Two Roads to Fast Clinical Trials, and the US Takes Neither

The HHS (FDA, NIH, ARPA-H and related agencies) is moving to speed clinical trials in what they are calling Operation TrialBlazer (kudos on the pun). The motivator, of course, is China:

China has made biotechnology a strategic national priority, systematically expanding its clinical research infrastructure with government backing, streamlined regulatory pathways, and sustained investment. In 2021, China’s global share of Phase 1 trials surpassed the United States’ share for the first time, a milestone that would have seemed unlikely just a decade earlier. And in 2024, China surpassed the United States in the total number of clinical trials registered, with over 7,100 registered, representing 39% of global trials…. For certain cutting edge modalities, including cell and gene therapy, radioligand therapy, and stem cell therapy, China uses investigator-initiated trials to provide additional flexibility, though with some tradeoffs around oversight and quality control. This means that drugs can move into human testing if a researcher has an interest and funding. In the U.S., comparable trials might wait years to start.

I am also pleased to see that they mention Australia, another advanced democracy, as a leader in clinical trial regulation:

Australia’s Clinical Trial Notification System allows trials to begin in fewer than 70 days after a final protocol is submitted, with regulatory approval granted in as little as 21 to 28 days and sites activated within 6 to 12 weeks.

Keep those comparisons in mind. Operation TrialBlazer proposes some good reforms such as CMC clarification. CMC is Chemistry, Manufacturing, and Controls–and it deals with the basics of manufacturing a drug. The FDA, however, is very risk averse and companies know that so they have often gone overboard in CMC: for example, proving stability of a formula at 6+ months when the trial is to last only a few weeks or documenting their full commercial manufacturing process before they even know if the drug works and knowing full-well that the process will be changed many times before a drug actually gets to market. In short, a lot of cost for very little benefit. The FDA is now clarifying that this kind of thing is not necessary. Good, that is low-hanging fruit. There are other good ideas as well.

But note what they are not proposing. Despite using China and Australia as exemplars they are not going down either path. Where China is fastest is in cell therapy, gene therapy, radioligand, and stem cell work and in these areas, China lets trials proceed on an investigator-initiated basis: as the TrialBlazer document puts it, a drug can move into humans “if a researcher has an interest and funding.” China then combines this open (or lax) front end (for these products) with an all-of-government industrial policy to accelerate winners.

The US is declining to go down that path. Ok, not my call, but I get it. But they are also declining to follow Australia. In Australia there is also no government prospective regulatory evaluation of most early-phase clinical trials. Under the Clinical Trial Notification (CTN) scheme, the sponsor submits their protocol package to a Human Research Ethics Committee (HRECs)–Australia’s IRBs–and once the ethics committee approves, the sponsor notifies the regulator, the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA), and pays a fee. The TGA does not read and clear the package before the trial starts. The roughly 21-to-28-day “approval” and sub-70-day start figures in the document are fast precisely because the regulatory step is not an evaluation. The government regulator stays out of the front end for most clinical trials, although in direct contrast with China it does step in for the highest risk biologicals. China has decided, high-risk, high-reward.

Australia does certify the certifiers, the HRECs. Europe uses a similar system for medical device approval. It’s a system proposed by former medical officer at the FDA Henry Miller and one I have long supported for the US. China is more laissez-faire.

The US architecture in contrast rests on the “gold standard” FDA reviews and the “FDA will retain full regulatory authority and decision-making.” In short, all of the TrialBlazer reforms are about making the gatekeeper faster, cheaper to prepare for, and less uncertain. None of it is about getting rid of the gatekeeper.

Addendum: Full disclosure, I did some consulting with ARPA-H on related work. See also my previous post on the a radical deregulatory approach, Montana’s SB535 and a Potential Biotech Renaissance in America

California’s Gay Certification Program

Chris Rufo and Austen Hufford have a good piece on California’s Gay Certification program. Yes, you read that right.

In 1986, Governor George Deukmejian signed Assembly Bill 3678, which required certain CPUC-regulated utilities to submit annual “plans” for buying goods and services from woman- and minority-owned companies. Two years later, CPUC created its “Supplier Diversity Program,” which would enforce the law and set contracting “goals” for large utilities.

Under a series of Democratic governors, the program has expanded to include gay-owned businesses. In September 2014, then-Governor Jerry Brown signed legislation requiring CPUC to recognize “LGBT-owned businesses” as eligible for supplier-diversity benefits. Five years later, Governor Gavin Newsom expanded the program further, “encouraging” other companies involved in the energy sector to award contracts to gay-owned firms.

…This scheme raises an obvious question: How does a business qualify as officially gay? Paperwork. Supplier Clearinghouse, a group that certifies firms for the CPUC program, features a list of qualifications linked on its website. Applicants can secure certification by providing a letter from an “LGBT organization” attesting to their sexual preferences; proof that a newspaper identified them as “LGBT”; or three letters from “personal contacts” written “on company letterhead” attesting to their homosexual orientation. Corporate officials who “falsely represent” their business as gay face up to a year in county jail.

So there you have it. Under the logic of ever increasing privileges for pretty much anyone except white males we now certify whether someone is gay or not.

This is an economics blog, however, so let’s turn from the culture war and ask, following Luke Froeb at Managerial Economics, what these set-asides cost the taxpayer:

A set-aside moves price through two separate channels, and they push the same direction.

  • First, it shrinks the number of bidders, so the second-lowest cost is higher (or the second-highest value is lower).
  • Second, the set-aside bidders themselves may be higher-cost or lower-value than the bidders they replace.

Both channels move price against the government….The lesson applies to California. Fewer, weaker bidders mean a worse deal for the government.

Brannman and Froeb estimate that set asides for small businesses reduce revenues in timber auctions by 15%, a substantial amount.

Addendum: It is worth noting that optimal auction theory tells us that it can sometimes be in the seller’s interest to handicap a strong bidder in order to make them increase their bids. Thus, in theory, an “affirmative action” program (not a set-aside) that deemed a bid from a minority firm as say 5% higher (so a minority bid at 100 can beat a non-minority bid at 104) could raise revenues. Note, however, that this optimal auction story only works when the minority firm loses the bid! In practice, even these sorts of schemes are money losers for the taxpayer.

Cuba

Some of the most impactful measures announced by Cuba’s Prime Minister Manuel Marrero Thursday include allowing:
  • Private and foreign capital to purchase and sell fuel
  • The creation of private corporate banking
  • Private business owners to own more than one company and hire more than 100 workers
  • Private businesses in agriculture and tourism
  • Tourism property sales, evaluated case-by-case, for Cubans resident in the country and abroad
  • Foreign investors to hire workers directly
  • Foreign investment in Old Havana and other tourist spots, in state telecom ETECSA data centers, mobile networks, and other digital infrastructure
  • The extension of surface rights up to 99 years and leases up to 50 years for foreign investments
  • Real estate development in tourism
  • Farmland lease rights for an “indefinite period”
  • Wholesale and retail trade without limits by foreign entities
  • The sale of state assets and state companies’ shares to the private sector and foreign companies.
Taken together, the reforms proposed significantly expand the private sector six decades after Cuba’s communist leaders forbade all private business—even frita stands— and adopted a centrally planned economy model that ended up ruining the country and dragging Cubans into a severe humanitarian crisis. Currently, the government is in such dire straits that it is even seeking to transfer the management of the country’s zoos and aquariums to private hands, another announced change.

Colorado’s Funeral Mistake

Today about a quarter of the US workforce are required to have a license to work in their chosen profession, up from just 5 percent in 1950. Almost always the trend has been to add occupational licensing over time, but in 1983 Colorado did something unusual: it delicensed funeral service workers such as funeral directors. Brandon Pizzola and I analyzed what happened in our 2017 paper, Occupational licensing causes a wage premium: Evidence from a natural experiment in Colorado’s funeral services industry.

What we found was that delicensing reduced wages, reduced prices, and caused a shift towards cremation rather than the more expensive mortuary services preferred by funeral directors. Here’s a key figure.

Average weekly wages in the funeral services industry in Colorado and the US (excluding Colorado), pre and post Colorado’s delicensing in 1983.

But that is not the end of the story. In 2023 a series of gruesome abuses came to light involving the sale of body parts, rotting bodies, and worse. Newspapers repeatedly noted that Colorado was the only state not to license funeral service workers. As a result, Colorado is relicensing funeral service workers as of 2027.

The problem is that there is no evidence that abuses were worse in Colorado. It’s easy to find similar abuses—including sexual abuse of corpses—in states with heavy licensing. Pizzola and I didn’t examine the rate of necrophilia among funeral workers in our paper (silly us), but we did cite the following:

A recent US government review of occupational licensing concluded that “the empirical research does not find large improvements in quality or health and safety from more stringent licensing” (CEA, 2015). Similarly, Colorado revisited their decision in a 1990 sunrise review that considered reinstating occupational licensing. The Colorado Department of Regulatory Agencies found that since the 1983 occupational delicensing: (1) “there had been incidents of malpractice within the profession but no widespread pattern of abuse,” (2) “[a]llegations of significant threats to the public health, safety and welfare perpetrated by the death care industry in Colorado regarding the improper disposal of human or infectious wastes had not been supported by verifiable evidence,” and (3) “claims that the public in Colorado had suffered or might suffer significant detriment due to a lack of trained mortuary science practitioners caused by the abolition of the Board were unsupported” (Colorado Department of Regulatory Agencies, 2007).

Moreover, the licensing requirements—mandating various hours of training and so forth—have very little to do with the types of abuses that generated public support for relicensing. How many hours of “don’t have sex with corpses” training is required? And the funeral director in the worst Colorado case was in fact sentenced to 40 years in jail. Isn’t that incentive enough?

People want what cannot be guaranteed: good behavior in all circumstances. And they will reach for a licensing regime if it promises that, even when such promises are empty.

The Shingles Vaccine Reduces Dementia

In 2023 in Can the Shingles Vaccine Prevent Dementia? I wrote:

A new paper provides good evidence that the shingles vaccine can prevent dementia, which strongly suggests that some forms of dementia are caused by the varicella zoster virus (VZV), the virus that on initial infection causes chickenpox.

We now have three more studies–from America, Australia and Canada–that find similar results using large numbers and credible research designs. Thus, I think we can up this to the Shingles vaccine reduces dementia.

Eric Topol summarizes the new evidence and writes:

If you are 50+ and have not gotten Shingrix vaccinated, you may want to consider that. You get protection vs Shingles (which can be dreadful), slowing of your biological aging (by methylation and RNA metrics), and ~20% reduction of dementia, predominantly related to Alzheimer’s disease. All of this benefit is magnified in women compared with men, but 3 of the studies showed some reduction of dementia in men. As a tradeoff, men appear to derive more cardiovascular benefit, but that evidence is not as compelling as protection from dementia from natural experiments.

Montana’s SB535 and a Potential Biotech Renaissance in America

In 2024, China’s NMPA approved 83 new drugs, the FDA approved 50. China’s share of new commercial clinical trials jumped from 8% globally in 2013 to 30% in 2024, just behind the US at 35%. Last year, China-based Jiangsu Hengrui Pharmaceuticals overtook AstraZeneca as the top clinical trial sponsor in the world.

What’s remarkable is how China is winning: deregulation and capitalism. It’s faster and easier to set up a clinical trial in China than in the United States. China is even experimenting with the peer approval model I’ve long advocated. The Medical Tourism Pilot Zone on Hainan island lets medical institutions import and use any pharmaceutical or device approved in the EU, US, or Japan — no separate Chinese approval needed. China is using our own regulatory judgments to get treatments to its patients faster than we do.

The core problem is that our clinical trial and drug approval system is slow and expensive. Getting a new drug to market in the US takes billions of dollars and a decade or more of clinical trials — and all of that before a company earns a single dollar. The consequence is drug lag and drug loss and also learning loss. Innovation is a dynamic process. You must build to build better.

It’s not over for the United States, however. Montana’s SB535, signed into law in May 2025, is the most important regulatory innovation in drug approval in my lifetime. The law authorizes investigational drugs and therapies that have cleared Phase I trials to be prescribed and sold — bypassing the traditional FDA approval pathway. It makes Montana the first state to license experimental treatment centers, “one stop shops” for otherwise hard-to-access care.

This is a very big deal.

SB535 makes Montana the only state in the nation where firms can move more quickly from a successful Phase I trial into limited commercialization. This positions Montana as a highly attractive location for biopharma, biotherapeutics, and other life sciences companies that want to accelerate time-to-market while continuing the federal FDA approval process.

Montana’s regulatory system creates the possibility of a self-funding clinical pipeline: companies using early commercial revenues to finance the path to full FDA approval. You get treatments to patients faster, and you keep companies alive long enough to prove their treatments work. Experimental treatments are not for everyone–these treatments are cash based–no Medicaid or Medicare and probably no private insurance either–but after conventional treatments have failed experimental treatments should be available for some patients, both for their benefit and for ours.

Montana is not alone. Florida now allows non-FDA approved stem cell therapies:

A new law in Florida, CS/CS/SB 1768, allows physicians to market and administer stem cell therapies that have not been approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for orthopedic conditions, wound care and pain management.

These experiments in regulatory federalism are vital and not just for patients but also for geopolitical competition. I am thrilled China is pursuing medical innovation (I predicted and applauded this in my TED talk) but I also don’t want to see America falling behind.

The Trump administration has been supportive. I would like to see HHS and the FDA working with companies operating under state right-to-try frameworks — sharing data, clarifying federal-state boundaries favorably, and treating these experiments as the biotech competitiveness infrastructure they are.

The FDA approval process has long been treated as the only legitimate path to market. The cost of that orthodoxy is measured in companies that never reached viability, innovations that never got off the ground, and patients who died when they didn’t have to. I have spent thirty years trying to get people to see the invisible graveyard. That’s hard. Most remain blind. But China’s bursting pipeline of new drugs is visible — could this be a Sputnik moment for biotech?

An American biotech renaissance — driven by AI, federalism, and regulatory innovation — is possible. The path forward is to double down on what makes America great: the laboratories of democracy are working, and in Montana and Florida, so are the labs.

The Cultural War is a Civil War

Kevin Bryan riffs on on my post The Nationalization of American Science. He is rightfully incensed:

AT is right this is a red tape-filled science policy of “losers”. If you think “cut funds from DEI-driven professors in the small departments no one cares about” is more important than “make sure the world’s strongest fundamental science continues”, you’re an idiot.

And yes, this is also the policy of “right-wing JD-brain” folks. They haven’t worked in a lab. They don’t know how we got AI, and recent cancer breakthroughs, and on and on. It’s all culture war, all the time – just the right-wing equivalent of the worst left-wing habits.

One last thing: I *hate* the term “administration priorities” or “President’s priorities”. Totally Unamerican! The President *executes* the law created by Congress, who represent the people, and who see turnover every two years. Period. “Oh, but Democrats do this too!” Grow up!

Owning the libs may feel good today but please look just one move ahead in the game tree. When AOC controls the executive branch, she will inherit every tool Trump normalized. Look a few moves further and see the damage to American institutions.

The culture war is a civil war. If we don’t end it, American science will be collateral damage.

Here Comes the Sun(screen)

I have been banging on about FDA delay in approving new sunscreens since 2013. Well it has finally happened. Twenty six years after being approved by the European Union and thirteen years after then-FDA Commissioner Margaret A. Hamburg told lawmakers that sorting out the sunscreen issue was “one of the highest priorities” the FDA has approved a new sunscreeen ingredient.

The US has been slow because it regulates sunscreens under the the more expensive, time consuming and rigorous drug standard rather than the less expensive cosmetic standard. Does this mean that our sunscreens are safer? No.

In fact, American sunscreens may be less safe.

Sunscreens protect by blocking ultraviolet rays from penetrating the skin. Ultraviolet B (UVB) rays, with their shorter wavelength, primarily affect the outer skin layer and are the main cause of sunburn. In contrast, ultraviolet A (UVA) rays have a longer wavelength, penetrate more deeply into the skin and contribute to wrinkling, aging and the development of melanoma, the deadliest form of skin cancer. In many ways, UVA rays are more dangerous than UVB rays because they are more insidious. UVB rays hit when the sun is bright, and because they burn they come with a natural warning. UVA rays, though, can pass through clouds and cause skin cancer without generating obvious skin damage.

The problem is that American sunscreens work better against UVB rays than against the more dangerous UVA rays. That is, they’re better at preventing sunburn than skin cancer. In fact, many U.S. sunscreens would fail European standards for UVA protection. Precisely because European sunscreens can draw on more ingredients, they can protect better against UVA rays. Thus, instead of being safer, U.S. sunscreens may be riskier.

European sunscreens are also more pleasant to apply, and because they work better with makeup they are probably used more often as part of a skin care regimen, which may reduce the prevalence of skin cancer. Once again, the United States’ slower and seemingly more risk-averse approach actually increases risk.

The lesson, for those who are listening, is general.

The Nationalization of American Science

OMB, joined by some forty grantmaking agencies—NSF, HHS, DOE, NASA, DOD among them—has proposed a sweeping rewrite of the rules governing all federal grants, the Regulation for Federal Financial Assistance.

American science has long been state funded but not state directed. Since Vannevar Bush, money has flowed through many agencies to independent universities, allocated largely by peer review. The system has flaws—conformity, gerontocracy, waste—but it had one great virtue, the system was decentralized and not under state control. This rule proposes to bring science funding under top-down, state control.

Program goals must now be “aligned with administration policies and priorities” (§ 200.202). Merit review is subordinated to politics: “senior appointees must conduct these reviews,” ensuring “that discretionary awards advance the President’s policy priorities,” while “peer review remains advisory and does not replace agency discretion” (§ 200.205). And every grant becomes terminable at will, whenever it “no longer effectuates program goals, Federal agency priorities, or the national interest *as they exist at the time of the termination*” (§ 200.340, emphasis added). Universities must even ensure their subrecipients don’t “significantly damage the reputation of… the Federal Government” (§ 200.332)—a loyalty clause for scientists.

All this is sold as cutting “burdensome conditions,” a goal I would support, but sadly that is bullshit. The proposed rules add more paperwork and many more layers of bureaucratic review. Payment requests must include written justifications. Every disbursement gets screened through Treasury’s “Do Not Pay” system. Every recipient must run E-Verify. Applicants must disclose any employee who worked at the awarding agency within two years. And on top of the existing review machinery sits a new pre-issuance review committee of “senior appointees” second-guessing the experts. Fixed amount awards—pay for outputs, not inputs—an innovative reward mechanism are *eliminated*, so every award now gets routine cost monitoring and financial reporting.

Political review of every award, peer review demoted, agency review promoted, termination whenever “priorities” change. Chilling. It’s a nightmare of petty low-trust review of the kind that is already drowning science. I must deal with this kind of nonsense all the time. More is not better.

The machinery is centralized too. OMB’s guidance becomes binding regulation, effective government-wide with no agency rulemaking. One dial in the White House now turns every grant program in the country.

The new rules will be sold as getting rid of DEI but that is an excuse to bring in the commissars. The new rules don’t depoliticize science they create even more politicization with the sign flipped, and the drafters admit it:

In the previous administration, executive agencies frequently chose to subsidize and expressly prioritize projects based on their ideological alignment with the categories of activities discussed in the proposed version of § 200.300. See, for example, E.O. 13985, sec. 1, 86 FR 7009, 7009 (Jan. 25, 2021) (“It is therefore the policy of [the Biden] Administration that the Federal Government should pursue a comprehensive approach to advancing equity . . . .”). In this administration, executive agencies will continue to use their discretionary authorities in a manner consistent with current Executive Branch policy. If executive agencies were entitled to subsidize those types of activities during the previous administration, there is no constitutional basis to prevent the government from reaching a different policy determination regarding which activities to fund during this administration.

Read that twice. Tip your hat to the new constitution, take a bow for the new revolution. Will science prosper when it is whipped by political turnover? Research runs on decade timescales; administrations run on four-year ones.

A decentralized funding system is inefficient the way markets and federalism are inefficient—we give up some economies of scale and get experimentation, error correction, and robustness in return. A system in which every award advances “the President’s policy priorities” is efficient the way ministries of science are efficient. We know how that experiment ends.

America is moving in the wrong direction. We should double down on what made America great. Instead we are adopting all of the loser policies of authoritarian nations.

The Labor Share Fell. So What?

The share of Gross Domestic Income accruing to labor has been declining in recent decades while the share accruing to capital has been rising. In the graph below, I show labor compensation as a share of GDI (left axis). Labor share has indeed been trending down–some of this could be an artifact of the data, e.g. an increase in proprietor’s income (labor) mislabeled as capital income, more pass throughs and so forth—but for the purposes of this post I will accept that the labor share has declined. What does this mean?

The natural response is to think that because the share going to labor has fallen and the share going to capital has risen that there has been a transfer of income from labor to capital. That is possible but it is not the only interpretation and it does not follow mechanically from the share data.

I have also plotted total compensation to labor (in real terms) in the graph above and far from shrinking it is higher than ever and growing. Moreover the right axis is logged so you can also see that outside of recessions the growth rate of labor compensation looks quite steady (similar slope over time). (Labor compensation per member of the labor force is noisier but looks similar).

The recessions in 2008 and 2020 are worth noting because these are periods when the labor share was high and locally at a maximum! The reason, of course, is that GDI was shrinking in these periods more than labor compensation. In other words, capital takes a bigger hit than labor in a recession. This is a good reminder that a high share of GDI is not what workers most care about–a high absolute level of GDI is more important for the bottom line.

In short, the data are consistent—not proof of, but consistent with—a story in which capital has become more productive, raising output. More productive capital also raises the demand for labor, so while more of the new output goes to capital in the first instance, the pie is growing and labor’s absolute compensation has grown with it. Yes, if the shares had stayed constant and output had grown just as much, labor compensation would have been higher still. And if my grandmother had wheels, she would have been a bicycle.

Hayekian Literary Criticism

In economics, Marx is relegated to the history of thought as his ideas were an economic dead end and a political disaster. Yet Marx-influenced literary criticism is a dominant mode of analysis in nearly every English department in the country. It’s not that the English professors are all Marxists, it’s that even the non-Marxists reach for Marxian concepts–class, ideology, alienation, material conditions, commodification–when analyzing texts. These concepts may be useful for analyzing a Victorian novel of the landed classes but they have become a default economics for all of literature. That default is odd. Class analysis predates Marx and society can be divided into more than one set of classes; material conditions do not supersede all artistic agency; and capitalism contains figures—entrepreneurs, speculators, intermediaries, innovators, discoverers—who are great subjects for art yet fit poorly into the Marxist moral geometry. Not surprisingly, Marxism handles capitalism’s protagonists badly.

Is Marxian economics the only economic lens one can apply to literature? What would a Hayekian literary criticism look like? The place to start is the great Paul Cantor’s pioneering essay on Thomas Mann’s “Disorder and Early Sorrow,” a slight-seeming story set in Weimar Germany during the hyperinflation. Cantor shows that when one reads the novella through Hayek and Mises rather than Marx, the story opens up.

Start with inflationary psychology and its ramifications. Inflation shortens time horizons. When money loses value by the hour, saving is foolish and the rational move is to spend as fast as you earn—Mises’s “flight into real goods.” Prudence, discipline, and respect for the past become maladaptive. Speed, improvisation, risk-taking, and a certain youthful irresponsibility become survival traits.

Thus, Cantor/Mann tell us that inflation changes psychology and inverts the authority of age over youth. The old are set in their ways and often living on fixed incomes that inflation has wiped out; they cannot adapt. The young have known nothing but instability and go with the inflationary flow effortlessly. So the conservative virtues that once commanded respect are in decline while youthful recklessness starts to look like competence. Thus, Mann’s world has “gone mad in the worship of youth”: the children call their father by his first name, the teenagers are “the big folk,” and Professor Cornelius literally crouches down to his children’s height as the hierarchy collapses around him.

Money is a society’s primary measure of value, so Cantor/Mann argue that when you shake a people’s faith in their money, you shake their other faiths. Thus Cantor ties the conviction-less skepticism of Cornelius—and the broader Weimar nihilism and disequilibrium that helped feed the rise of Nazism—to monetary disequilibrium.

In short, inflation converts economic disorder into moral, social, psychological, and finally ontological disorder. Prices become unstable, then values, then identities, then reality. The modern feeling of absurdity and inauthenticity that critics reflexively pin on capitalism, Cantor/Mann argue is due to government-created inflation and paper money.

A Marxist could read the same story and find the inevitable contradictions of capitalism. Cantor reads it and finds the consequences of the state debasing the currency. Both are economic readings of literature. Only one of them has the economics correct.

Cantor is the place to begin but a Hayekian literary criticism could go much further. Atavism, the impossibility of social justice, products of human action but not of human design, spontaneous order, the fatal conceit, subjectivism, the sensory order–there is a lot of Hayekian ideas that literary interpretation could draw upon.

A Hayekian criticism would ask questions like how do characters acquire and process knowledge? Which institutions transmit information successfully, and which corrupt it? How do money, law, language, and custom function as social coordination mechanisms? Why do some attempts at rational redesign end in disaster? Read War and Peace as a critique of the great-man theory of history, Brazil and The Lives of Others as the fatal conceit degenerating into ignorance, fear, and absurdity. The Wire as a Hayekian epic of spontaneous order that demonstrates the illusion of social justice. Cantor’s essay on Mann shows the method, the broader project remains underdeveloped.

Hat tip: Hollis Robbins for discussion.

Addendum: Don’t forget my earlier WSJ piece, Capitalism: Hollywood’s Miscast Villain which gives an economic, one might even say Marxist, explanation for why film directors in particular disdain capitalists.

Let Me Disinherit My Children, S’il vous plaît

Following John Arnold, I posted earlier about how European laws often require wealthy people to give most of their wealth to their children. Here is an example:

Pierre-Edouard Sterin, founder of Smartbox and worth about €1.4 billion, told French senators he wants to disinherit his five children and donate everything to charity. French law, under the Napoleonic Code, mandates that with five children, three-quarters of his estate must go to them, leaving only one quarter freely disposable. Sterin argued for complete freedom to decide the fate of one’s assets, saying it is ‘a real freedom to start with nothing in life’.

The US Exports Intelligence

Most Americans work in the service sector so it’s not surprising that most export-related jobs are in the service sector (The U.S. exports about $2.2 trillion of goods and $1.2 trillion of services, but services are more labor intensive than manufacturing so they support more export jobs per dollar.)

Richard Baldwin writes:

In 2022, US service exports supported 8.9 million American jobs.

US manufacturing exports supported 2.2 million.

That’s four-to-one in favour of services. Yet in the national narrative, ‘export jobs’ almost always means things done in steel mills and factories.

…When a household in Germany pays for Netflix, that is an American export. When a Brazilian retailer buys Microsoft cloud capacity, that is an American export. When JPMorgan structures a financial deal in London, or an American consulting firm advises a company in Singapore, those are American exports too.

None of these is shipped in a container. No customs official records them as they clear the customshouse. Yet they are exports since they earn foreign income for America just as surely as the ‘Boeings, Beans and Beef’ that President Trump sold on his recent China trip.

Need I remind you that when OpenAI sells intelligence to people abroad, that is a US export? N.B. this is the future.

World trade in goods expanded roughly five-fold between 1990 and 2020. Trade in digitally enabled services expanded more than eleven-fold over the same period. These are the modern services.

The trade debate is fixated on manufacturing—where America is doing fine—while largely ignoring services, where America is crushing. Increasingly, our most valuable exports travel not on container ships but at the speed of light over fiber.