median salary for British civil servants is £35,680. In April, amid the Iran conflict, the Daily Mail pounced on Prime Minister Keir Starmer for vacationing in Valencia, Spain, at what the tabloid described as a luxury hotel, costing £200 a night.
Americans are likely to come away a bit smug, especially as Independence Day approaches and Europeans are enjoying our giant stadiums and central air conditioning. Look deeper, however, and Britain’s story becomes more uncomfortable. Does this sound familiar?
Recent plans to transform the country have rested in no small part on High Speed 2, a superfast rail line intended to connect London with Birmingham, Leeds, and Manchester. But since HS2 was proposed, in 2009, its costs have tripled, to more than £100 billion. It is the most expensive rail line in the world. (A special structure to protect a rare bat species near the rail line in Buckinghamshire required 8,000 permits and was built at a cost of £216 million.) The most important sections of the proposed route have been lopped off. The rump line—going from Birmingham, Britain’s second-largest city, to not-quite-central London—may be finished by 2040…. HS2 has been delayed for so long that two swiftly built towers near the terminus now themselves look derelict and in need of demolition.
…Building infrastructure, or much of anything else, has become all but impossible in the United Kingdom. In addition to having the world’s most expensive (not yet built) train line, Britain also hosts the world’s most expensive (not yet built) nuclear-power plant, Hinkley Point C. Its environmental-impact assessment ran 31,401 pages; the plant will feature a £700 million “fish disco,” which will pulse sounds underwater to deter animals from its intake pipes.
Upon closer inspection, the United States looks a lot less like a shining city on a hill and a lot more like a declining Great Britain, appendaged with one or two dynamic sectors, most notably AI. The similarities are especially obvious in the retrograde solutions Britain has lumbered into, namely attacking immigrants and trade—Brexit being the equivalent of a high tariff regime. Nations in decline, like people, tend to lash out at others rather than deal with their real problems. Needless to say, neither immigrants nor trade explain Britain’s—or California’s—inability to build high-speed rail or other infrastructure.
It is discomforting to watch the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution, individual rights, and free speech—the nation that once built the railways, the steam engines, the factories that remade the world—lose the capacity to build much of anything, or even to tolerate people speaking their minds. In parallel, instead of dealing with our real problems—almost all of our creation—the right gets literally hysterical over symbolic culture-war questions like birthright citizenship, while the left nominates candidates with Marxist-Leninist sympathies. The abundance and progress movements are some of the few shining lights. It’s not too late. But Great Britain is a warning.
James Mirrlees auction markets in everything
To mark what would have been Jim Mirrlees’ 90th birthday on 4 July, Nuffield College (Oxford University) is auctioning off some signed books from Jim’s personal collection and other special items of Jim’s generously donated by the Mirrlees family and the artist Yu Ji. The proceeds will support a fund for scholarships in Jim’ s memory.
The auction is conducted entirely online and is open to all.
Our auction is a simplification of the Product-Mix Auction that Paul Klemperer (Jim’s successor as Oxford’s Edgeworth Professor) designed for the Bank of England in 2007-8 at the beginning of the financial crisis. The Bank still runs its version regularly, and has now sold almost £400 billion of repos using it. (We expect to raise a little less!) This version has been programmed by Edwin Lock (Nuffield Research Fellow, 2021-24) who, along with Elizabeth Baldwin (Nuffield Research Fellow 2016-2017), has been involved with Paul in the further development of the Product-Mix Auction. (For more on this auction, see this paper, or this 5-minute film published by the Guardian newspaper.)
…The auction is focused on “social welfare”, not expected revenue…
Here is the link, via Tim Harford and Paul Klemperer..