A Beautiful Theory Falls to Ugly Data
My latest paper, A Test of the Coase Conjecture Using Prices of Electronic Books, with the excellent Tim Groseclose, has just been published. The Coase Conjecture is another one of Coase’s little ideas — the original paper is six pages — that has spawned hundreds of follow-up papers and thousands of citations.
The idea is simple. A monopolist of a durable good has a time-inconsistency problem. Set the monopoly price in period 1 and he will be tempted in period 2 to cut the price and mop up the customers whose valuations sit between the period-1 price and MC. But the same logic applies in period 2, and again in period 3, and so on — eventually the price unravels to MC. Consumers see this coming, the monopolist knows the consumers see it coming, and so the monopolist cuts price to MC in period 1. And since a “period” is just the interval between price changes, the whole unraveling happens — in Coase’s phrase — “in the twinkling of an eye.”
The theorists, most notably Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson and Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole, formalized Coase’s insight and showed that under quite general conditions the logic goes through. Which is rather surprising, since, as Tim and I point out, Coase’s conjecture implies that many patents and copyrights are essentially worthless — a prediction wildly at variance with the facts. Other theorists, including Stokey, Ausubel and Deneckere, and Board and Pycia, have offered variants under which the Coase outcome does and does not obtain.
For all this theory, there have been almost no direct tests of the Coase Conjecture apart from a handful of lab experiments. Ours is one of the first papers to take the conjecture to the real world. We look at e-books, an unusually clean setting: digital goods are durable, marginal costs are low, resale is limited, and prices can be changed quickly. Using the prices of e-books that are in the public domain as a proxy for marginal cost, we ask: (a) do prices rapidly fall to MC, and (b) does the market clear in the first period? The answer to both is no. E-book prices begin well above MC, sales continue over many periods, and prices don’t even decline monotonically.
We reject the Coase Conjecture decisively.
The paper has an interesting history. The theorists (or the referees we guessed were theorists) praised the paper for taking the theory seriously but inevitably had a fillip to offer, distinguishing the world of pure theory from empirical tests. The empiricists, on the other hand, said our tests were too simple since no one takes the theory that seriously. It’s good to see the paper find a home!
We reject the Coase Conjecture decisively, but it remains to say why. We can rule out some explanations — it’s not rising MC, and it’s not the finiteness of buyers (which can support a perfectly price-discriminating Pac-Man equilibrium).
Two theories remain: 1) sellers can commit not to lower prices, and 2) the outside-options model of Board and Pycia. I prefer the former, my co-author prefers the latter. To me, commitment just isn’t that hard. The standard story is that profits are like cookies on the table and the monopolist can’t resist — but at least the people tempted by cookies get to eat the cookies! The Coase profits are illusory: the monopolist races to MC in period 1 precisely because they know they won’t resist later and as a result they don’t even get a taste of profit! Too clever by half. I say, show some backbone. Firms are *all about* commitment — to workers, consumers, contractors. Why not to a price? My co-author points out, however, that this is more Tabarrok-vibe than carefully laid out theory.
Tim likes the Board and Pycia model which begins with the plausible idea that consumers have outside options — if they don’t buy the book today, they will buy another book, rent the movie, or borrow from the library — and crucially, once they take the outside option, the consumer never returns to the market. You might think outside options would make it *harder* for the firm to set a high price, but Board and Pycia show in a very clever but extended argument that when you carefully work out the full equilibrium the opposite holds: outside options give firms a time-consistent incentive to set and keep a high price. Tim explains the argument further here (see also our paper for an intuitive breakdown).
In any case, the Coase Conjecture — at least as modelled by the theorists — fails in an environment most conducive to it.
A beautiful theory falls to ugly data.
Liberal Economists Score an Own Goal Against Bezos
Jeff Bezos tweeted:
Yes, the United States has the most progressive tax system in the world. The top 1% pay 40% of taxes, the bottom 50% pay 3% of taxes. We can make it even more progressive by zeroing out taxes on the bottom half. It’s a small amount of the total tax revenue but very meaningful to people in this group.
Strangely, a chorus of liberal economists rushed to attack Bezos. Gabriel Zucman replied:
Contrary to what you claim, working-class people contribute significantly to funding American society today. Payroll taxes and consumption taxes absorb a high fraction of their income.
Justin Wolfers piled on:
If you only count the progressive taxes the U.S. levies, then the U.S. system is quite progressive. But if you also count regressive taxes (payroll taxes, sales taxes, etc), it’s not very progressive.
Bezos called for cutting taxes on the bottom half to make the tax system more progressive and the redistributionists came out swinging–to argue he was wrong about how progressive the current system already is. Own goal. Heretics are worse than unbelievers.
But there’s a second, more interesting thing going on. To make the regressivity case, Zucman and Wolfers have to count payroll payments as taxes. That cuts directly against eighty years of liberal doctrine. Beginning with FDR, the argument on the liberal side has always been that payroll taxes are not taxes but contributions or premiums entitling the payer to benefits as an “earned right.” Here’s FDR to Luther Gulick in 1941:
We put those payroll contributions there so as to give the contributors a legal, moral, and political right to collect their pensions and their unemployment benefits. With those taxes in there, no damn politician can ever scrap my social security program.
That framing isn’t a historical curiosity. It runs straight through liberal social security stalwarts like Arthur Altmeyer, Wilbur Cohen, and Robert Ball, and it’s alive today in Nancy Altman and Eric Kingson’s Social Security Works!, which attacks billionaires and insists Social Security benefits are “earned compensation.” The whole political durability of the program–the third rail–rests on this framing.
So the modern left wants it both ways. When the question is whether to cut Social Security, FICA is a premium and benefits are earned compensation. When the question is whether the tax system is progressive, FICA is suddenly a regressive tax. Pick a lane.
Is there a principled way to resolve this? Yes, and it follows Jim Buchanan (see my earlier post here) and Larry Summers who laid out the economics in his classic paper Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits. The principled test is whether a payment reduces labor supply. The wedge between marginal product and the worker’s reservation wage isn’t the statutory rate–it’s the gap between the mandated payment and the worker’s marginal benefit. Sylvain Catherine made exactly this point in reply to Wolfers:
Payroll taxes are not regressive! They are mandatory contributions to a retirement system that offers higher rates of returns at the bottom than at the top.
Consider a forced savings program: everyone must pay 12.4% of income into a 401(k). Is this a tax? For someone who was going to save 15% anyway, not at all. For someone who was going to save 10%, only the extra 2.4% bites. Mandatory does not mean tax. The marginal valuation of the mandated benefit is the key.
Now apply this to the two payroll taxes.
Medicare (HI): Every marginal dollar buys zero marginal benefit. Thus, it’s a tax. Part A eligibility is binary–40 quarters gets you in–and once in, your benefit is whatever Medicare spends on your care. No relationship on the margin. (Moreover, the raw HI schedule is unambiguously progressive: 2.9% flat, rising to 3.8% above $200K/$250K thresholds, plus the NIIT.)
Social Security (OASDI): The 90/32/15 Primary Insurance Amount bend points mean a low earner gets a much better return than a high earner. So the gross statutory rate is flat-then-regressive; but the net rate is progressive. In short, OASDI isn’t a tax for low earners but it is a tax for higher earners, thus the tax is progressive.
So: HI is a progressive tax. OASDI is a contribution at the bottom and a tax at the top. Either way, the Zucman-Wolfers framing—payroll payments as straightforward regressive taxes—is wrong and rhetorically it abandons the framing the left has spent eighty years building to protect these programs.
Personally, I’d prefer a system truer to the old rhetoric–a forced savings program with a closer connection between marginal payments and benefits. But if the left wants to reframe Social Security contributions as taxes, and thus make Social Security all about redistribution to the poor, rather than a wise savings program, roll the dice. Just remember that Altmeyer, Cohen, and Ball spent decades building the “earned right” framing precisely because they understood it was the program’s structural defense against means-testing and privatization. Drop the framing and you drop the defense. I suspect the privatizers at AEI and Cato will happily take that trade but the left may come to regret making it for them.
The AIs are “One of Us”
A general purpose AI model from OpenAI has produced a (dis)proof of an important conjecture. Tim Gowers writes:
AI has now solved a major open problem — one of the best known Erdos problems called the unit distance problem, one of Erdos’s favourite questions and one that many mathematicians had tried.
A number of prominent mathematicians comment. I enjoyed Thomas Bloom’s comments:
This was one of Erdős’ favourite problems – he first asked it in 1946 [14] and returned to it many times. (The site www.erdosproblems.com, on which it is Problem #90, currently lists 14 separate references, and there are no doubt more.) The influential collection of ‘Research Problems in Discrete Geometry’ by Brass, Moser, and Pach [8] describes it as ‘possibly the best known (and simplest to explain) problem in combinatorial geometry’. For an AI to produce a solution to a problem of this calibre is both surprising and impressive.
…On examining the construction, it becomes more clear how people had missed this before – it requires the confluence of several different unlikely events: that a good mathematician is
(1) spending significant time in thinking about the unit distance conjecture in the first place;
(2) seriously trying to disprove it, despite the oft-repeated belief of Erdős that it is true;
(3) believes that there is mileage in generalising the original construction to other number fields,
and so is willing to expend significant time in exploring such constructions; and
(4) sufficiently familiar with the relevant parts of class field theory to recognise that the appropriately phrased question about infinite towers of number fields with appropriate parameters can be solved using existing theory.The AI met all of these criteria, and its success here echoes previous achievements: it often produces the most surprising results by persevering down paths that a human may have dismissed as not worth their time to explore, combining superhuman levels of patience with familiarity with a vast array of technical machinery.
…perhaps some in the area will be a little disappointed with how little this tells us: it does not introduce any powerful new geometric tools, or hitherto unsuspected structural results, that a proof of the unit distance conjecture would likely have called for. Still, while perhaps not the proof of a conjecture that we had hoped for, no doubt this construction and the ideas involved will have a major impact in discrete geometry.
One aspect of this proof should not be overlooked: while the original proof produced by AI was completely valid, it was significantly improved by the human researchers at OpenAI and the many other mathematicians involved in the present paper. The human still plays a vital role in discussing, digesting, and improving this proof, and exploring its consequences.
The frontiers of knowledge are very spiky, and no doubt the coming months and years will see similar successes in many other areas of mathematics, where long-standing open problems are resolved by an AI revealing unexpected connections and pushing the existing technical machinery to its limit. AI is helping us to more fully explore the cathedral of mathematics we have build over the centuries; what other unseen wonders are waiting in the wings?
One way of putting this is that the mathematicians are now acknowledging that the AI’s are “one of us”. Gooble Gobble! Read the AIs chain of thought to understand why. I asked Claude how many people the world could understand the proof:
A rough tiered estimate, treating “understand” as “could read the 42-page note and follow the argument without needing to learn new machinery from scratch”:
Tier 1 — could referee it cold (real working knowledge of class field towers + the Ellenberg–Venkatesh circle): roughly 150–400 people worldwide. This is essentially the active algebraic number theory community working near arithmetic statistics, plus a handful of arithmetic-geometry-adjacent combinatorialists. The author list itself is a decent proxy for the upper crust of this group.
Tier 2 — could understand it with a week or two of focused effort and some Wikipedia/textbook chasing (strong number theorists or combinatorialists outside the immediate subfield, plus sharp grad students past quals at top programs): roughly 2,000–5,000. Think most tenure-track number theorists, the top tier of extremal combinatorics, and arithmetic geometers generally.
Tier 3 — could grasp the structure of the argument from a Quanta-style exposition without verifying the steps: 50,000–200,000+, i.e., most working mathematicians and a chunk of physicists/CS theorists. This is not what you asked, but it’s where most of the public “understanding” will sit.
Repugnant Economics
I spoke on a panel at AEI with Nobelist Al Roth about his new book, Moral Economics, which covers “repugnant markets,” from prostitution to surrogacy to kidney exchange. A fun book!
My case study was acting. Acting was considered repugnant for over 2,000 years. In Rome, actors could not vote, hold office, or be trusted to give an oath in legal proceedings. So why don’t we find acting repugnant today?
One lesson: weighing costs and benefits is not enough. Roth discusses empirical research showing that legalizing prostitution cut STDs and sexual assaults—against prostitutes and others. But evidence alone won’t shift a repugnance norm. You also have to reframe the activity. Acting, for example was reframed from body rental to a skill requiring intelligence, training and ability. So I went out of my way to say that I am a fan of Aella—though not her only fan—and that I see no reason why escorting should not be considered a skill, requiring intelligence, training, and ability. I can think of few better ways of raising social welfare than making sex 10% better!
I also spoke on human challenge trials. Roth and I agree: challenge trials could have sped up COVID vaccines and saved tens of thousands of lives. We should be angry this didn’t happen. Why didn’t it? Even though most people think human challenge trials are a good idea, there was a repugnance bottleneck because the minority who did find human challenge trials repugnant were in charge. I discuss how to change this.
Al leads the discussion. My comments start at 25:15.
Dwarkesh in the Datacenter
Dwarkesh tours one of Jane Street’s datacenters. It’s extraordinary how much compute goes into finance. (I once predicted that the finance AIs would be the first to become conscious, since they have the most compute.) More generally, however, this is a peek inside the remarkable economics, technology and physics of a datacenter. Did you know the electrical signal in a copper wire can travel faster than light in fiber…and that matters! Amazing.
Hayek in Jacobin
Here’s something I never expected to write: Jacobin, the magazine of the DSA-aligned left, has a good article on central planning. In an interview, Vivek Chibber lays out essentially the Mises–Hayek–Kornai critique of central planning. Information problems, incentive problems and the consequent failures are laid bare. Moreover, Chibber refuses to lay the blame at the feet of Stalin, poverty, or the Russians. Nor does he wave hopefully at supercomputers and AI, as is fashionable today on the planning-curious left:
The dilemma is this. There is a problem of information. Supercomputers will in fact help process information better. But if the information coming in is junk, and if that junk is built into the system because of the incentives that operators have in workplaces to lie, you will not have a planning system that can be put on its feet through the advent of computers or artificial intelligence or anything like that. I don’t see any reason to think that that strategic misalignment of incentives is simply there because of Russian backwardness or poverty.
Even the pedestrian is shocking coming from Jacobin:
Normally in capitalism, what do managers do? They want to make profits. The way to make a profit is by trying to sell, at the lowest price possible, the best-quality good that you can.
A vivid conclusion:
Melissa Naschek: What do you think leftists should learn from the failure of fully planned economies?
Vivek Chibber: What they should learn is that the burden of proof is on us, on the Left, if we want to continue with this slogan of replacing the market with the plan. The burden of proof is on us to show that it can work. You might say that along with this ought to come a kind of humility about facts and about the world.…it would be criminally negligent to ignore the experience of decades upon decades of planning and say to yourself, “Well, that wasn’t what my vision of socialism is, so I’m going to ignore it.” Because if you do that, I can guarantee 100 percent you will end up repeating many of the mistakes and falling into the same dilemmas that the planners did.
I could offer critiques. Stalin was not an impediment to central planning but a consequence of it. And to warn that ignoring the experience of central planning risks repeating “the same dilemmas that the planners did” is a bloodless way to describe dictatorship, famine, and mass murder. But that would be churlish. Let me end instead by saying that I agree with this:
If we’re actually serious about changing the world, people on the Left … should be the most remorseless and the most merciless when it comes to facts.
Replace “people on the Left” with “we” and the line is exactly right.
Philosophical Ideas Behind Their Time
Justin Weinberg at Daily Nous riffs off my post, Ideas Behind Their Time, to ask for philosophical examples. He nominates Gettier problems–i.e. counterexamples to the idea that knowledge is simply “justified true belief” as a possibility. The classic Gettier paper is from 1963. Wikipedia notes that the Indian philosopher Dharmottara has some clear examples c770 AD but as an element within the Western tradition the idea does seem behind its time.
I would nominate the following as philosophical ideas behind their time:
- Hume’s is/ought distinction: the idea that you cannot derive a normative conclusion from factual premises.
- Hume’s problem of induction: past regularities do not rationally guarantee future regularities.
- Rawls’s Veil of Ignorance: the principles of justice should be derived without knowing one’s own particularities of class, race, gender and so forth. Seems obvious as an idea.
- The Trolley Problem: similar ideas can be found earlier but the clean distinction between killing and let die or more generally omission and commission could have come much earlier. One might also think of the Prisoner’s Dilemma in this category of ideas or constructs that cleanly isolate an otherwise present but opaque idea.
- The analytic/synthetic truths distinction: some things are true by definition, others are empirical. Obvious and it can be found before say Kant, yet a clear earlier statement would have resolved many issues and seems well within say Aristotle’s capability.
- Aumann’s Agreement Theorem, technically, this requires Bayesian machinery and is difficult to formulate with precision, so I would not say the actual theorem was behind its time. But the underlying idea—that disagreement itself, not merely the arguments offered, should cause one to question and refine one’s own beliefs—could have been developed in Athens.
- I’d also nominate a package of ideas like abolitionism, equal rights for women, and religious toleration–each of these is tendentious as examples yet the basic package seems fairly obvious as a category and yet late. (Perhaps if the veil of ignorance had been thought of earlier so would these ideas!) Note, that I am not arguing that abolitionism or equal rights for women could have happened much earlier only that these ideas were behind their time–the ideas were morally obvious even if not institutionally feasible.
Note also that I am not arguing that these ideas are all correct, only that they were philosophical ideas behind their time. More examples?
How Much Has Shale Gas Saved U.S. Consumers?
Every US president since Nixon has called for freeing the US from ‘dependence on foreign oil’ (within ten years!). Every president has failed. Fracking, however, has delivered the goods. Fracking has reduced the price of energy, reduced net emissions of greenhouse gases and turned the US into an energy exporter.
In How Much Has Shale Gas Saved U.S. Consumers? Lucas Davis compare LNG prices in the US ($5.3 Mcf), Europe ($14.4 Mcf) and Japan ($16.1 Mcf) to offer some plausible back of the envelope calculations:
Advances in hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling caused U.S. natural gas production to increase significantly, and the U.S. went from being a net importer of natural gas to being the world’s largest exporter. This paper calculates how much shale gas has saved U.S. natural gas consumers. Using price differences between the United States, Europe and Japan, we calculate that U.S. natural gas consumers have saved $4.5-$5.3 trillion between 2007 and 2025, equivalent to $237-$276 billion annually. Access to low-price U.S. natural gas has been particularly valuable during major supply shocks such as the war in Ukraine, and the benefits of shale gas have been experienced broadly across sectors and states.
Ideas Behind Their Time: Part Two
In 2010 I wrote about Ideas Behind Their Time:
We are all familiar with ideas said to be ahead of their time, Babbage’s analytical engine and da Vinci’s helicopter are classic examples. We are also familiar with ideas “of their time,” ideas that were “in the air” and thus were often simultaneously discovered such as the telephone, calculus, evolution, and color photography. What is less commented on is the third possibility, ideas that could have been discovered much earlier but which were not, ideas behind their time.
I gave experimental economics, random clinical trials and view morphing (“bullet time”) as examples. Jason Crawford has a list discussing the wheel, the steam engine and bicycles among other possibilities. In some cases, further exploration indicates that an idea required precursors and so was not as behind its times as first suspected, in rare cases, however, good ideas really could have been invented much earlier.
Using Claude, Brian Potter has significantly expanded the list by looking systematically across a wide range of inventions and asking could they have been invented earlier? Most could not. Put the other way, most useful technologies tend to be invented quite quickly once they are possible–this is reassuring. The airplane, for example, could not have been invented before a high power-to-weight engine, which happened circa 1880 making the late 1880s the earliest feasible date for powered flight. Thus, the Wright Brothers (1903) were only just behind the earliest feasible date–and that is true for many inventions.
The ideas very far behind their time include the stethoscope, general anesthesia and reinforced concrete and quite far behind are the Jacquard loom and canning. Is there a pattern here?
Addendum: Brian’s Github with the full prompt and output for each invention is here.
Public Choice Outreach!
Just a few spots left! Lots of great speakers including Tyler, myself, Bryan Caplan, Robin Hanson, Jon Klick, Shruti Rajagopalan and more.
Please apply and encourage your students to apply.
Rose Farts and the Invisible Hand
In Modern Principles, Tyler and I show the invisible hand by telling the story of how the increase in oil prices in the 1970s encouraged millions of adjustments in how goods were produced and allocated, everything from an increased use of brick for driveways to a movement of the flower market from the US, which relied on heating greenhouses, to warmer climes like Columbia and Kenya. See the I, Rose video!
The FT has an amusing update:
“When my sheep break wind, it smells of roses,” he said, recounting one of the more bizarre and far-flung consequences of the decision by US President Donald Trump and Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to bomb Iran in February.
Since Tehran hit back by firing drones and missiles at US allies in the Gulf — grounding cargo flights and closing off the Strait of Hormuz through which booming east African trade with the region used to flow — Mahihu has been forced to jettison millions of rose stems.
The Southern Poverty Law Center Indictment
The excellent Patrick McKenzie has a very long Bits About Money post on the the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) indictment. It is filled with details about bank operating procedures. I’m going to summarize. The post is divided into what I think of as two parts. First, did the SPLC commit bank fraud? Second, what is the backstory behind the indictment?
The first part is simple, McKenzie argues that yes the SPLC committed bank fraud, more specifically false statements to a federally insured bank under 18 U.S.C. §1014–the main reason why this is not a hard call is that almost any false statement made to influence a bank, no matter how small, is illegal and can get you 30 years. Moreover, the banks are essentially an investigatory arm of the state and they collect data for decades, any piece of which can generate an indictment. The main way in which the SPLC committed bank fraud is that they set up fake businesses to pay secret informants. Neither of these things, as far as I know, are per se illegal but lying to your bank about the ownership, control and purposes of accounts opened in fictitious business names is illegal.
When Bank-1 investigated, an SPLC employee asked the bank to close several of the accounts and transfer the remaining balances to an SPLC account. Later, SPLC’s president/CEO and board chair confirmed in writing that the accounts were opened for SPLC operations and operated under SPLC authority. As Patrick writes, the letter is “a succinct confession to bank fraud.” Thus, the case that the SPLC paid informants through bank accounts opened under fictitious business names appears strong.
But the government had long been aware of SPLC’s informant work, indeed the existence of the informant program has been public knowledge for decades. It’s hard to see how to run a secret network to pay informants without hiding some information–could the SPLC simply have told the bank what they were doing? It seems to me that the punishment for false statements to a bank ought to depend on the motive and intention of the false statements but the law isn’t written that way. Another administration, however, would certainly look away. Which brings us to the second part of the story.
The SPLC itself was embedded in banking and private-sector decision making. Suppose Acme Inc., a large business, wanted to offer its employees matching grants for charitable donations. Acme, however, doesn’t want newspaper headlines like “Acme donated to the KKK!” So Acme contracts with a firm that vets charitable donations, and that firm uses a blacklist created by the SPLC. This was routine. Amazon used the SPLC list for AmazonSmile; workplace-giving vendors used or advertised SPLC screening; all of this gave the SPLC and the broader Change the Terms coalition power to pressure social media, tech, and financial infrastructure firms over speech, blacklisting, and payments because they were already in the door and embedded in their systems.
When the SPLC was mostly identifying nearly universally despised organizations like the KKK, all of this was more or less accepted by everyone in the know, except perhaps for a few hard core civil-libertarians. But in the woke era the SPLC overplayed their hand. The SPLC and related organizations began to take on conservative, Trump affiliated organizations with widespread support. Through a massive PR and outreach campaign they pressured social media organizations, tech firms, and finance firms to follow along–and this was not just a media campaign, the Change the Terms coalition had hundreds of meetings with top level staff. The partisan nature made it legally questionable but when your allies are in power. these things can be overlooked. In perhaps the most remarkable part of the document, Patrick quotes a donor fundraising letter from Free Press and Free Press Action (not the SPLC but part of the larger coalition):
Our efforts have yielded numerous concrete changes. After years of pressure from Free Press and our allies, Twitter finally banned Trump[.]
…Facebook initially suspended Trump “indefinitely” and later changed his suspension to a two-year ban. We’re now pushing the company to permanently ban Trump and to close a loophole that’s allowing a Trump PAC to fundraise and organize on his behalf.
…FUND THE FIGHT. Your generosity makes our work possible. Please give what you can today to make sure we have the resources we need to keep fighting for equitable media policies that improve people’s lives.
As Patrick notes, the fund raising letter closed with the following deadpan disclaimer:
Free Press and Free Press Action are nonpartisan organizations….Free Press and Free Press Action do not support or oppose any candidate for public office.
Trump won. Many people will say the indictment is the result. That may well be true but that doesn’t make the indictment legally weak.
Read the whole thing for a lesson in how SPLC’s list and coalition work became embedded in private-sector decisioning systems and more generally for a behind the scenes look at how institutional power actually works.
Pro-Development Environmentalists
The Breakthrough Institute (BTI) found that “just 10 organizations initiated 35% of the total NEPA cases brought by NGOs.” The Sierra Club and its local chapters alone were responsible for more than 14% of these lawsuits. The dominance of a small number of groups is more pronounced in forest management and energy cases; only 10 groups filed 67% and 48% of these cases, respectively. In BTI’s “The Procedural Hangover: How NEPA Litigation Obstructs Critical Projects” follow-up, which expanded the analysis to district and circuit court NEPA cases, Alliance for the Wild Rockies and the Center for Biological Diversity were responsible for 24% of all litigation against public lands management decisions.
To paraphrase Alex Tabarrok, federal environmental agencies seem to exist to manage the obsessions of a tiny number of neurotic—and possibly malicious—environmental NGOs.
Grant Mulligan’s excellent post shows in detail how environmental groups use the courts to block projects—including environmental projects. But Mulligan finds that a disproportionate share of the lawsuits come from a handful of relatively small organizations. A textbook case of the tyranny of the complainers.
The lawsuits give environmentalists a bad name but the key point is that many environmental groups are not reflexively anti-development.
What are the largest environmental groups doing with their money if not suing to stop development? Two of the three biggest, the Wildlife Conservation Society and San Diego Zoo Wildlife Alliance, primarily operate zoos. Land trusts like TNC, The Conservation Fund, and Ducks Unlimited protect land directly. Many also work on research and policy to varying degrees. Contrary to the typical narrative, many operate pro-market, abundance-style projects.
TNC has several programs that align with the abundance agenda. TNC’s Power of Place research and policy work is aimed at facilitating the build-out of renewable energy and transmission infrastructure. The idea behind the research is to identify and speed the permitting and development of renewable energy projects that won’t interfere with important conservation areas. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) used the research as part of its Western Solar Plan, which aims to promote solar development on public land. TNC also wants permitting reform, and their mapping efforts are an example of what environmentalism that builds could look like — identify critical habitats that need protecting and guard them closely while unleashing building everywhere else.4
While the tyrannical minority has held up forest management projects, TNC has been an advocate and practitioner of forest thinning and prescribed burns to prevent catastrophic wildfires for more than 60 years. In California, they’re part of a coalition working to thin millions of acres of overgrown forests.
TNC isn’t alone. Audubon’s renewables siting work, Ducks Unlimited’s water infrastructure projects, and the Conservation Fund’s Working Lands programs all follow the same pattern of balancing environmental protections with economic imperatives. Plenty of green groups agree, as Larry Selzer, Conservation Fund’s President and CEO, says in Abundance by Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson, “we have to build, and build, and build.”
I’m not trying to defend all the choices of TNC or suggest that the big environmental NGOs don’t promote their share of bad policies. I had plenty of discussions with degrowthers when I worked at TNC that made me want to pull my hair out. I’ve also written about the need for environmentalism to be more positive-sum in frustration over zero-sum environmental positions. But on the whole, environmentalists have been made too convenient a villain by abundance advocates. Environmentalists aren’t as uniformly obstructionist, degrowth, and misanthropic as commonly believed.5
Understanding that only a vocal minority of environmentalists are anti-progress, procedural complainers is important because abundance advocates and environmentalists aren’t natural enemies—and assuming they are serves neither side.
Capitalism and Modernity
Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, one of the few economists in the world equally at home solving stochastic dynamic optimization problems as with sociological theory and history, has an excellent series of twitter posts on capitalism and modernity.
JFV: I have been reading (and re-reading) a lot of social theory.
What strikes me is that most critics of “capitalism” (whatever “capitalism” might mean, and regardless of the value of those critiques) are really critics of modernity, understood as the organization of society around technology, formal institutions, and rational criteria.
I teach the economic history of the Soviet Union and socialist China, and all the pathologies (pollution, reliance on fossil fuels, inequality, depersonalization, consumerism, alienation, you name it) that you can find in a poor neighborhood of 2026 Philadelphia appeared in the same way, or even more, in a factory in Leningrad in 1970 or on a collective farm in Jiangsu in 1978.
Critics seem to lack a vocabulary (or, if you prefer, a cognitive framework) for distinguishing “capitalism” from modernity. For example, people everywhere tend to link personal relationships to displays of consumption. There are likely deep evolutionary reasons for this. De Beers did not invent spending a lot of money on a useless engagement ring: it rode a pre-existing disposition into a particular form of consumption. Couples in Leipzig in 1982 were as interested in conspicuous consumption as those in Chicago in 2026. Talking about “Love and the Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism” misses the point completely.
Of course, you can try, as some of the more perceptive Trotskyists did, to argue that the Soviet Union or China were not truly socialist countries, but this is just a lazy application of the “no true Scotsman” fallacy, and, consequently, their complaints failed to gain much traction outside some departments of cultural studies.
But this is not just a matter of poor analytic skills, as bad as those are. More importantly, it means that 99% of the policy proposals activists put on the table to correct the problems of “capitalism” are doomed to fail because they do not understand where the root cause of the phenomena they complain about lies.
I see this at the university. Do you think the corporation you deal with is self-serving and incompetent? Wait until you need to deal with the Graduate School at a private Ivy League university. The incentive problems (asymmetric information, career concerns, lack of timely feedback, pressure toward conformity) that cause dysfunction in the former are even more pronounced in the latter because of the absence of a profit motive, the sharpest disciplinary mechanism.
At a very fundamental level, Marx got modernity wrong; Weber got it right. Time to spend much less time with Marx and much, much more time with Weber.
Here’s the second post:
Many readers yesterday asked for more concrete examples of what I have in mind regarding the distinctions between features inherent to modernity and those inherent to “capitalism.”
Imagine we have a functioning socialist commonwealth. For simplicity, I will call it the SC.
Imagine also that this SC aims to provide state-of-the-art medical care to its citizens. This is not about superfluous consumption. It is about the desire to provide good preventive care, adequate treatment, palliative care, and so on.
Soon, you realize that you need the scientific-technological complex that develops advanced mRNA vaccines and, even more importantly, the industrial capacity to produce tens of millions of doses at short notice when a new virus arrives or an old one mutates. These are sophisticated processes that involve coordinating millions of individuals with diverse knowledge, skills, and personalities.
But it does not stop there. You will need to produce thousands of MRIs, scanners, FLASH radiotherapy machines, and all the bewildering array of equipment you find in a top hospital.
And I insist: wanting to be treated with the latest oncological equipment if you get cancer is not frivolity. It is a deep human desire that a good society (any society, really) should attempt to provide.
How are you going to accomplish all this? An SC does not want to use private property, so it relies on some form of public property. But public ownership is not the main issue. The real issue is that the SC would need to organize large bureaucratic organizations. Without them, it cannot develop and deploy vaccines, MRIs, scanners, and the rest. The need to scale is the key mechanism at play, not who owns the property.
And, because of their scale, these large bureaucratic organizations will suffer the type of problems that critics of “capitalism” attribute to “capitalism.” The organization will be impersonal and alienating, and inefficient due to career concerns, asymmetric information, conformity effects, and internal politics.
Moreover, because resource constraints hold in every human endeavor, some claims for medical treatment will be denied. The SC will not have enough resources to satisfy every medical demand (and medical demands are, for all practical purposes, unlimited), every demand for education, every demand for the environment, and every demand for this or that worthwhile cause. Sorry, yes, scarcity will always be with us, with or without AI.
Patients whose requests for medical treatment are denied will be particularly annoyed because the SC is built on the idea that such events cannot happen. At least in a “capitalist” society there is someone to blame (the “capitalist”).
Those who deny the need for large bureaucratic organizations are living in a fantasy world. I am pretty sure the day they are told they have prostate cancer, they will run to their closest large bureaucratic organization for treatment.
Those who deny the problems of large bureaucratic organizations, and how deeply irresoluble those problems are, have not seen how not-for-profits work. I have never seen more acrimonious fights than within not-for-profit organizations, where some shared sense of the common good unites members. The fights are fierce precisely because profits play no role.
I have been reading about these issues for nearly 40 years, and I have seen plenty of proposals to address the problems of large bureaucratic organizations. A favorite among many is “participation” or “more democracy” within the organization. No, sorry, more “participation” or “more democracy” only makes things worse. Yugoslavia taught us that you cannot run a large bureaucratic organization based on democratic participation (well, you only need to know some basic economics; Arrow’s impossibility theorem, anyone?).
Large bureaucratic organizations are essential to modern life, and they are full of problems, with or without “capitalism.”
This is what Weber understood and what Marx, who had an incredibly naïve view of the future, never grasped. Weber saw that bureaucracy is not a feature of “capitalism” but the institutional form modern society uses to coordinate large-scale tasks under rational, impersonal rules. Hospitals, ministries, armies, universities, and, yes, corporations all converge on the same form because it works at scale. The iron cage is not capitalist. It is modernity.
The third excellent post on whether capitalism created modernity which criticizes Quine and the analytic-synthetic distinction (!) is here.
HUD Says Realtors Can Now Speak the Truth
HUD: The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) sent a “Dear Colleague” letter to real estate professionals clarifying they are not violating the Fair Housing Act when they share information with prospective homebuyers about neighborhood crime rates and school quality data.
“Buying a home is one on the most significant decisions a family will ever make,” said Secretary Scott Turner. “Americans should not be left in the dark about vital facts like neighborhood safety or school quality. HUD is making clear that real estate professionals can openly and lawfully provide this information in an equal and consistent manner to American families.”
The background is that The Fair Housing Act of 1968 prohibits discrimination in housing based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin (and via later amendments) familial status, and disability. Discrimination included “steering” buyers toward or away from neighborhoods based on protected characteristics. The Biden administration ramped this up with a directive and Executive Order that essentially said the Fair Housing Act must be interpreted not just to prohibit discrimination but to redress and undo past discrimination:
This is not only a mandate to refrain from discrimination but a mandate to take actions that undo historic patterns of segregation and other types of discrimination and that afford access to long-denied opportunities.
…the [HUD] Secretary shall take any necessary steps,…to implement the Fair Housing Act’s requirements that HUD administer its programs in a manner that affirmatively furthers fair housing and HUD’s overall duty to administer the Act (42 U.S.C. 3608(a)) including by preventing practices with an unjustified discriminatory effect.
The “discriminatory effect” language reinforced that so-called disparate impact, not just intentional discrimination counted as discriminatory—and it contributed to a legal and reputational environment in which platforms and agents had strong incentives to avoid anything that could be characterized as steering. As a result, by the end of the year, Realtor.com had removed its crime map from all search results, as did Trulia, Redfin announced it would not add crime data to its platform and since Zillow already didn’t include such data, by early 2022 all the major portals had dropped crime information. Similarly, the National Association of Realtors published material instructing agents not to directly answer client questions about neighborhood safety. One article in “The Safety Series” was titled “‘Is This a Safe Neighborhood?’ Don’t Answer That” and by “Safety Series” they meant safety for the realtor not the client.
So without explicitly making such information illegal, the government created a legal and reputational climate that chilled its provision. Portals removed crime maps and realtors became reluctant to answer ordinary buyer questions about neighborhood safety and school quality. That is a degradation of service, not a civil-rights victory. The pretext was that crime information might not be accurate but the real fear was that it would accurately suggest neighborhoods with high percentages of black residents had more crime. Withholding information about crime and schools, however, does not change the facts; it just shifts the informational advantage toward buyers who are wealthy, well-connected, or sophisticated enough to find the data themselves. Moreover, it should go without saying that black homebuyers also want information about neighborhood crime rates–don’t these buyers count? Suppressing truthful information is rarely a good way to improve outcomes. As with Ban the Box, blocking direct access to relevant information encourages worse proxy-based decision-making.
Trump’s HUD is correct: fair housing law should prohibit discrimination, not prevent realtors from telling the truth.