A City Not a Museum

Good Binyamin Appelbaum piece on the difficulties of building in NYC. The data will be familiar but I especially appreciate this vibe which we need more of:

I hope someday I’ll be walking with my children on the Lower East Side or the Upper West Side or Brooklyn Heights. We’ll pass one of the places where my ancestors lived, and the building will be gone. In its place will stand an apartment building, housing a new generation of New Yorkers.

See also my piece Against Historical Preservation where I wrote:

…a confident nation builds so that future people may look back and marvel at their ancestor’s ingenuity and aesthetic vision. A nation in decline looks to the past in a vain attempt to “preserve” what was once great. Preservation is what you do to dead butterflies.

Uber and Traffic Fatalities

Abstract: Previous studies of the effect of ridesharing on traffic fatalities have yielded inconsistent, often contradictory conclusions. In this paper we revisit this question using proprietary data from Uber measuring monthly rideshare activity at the Census tract level. Using these more detailed data, we find a consistent negative effect of ridesharing on traffic fatalities. Impacts concentrate during nights and weekends and are robust across a range of alternative specifications. Overall, our results imply that ridesharing has decreased U.S. traffic fatalities by 5.4% in areas where it operates. Based on conventional estimates of the value of statistical life the annual life-saving benefits are $6.8 billion. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that these benefits are of similar magnitude to producer surplus captured by Uber shareholders or consumer surplus captured by Uber riders.

The authors, Michael Anderson and Lucas Davis, note that alcohol involvement is reported in approximately 30% of fatal crashes, which is an amazingly high number unless you think a lot of people are driving drunk. I am reminded of a clever paper by Levitt and Porter who use the proportion of crashes involving two drunk drivers to estimate that it is not that lots of people are driving drunk but rather that “drivers with alcohol in their blood are seven times more likely to cause a fatal crash” and “legally drunk drivers pose a risk 13 times greater than sober drivers.” Thus, substituting a sober driver for a drunk driver is a very good thing and so it’s plausible to me that Uber significantly reduces traffic fatalities.

Consider this a public service announcement.

The Sullivan Signal: Harvard’s Failure to Educate and the Abandonment of Principle

The current Harvard disaster was clearly signaled by earlier events, most notably the 2019 firing of Dean Ronald Sullivan. Sullivan is a noted criminal defense attorney; he was the director of the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia and he is the Director of the Criminal Justice Institute at Harvard Law School, he advised President Obama on criminal justice issues, he represented the family of Michael Brown. He and his wife were the first black Faculty Deans in the history of the college.

Controversy erupted, however, when Sullivan joined Harvey Weinstein’s legal defense team. Student protests ensued. The students argued that they couldn’t “feel safe” if a legal representative of a person accused of abusing women was also serving in a role of student support and mentorship. This is, of course, ridiculous. Defending an individual accused of murder does not imply that a criminal defense attorney condones the act of murder.

Harvard should have educated their students. Harvard should have emphasized the crucial role of criminal defense in American law and history. They should have noted that a cornerstone of the rule of law is the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial, irrespective of public opinion.

Harvard should have pointed proudly to John Adams, a Harvard alum, who defied popular opinion to defend hated British soldiers charged with murdering Americans at the Boston Massacre. (If you wish to take measure of the quality of our times it’s worth noting that Adams won the case and later became president—roughly equivalent to an attorney for accused al-Qaeda terrorists becoming President today.)

Instead of educating its students, Harvard catered to ignorance, bias and hysteria by removing both Sullivan and his wife from their deanships. Harvard in effect endorsed the idea, as Robby Soave put it, that “serving as legal counsel for a person accused of sexual misconduct is itself a form of sexual misconduct, or at the very least contributes to sexual harassment on campus.” Thus Harvard tarred Sullivan and his wife, undermined the rule of law and elevated the rule of the mob. Claudine Gay, then Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, contributed to the ignorance, bias and hysteria. (It’s also notable, that Sullivan also criticized Harvard’s handling of the investigation of Roland Fryer as being “deeply flawed and deeply unfair.” This may have been Sullivan’s real sin, as the investigation of Fryer was under Dean Claudine Gay.)

Thus, we see in the Sullivan episode disregard for free speech, unprincipled governance in which different rules are applied to different actors in similar situations, and a bending to the will of the mob, all issues which have repeated themselves under the Gay regime. Sad to say, however, that these flaws were not so much ignored at the time as lauded.

Harvard followed the mob and when the mob turned and the season changed it had left itself no defense.

Addendum: See also Tyler, My thoughts on the Harvard mess.

Tim Harford answers more of your crazy economics questions

Tim Harford answers more of your crazy economics questions:

Olly asks: What if your tax bill was discounted by the distance you lived from the centre of London (eg if you lived in Kingsway, you paid the full amount; if you lived in Shetland, you would pay no tax)?

I suppose the aim here might be to encourage people to move away from London and into less populated areas. If this policy was a success, the likely outcome would be a damaged environment (with more driving and less travel by efficient methods such as trains, bicycles and elevators) and a much less dynamic economy (since cities are where most innovation takes place). I am reminded of the great urbanist Jane Jacobs’s sarcastic description of “a nice, even smear of mixed economic activity”, which seems so plausible from behind a bureaucrat’s desk, and which would be such a disaster in practice. Fortunately, this tax would make less difference than you think. In response to these tax incentives, some people would be minded to move further away from Kingsway and closer to Shetland. The mere temptation for this mass exodus to occur would prompt both rents and property prices to adjust, offsetting the tax. Owners of London property would suffer, while owners of property far from the charms of Kingsway would prosper. Not many people would actually move. Thank goodness.

See also Tim’s excellent answer on what would happen if we made inflation illegal?

Why Do Poor People Commit More Crime?

It’s well known that people with lower incomes commit more crime. Call this the cross-sectional result. But why? One set of explanations suggests that it’s precisely the lack of financial resources that causes crime. Crudely put, maybe poorer people commit crime to get money. Or, poorer people face greater strains–anger, frustration, resentment–which leads them to lash out or poorer people live in communities that are less integrated and well-policed or poorer people have access to worse medical care or education and so forth and that leads to more crime. These theories all imply that giving people money will reduce their crime rate.

A different set of theories suggests that the negative correlation between income and crime (more income, less crime) is not causal but is caused by a third variable correlated with both income and crime. For example, higher IQ or greater conscientiousness could increase income while also reducing crime. These theories imply that giving people money will not reduce their crime rate.

The two theories can be distinguished by an experiment that randomly allocates money. In a remarkable paper, Cesarini, Lindqvist, Ostling and Schroder report on the results of just such an experiment in Sweden.

Cesarini et al. look at Swedes who win the lottery and they compare their subsequent crime rates to similar non-winners. The basic result is that, if anything, there is a slight increase in crime from winning the lottery but more importantly the authors can statistically reject that the bulk of the cross-sectional result is causal. In other words, since randomly increasing a person’s income does not reduce their crime rate, the first set of theories are falsified.

A couple of notes. First, you might object that lottery players are not a random sample. A substantial part of Cesarini et al.’s lottery data, however, comes from prize linked savings accounts, savings accounts that pay big prizes in return for lower interest payments. Prize linked savings accounts are common in Sweden and about 50% of Swedes have a PLS account. Thus, lottery players in Sweden look quite representative of the population. Second, Cesarini et al. have data on some 280 thousand lottery winners and they have the universe of criminal convictions; that is any conviction of an individual aged 15 or higher from 1975-2017. Wow! Third, a few people might object that the correlation we observe is between convictions and income and perhaps convictions don’t reflect actual crime. I don’t think that is plausible for a variety of reasons but the authors also find no statistically significant evidence that wealth reduces the probability one is suspect in a crime investigation (god bless the Swedes for extreme data collection). Fourth, the analysis was preregistered and corrections are made for multiple hypothesis testing. I do worry somewhat that the lottery winnings, most of which are on the order of 20k or less are not large enough and I wish the authors had said more about their size relative to cross sectional differences. Overall, however, this looks to be a very credible paper.

In their most important result, shown below, Cesarini et al. convert lottery wins to equivalent permanent income shocks (using a 2% interest rate over 20 years) to causally estimate the effect of permanent income shocks on crime (solid squares below) and they compare with the cross-sectional results for lottery players in their sample (circle) or similar people in Sweden (triangle). The cross-sectional results are all negative and different from zero. The causal lottery results are mostly positive, but none reject zero. In other words, randomly increasing people’s income does not reduce their crime rate. Thus, the negative correlation between income and crime must be due to a third variable. As the authors summarize rather modestly:

Although our results should not be casually extrapolated to other countries or segments of the population, Sweden is not distinguished by particularly low crime rates relative to comparable countries, and the crime rate in our sample of lottery players is only slightly lower than in the Swedish population at large. Additionally, there is a strong, negative cross-sectional relationship between crime and income, both in our sample of Swedish lottery players and in our representative sample. Our results therefore challenge the view that the relationship between crime and economic status reflects a causal effect of financial resources on adult offending.

Top MR Posts of 2023

This was the year of AI; including the top post from Tyler, Existential risk, AI, and the inevitable turn in human history but also highly ranked were my posts AGI is Coming and AI Worship and Tyler’s GPT and my own career trajectory. Also our paper, How to Learn and Teach Economics with Large Language Models, Including GPT has now been downloaded more than ten thousand times.

2. Second most popular post was The Extreme Shortage of High IQ Workers

3. The University Presidents

4. The Harried Leisure Class.

5. *GOAT: Who is the Greatest Economist of all Time, and Why Does it Matter?*

6. Matt Yglesias on depression and political ideology which pairs well with another highly-ranked Tyler post, So what is the right-wing pathology then? and also Classical liberals are increasingly religious.

7. Can the SVB crisis be solved in the longer run?

8. Substitutes Are Everywhere: The Great German Gas Debate in Retrospect

9. My paean to Costco.

10. Is Bach the greatest achiever of all time?

11. The Real Secret of Blue Zones

12. SpaceX Versus the Department of Justice

13. What does it mean to understand how a scientific literature is put together?

14. In Praise of the Danish Mortgage System

15. Great News for Female Academics!

Finally, don’t forget Tyler’s posts Best non-fiction books of 2023, Favorite fiction books of 2023, and Favorite non-classical music.

What were your favorite posts/articles/books/music/movies of 2023?

More on Pharma Pricing

A reader in the industry writes with excellent comments on yesterday’s post on the Chris Rock hypothesis.

Long-time reader, first-time emailer–love the show ;).  I’ve been in and around the pharma industry for nearly 30 years, and I’ve spent time in gene therapy/gene editing where the one-time cure model dominates.  Some thoughts on chronic vs. curative dosing and why a curative therapy is likely worth less:

  1. There’s a potential mismatch between payment for a drug and the accrual of value that justifies its price point.  If I take a curative therapy for a disease like hemophilia (e.g., the new $2.9 M drug, Roctavian), the insurance company immediately incurs the cost of the drug, but the prime financial benefits (no more expensive chronic therapy, reduced expensive visits to the hospital) accrue over time.  Patients switch insurance companies as they switch jobs, so the “payout” that justifies the treatment price accrues to the subsequent insurers.  On chronic therapy, if a patient switches to another insurer, the new insurer picks up the payments so there’s no such disconnect.  Rationally, insurers should pay more for chronic therapy, even in present value terms.
  2. Durability of effect is unknown until it isn’t.  It’s difficult to charge for a drug as a cure until such time you know it’s a cure and have proven it as such.  How long do you have to follow treated patients to prove that?  Gene therapies are starting to show waning efficacy in some cases.  The FDA mandates that you cannot include something in the drug label that has not been proven.  Payors will point to a label and ask why they should pay for something that’s not on there.  This can be mitigated by programs where the drug company pays back a portion of the cost if it doesn’t work, but collecting on that seems like a huge hassle–how do you prove that it stopped working (I can hear Mike Munger–“the answer to your question is transaction costs…”)?
  3. Sticker shock and headline numbers.  A drug that costs $3 M or more is something the White House can use at a podium and get a reaction.  Never mind that it gets paid back pretty quickly by discontinuing a therapy that costs hundreds of thousands per year–life-saving drugs should not cost millions of dollars!  This puts downward pressure on one-time cures.

So, my perspective is that it is more difficult for a one-time treatment/cure to capture the value it creates vs. a chronic therapy.  So, why did Lilly shares tumble on the news?  More important than duration of therapy is market share vs. competitors.  A more permanent solution (with no rebound after discontinuation) would more than make up for lost revenue on the back end by taking share from the competition on the front end.  And THAT is why pharma is incentivized to pursue cures.  Making a better drug will beat the competition, and a cure is a better drug.  Big Pharma doesn’t necessarily pursue curative treatments directly because they don’t know how.  Technologies like CRISPR and mRNA have to come up via biotechs that are purpose-built to maximize the platforms’ value and to understand/navigate the underlying technology.  That said, Big Pharma has inked HUGE deals to gain access to these technologies (e.g., Pfizer/BioNTech), so they do seem to come around eventually.

These are all excellent points. On point 1, note that Medicaid creates similar incentives in that insurance firms want to farm long term costs onto Medicaid.

Point 3 suggests that we should be especially wary of price controls on cures. Sticker shock may drive us to price controls leaving us with treatments that look cheaper but are even more expensive in the long-run (and by present discounted value). Sovaldi is a case in point. Its initial $84,000 price generated huge opposition even though it typically cured hepatitis C infections and avoided many later liver cancers and saved money overall. Indeed, as I pointed out earlier, Sovaldi so reduced the number of liver transplants that more people with other diseases ended up with life-saving transplants.

This is also what I meant by starting in the right place. If you start in the right place you have some hope of getting to real causes and possible solutions.

A Weighty Puzzle-Answers

Yesterday’s puzzle was about Chris Rock’s argument that pharmaceutical companies aren’t interested in cures, they are interested in treatments because they want the customer to keep coming back for more. The argument is common. So common that both ChatGPT and Claude completely botch this question. Claude, for example, says:

…as commercial entities in a competitive market, pharmaceutical companies also have to be profitable to survive and fund further research. In that sense, financially, an ongoing need to buy a treatment provides more direct revenue than a one-time cure.

Sigh. Claude is not nearly as funny as Chris Rock but without Rock’s delivery and worldly cynicism is the error now obvious?

Consider two lightbulbs, one lasts for 2 years the other lasts for 1 year. Which lightbulb is more profitable to sell? Any sensible analysis must begin with the following simple point: A lightbulb that lasts for 2 years is worth about twice as much as a lightbulb that lasts one year. Thus, assuming for the moment that costs of production are negligible, there is no secret profit to be had from selling two 1-year lightbulbs compared to selling one 2-year lightbulb. The firm that sells 1-year lightbulbs hasn’t hit on a secret profit-sauce because its customers must come back for more. If it did it could sell really profitable 1-month bulbs!

The same thing is true for pharmaceuticals. A treatment that lasts for 10 years is worth about ten times as much as an annual treatment. Or, to put it the other way, a treatment that lasts for 10 years is worth about the same as 10 annual treatments producing the same result. (n.b. yes, discounting, but discounting by both consumers and firms means that nothing fundamental changes.)

The simple argument starts us in the right place. We can then add arguments, on both sides, depending on context. In the case of Eli Lilly and Zepbound I think the major argument to add is that investors were likely pricing in a small chance that Zepbound had longer-lasting effects than Wegovy and when this was shown not to be true the price of the stock dropped. Thus, investors were pricing in some chance that Zepbound could have had greater market power–Sure made this argument in the comments yesterday. 

Another argument: Consumers might be rationally or irrationally myopic. A rational myopia, for example, might be brought about if consumers don’t believe claims of longer durability. Quite possible. Econ question number 2–other than waiting ten years how could a firm convince buyers that its product was more durable than that of its competitors? (Hint: 🦚. Or you can find the answer is in Modern Principles.). Econ question number 3–if consumers were irrationally myopic would firms sell the treatment or, sell the cure with a different pricing strategy?

The cost of producing durability also matters–a lot. Sometimes cures are cheaper (one pill is cheaper than 10) but sometimes cures are more expensive. If longer durability is more expensive, there will be a tradeoff–these lightbulbs are more expensive but I will have to replace them less often–and the market process will work things out, perhaps differently for different consumers.

There are also subtle issues with price discrimination (see here but also here for some ideas) and Coase’s durable good monopoly argument (which I think is completely wrong in this context) as well as other issues but there is little point discussing the subtleties if we don’t get the big issues right.

The big issue to get right is that renting isn’t inherently more profitable than selling.

Addendum: When I pointed Claude to the above arguments, Claude responded “You make an excellent observation…there are good reasons why a one-time cure could potentially warrant an exceptionally high price point, well above an annual treatment cost. The pricing strategies pharmaceutical firms employ would analyze all these aspects in depth. Thank you for pushing me to recognize my flawed assumptions. I appreciate the opportunity to clarify my understanding here. Let me know if you have any other insightful points!”

I wonder if the commentators will be so wise and gracious?

A Weighty Economics Puzzle

Yesterday a new study was released showing that patients on Eli Lilly’s Zepbound (tirzepatide) lost weight but regained a meaningful percentage after being switched to placebo. Eli Lilly stock “tumbled” on the news, e.g. here and here or see below. In other words, Eli Lilly stock fell when investors learned that to keep the weight off patients would have to continue to take Zepbound for life. Hmmm…that certainly violates what the man in the street thinks about pharmaceutical companies and profits. Chris Rock, for example, says the money isn’t in the cure, the money’s in the comeback. If so, shouldn’t this have been great news for Eli Lilly?

So why did Eli Lilly stock fall? Could it be that the Chris Rock and the man in the street are wrong? I will leave this as an exercise for the reader.

No Child Left Behind: Accelerate Malaria Vaccine Distribution!

My post What is an Emergency? The Case for Rapid Malaria Vaccination, galvanized the great team at 1DaySooner. Here is Zacharia Kafuko writing at Foreign Policy:

Right now, enough material to make 20 million doses of a lifesaving malaria vaccine is sitting on a shelf in India, expected to go unused until mid-2024. Extrapolating from estimates by researchers at Imperial College London, these doses—enough for 5 million children—could save more than 31,000 lives, at a cost of a little more than $3,000 per life. But current plans by the World Health Organization to distribute the vaccine are unclear and have been criticized as lacking urgency.

…Vaccine deployment and licensure is an incredibly complex scientific, legal, and logistical process involving numerous parties across international borders. Roughly speaking, after the WHO recommends vaccines (such as R21), it must also undertake a prequalification process and receive recommendations from its Strategic Advisory Group of Experts before UNICEF is allowed to purchase vaccines. Then Gavi—a public-private global health alliance—can facilitate delivery by national governments, which must propose their anticipated demand to Gavi and make plans to distribute the vaccines.

Prequalification can take as long as 270 days after approval. However, the COVID-19 vaccines were rolled out within weeks of WHO’s approval, using the separate EUL process rather than the more standard prequalification process that R21 is now undergoing.

For COVID-19 vaccines, EUL was available because the pandemic was undeniably an emergency. Given the staggering scale of deaths of children in sub-Saharan Africa every year, shouldn’t we also be treating malaria vaccine deployment as an emergency?

The R21 malaria vaccine does not legally qualify for EUL because malaria already has a preventive and curative toolkit available. My concern is that this normalizes the deaths of hundreds of thousands of children each year in Africa.

We can move more quickly and save more lives, if we have the will.

Number Go Up

Number Go Up, Zeke Faux’s account of the wildest excesses of the crypto boom (2020-2022), is highly entertaining from page one:

“I am not going to lie,” Sam Bankman-Fried told me.
This was a lie.

Faux describes the scene on a yacht off the Bahamas owned or rented by Brock Pierce, the child actor who starred in the Mighty Ducks and who co-founded Tether, a stablecoin that Faux is on the hunt to uncover its origins and backing:

A crypto venture capital fund manager–wearing a mock souvenir T-shirt from convicted pedophile Jeffrey Epstein’s private island–joked about a scam that another yacht guest was running. A crypto public relations man offered what he called “Colombian marching powder” to a young woman. A small group of people dancing told me that they were philosophy students who’d come to the Bahamas to intern for FTX’s Bankman-Fried.

On Razzlekhan, the rapper, entrepreneur, and former World Bank economist-intern, who with her husband managed to pull off the largest heist in world history, some US $4.5 billion! (well, technically they stole  ~$69 million worth of bitcoin in 2016 but they couldn’t sell it very easily and by the time they were caught in 2022 it was worth $4.5 billion):

As a performer, Razzlekhan was both hypersexual and aggressively unappealing. She alternated jokes about diarrhea and sex with boasts about her edgy business practices. Her signature move, if you can call it that, was to throw up her hand with her fingers split into a “V” stick out her tongue, and say “Razzle Dazzle!” Then she would make a loud phlegmy cough.

Ironically, the US government now holds the recovered coin, making it one of the largest holders of bitcoin in the world.

On the collapse of Three Arrows

Court documents showed that the fund’s holdings included a portfolio of NFTs. Among them were a Bored Ape with a vaguely racist “sushi chef headband” and a pixelated image of a cartoon penis, called a CryptoDickButt, which, incredibly, was worth about $1,000 at the time.

It’s not all fun and games. Faux also travels to the Philippines to witness the bust of Axie Infinity game miners and to Cambodia to investigate what amounts to slave labor camps run by Chinese gangsters.

One doesn’t get a favorable impression of crypto from Number Go Up but in fact one doesn’t learn much about crypto at all. Indeed, Faux’s book isn’t really about crypto it’s about the rise and collapse of a bubble and the consequent madness of crowds. It’s an old and familiar story. Not that different from the tulip mania (see the picture below), the dot-com boom, or the house flippers and mortgage boom of 2006-2008 (see the Big Short for similar stories of excess). The madness of crowds is fascinating, fun, and good for a morality tale but it doesn’t really tell us much about the underling asset. Tulips never amounted to much, the internet did great, house prices are back up. Crypto? Jury is still out. Thus, I was entertained by Number Go Up, but didn’t learn much.

Still, I agree with Faux on this, don’t put your money in Tether.

image of artwork listed in title parameter on this page

Wikipedia: Allegory of the Tulip Mania. The goddess of flowers is riding along with three drinking and money weighing men and two women on a car. Weavers from Haarlem have thrown away their equipment and are following the car. The destiny of the car is shown in the background: it will disappear in the sea.

Space Tourism Revisited, Again

One of the advantages of writing a blog for 20 years is that you get a feel for what is new and for what seems new but is actually old. Space tourism falls into the latter category. I wrote my first piece on space tourism in 2004 when Burt Rutan was predicting 100,000 space tourists annually in 10 years. In contrast, I argued that rockets were far too unsafe a technology on which to build a tourism industry:

The problem is safety. Simply put, rockets remain among the least safe means of transportation ever invented. Since 1980 the United States has launched some 440 orbital launch rockets (not including the Space Shuttle). Nearly five percent of those rockets have experienced total failure, either blowing up or wandering so far from course as to be useless. The space shuttle has a slightly better record of safety — it was destroyed in two of 113 flights. There are lots of millionaires willing to spend one or two million dollars for a flight into space but how many will risk a two to five percent chance of death?

Ten years later there weren’t 100,000 space tourists but Richard Branson was predicting a more modest (!) 10,000 space tourists by 2022. Well, 2022 came and went and space tourism has yet to get off the ground. Overall, rockets still look very unsafe. Is anyone surprised? Blue Origin, for example has had 1 total failure in 22 flights, 4.5%. SpaceX has by far the best record with–generously not including test flights–1 total failure in 289 Falcon flights, .34%. That’s great and especially impressive given that Falcon flies much higher than other rockets! But wingsuit flying, no one’s ideas of a safe sport, is still safer than a SpaceX flight! (.2%) and commercial airlines are running at many orders of magnitude safer at .00034%.

Thus, after 20 years, I don’t see much reason to update. Like climbing Mount Everest or wingsuit flying, we might see a few flights a year catering to the rich and foolhardy but we have a long way to get before we get fat guys with cameras in space.

Gun Buybacks and the Elasticity of Supply

Can gun buybacks work? Some simple economics suggests, no! The first of our videos on the elasticity of supply, Why Housing is Unaffordable, illustrated inelastic supply. Today’s video on gun buybacks illustrates elastic supply. Our gun buyback video hits the sweet spot for MRU videossolid economics leading to surprising conclusions illustrated in an entertaining and accurate way.

Of course, both of these videos draw upon and pair great with our textbook, Modern Principles of Economics.