Thursday assorted links
1. How a research trip to Antarctica deals with time zones (NYT).
3. What kind of books did people buy in 2025? (NYT)
4. Notes on Taiwan.
6. What Shruti has been reading, including about India but not only.
7. On the compute theory of everything.
Dan Wang 2025 letter
Self-recommending, here is the link, here is one excerpt:
People like to make fun of San Francisco for not drinking; well, that works pretty well for me. I enjoy board games and appreciate that it’s easier to find other players. I like SF house parties, where people take off their shoes at the entrance and enter a space in which speech can be heard over music, which feels so much more civilized than descending into a loud bar in New York. It’s easy to fall into a nerdy conversation almost immediately with someone young and earnest. The Bay Area has converged on Asian-American modes of socializing (though it lacks the emphasis on food). I find it charming that a San Francisco home that is poorly furnished and strewn with pizza boxes could be owned by a billionaire who can’t get around to setting up a bed for his mattress.
And:
One of the things I like about the finance industry is that it might be better at encouraging diverse opinions. Portfolio managers want to be right on average, but everyone is wrong three times a day before breakfast. So they relentlessly seek new information sources; consensus is rare, since there are always contrarians betting against the rest of the market. Tech cares less for dissent. Its movements are more herdlike, in which companies and startups chase one big technology at a time. Startups don’t need dissent; they want workers who can grind until the network effects kick in. VCs don’t like dissent, showing again and again that many have thin skins. That contributes to a culture I think of as Silicon Valley’s soft Leninism. When political winds shift, most people fall in line, most prominently this year as many tech voices embraced the right.
Interesting throughout, plus Dan writes about the most memorable books he read in 2025.
Autism Hasn’t Increased
Autism diagnoses have increased but only because of progressively weaker standards for what counts as autism.
The autistic community is a large, growing, and heterogeneous population, and there is a need for improved methods to describe their diverse needs. Measures of adaptive functioning collected through public health surveillance may provide valuable information on functioning and support needs at a population level. We aimed to use adaptive behavior and cognitive scores abstracted from health and educational records to describe trends over time in the population prevalence of autism by adaptive level and co-occurrence of intellectual disability (ID). Using data from the Autism and Developmental Disabilities Monitoring Network, years 2000 to 2016, we estimated the prevalence of autism per 1000 8-year-old children by four levels of adaptive challenges (moderate to profound, mild, borderline, or none) and by co-occurrence of ID. The prevalence of autism with mild, borderline, or no significant adaptive challenges increased between 2000 and 2016, from 5.1 per 1000 (95% confidence interval [CI]: 4.6–5.5) to 17.6 (95% CI: 17.1–18.1) while the prevalence of autism with moderate to profound challenges decreased slightly, from 1.5 (95% CI: 1.2–1.7) to 1.2 (95% CI: 1.1–1.4). The prevalence increase was greater for autism without co-occurring ID than for autism with co-occurring ID. The increase in autism prevalence between 2000 and 2016 was confined to autism with milder phenotypes. This trend could indicate improved identification of milder forms of autism over time. It is possible that increased access to therapies that improve intellectual and adaptive functioning of children diagnosed with autism also contributed to the trends.
The data is from the US CDC.
Hat tip: Yglesias who draws the correct conclusion:
Study confirms that neither Tylenol nor vaccines is responsible for the rise in autism BECAUSE THERE IS NO RISE IN AUTISM TO EXPLAIN just a change in diagnostic standards.
Earlier Cremieux showed exactly the same thing based on data from Sweden and earlier CDC data.
Happy New Year. This is indeed good news, although oddly it will make some people angry.
My podcast with Neil Joseph
Rrecommended, and we talk about India a good deal. Here is a transcript.
Taxation in a strong AI world
Here is Dwarkesh’s tweet, based on his recent paper with Trammell, raising the issue of whether wealth taxes will become desirable in the future. A few points:
1. I think quality homes in good locations will be extremely valuable. Those could be taxed more. You could call that a wealth tax, but arguably it is closer to a “housing services tax.”
2. You could put higher consumption taxes on items the wealthy purchase to a disproportionate degree. Paintings and yachts, and so on. Tom Holden argues: “In a world in which capital is essentially the only input to production, taxing capital reduces the growth rate of the economy. Whereas at present capital taxes have only level effects. So if anything, capital taxes will become less desirable as the labour share falls.”
3. I think the amount of money spent on health care will go up a lot. And people will live much longer, which will further boost the amount spent on health care. Taxing health care more is the natural way to address fiscal problems. Some people will fly abroad for their knee surgeries, but for a long time most health care will be consumed nearby, even in a strong AI world. If the way we keep the budget sane is to have people die at 95 instead of 97, there may be some positive social externalities from the shorter life spans. We also could use some of that money for birth subsidies.
4. As a more general point, capital will not be a perfect substitute for labor, or anything close to that, anytime soon.
5. Final incidence of the AI revolution is not just about the degree of substability of capital for labor. It is also about supply and demand elasticities in goods and services markets. For instance, to the extent AI makes various services much cheaper, real wages are rising not falling. That may or may not be the dominant effect, but do not assume too quickly that wages simply fall.
5b. It is not an equilibrium for capital to simply “have all the goodies.” Let’s say that Simon Legree, using advanced AI, can produce all the world’s output using a single watt of energy. And no one else with an AI company can produce anything to compete with that (this already sounds implausible, right?). If Simon simply hoards all that output, he has no profit, though I guess he can cure his own case of the common cold. The prices for that output have to fall so it can be purchased by someone else. The nature of the final equilibrium here is unclear, but again do not assume all or even most of the returns will stay with capital. That is almost certainly not the case.
Addendum: Here is some follow-up from Dwarkesh. I think he is talking about a world very different from our own, as there is talk of ownership of galaxies. That said, many other people wish to implement his ideas sooner than that.
Building more will boost labor’s share
This paper argues that the decline in the labor share is not driven by the overall quantity of capital, but by its changing composition. Constructing annual macro data for 16 advanced countries over two centuries, we show that, since 1980, the relative decline in buildings capital and the associated increase in real prices of buildings have reduced the labor share because buildings and labor are complements. The decline in the labor share has been reinforced by the increase in machinery capital and the associated decline of real prices of machinery capital because machinery capital and labor are substitutes. Together, these shifts in capital composition account for a substantial portion of the observed decline in the labor share of income.
Here is the full article by Jacob Kerspien, Jakob Madsen, and Holger Strulik, via tekl.
Wednesday assorted links
1. New data on the economics of LLMs: “Fifth, we estimate preliminary short-run price elasticities just above one, suggesting limited scope for Jevons-Paradox effects.”
2. How much is Germany still using fax machines?
3. Top ten pieces from Works in Progress.
4. MIE claims about Slovenia. Cheap talk, or can this be true?
6. Top economics papers from 2025?
7. The best “best movies of the year” set of lists I have seen.
8. The basics on Sudan. And more ongoing trouble in the Gulf and in East Africa. I hope this is not the big story of the year to come, but fear it may be.
Existential Risk and Growth
By Philip Trammell and Leopold Aschenbrenner, a new paper:
Technological development raises consumption but may pose existential risk. A growing literature studies this tradeoff in static settings where stagnation is perfectly safe. But if any risky technology already exists, technological development can also lower risk indirectly in two ways: by speeding (1) technological solutions and/or (2) a “Kuznets curve” in which wealth increases a planner’s willingness to
pay for safety. The risk-minimizing technology growth rate, in light of these dynamics, is typically positive and may easily be high. Below this rate, technological development poses no tradeoff between consumption and cumulative risk.
Self-recommending…
“What we got wrong this year”
This is from The Free Press, and the instructions were to fess up to a mistake made in a piece for The Free Press (not elsewhere). Here is mine:
On October 26 I wrote about President Trump’s $20 billion support package for Argentinian president Javier Milei. At the time I, along with many other economists, thought the bailout was a costly mistake, but so far the decision has been vindicated.
The backstory is that Milei was trying to peg the Argentinian peso artificially high. Such policies usually do not work, even with strong backing from the International Monetary Fund, or in this case the U.S. It felt like the U.S. would lose a lot of money supporting a doomed economic policy. After all, Milton Friedman taught us long ago that floating exchange rates, set by market forces, usually are best.
But Milei stuck to his guns with the peg, an unusual move for a libertarian-oriented reformer, and Trump decided to back him. What happened in the “market test of strength” is that Milei and Trump won. The peg held, and the U.S. government seems not to have suffered any losses from this policy. By December, Argentina announced that it would be softening its currency peg and moving closer to a floating-rate system, as most economists recommend.
Why were the economists—including me—wrong? Maybe we were right ex ante, and Milei and Trump got lucky ex post. An alternative view is that the political symbolism of holding the peg was more important than the economics of the decision, and Milei had insight the economists did not.
When you are not sure why you were wrong, or how wrong you were, that is all the more reason to stay humble.
There are many other answers at the link.
Derek Thompson on 2025
I think this was a really bad year for American politics, a mediocre year for the American economy, and an exceptional year for America.
In 12 months, you’ve got
– the largest decline in murder rate ever recorded
– huge declines in traffic fatalities, drug overdoses, and suicide
– first ever personalized gene editing treatment and breakthroughs in HIV and cancer therapy
– continued advances in GLP1 technology that seems to reduce weight and inflammation and a bunch of other stuff
– declines in teen anxiety and despair
– surge in self-driving car technology*
– all this happened in a period when both the SP500 and inflation adjusted median wages hit record highs
Here is the link, a good record for tech most of all. Except perhaps on the politics.
Conor Sen claims
Resale housing inventory has climbed toward or above pre-pandemic levels in most of the South and West. Even in the supply-constrained Northeast and Midwest, there are signs of inventory growth. By 2027 — the year in which the oldest members of Gen Z start turning 30 — the US will probably have more existing homes for sale than it’s had in a decade.
This normalization is putting gradual but persistent pressure on prices. At a metro level, price growth is either decelerating or prices are outright falling just about everywhere. A surge in delistings heading into year-end indicates that market dynamics are weaker than advertised home prices suggest. The S&P Cotality Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index rose just 1.3% in September from a year ago, well below the 3.7% growth in the average hourly earnings of American workers.
Here is more from Bloomberg. Conor has further analysis and suggests the 2030s will be quite a good house-buying time for Generation Z.
Tuesday assorted links
1. Ulkar on Kodaly and the cello.
2. “Lowbrow fiction is good sex and highbrow fiction is bad sex.”
3. The economics of Duke University.
4. Beginner’s Guide to the Mahabharata and Ramayana.
5. Andrew Batson on music of the year for him.
6. Model this (claim about Freemasonry and the British police).
7. Zhengdong Wang year end letter on AI.
8. I do not think these particular estimates are reliable, nonetheless murder rates would be much higher if not for medical advances.
What is the greatest artwork of the century so far?
That question is taken from a recent Spectator poll. Their experts offer varied answers, so I thought at the near quarter-century mark I would put together my own list, relying mostly on a seat of the pants perspective rather than comprehensiveness. Here goes:
Cinema
Uncle Boonmee, In the Mood for Love, Ceylan’s Winter Sleep, Yi Yi, Artificial Intelligence, Her, Y Tu Mama Tambien, Four Months Three Weeks Two Days, from Iran A Separation, Oldboy, Silent Light (Reygadas), The Three Burials of Melquiades Estrada, Get Back, The Act of Killing, Master and Commander, Apocalypto, and New World would be a few of my picks. Incendies anyone?
Classical music (a bad term these days, but you know what I mean):
Georg Friedrich Haas, 11,000 Strings, Golijov’s Passion, John Adams Transmigration of Souls, The Dharma at Big Sur, Caroline Shaw, and Stockhausen’s Licht operas perhaps. Typically such works need to be seen live, as streaming is no substitute. As for recordings, recorded versions of almost every classic work are better than before, opera being excluded from that generalization. So the highest realizations of most classical music compositions have come in the last quarter century.
Fiction
Ferrante, the first two volumes of Knausgaard, Submission, Philip Pullman, and The Three-Body Problem. The Marquez memoir and his kidnapping book, both better than his magic realism. The Savage Detectives. Sonia and Sunny maybe?
Visual Arts
Bill Viola’s video art, Twombly’s Lepanto series, Cai Guo-Qiang and Chinese contemporary art more generally (noting it now seems to be in decline), the large Jennifer Bartlett installation that was in MOMA, Robert Gober. Late Hockney and Richter works. The best of Kara Walker. The second floor of MOMA and so much of what has been shown there.
Jazz
There is so much here, as perhaps the last twenty-five years have been a new peak for jazz, even as it fades in general popularity. One could mention Craig Taborn, Chris Potter, and Marcus Gilmore, but there are dozens of top tier creators. Cecile McLorin Salvant on the vocal side. Is she really worse than Ella Fitzgerald? I don’t think so.
Popular music (also a bad term)
The best of Wilco, Kanye, D’angelo, Frank Ocean, Bob Dylan’s Love and Theft. How about Sunn O)))? No slight intended to those listed, but I had been hoping this category would turn out a bit stronger?
Television
The Sopranos, the first two seasons of Battlestar Galactica, Srugim, Borgen, and Curb Your Enthusiasm.
Assorted
Hamilton, and there is plenty more in theater I have not seen. At the very least one can cite Stoppard’s Coast of Utopia and Leopoldstadt. There is games and gaming. People around the world, overall, look much better than ever before. The Museum of Islamic Art in Doha and the reoopened Great Egyptian Museum in Cairo. The new wing at MOMA. Architecture might need a post of its own, but I’ll start by citing the works of Peter Zumthor. (Here is one broader list, it strikes me as too derivative in style, in any case it is hard to get around and see all these creations, same problem as with judging theatre.) I do not follow poetry much, but Louise Glück and Seamus Heaney are two picks, both with many works in the new century. The top LLMs, starting (but not ending) with GPT-4. They are indeed things of beauty.
Overall, this list seems pretty amazing to me. We are hardly a culture in decline.
I podcast again with Kevin Gentry
Monday assorted links
1. Medical breakthroughs from 2025.
2. 52 things Kent Hendricks learned in 2025.
3. Séb Krier.
4. Nusantara (NYT). A good piece, good photos.
5. What is the difference between cheap vs. expensive jeans?