Sentences to ponder

Nearly a quarter of South Korean men over 75 are still in the labor force, as are 14 percent of Japanese men. In the United States, a 10th of such men are working or seeking work, compared with half of 1 percent in France.

Put another way, a Korean man over 75 is more likely to be working than a Frenchman in his early 60s.

There is more here.

How well does the Mortensen-Pissarides model match the business cycle data?

From a few years back, Harold Cole and Richard Rogerson study this question and write:

We examine whether the Mortensen-Pissarides matching model can account for the business cycle facts on employment, job creation, and job destruction.  A novel feature of our analysis is its emphasis on the reduced-form implications of the matching model.  Our main finding is that the model can account for the business cycle facts, but only if the average duration of a nonemployment spell is relatively high — about nine months or longer.

I do not wish to claim that today's currently long unemployment spells make this the model to use.  I would point out, however, that most Keynesian models suggest more mean-reversion than we seem to be experiencing, especially since our central bank, whatever its weaknesses, is no longer allowing outright deflation.  The topic of "short run macroeconomics for the long run" will be a boom area, and right now it is poorly understood.

China fish fact of the day

Currently the world's wild [fish] catch measures 170 billion pounds — the equivalent in weight to the entire human population of China, scooped up and sliced, sauteed, poached, baked and deep-fried, year in and year out, every single year.  This is a lot of fish — six times greater than the amount of fish we took from the ocean half a century ago.

That is from Paul Greenberg's Four Fish: The Future of the Last Wild Food.

From the comments

PeterW has written:

I never really bought the "conservatives are fearful" argument; after all, the left is the one arguing for more economic protection.

I think a more useful distinction is that people want free-market competition in areas where they are strong, and protection and regulation in areas where they are weak. Conservatives want free competition in the economic sphere but moral protections in social interactions; liberals want protection from market forces but are happy to take their licks in status-seeking competitions.

In a state of nature, the highest-status people get away with much more bad behavior than low status folks. Therefore, strict social rules are essentially a progressive tax on status!

Richard T. Gill

Richard T. Gill, in all statistical probability the only Harvard economist to sing 86 performances with the Metropolitan Opera, died on Monday…He was 82.

The article is here.  Gill wrote many widely used texts and oddly he did not begin vocal training until he was almost forty. Up until that point, he had little acquaintance with classical music and he smoked two and a half packs of cigarettes a day.  He first performed in a staging of Figaro at Harvard, directed by John Lithgow and conducted by John Adams (the John Adams).  Later, he was in the world premiere of Philip Glass's Satyagraha.  Gill continued to write and edit textbooks throughout his singing career.

In 1971 he gave up his tenure at Harvard.  In 1984-85 he hosted a 28-part PBS show on economics.  In the 1990s he wrote two books, one on population the other on the decline of the American family.  Here is Gill's proposal for a Parental Bill of Rights.  His short stories for Atlantic Monthly and The New Yorker were widely anthologized and in 2003 he published his first novel.

Here is his home page.  At the time of his death he was working on a three to four-volume autobiography.  As a Harvard undergraduate he was a successful boxer and somehow he ended up as an Assistant Dean at Harvard by age 21 and later Master of Leverett House.

Popularizing Deadweight Loss

Indy requests a popularization of deadweight loss. Let's do the deadweight loss from a tax.

Imagine that you want to go to New York on a trip.  You value the trip at $50 and a bus ticket costs $40.  Do you take the trip? 

A. Yes.  The value ($50) of the trip exceeds the cost of the ticket ($40) so you travel to New York.   

How much consumer surplus (net value) do you get from the trip?

A. $10=$50-$40.

The government taxes bus tickets which raises the price of a bus ticket to $60.  Do you take the trip?

A. No. The value of the trip is now less than the price of the ticket.

What happened to the $10 consumer surplus which you used to get when there was no tax?

A. It's gone since no trip takes place.

Did the government get any tax revenue from you?

A. No.

Key idea: Consumers lose but the government does not gain from trips that are not taken.

Conclusion: Deadweight loss is the value of the trips (trades) which do not happen because of the tax.

New papers on fiscal policy

Price Fishback has a new paper (ungated but earlier draft here) surveying what we have learned about the macroeconomics of the Great Depression, here is one bit:

Some thinks that World War II offers an example of a situation where fiscal stimulus worked.  But the World War II analogy is highly misleading for any discussion of a peace-time economy.  The deficits were run during an all-out war when 40 percent of GDP was spent on munitions, the military made most of the allocation decisions in the economy, over 15 percent of the workforce was in harm's way in the military, there were widespread wage and price controls, and rationing ruled the day.  In essence, the World War II deficit experience tells us more about fiscal stimulus in the Soviet Union's command economy during the Cold War than it does about the modern U.S. mixed economy.

From Ethan Ilzetzki, Enrique Mendoza, and Carlos Vegh, here is a new paper (gated) on fiscal multipliers (shorter, ungated version here, powerpoints here, slides here, ungated but slightly older version here):

We contribute to the intense debate on the real effects of fiscal stimuli by showing that the impact of government expenditure shocks depends crucially on key country characteristics, such as the level of development, exchange rate regime, openness to trade, and public indebtedness. Based on a novel quarterly dataset of government expenditure in 44 countries, we find that (i) the output effect of an increase in government consumption is larger in industrial than in developing countries, (ii) the fiscal multiplier is relatively large in economies operating under predetermined exchange rate but zero in economies operating under flexible exchange rates; (iii) fiscal multipliers in open economies are lower than in closed economies and (iv) fiscal multipliers in high-debt countries are also zero.

That's zero as in "two times zero equals zero," or "1/2 times zero equals zero too" or even "-0.5 times zero equals zero."  I don't think the multiplier is zero for the United States, but very likely it's zero in a bunch of places.

Arbitrage

“Marijuana domain name values will fly off the charts once Prop 19 passes,” said Mr. Faler, 49. “I’m hoping to make enough money to buy a condo in Morocco. That’s how big it’s going to be.”

Mr. Faler, who lives about 90 miles southeast of Los Angeles in Menifee, Calif., is poised to enter the pets and marijuana market by registering domains like potfordogs.com and marijuanadogbone.com because “dogs get cancer too” he says.

Here is more, interesting throughout.  The owner of marijuana.com has been turning down offers for $2 million.

More on Arrow’s theorem

Dirk writes:

I vote that this post deserves a follow up post with more clarification. If anyone is against this please express your vote with inaction. Us laymen would like to understand this a little better. For the record, the reason I got on a tangent about the law of large numbers was that I watched Boudreaux's lecture and understood it in terms of 3 parties but kept thinking if there were 3000 parties it was unlikely that exactly 1000 would have preference A, 1000 preference B, and 1000 preference C. I guess I'm used to thinking in terms of run-off elections and not the sort in the example. That is why I couldn't grasp why things should "collapse" back to an island situation where n = 2 or 3.

Arnold Kling comments as well and not everyone is happy.  

Return to the oft-neglected difference between intra-profile and inter-profile versions of the theorem.  Most commentators and expositors have in mind an intra-profile version of the theorem.  They set up an example of people and preferences and show how cycling or some other paradox of choice or voting is possible.  Observers then wonder whether this cycling is likely as the number of people increases, or as preferences change, and indeed sometimes it is not, as Gordon Tullock pointed out long ago and as Dirk above wonders.

That's interesting stuff, but those fun and practical-sounding expositions are not Arrow's theorem as Arrow wrote it up.  Think of Arrow's theorem as modal in nature: "Maybe there is no paradox with current preferences, but there exist possible preferences where everything goes screwy, under any decision rule satisfying a few criteria."  Arrow showed that claim is related to something like: "if we apply a specified decision-making procedure across all possible preference configurations, consistent application means the same person gets her way each time."

That's called Arrovian dicatorship, but it does not have to be either harmful or unjust or not even necessarily undemocratic.  It just means that one person — the same person — is always getting her first choice, across these modal worlds with differing preference configurations.

This more metaphysical and more originally Arrovian version of the theorem is perhaps why Arnold Kling finds it difficult to apply the theorem to practical problems.  It is not about the likelihood or relevance of cycling (though it is a jumping-off point for those analyses).  It is instead a deep result about the implications of consistency, combined with limited information about the value of ordinally ranked outcomes.

The intra-profile versions are still important.  For intra-profile versions of Arrow, start with Kemp and Ng (1976).  Here is a good summary article on that literature.  Samuelson, by the way, remained somewhat recalcitrant when it came to the theorem.

Allowing in even limited amounts of interpersonal comparability defuses the paradox, as shown by Kevin Roberts (ReStud, 1980) and Amartya Sen (see the essays in Choice, Measurement, and Welfare).  That said, interpersonability can lead to other paradoxes, as shown by Derek Parfit and his Repugnant Conclusion.  Paradoxes everywhere, and you must choose which ones to live with. 

I take the practical upshot of Arrow's interprofile theorem to be this: when you make a judgment, it is our assessment of the interpersonal comparisons (or intersport importance comparisons, for scoring a decathlon) which is doing all the work.  Be very careful with those. 

Neither Tullock nor Samuelson was happy with Arrow's theorem, especially when it came to practical implications, so it is fine if you wish to add your name to that list.  But I also think they each missed Arrow's point a bit and that of the major economists of his time he was probably the deepest thinker, albeit not the best practical thinker.