Why are Top Scientists Leaving Harvard?
Harvard magazine has an excellent interview with three scientists, Michael Mina, Douglas Melton and Stuart Schreiber, all highly regarded in their fields of life sciences, who have recently left Harvard for the private sector.
Why did they leave? Mina tells an incredible story of what happened during the pandemic. At the time Mina was a faculty member at the Chan School of Public Health, he is extremely active in advising governments on the pandemic, and he brings Harvard millions of dollars a year in funding. But when he tries to hire someone at his lab, the university refuses because there is hiring freeze! Sorry, no hiring for pandemic research during a pandemic. In my talk on US Pandemic Policy I discuss the similar failure of the Yale School of Public Health and how miraculously and absurdly Tyler stepped in to save the day. The rot is deep.
Melton also notes the difference in speed of response between the public and private/commercial sector:
Polls have shown that principal investigator biologists now spend up to 40 percent of their time—it’s a shocking number, 40 percent of their time—writing grants.
In industry, the funding allows for very rapid change. There’s no writing a grant and waiting six months to see if it could get funded, and then waiting another six months for the university to make arrangements to receive the funds. The speed with which you can move into a new area is not comparable.
Years ago, the pharmaceutical industry rarely did discovery research. But now, pharmaceutical companies do basic science. That’s been a good shift, in my opinion, but it’s been a shift.
“The computational resources, the sequencing, the chemical screening— it’s not comparable to what we can do in any university.”
Everything gets done much quicker. For example, when you want to file for a patent at a company, the next morning there are two patent attorneys in your office ready to write that patent. The computational resources, the sequencing, the chemical screening— it’s not comparable to what we can do in any university. It’s a whole order of magnitude different.
Our last hire at GMU took well over a year to complete. It’s outrageous. There are no functional reasons why universities should be so slow. Don’t forget, Harvard has an endowment of $50 billion!
Melton also asks whether a new private-public partnership model is possible:
Why can’t we find a way—since many of our undergraduates and graduates will end up working in industry—why can’t we find a way for them to do their studies and their Ph.D. and their postdoctoral work in conjunction with Harvard, with MIT, and with Vertex? There are reasons for that, but we haven’t been imaginative enough to think about a compromise.
Hat tip: R.P.
The Marginal Revolution Podcast–Options!
Today on the MR Podcast Tyler and I talk about The Quest to Price Options. First, we run through the amazing history of option pricing theory from Bachelier to Black, Scholes and Merton with stops in between for Einstein, Samuelson, Thorpe and Kassouf.
We then look at how understanding options changes how one sees the world. Here’s one bit:
TABARROK: In the Hayekian-Mises business cycle theory, the interest rate is really the key thing. Everyone’s just following the interest rate. Interest rate falls because of government increases supply of money or something like that and everyone just goes into investment.
COWEN: Yes. It was Black himself who said, “No, it’s changes in the risk premium that are doing the work.” That was what he was working on before he died. The papers of mine he wanted to see, were actually on the same idea. The changes in the risk premium might be driving investment. How do we think about those in a business cycle context?
TABARROK: Yes. Those seem to be much more important than the pure interest rate itself. There’s a lot of investment decisions that you can think about like an option. Suppose you have a 10-year mineral lease, which gives you the right to drill an oil well anytime in the next 10 years. Well, when should you drill? It seems obvious that the higher the price of oil, the greater should be your incentive to drill. The price of oil goes up and down. You don’t want to drill the well and then find out that oil prices have dropped below the cost of extraction.
Once the well has been drilled, the costs are sunk, literally in this case. You can think about the decision to drill the oil well as exercising the option to drill. You want to use some model to figure out when, given the volatility of oil prices, is the optimal time to drill the well.
COWEN: It’s related to seeing all these underdeveloped or undeveloped storefronts in American cities. Oh, there’s something that used to be a store. Now, it’s all boarded up. Why don’t they put something in there? Why doesn’t the price adjust? Sometimes it’s regulation, legal issues, but sometimes it’s option value.
You’re not sure what you’re going to put in. You don’t want to have to remodel the thing again. Maybe it should be a restaurant, but your town is not yet ready for a Brazilian churrascaria and, in the meantime, everyone’s waiting.
….It’s a major problem in economicdevelopment. The Danish government is relatively credible. Many, but not all, parts of the US government are. That enables investment and growth. There’s plenty of countries, if you just look at the books, a lot of their laws don’t sound that much worse, say, than US laws. They might even sound better but no one knows what the law will be two, three, 10 years from now. It’s just harder for them to mobilize the proper incentives.
This is our last podcast of the year. What topics should we take on next year?
Subscribe now to take a small step toward a much better world: Apple Podcasts | Spotify | YouTube.
Technological Disruption in the US Labor Market
Deming, Ong and Summers have a good overview of long-run and very recent changes in the US labor market. Using a measure of occupational titles the authors find:
The years spanning 1990-2017 were the most stable period in the history of the US labor market, going back nearly 150 years.
It’s a bit too early to distinguish an AI revolution from a COVID shock but the last four years look to be more disruptive than any since the 1970s and over a slightly longer period there are trends including a decline in retail, as consumers shift to online shopping and delivery, and a decline in office work, the latter especially suggesting an AI effect:
There were 850,000 fewer retail sales workers in the US in 2023 compared to 2013 even though the US economy added more than 19 million jobs over this period.
There are nearly five hundred thousand fewer secretaries and administrative assistants in the US labor force now than there were a decade ago. At the same time, management and business occupations have grown very rapidly. There were four million more managers and 3.5 million more business and financial operations jobs in the US in 2023 than there were in 2013.
Keep in mind that these changes are occurring as employment and wages overall are rising.
Zakaria on Rent Seeking
Fareed Zakaria on Freakonomics Radio:
ZAKARIA: You can see it in what happened a day after the election results became clear. You got a flurry of tweets from every major C.E.O. in America — every major tech C.E.O., every bank C.E.O. — fawning over Trump, congratulating him and telling him how much they wanted to work well with him. I think that this is a very sad development that’s happened. It’s not entirely because of Trump. But we have politicized the economy in America. All this industrial policy, these tariffs, these bans. What that does is it suddenly makes Washington a very crucial arbiter to the success of business. You add to it Trump, who personally loves the idea of fining Caterpillar for doing this and Harley Davidson for doing that and Chase for doing — he views it as his job as president to literally dole out rewards and punishments to companies, depending on whether they do what he regards as the right thing or the wrong thing. It’s deeply saddening to me as somebody who grew up in India, where this is business as usual. Every business had to slavishly pander to whoever the prime minister at the time was. And you see it in Musk. Tesla stock, in the two days after Trump won, was up 20 percent or something like that, adding tens of billions of dollars to Elon Musk’s net worth. Nothing fundamental in the economics had changed for Tesla. There was just an expectation, now that he was a friend of Trump’s, that he was going to somehow be showered with federal largesse. You know, there’s a guy in India called Adani who’s Modi’s best friend, and his stocks trade at multiples 10 times that of every other Indian company. Because everyone assumes that at the end of the day, being Modi’s best friend is worth $100 billion or something like that.
DUBNER: That’s probably a pretty safe assumption.
ZAKARIA: It’s a safe assumption in India. What’s tragic is it might even be a safe assumption in America. But it’s not what the American economy was supposed to be about. And I think it’s a very sad trend.
Hat tip: Larry White.
Tetlock on Testing Grand Theories with AI
Testing grand theories of politics (or economics) is difficult because such theories are always contingent on ceteris paribus assumptions but outside of a lab, all else is rarely the same. The great Philip Tetlock has run multi-decade forecasting experiments but these are time and resource consuming. Tetlock, however, now suggests that LLMs could speed the process of testing grand theories like Mearsheimer’s neo-realism theory of politics:
With current or soon to be available technology, we can instruct large language models (LLMs) to reconstruct the perspectives of each school of thought, circa 1990,and then attempt to mimic the conditional forecasts that flow most naturally from each intellectual school. This too would be a multi-step process:
1. Ensuring the LLMs can pass ideological Turing tests and reproduce the assumptions, hypotheses and forecasts linked to each school of thought. For instance, does Mearsheimer see the proposed AI model of his position to be a reasonable approximation? Can it not only reproduce arguments that Mearsheimer explicitly endorsed from 1990-2024 but also reproduce claims that Mearsheimer never made but are in the spirit of his version of neorealism. Exploring views on historical counterfactual claims would be a great place to start because the what-ifs let us tease out the auxiliary assumptions that neo-realists must make to link their assumptions to real-world forecasts. For instance, can the LLMs predict how much neorealists would change their views on the inevitability of Russian expansionism if someone less ruthless than Putin had succeeded Yeltsin? Or if NATO had halted its expansion at the Polish border and invited Russia to become a candidate member of both NATO and the European Union?
2. Once each school of thought is satisfied that the LLMs are fairly characterizing, not caricaturing, their views on recent history(the 1990-2024) period, we can challenge the LLMs to engage in forward-in-time reasoning. Can they reproduce the forecasts for 2025-2050 that each school of thought is generating now? Can they reproduce the rationales, the complex conditional propositions, underlying the forecasts—and do so to the satisfaction of the humans whose viewpoints are being mimicked?
3. The final phase would test whether the LLMs are approaching superhuman intelligence. We can ask the LLMs to synthesize the best forecasts and rationales from the human schools of thought in the 1990-2024 period, and create a coherent ideal-observer framework that fits the facts of the recent past better than any single human school of thought can do but that also simultaneously recognizes the danger of over-fitting the facts (hindsight bias). We can also then challenge these hypothesized-to-be-ideal-observer LLM s to make more accurate forecasts on out-of-sample questions, and craft better rationales, than any human school of thought.
Tabarrok on Bail
I appeared on the Bail in the Midwest Podcast (Apple) to talk about crime and bail. Here is one bit:
I’ve talked about capturing these people and recapturing them and that of course is what you see on television. That’s the sexy part of it but actually a lot of what is going on, as you well know, is that the bail bondsmen understand the system much better than the the clients do. So what they’re often doing is helping their clients to navigate the system and to remind them that “you have a court date”. They call them up and send them a text, “don’t forget you have to be at court at this time in this place,” you know these these people are not necessarily putting it on their Google Calendar right? So the bail bondsmen they really perform a social service in helping people to navigate the intricacies of the criminal justice system at a time of high stress.
Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/episode/7dwB1NX43CEqNzBA2crSDp
Podcast Index: https://podcastindex.org/podcast/5314589?episode=30862010733
Trump City
Donald Trump wants to create Freedom Cities. It’s a good idea. As I wrote in 2008, the Federal Government owns more than half of Oregon, Utah, Nevada, Idaho and Alaska and it owns nearly half of California, Arizona, New Mexico and Wyoming. See the map (PDF) for more [N.B. the vast majority of this land is NOT parks]. Thus, there is plenty of land to build new cities that could be adopted to new technologies such as driverless cars and drones.
Mark Lutter review the history and motivation and has a good suggestion:
Our favorite possibility is Presidio National Park. Though much smaller than Guantanamo Bay or Lowry Range, its location is ideal. San Francisco is the world’s tech capital, despite its many problems. The federal government can help San Francisco unleash its full potential by developing Presidio. With Paris-level density and six-story apartment buildings, a developed Presidio would add 120,000 residents, increasing San Francisco’s population by 15 percent. Further, given the city’s existing talent density, a Presidio featuring a liberalized biotechnology regime would quickly become a world innovation leader in this sector. America deserves a Bay Area that can compete; turning Presidio into a Freedom City could be an important step in that direction.
I would add only one suggestion let’s call this Trump City.
Buenos Aires
Recommendations?
You Have Been Warned
New paper in Science, A single mutation in bovine influenza H5N1 hemagglutinin switches specificity to human receptors. If that isn’t clear enough, here is the editor’s summary:
In 2021, a highly pathogenic influenza H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b virus was detected in North America that is capable of infecting a diversity of avian species, marine mammals, and humans. In 2024, clade 2.3.4.4b virus spread widely in dairy cattle in the US, causing a few mild human cases, but retaining specificity for avian receptors. Historically, this virus has caused up to 30% fatality in humans, so Lin et al. performed a genetic and structural analysis of the mutations necessary to fully switch host receptor recognition. A single glutamic acid to leucine mutation at residue 226 of the virus hemagglutinin was sufficient to enact the change from avian to human specificity. In nature, the occurrence of this single mutation could be an indicator of human pandemic risk. —Caroline Ash
Time to stock up on Tamiflu and Xofluza.
Addendum: See also A Bird Flu Pandemic Would Be One of the Most Foreseeable Catastrophes in History
Info Finance has a Future!
Info finance is Vitalik Buterin’s term for combining things like prediction markets and news. Indeed, a prediction market like Polymarket is “a betting site for the participants and a news site for everyone else.”
Here’s an incredible instantiation of the idea from Packy McCormick. As I understand it, betting odds are drawn from Polymarket, context is provided by Perplexity and Grok, a script is written by ChatGPT and read by an AI using Packy’s voice and a video is produced by combining with some simple visuals. All automated.
What’s really impressive, however, is that it works. I learned something from the final product. I can see reading this like a newspaper.
Info finance has a future!
Addendum: See also my in-depth a16z crypto podcast (Apple, Spotify) talking with Kominers and Chokshi for more.
Marginal Revolution Podcast–The New Monetary Economics!
Today on the MR Podcast Tyler and I discuss the “New Monetary Economics”. Here’s the opening
TABARROK: Today we’re going to be talking about the new monetary economics. Now, perhaps the first thing to say is that it’s not new anymore. The new monetary economics refers to a set of claims and ideas about monetary economics from the 1980s, more or less, coming from people mostly in finance, like Fischer Black and Eugene Fama, and making some very bold claims that macroeconomics had gotten some things completely wrong. You and Randall Kroszner also wrote a great book, Explorations in the New Monetary Economics, and that appeared in 1994. [Someone should reprint this book!, AT]
Now, most people thought that the ideas of the new monetary economics were simply crazy. Black and Fama, for example, they argued that the Fed was essentially impotent; that it couldn’t control the money supply or even the price level, let alone the economy, at least in some circumstances.
COWEN: Fischer Black started the new monetary economics with a 1970 article, very early. Not in a standard journal, of course. Black argued that the Fed doesn’t matter. The supply of money and the price level were not closely related in any obvious way. There’s a well-known story where Fischer Black showed up at Chicago to present a paper at Milton Friedman’s monetary seminar. Friedman started off by introducing Black as, “Fischer Black’s paper is totally wrong. He’s going to present it to us. We have two hours to figure out why.”
At the same time, people like Paul Samuelson, Robert Solow, the MIT crowd, they also just said Black is totally wrong. He’s a genius on finance and options pricing, but when it comes to monetary economics, just forget about it. Dismiss him. They even said this in print at times.
The ideas of the NME remain as counterintuitive as ever–is it really possible that the Fed has no power over inflation let alone the real economy??? Yet the ideas seem increasingly relevant to modern, sophisticated, highly liquid financial markets and monetary systems including crypto. If anything, the NME has become harder to dismiss, as the world theorized by its proponents in the 1970s and 1980s now mirrors today’s reality far more than their own. While the NME may be now be old, the ideas remain as challenging and even as inspiring as ever.
I am not sure that either Tyler or I have a solid conclusion on the NME but we invite you to join us on this exploration.
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Some Simple Economics of the Google Antitrust Case
The case is straightforward: Google pays firms like Apple billions of dollars to make its search engine the default. (N.B. I would rephrase this as Apple charges Google billions of dollars to make its search engine the default–a phrasing which matters if you want to understand what is really going on. But set that aside for now.) Consumers, however, can easily switch to other search engines by downloading a different browser or changing their default settings. Why don’t they? Because the minor transaction costs are not worth the effort. Moreover, if Google provides the best search experience, most users have no incentive to switch.
Consequently, any potential harm to consumers is limited to minor switching costs, and any remedies should be proportionate. Proposals such as forcing Google to divest Chrome or Android are vastly disproportionate to the alleged harm and risk being counterproductive. Google’s Android has significantly increased competition in the smartphone market, and ChromeOS has done the same for laptops. Google has invested billions in increasing competition in its complements. Google was able to make these investments because they paid off in revenue to Google Search and Google Ads. Kill the profit center and kill the incentive to invest in competition. Unintended consequences.
I argued above that consumer harm is limited to minor switching costs. The plaintiffs’ counter-argue that Google’s purchase of default-status “forecloses” competitors from achieving the scale necessary to compete effectively. This argument relies on network effects – more searches improve search quality through better data. However, this creates a paradox: on the theory of the plaintiffs, two or three firms each operating at smaller scale is worse than one operating at large scale. For the plaintiffs’ argument to hold, it must be shown that we are at the exact sweet spot where the benefits of increased competition in lowering the price of advertising outweighs the efficiency losses to consumer search quality from reduced scale. Yet, there is no evidence in the case—nor even an attempt—to demonstrate that we are at such a sweet spot.
Or perhaps the argument is that with competition we would get even better search but that argument can’t be right because the costs of switching, as noted above, are bounded by some minor transaction costs. Thus, if a competitor could offer better search, it would easily gain scale (e.g. AI search, see below).
Traditional foreclosure analysis requires showing both substantial market closure and consumer harm. Given the ease of switching and the complex relationship between scale and search quality, proving such harm becomes challenging and my read is that the plaintiffs didn’t prove harm.
In my view, the best analogy to the Google antitrust case is Coke and Pepsi battling for shelf space in the supermarket. Returning to my earlier parenthetical point, Apple is like the supermarket charging for prime shelf placement. Is this a significant concern? Not really. Eye-level placement matters to Coke and Pepsi but by construction they are competing for consumers who don’t much care which sugary, carbonated beverage they consume. For consumers who do care, the inconvenience is limited to reaching to a different shelf.
To add insult to injury, the antitrust case is happening when Google is losing advertising share and is under pressure from a new search technology, Artificial Intelligence. AI search from OpenAI, Anthropic, Meta Llama, and xAI is very well funded and making rapid progress. Somehow AI search did manage to achieve scale! As usual, the market appears more effective than the antitrust authorities at creating competition.
Addendum: Admittedly this is outside the remit of the judge, but the biggest anti-competitive activities in tech are probably government policies that slow the construction of new power generation, new power lines, new data centers, and deals between power generators and data centers. I’d prefer the government take on its own anticompetitive effects before going after extremely succesful tech companies that have clearly made consumers much better off.
A Bird Flu Pandemic Would Be One of the Most Foreseeable Catastrophes in History
Zeynep Tufekci writing in the NYTimes hits the nail on the head:
The H5N1 avian flu, having mutated its way across species, is raging out of control among the nation’s cattle, infecting roughly a third of the dairy herds in California alone. Farmworkers have so far avoided tragedy, as the virus has not yet acquired the genetic tools to spread among humans. But seasonal flu will vastly increase the chances of that outcome. As the colder weather drives us all indoors to our poorly ventilated houses and workplaces, we will be undertaking an extraordinary gamble that the nation is in no way prepared for.
All that would be more than bad enough, but we face these threats gravely hobbled by the Biden administration’s failure — one might even say refusal — to respond adequately to this disease or to prepare us for viral outbreaks that may follow.
…Devastating influenza pandemics arise throughout the ages because the virus is always looking for a way in, shape shifting to jump among species in ever novel forms. Flu viruses have a special trick: If two different types infect the same host — a farmworker with regular flu who also gets H5N1 from a cow — they can swap whole segments of their RNA, potentially creating an entirely new and deadly virus that has the ability to spread among humans. It’s likely that the 1918 influenza pandemic, for example, started as a flu virus of avian origin that passed through a pig in eastern Kansas. From there it likely infected its first human victim before circling the globe on a deadly journey that killed more people than World War I.
And that’s why it’s such a tragedy that the Biden administration didn’t — or couldn’t — do everything necessary to snuff out the U.S. dairy cattle infection when the outbreak was smaller and easier to address.
Will there be a large outbreak among humans? Probably not. But a 9% probabability of a bad event warrants more than a shrug. Bad doesn’t have to be on the scale of COVID-bad to warrant precaution. The 2009 H1N1 flu pandemic, while relatively mild, infected about 61 million people in the U.S., leading to 274,000 hospitalizations, 12,400 deaths, and billions of dollars in economic costs.
H5N1 will likely pass us over—but only the weak rely on luck. Strong civilizations don’t pray for mercy from microbes; they crush them. Each new outbreak should leave us not relieved, but better armed, better trained and better prepared for nature’s next assault.
Literacy Rates and Simpson’s Paradox
Max T. at Maximum Progress shows that between 1992 and 2003 US literacy rates fell dramatically within every single educational category but the aggregate literacy rate didn’t budge. A great example of Simpson’s Paradox! The easiest way to see how this is possible is just to imagine that no one’s literacy level changes but everyone moves up an educational category. The result is zero increase in literacy but falling literacy rates in each category.
Two interesting things follow. First, this is very suggestive of credentialing and the signaling theory of education. Second, and more originally, Max suggests that total factor productivity is likely to have been mismeasured. Total factor productivity tells us how much more output can we get from the same inputs. If inputs increase, we expect output to increase so to measure TFP we must subtract any increase in output due to greater inputs. It’s common practice, however, to use educational attainment as a (partial) measure of skill or labor quality. If educational attainment is just rising credentialism, however, then this overestimates the increase in output due to labor skill and underestimates the gain to TFP.
This does not imply that we are richer than we actually are–output is what it is–but it does imply that if we want to know why we haven’t grown richer as quickly as we did in the past we should direct less attention to ideas and TFP and more attention to the failure to truly increase human capital.
Thanksgiving and the Lessons of Political Economy
It’s been a while so time to re-up my 2004 post on thanksgiving and the lessons of political economy. Here it is with no indent:
It’s one of the ironies of American history that when the Pilgrims first arrived at Plymouth rock they promptly set about creating a communist society. Of course, they were soon starving to death.
Fortunately, “after much debate of things,” Governor William Bradford ended corn collectivism, decreeing that each family should keep the corn that it produced. In one of the most insightful statements of political economy ever penned, Bradford described the results of the new and old systems.
[Ending corn collectivism] had very good success, for it made all hands very industrious, so as much more corn was planted than otherwise would have been by any means the Governor or any other could use, and saved him a great deal of trouble, and gave far better content. The women now went willingly into the field, and took their little ones with them to set corn; which before would allege weakness and inability; whom to have compelled would have been thought great tyranny and oppression.
The experience that was had in this common course and condition, tried sundry years and that amongst godly and sober men, may well evince the vanity of that conceit of Plato’s and other ancients applauded by some of later times; that the taking away of property and bringing in community into a commonwealth would make them happy and flourishing; as if they were wiser than God. For this community (so far as it was) was found to breed much confusion and discontent and retard much employment that would have been to their benefit and comfort. For the young men, that were most able and fit for labour and service, did repine that they should spend their time and strength to work for other men’s wives and children without any recompense. The strong, or man of parts, had no more in division of victuals and clothes than he that was weak and not able to do a quarter the other could; this was thought injustice. The aged and graver men to be ranked and equalized in labours and victuals, clothes, etc., with the meaner and younger sort, thought it some indignity and disrespect unto them. And for men’s wives to be commanded to do service for other men, as dressing their meat, washing their clothes, etc., they deemed it a kind of slavery, neither could many husbands well brook it. Upon the point all being to have alike, and all to do alike, they thought themselves in the like condition, and one as good as another; and so, if it did not cut off those relations that God hath set amongst men, yet it did at least much diminish and take off the mutual respects that should be preserved amongst them. And would have been worse if they had been men of another condition. Let none object this is men’s corruption, and nothing to the course itself. I answer, seeing all men have this corruption in them, God in His wisdom saw another course fitter for them.
Among Bradford’s many insights it’s amazing that he saw so clearly how collectivism failed not only as an economic system but that even among godly men “it did at least much diminish and take off the mutual respects that should be preserved amongst them.” And it shocks me to my core when he writes that to make the collectivist system work would have required “great tyranny and oppression.” Can you imagine how much pain the twentieth century could have avoided if Bradford’s insights been more widely recognized?