Category: History
The 1970s Crime Wave
Tyler and I wrap up our series of podcasts on the 1970s with The 1970s Crime Wave. Here’s one bit:
TABARROK: …people think that mass incarceration is a peculiarly American phenomena, or that it came out of nowhere, or was due solely to racism. Michelle Alexander’s, The New Jim Crow, takes his view. In fact, the United States was not a mass incarceration society in the 1960s.
It became one in the 1980s and 1990s due to the crime wave of the 1970s. It was not simply due to racism. It is true Blacks do commit more crimes relative to their population than whites, but Blacks are also overrepresented as victims. The simple fact of the matter is that Black victims of crime, the majority group, demanded more incarceration of Black criminals. In 1973, the NAACP demanded that the government lengthen minimum prison terms for muggers, pushers, and first-degree murders.
The Black newspaper, the Amsterdam News, advocated mandatory life sentences for “the non-addict drug pusher of hard drugs.” The Black columnist, Carl Rowan, wrote that “locking up thugs is not vindictive.” Eric Holder, under Obama, he was the secretary of—
COWEN: Of something.
TABARROK: Yes, of something. He called for stop and frisk. Eric Holder called for stop and frisk. Back then, the criminal justice system was also called racist, but the racism that people were pointing to was that Black criminals were let back on the streets to terrorize Black victims, and that Black criminals were given sentences which were too light. That was the criticism back then. It was Black and white victims together who drove the punishment of criminals. I think this actually tells you about two falsehoods. First, the primary driver of mass imprisonment was not racism. It was violent crime.
Second, this also puts the lie, sometimes you hear from conservatives, to this idea that Black leaders don’t care about Black-on-Black crime. That’s a lie. Many Black leaders have been, and were, and are tough on crime. Now, it’s true, as crime began to fall in the 1990s, many Blacks and whites began to have misgivings about mass incarceration. Crime was a huge problem in the 1970s and 1980s, and it hit the United States like a brick. It seemed to come out of nowhere. You can’t blame people for seeking solutions, even if the solutions come with their own problems.
A lot of amazing stuff in this episode. Here’s our Marginal Revolution Podcast 1970s trilogy
- 1970s Inflation: The Economic Fever That Changed America
- Oil Shocks, Price Controls and War
- The 1970s Crime Wave
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New results on tariff history do not favor protectionism
I cover these in my latest Bloomberg column, here is one excerpt:
A new paper from the National Bureau of Economic Research shows that tariffs probably did more harm than good. Using meticulously collected industry-level and state-level data, the paper traces the impact of specific tariff rates more clearly than before. The results are not pretty.
One core finding is that industries with higher tariffs did not have higher productivity — in fact, they had lower productivity. Tariffs did raise the number of US firms in a given sector, but they did so in part by protecting smaller, less productive firms. That was not the path by which the US became an industrial giant, nor is it wise to use trade policy to keep lower-productivity firms in business. Not only does it slow economic growth, it also keeps workers in jobs without much of a future.
These results contradict the traditional protectionist story — that tariffs allow the best firms to grow larger and capture the large domestic market. In reality, the tariffs kept firms smaller and probably lowered US manufacturing productivity.
The paper also finds that the tariffs of that era raised the prices for products released domestically. That lowers living standards, and should give a second Trump administration reason to pause, as he just won an election in which inflation was a major concern. The finding about inflation also counters another major protectionist argument: that tariffs eventually lower domestic prices because they allow US firms to expand and enjoy economies of scale. That is the opposite of what happened.
The paper also details how lobbying, logrolling and political horse-trading were essential features of the shift toward higher US tariffs. A lot of the tariffs of the time depended on which party controlled Congress, rather than economic rationality. Trump is fond of citing President William McKinley’s tariffs, but they are evidence of the primacy of political influence and rent-seeking, not of a well-thought out strategic trade policy.
The authors of the new research are Alexander Klein and Christopher M. Meissner.
Human Capital Accumulation in China and India in 20th Century
By Nitin Kumar Bharti and Li Yang:
Abstract. The education system of a country is instrumental in its long-run development. This paper compares the historical evolution of the education systems in the two largest emerging economies- China and India, between 1900 and 2018. We create a novel time-series data of educational statistics related to enrolment, graduates, teachers and expenditure based on historical statistical reports. China adopted a bottom-up approach in expanding its education system, compared to India’s top-down approach in terms of enrolment. While India had a head-start in modern education, it has gradually been overtaken by China- at Primary education in the 1930’s Middle/Secondary level in the 1970s and Higher/Tertiary level in the 2010s. It resulted in the lower cohort-wise average education and higher education inequality in India since 1907. Vocational education is a central component of the Chinese education system, absorbing half of the students in higher education. In India, the majority of the students pursue traditional degree courses (Bachelors, Masters etc.), with 60% in Humanities courses. Though India is known as the “land of engineers”, China produces a higher share of engineers. We conjecture that the type of human capital in China through engineering and vocational education helped develop its manufacturing sector. Utilizing micro-survey data since the 1980s, we show that education expansion has been an inequality enhancer in India. This is due to both the unequal distribution of educational attainment and higher individual returns to education in India.
Interesting throughout, via Pseudoerasmus.
What is the Best-Case Scenario for a Trump Presidency?
The economy is strong and Trump has a significant opportunity to simply take credit for that if he avoids major disruptions. While he must fulfill some of his campaign promises, people voted for Trump not for his policies per se. Trump has leeway. No one will accuse him of flip-flopping. While these are not my first-best policies, Trump won against astounding media and elite opposition and an attempted assassination. The people have spoken, so here’s a best-case outline for following through on Trump’s policies without cratering the economy:
- Trade Policy: Moderate tariff increases on China. No Chinese electric cars for us. But drop the “tariffs on everything” language. He can always say his rhetoric was a threat to get other countries to lower their tariffs. Let’s instead talk tough against our enemies but shift toward “friend-shoring”, maintaining or even lowering tariffs with allied nations, such as Canada, Europe, and possibly India, as part of a broader strategy to contain China’s influence.
- Border Control: Trump must strengthen the border. But let’s limit deportations to individuals who arrived in the past four years. Control the border, throw some illegals out but minimize human misery by not deporting long-term residents and their US-citizen families. Declare a win while avoiding economic disruption and strengthening the police state.
- Vaccine and Health Policy: Appoint Robert F. Kennedy Jr. to head a committee on vaccine policy and, after several years of investigation, write a report. Take medical freedom more seriously.
- Crypto Regulation: Appoint Hester M. Peirce to head the SEC. Stabilize the regulatory environment for cryptocurrency. Simplify tax rules for crypto. Support digital dollar growth and treat stablecoins as what they are, namely, the US dollar dominating world electronic payments.
- Space and Innovation: U.S. Space Force! Commit to Mars exploration and position the U.S. as a leader in space innovation. Get advice from Elon.
- US AI. Immediately approve Meta for its nuclear-AI program. Swat the bees. Approve Amazon as well. Tell the FERC that their job is to increase the supply of energy. Keep the Chip Act but make it clear that the goal is to dominate the space not make jobs or social policy. We are the world leaders in AI. Let’s keep it that way.
- Kill Bureaucracy: Let Elon Musk take the chainsaw to a few bureaucracies like Javier Milei. Afuera! Afuera! Afuera! Streamline bureaucratic processes, cut red tape and invigorate tech and infrastructure initiatives.
- Respect Meritocracy: End race and gender based discrimination in government programs.
- Expand Housing Supply: Build baby build! Trump is a natural to lead this. Trump the developer! Incentivize states and localities to streamline zoning laws and reduce restrictions that hamper new housing developments. Increase housing supply.
Each of these policies is consistent with Trump’s priorities and rhetoric and has broad appeal for voters who value economic opportunity, accountability, and national resilience. The economy is strong. Trump has the wind at his back. If he is sensible, all of this would make for a successful presidency. If Trump wants the judgment of history, the path is open should he choose to walk it.
My Conversation with the excellent Christopher Kirchhoff
Here is the audio, video, and transcript. Here is the intro:
Christopher Kirchhoff is an expert in emerging technology who founded the Pentagon’s Silicon Valley office. He’s led teams for President Obama, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and CEO of Google. He’s worked in worlds as far apart as weapons development and philanthropy. His pioneering efforts to link Silicon Valley technology and startups to Washington has made him responsible for $70 billion in technology acquisition by the Department of Defense. He’s penned many landmark reports, and he is the author of Unit X: How the Pentagon and Silicon Valley are Transforming the Future of War.
Tyler and Christopher cover the ascendancy of drone warfare and how it will affect tactics both off and on the battlefield, the sobering prospect of hypersonic weapons and how they will shift the balance of power, EMP attacks, AI as the new arms race (and who’s winning), the completely different technology ecosystem of an iPhone vs. an F-35, why we shouldn’t nationalize AI labs, the problem with security clearances, why the major defense contractors lost their dynamism, how to overcome the “Valley of Death” in defense acquisition, the lack of executive authority in government, how Unit X began, the most effective type of government commission, what he’ll learn next, and more.
Excerpt:
COWEN: Now, I never understand what I read about hypersonic missiles. I see in the media, “China has launched the world’s first nuclear-capable hypersonic, and it goes 10x the speed of sound.” And people are worried. If mutual assured destruction is already in place, what exactly is the nature of the worry? Is it just we don’t have enough response time?
KIRCHHOFF: It’s a number of things, and when you add them up, they really are quite frightening. Hypersonic weapons, because of the way they maneuver, don’t necessarily have to follow a ballistic trajectory. We have very sophisticated space-based systems that can detect the launch of a missile, particularly a nuclear missile, but right then you’re immediately calculating where it’s going to go based on its ballistic trajectory. Well, a hypersonic weapon can steer. It can turn left, it can turn right, it can dive up, it can dive down.
COWEN: But that’s distinct from hypersonic, right?
KIRCHHOFF: Well, ICBMs don’t have the same maneuverability. That’s one factor that makes hypersonic weapons different. Second is just speed. With an ICBM launch, you have 20 to 25 minutes or so. This is why the rule for a presidential nuclear decision conference is, you have to be able to get the president online with his national security advisers in, I think, five or seven minutes. The whole system is timed to defeat adversary threats. The whole continuity-of-government system is upended by the timeline of hypersonic weapons.
Oh, by the way, there’s no way to defend against them, so forget the fact that they’re nuclear capable — if you want to take out an aircraft carrier or a service combatant, or assassinate a world leader, a hypersonic weapon is a fantastic way to do it. Watch them very carefully because more than anything else, they will shift the balance of military power in the next five years.
COWEN: Do you think they shift the power to China in particular, or to larger nations, or nations willing to take big chances? At the conceptual level, what’s the nature of the shift, above and beyond whoever has them?
KIRCHHOFF: Well, right now, they’re incredibly hard to produce. Right now, they’re essentially in a research and development phase. The first nation that figures out how to make titanium just a little bit more heat resistant, to make the guidance systems just a little bit better, and enables manufacturing at scale — not just five or seven weapons that are test-fired every year, but 25 or 50 or 75 or 100 — that really would change the balance of power in a remarkable number of military scenarios.
COWEN: How much China has them now? Are you at liberty to address that? They just have one or two that are not really that useful, or they’re on the verge of having 300?
KIRCHHOFF: What’s in the media and what’s been discussed quite a bit publicly is that China has more successful R&D tests of hypersonic weapons. Hypersonic weapons are very difficult to make fly for long periods. They tend to self-destruct at some point during flight. China has demonstrated a much fuller flight cycle of what looks to be an almost operational weapon.
COWEN: Where is Russia in this space?
KIRCHHOFF: Russia is also trying. Russia is developing a panoply of Dr. Evil weapons. The latest one to emerge in public is this idea of putting a nuclear payload on a satellite that would effectively stop modern life as we know it by ending GPS and satellite communications. That’s really somebody sitting in a Dr. Evil lair, stroking their cat, coming up with ideas that are game-changing. They’ve come up with a number of other weapons that are quite striking — supercavitating torpedoes that could take out an entire aircraft carrier group. Advanced states are now coming up with incredibly potent weapons.
Intelligent and interesting throughout. Again, I am happy to recommend Christopher’s recent book Unit X: How the Pentagon and Silicon Valley are Transforming the Future of War, co-authored with Raj M. Shah.
Sentences to ponder about 1812 America
…even with a population of only about 7.5 million, U.S. already had more business corporations than any other country, and possibly more than all other countries put together, securing its role as the world’s first “corporation nation.”
That is from Sylla and Wright, via the excellent Kevin Lewis.
What should I ask Paula Byrne?
Paula Jayne Byrne, Lady Bate…is a British biographer, novelist, and literary critic.
Byrne has a PhD in English literature from the University of Liverpool, where she also studied for her MA, having completed a BA in English and Theology at West Sussex Institute of Higher Education (now Chichester University).
Byrne is the founder and chief executive of a small charitable foundation, ReLit: The Bibliotherapy Foundation, dedicated to the promotion of literature as a complementary therapy in the toolkit of medical practitioners dealing with stress, anxiety and other mental health conditions. She is also a practicing psychotherapist, specializing in couples and family counseling.
Byrne, who is from a large working-class Roman Catholic family in Birkenhead, is married to Sir Jonathan Bate, Shakespeare scholar and former Provost of Worcester College, Oxford
Her books cover Jane Austen, Mary Robinson, Evelyn Waugh, Barbara Pym, JFK’s sister, two novels, and her latest is a study of Thomas Hardy’s women, both in his life and in his fiction, namely Hardy’s Women: Mother, Sister, Wives, Muses. Here is her home page. Here is Paula on Twitter.
Risers and Fallers, mostly Fallers
Here is a fun post by Arnold Kling on which thinkers have kept name recognition and also influence. Excerpt:
Sociology (Erving Goffman, Talcott Parsons, Robert Nisbet, Charles Murray, Matt Granovetter, Robert Trivers, E.O. Wilson, Richard Dawkins, Stephen Jay Gould)
Is there not a good case to be made that we are living in Erving Goffman’s world? I think he coined the term “impression management,” and certainly with the advent of social media that is now a big part of our lives. But he is a Faller. Probably if you would read him now, you would dismiss him as offering Blinding Glimpses of the Obvious. Parsons and Nisbet are also Fallers.
Murray is still polarizing, but much lesser known than he was in the 20th century. So he is a Faller, but too much of one.
Granovetter is a Riser, no? Social networks are a big deal now, and he is known for his work on those.
I put the sociobiology controversialists in the sociology category, since the public doesn’t care about insects or peacocks. I would say that Gould’s crusade against evolutionary biology failed, so he seems to be somewhat of a Faller. Dawkins and Trivers seem like Risers, but Wilson was much more well known, and controversial, in his prime.
Keynes, Tolkien, and Rand are among the risers (sometimes relatively speaking), so what does that tell us about the current world?
Does it matter who Satoshi was?
That is the topic of my latest Bloomberg column, here is one excerpt:
It also matters if Satoshi was a single person or a small team. If a single person, that might mean future innovations are more likely than generally thought: If Satoshi is a lone individual, then maybe there there are more unknown geniuses out there. On the other hand, the Satoshi-as-a-team theory would mean that secrets are easier to keep than people think. If that’s the case, then maybe conspiracy theories are more true than most of us would care to admit.
According to many speculations, Satoshi came out of a movement obsessed with e-cash and e-gold mechanisms, dating to the 1980s. People from those movements who have been identified as potential Satoshi candidates include Nick Szabo, Hal Finney, Wei Dai, David Chaum and Douglas Jackson, among others. At the time, those movements were considered failures because their products did not prove sustainable. The lesson here would be that movements do not truly and permanently fail. It is worth experimenting in unusual directions because something useful might come out of those efforts.
If Peter Todd is Satoshi, then it’s appropriate to upgrade any estimates of the ability of very young people to get things done. Todd would have been working on Bitcoin and the associated white paper as a student in his early 20s. At the same time, if the more mainstream Adam Back is involved, then maybe the takeaway is that rebellious young people should seek out older mentors on matters of process and marketing.
I believe that in less than two years we will know who Satoshi is.
The MR Podcast–Oil Shocks, Price Controls and War
Our second podcast on the 1970s titled Oil Shocks, Price Controls and War is now available! Here’s one bit:
Tabarrok: …Sheikh Ahmed Yamani, in a famous statement, he was the oil minister for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, he’s a leader of OPEC, he says on October 16th, this is 10 days after the war begins, “This is a moment for which I have been waiting for a long time. The moment has come. We are masters of our own commodity.” They raise the price of oil. Oil production falls by about 9 percent to 10 percent. That doesn’t seem on the surface to be a huge amount, but it reveals something which people had not been prepared for, and that was the inelasticity of oil demand.
I would put it this way. I think this is the key idea here. Almost accidentally, the exporting countries had discovered that the demand for oil was more inelastic than anyone had ever realized. The main lesson they drew before 1973, the oil exporting countries thought that the only way to increase revenues was to produce more. After 1973, they learned that an even better way to increase revenues was to produce less.
Here’s another:
COWEN: Since the 1980s, economists, for a number of reasons, have underrated real shocks as a source of business cycles and downturns. You have the Keynesians who didn’t want to talk about it, and then you had the Monetarists, Milton Friedman, who wanted to promote their own recipe, and people just stopped talking about it. Even 2008, which clearly had a lot to do with a major negative shock to aggregate demand, but the price of oil is quite high at the time when that’s breaking, and it was a major factor behind the downturn.
TABARROK: Absolutely.
COWEN: No one wants to talk about that.
Here is the MR Podcast home page. Subscribe now to take a small step toward a much better world: Apple Podcasts | Spotify | YouTube.
*A Voyage Around the Queen*
I loved this Craig Brown book, although many of you won’t. A good biography typically brings a subject to life. This biography sets out to convince you that Queen Elizabeth II could never be understood whatsoever, that she was a literal cipher and always was going to stand outside our typical categories. She did love jigsaw puzzles.
Can you stand a book that has sentences like?:
The Queen Mother’s corgis were every bit as edgy.
The Queen was born in 1926, and the book lists some words that were first chronicled in that same year:
Bible belt, business lunch, car park, kitsch, market research, pop song, publicity stunt, recycle, sugar daddy, and totalitarian.
Recommended, for some of you at least. You need to have a touch of mischief in you perhaps?
Gustav de Molinari, the first libertarian?
He was a nineteenth century Belgian economist, wonderful to read, and still neglected as a thinker. Here is one excerpt from a short open access book by Benoit Malbranque, now on line:
Gustave de Molinari himself was perhaps as much a traveler, a journalist and an historian, as he was a political philosopher. In fact, apart from a handful of professional travelers, very few people knew so much about the world as he did. Over the years, he made lengthy stays in Switzerland (1857), Russia (1860, 1882), Canada (1876, 1880, 1885), Ireland (1880), and the United States (1876, 1880, 1885). His journeys also made him discover England, Germany, Poland, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Turkey, as well as the Caribbean islands, Panama, Columbia, and Venezuela. Travels were obviously, at that time, more perilous and adventurous than they are now. By sea, they were both uncomfortable and terribly long: crossing the Atlantic Ocean took de Molinari 12 days in 1876, 10 days in 1880, and 11 days in 1885.
Part of his forward-looking libertarianism was a strong belief in international agreements, in the interests of peace and mutual cooperation. He also blamed the poor quality and high expense of American food, as he perceived it, on American protectionism.
Here is a more general page of relevant material on French liberalism. All via Daniel Klein.
The early history of peer review
By the 1950s, the Royal Society was asking reviewers to respond to standardized questions, including whether a study contained “contributions to knowledge of sufficient scientific interest” and simply whether the society should publish it.
These questions could prompt brief responses even to significant pieces of work. Chemist Dorothy Hodgkin wrote barely 50 words when asked to review the full manuscript of the structure of DNA by Francis Crick and James Watson in 1953, which was published in Proceedings of the Royal Society in April 19541. (A shorter paper announcing the discovery had already appeared in Nature2.)
In her sole comment, beyond a series of yes and no answers, Hodgkin suggests the duo should “touch up” photographs to eliminate distracting reflections of “chairs in the perspex rod” — a technical fix that modern cameras perform routinely. Crick and Watson seemed to follow the advice.
The archive is also littered with long reports, many in handwritten scrawl. In 1877, reviewer Robert Clifton finished a 24-page report on two related papers on optics, with an apology: “How you will hate me for bothering you with this tremendously long letter, but I hope before we meet time will have softened your anger.”
Ferlier says that the introduction of the standardized referee questions significantly reduced the amount of time and effort put in by reviewers. “There’s really this understanding in the nineteenth century and very early twentieth century that the peer review is a real discussion,” she says. “After that, it becomes a way of managing the influx of papers for the journal.”
The article, by David Adam in Nature, is interesting throughout. Via Mike Rosenwald.
My Conversation with Musa al-Gharbi
I am a big fan of Musa’s work, most of all his new book We Have Never Been Woke: The Cultural Contradictions of a New Elite. As for the podcast, here is the video, audio, and transcript. Here is the episode summary:
Tyler and Musa explore the rise and fall of the “Great Awokening” and more, including how elite overproduction fuels social movements, why wokeness tends to fizzle out, whether future waves of wokeness will ratchet up in intensity, why neuroticism seems to be higher on the political Left, how a great awokening would manifest in a Muslim society, Black Muslims and the Nation of Islam, why Musa left Catholicism, who the greatest sociologist of Islam is, Muslim immigration and assimilation in Europe, and more.
Excerpt:
COWEN: Let me give you an alternate theory of the Great Awokening, and tell me what’s wrong with it. It’s not really my view, but I hear it a lot.
So on the Left, there’s some long-term investment in teaching in America’s top universities. You produce a lot of troops who could become journalists, and they’re mostly left-leaning. Then 2011, 2012 — there’s something about the interaction of social media and, say, The New York Times and other major outlets, where all of a sudden they have a much bigger incentive to have a lot of articles about race, gender, Black Lives Matter, whatever. When those two things come together, wokeness takes off based on a background in Christianity and growing feminization of society.
By the time you get to something like 2021, enough of mainstream media has broken down that it’s simply social media out there going crazy. That just gives us a lot of diversity of bizarre views rather than just sheer wokeness — and besides, Elon is owning Twitter, so wokeness ends.
What’s wrong with that account?
AL-GHARBI: For one, I do think that some of the factors that you identified are important for contextualizing the current moment. For instance, a lot of the symbolic professions, like law and consulting, academia, journalism — they are being feminized. I do talk a bit in the book about how this matters for understanding the dynamics in a lot of these institutions. Not just over the last 10 years, but over the last several decades, in part because women and men tend to engage in very different forms of status-seeking and competition and things like that. So that does matter.
Things like social media obviously do change the way interactions play out. But you can see, actually, that things like social media or changes in the media landscape after 2010 — one limitation for using those kinds of explanations to explain the current moment is that it becomes hard, then, to understand how or why it was the case that . . .
There were three previous episodes like this, one in the 1920s through the early ’30s, one in the mid-1960s to the late ’70s, and then one in the late ’80s through early ’90s. In all cases where we didn’t have social media, where the structure of media enterprises was importantly different than it is today, and before you had Gen Z “kids these days” with their idiosyncratic attitudes, or before a lot of these professions were as feminized as they were today.
I think all of those factors you said actually do matter, and they matter in the sense — because each of these episodes, there’s so much in common, an insane amount. When you read the book and I walk through some of these — I think a lot of readers will be troubled, maybe, by how similar these episodes are. But they’re also importantly different. They don’t play out identically. They are importantly different: The role that symbolic capitalists occupy in society changed immensely over the last century. The constitution of these fields has changed immensely. There are a lot more women; there are a lot more nonwhite people in these professions than there were in the past, and so on and so forth.
All of those factors you described: I think they actually do matter, especially for understanding the ways in which this period of awokening might differ from previous episodes, but I don’t think they explain why awokenings happen at all.
COWEN: If “woke” recurs, do you think there’s a ratchet effect where it comes back bigger and stronger each time, a bit like the destructiveness of war? Or is it more of a random walk? Like, the next wave of woke in 37 years might be half as strong as the one we just had. What’s your model?
AL-GHARBI: I think it’s random; that depends a little bit on . . .
What I argue in the book is that the — for instance, when we look at the last period of awokening in the late ’80s and early ’90s, it was much less — that was the last time we had these struggles over what they call political correctness, or the PC culture, which we call wokeness today. As I argue in the book, it didn’t last as long, that awokening. It was shorter than most of the others, actually. Shorter than the one in the ’60s, shorter than the one after 2010. It was a little shorter, and it also wasn’t quite as dramatic.
I think there are these kind of contextual factors that significantly inform how severe it is or how long it lasts, how long it’s able to sustain itself or how long it is until the frustrated elites get — enough of them get satisfied that they disengage. My guess is that it’s more of a random walk, but I’m open to persuasion.
Definitely interesting.
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson Win Nobel Prize for Institutions and Prosperity
The Nobel prize goes to Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson for their work on institutions, prosperity, and economic growth. Here is a key piece summarizing their work: Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth.
This paper develops the empirical and theoretical case that differences in economic institutions are the fundamental cause of differences in economic development. We first document the empirical importance of institutions by focusing on two “quasi-natural experiments” in history, the division of Korea into two parts with very different economic institutions and the colonization of much of the world by European powers starting in the fifteenth century. We then develop the basic outline of a framework for thinking about why economic institutions differ across countries. Economic institutions determine the incentives of and the constraints on economic actors, and shape economic outcomes. As such, they are social decisions, chosen for their consequences. Because different groups and individuals typically benefit from different economic institutions, there is generally a conflict over these social choices, ultimately resolved in favor of groups with greater political power. The distribution of political power in society is in turn determined by political institutions and the distribution of resources. Political institutions allocate de jure political power, while groups with greater economic might typically possess greater de facto political power…Economic institutions encouraging economic growth emerge when political institutions allocate power to groups with interests in broad-based property rights enforcement, when they create effective constraints on power-holders, and when there are relatively few rents to be captured by power-holders.
See this great MRU video on Institutions for a quick overview! Here from an interview with Acemoglu, is a slightly more pointed perspective. Politics keeps people poor:
Why is it that certain different types of institutions stick?….it wouldn’t make sense, in terms of economic growth, to have a set of institutions that ban private property or create private property that is highly insecure, where I can encroach on your rights. But politically, it might make a lot of sense.
If I have the political power, and I’m afraid of you becoming rich and challenging me politically, then it makes a lot of sense for me to create a set of institutions that don’t give you secure property rights. If I’m afraid of you starting new businesses and attracting my workers away from me, it makes a lot of sense for me to regulate you in such a way that it totally kills your ability to grow or undertake innovations.
So, if I am really afraid of losing political power to you, that really brings me to the politics of institutions, where the logic is not so much the economic consequences, but the political consequences. This means that, say, when considering some reform, what most politicians and powerful elites in society really care about is not whether this reform will make the population at large better off, but whether it will make it easier or harder for them to cling to power.
Those are the sort of issues that become first-order if you want to understand how these things work.
One interesting aspect of this year’s Nobel is that almost all of AJRs Nobel work is accessible to the public because it has come primarily through popular books rather than papers. The Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Why Nations Fail, and the The Narrow Corridor all by Acemoglu and Robinson and Power and Progress by Acemoglu and Johnson are all very readable books aimed squarely at the general public. The books are in many ways deeper and more subtle than the academic work which might have triggered the broader ideas (such as the famous Settler Mortality paper). Many of the key papers such as Reversal of Fortune are also very readable.
This is not to say that the authors have not also made many technical contributions to economics, most especially Acemoglu. I think of Daron Acemoglu (GS) as the Wilt Chamberlin of economics, an absolute monster of productivity who racks up the papers and the citations at nearly unprecedented rates. According to Google Scholar he has 247,440 citations and an H-index of 175, which means 175 papers each with more than 175 citations. Pause on that for a moment. Daron got his PhD in 1992 so that’s over 5 papers per year which would be tremendous by itself–but we are talking 5 path-breaking, highly-cited papers per year plus many others! (Of course, most written with excellent co-authors). In addition, he’s the author of a massive textbook on economic growth. More than any other economist Daron has pushed the cutting-edge of technical economics and has also written books of deep scholarship still accessible to the public. In his overview of Daron’s work for the John Bates Clark medal Robert Shimer wrote “he can write faster than I can digest his research.” I believe that is true for the profession as a whole. We are all catching-up to Daron Acemoglu.
Indeed, in reading a book like Why Nations Fail and papers like The Network Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations (one of my favorite Acemoglu papers) and The Uniqueness of Solutions for Nonlinear and Mixed Complementarity Problems it’s difficult to believe they are co-authored by the same person. Acemoglu is as comfortable talking history, politics, and political economy as he is talking about the economics of recessions and abstruse mathematics.
Here are Previous MR posts on Daron Acemoglu including this post on democracy where I find the effect of democracy on growth to be ho-hum. Here is Maxwell Tabarrok on Acemoglu on AI. Here is Conversations with Tyler with Acemoglu and a separate conversation with Simon Johnson.
As noted, one of my favorite Acemoglu papers (with Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi) is The Network Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations. Conventional economics models the aggregate economy as if it were a single large firm. In fact, the economy is a network. An auto plants needs steel and oil to operate so fluctuations in the steel and oil industry will influence production in the auto industry. For a long time, the network nature of production has been ignored. In part because there are some situations in which a network can be modeled as if it were a single firm and in part because it’s just much easier to do the math that way. Acemoglu et al. show that aggregate fluctuations can be generated by sector fluctuations and that organization of the network cannot be ignored. This is a modern approach to real business cycles. See also my post on Gabaix and granular fluctuations).
In recent work, Acemoglu and Restrepo have created a new way of modeling production functions which divides work into tasks, some of which are better performed by capital and others by labor. Technological change is not simply about increasing the productivity of labor or capital (modeled in standard economics as making one laborer today worth two of yesterday’s) but about changing which tasks can best be done by capital and which by labor. As a task moves from labor to capital the demand for labor falls but productivity increases which generates demand for other kinds of labor. In addition, as capital replaces labor in some tasks entirely new tasks may be created for which labor has a comparative advantage. A number of interesting points come out of this including the idea that what we have to fear most is not super-robots but mediocre-robots. A super-robot replaces labor but has an immense productivity advantage which generates wealth and demand for labor elsewhere. A mediocre-robot replaces the same labor but doesn’t have a huge productivity advantage. In an empirical breakdown, Acemoglu and Restrepo suggest that what has happened in the 1990s and especially since 2000 is mediocre-robots. As a result, there has been a decline in labor on net. Thus, Acemoglu is more negative than many economists on automation, at least as it has occurred recently. Acemoglu and Restrepo is some of the best recent work going beyond the old tired debates to reformulate how we think of production and to use that reformulation to tie those reformulations to what is actually happening in the economy.
Solow thought of technical change as exogenous which is still the first-pass approach to thinking about technical change. Acemoglu in contrast focuses on price and market size. In particular, the larger the market the greater the incentive to invest in R&D to serve that market (see also my TED talk). Thus, technical change will tend to be cumulative. A sector with a productivity improvement will grow which can make that sector even more remunerative for further technical advances (depending on elasticities). This matters a lot for environmental change because it suggests that a relative small intervention today–including subsidizing research on clean technologies–can have a huge payoff in the future because by directing technical change in the right direction you make it easier to switch later on. (from this interview)
But let’s think of the logic of directed technical change with cumulative research. The less we do on green technology today, the less knowledge is accumulated in the green sector, so the bigger is the gap between fossil-fuel-based technology and energy, and the cleaner energy, so the harder it will be in the future to close that gap. With more proactive, decisive action today, we already start closing the gap, and we’re making it easier to deal with the problem in the future.
Simon Johnson has also written important books on banking and finance including and that was before the big run up in American debt! James Robinson has written widely on African development and colonialism and African development more generally.
Overall, I’d say that this is an award for political science and for popular economics in the very best sense of economics that matters. Go buy their books and read them!